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Abstract 
 
This thesis analyses collective punishment in the context of human rights law from a 
New Legal Realist perspective. Collective punishment is a concept deriving from the law 
of armed conflict. It describes the punishment of a group for an act allegedly committed 
by some of its members and is prohibited in times of armed conflict by treaty and 
customary international law. 
Recently, the imposition of collective punishment has been witnessed in situations 
outside armed conflict. This means that the applicable legal framework is human rights 
law and not the law of armed conflict. Human rights instruments do not explicitly 
address collective punishment. Consequently, there is a genuine gap in the protection of 
groups affected by collective punishment in situations outside of or short of armed 
conflict. 
Supported by two case studies on collective punishment in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories and in Chechnya, the thesis examines potential options to close this gap in 
human rights law in a way contributing to the empowerment of affected groups. This 
analysis will focus on the European Convention on Human Rights due to its relevance to 
the situation in Chechnya. 
The protection and empowerment of groups necessitates a reconsideration of group 
rights under the human rights framework and challenges the traditionally individual 
focus of human rights law. By questioning whether human rights instruments can 
encompass such rights and adapt to the changing circumstances, the thesis contributes 
to the broader academic debate on rights held by collectivities in general and on 
collective human rights in particular. 
The thesis is therefore centred on the following research question: What is the 
relationship between the legal regulation and state policies on collective punishment 
under the law of armed conflict and human rights law and what effects does this 
relationship have on the protection and empowerment of affected groups? 
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1 Introduction 
 
Shown on the previous page are two images of destroyed houses. The house shown in 
the first picture is in the village of Deir Abu Mash’al in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories (OPT) and belonged to the Saleh family. The house shown in the second 
picture is in the village of Yandi in Chechnya and belonged to the Baidulaev family. The 
house of the Saleh family was destroyed due to the involvement of a family member in 
an attack on the border police. The house of the Baidulaev family was destroyed due to 
the alleged insurgent ties of a family member after insurgents attacked the Chechen 
capital Grozny.1 
There are similarities between these two cases. In both, a group or collectivity is 
punished for the act or the alleged act of an individual member of the group. Yet this 
group is not confined to the family, but encompasses the community to which they 
belong, the Palestinians on one hand, and the Chechens on the other on a broader level. 
These groups are targeted by the Israeli and Russian authorities. They punish these 
groups collectively for acts committed or allegedly committed by one or some of their 
members for which the other group members do not bear individual responsibility. 
Under the law of armed conflict, this is known as collective punishment. 
Collective punishment is prohibited in times of armed conflict under treaty as well as 
customary international law. It is not explicitly prohibited in situations outside armed 
conflict. The house of the Saleh family in the OPT was destroyed in 2017 during the 
ongoing Israeli occupation. The occupation means that the law of armed conflict is 
applicable in this context and for this reason the demolition of the house violated the 
prohibition of collective punishment. 
The house of the Baidulaev family in Chechnya was destroyed in 2014, in the aftermath 
of the second non-international armed conflict between Chechnya and Russia. Large-
scale fighting ceased over a decade ago, yet sporadic confrontations between the military 
                                                          
1 B’Tselem (2017). Innocents punished: Israeli military demolishes three homes and seals 
another, Ramallah District, online available at: http://www.btselem.org/photoblog/innocents-
punished-israeli-military-demolishes-three-homes-and-seals-another-ramallah-dist (accessed 
on 15/04/18); Human Rights Watch (2014). Dispatches: Burning Down the House in Chechnya, 
online available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/12/10/dispatches-burning-down-
house-chechnya (accessed on 15/04/18); Memorial Human Rights Centre (2014). Чечня: 
силовики сожгли дома родственников боевиков, online available at: 
https://memohrc.org/ru/news/chechnya-siloviki-sozhgli-doma-rodstvennikov-boevikov 
(accessed on 15/04/18). 
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and insurgents have continued. It is unclear, whether Chechnya is still in the state of a 
non-international armed conflict or not. Given this uncertainty, it is not clear whether 
the destruction of the Baidulaev home was prohibited under the law of armed conflict. If 
one reaches the conclusion that the non-international armed conflict is over, the 
prohibition of collective punishment does not apply to the destruction of their home. 
A law that makes family members bear financial responsibility for damages arising from 
terrorist attacks involving their relatives exacerbates the situation. This law was passed 
by the Russian State Duma in 2013 and is applicable across Russia. It does not 
specifically address the current status in Chechnya. Crucially, that means the applicable 
international legal framework would be human rights law and not the law of armed 
conflict. Furthermore, the Putin-loyal head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov is 
pursuing a relentless policy of collective responsibility which has led to house burnings, 
ill-treatment, public humiliation and collective expulsion of people associated with the 
insurgent movement. 
Punishing a group for acts committed or allegedly committed by some of its members in 
this way is prohibited under the law of armed conflict, but not under human rights law. 
Current international human rights instruments do not explicitly address collective 
punishment. Consequently, the house destructions in the OPT are in breach of the 
prohibition of collective punishment, whereas house destructions in Chechnya are not. 
The drastic split in the legal assessment between those two very similar cases highlights 
a genuine gap in human rights law. 
The comparison of these two cases prompts the following question: What is the 
relationship between the legal regulation and state policies on collective punishment 
under the law of armed conflict and human rights law and what effects does this 
relationship have on the protection and empowerment of affected groups? In other 
words, the imposition of collective punishment is not limited to situations of armed 
conflict but has expanded to situations governed by human rights law. If there is no 
prohibition of collective punishment in human rights law, there is no express 
international rule that a national law introducing collective punishment, such as the 
Russian law on compensation for terrorist attacks, would violate. Furthermore, without 
a prohibition of collective punishment under human rights law, affected groups have no 
substantive rule they can base their claims against the perpetrators on. 
 
 
  13 
 
The thesis is divided into six substantive chapters grouped in three parts. The first part 
is devoted to the legal regulation of collective punishment under the law of armed 
conflict and a case study on the OPT. The second part addresses the legal regulation, or 
rather non-regulation of collective punishment under human rights law, and a case study 
on Chechnya. The third part brings these findings together by assessing the theoretical 
debate on group rights as human rights and the viability of prohibiting collective 
punishment under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The focus on the 
ECHR stems from the cases already brought before this Court by Chechens regarding 
other aspects resulting from the two non-international armed conflicts fought against 
Russia.  
This substantive analysis is preceded by a short methodology chapter outlining the 
theoretical approach and methods applied throughout the thesis; namely New Legal 
Realism and case studies. As the images above have shown, the analysis undertaken in 
this thesis is not limited to a theoretical assessment. It goes beyond this by emphasising 
the ways in which the law of armed conflict and human rights law obtain their meaning, 
are practised, and change over time. Adopting the New Legal Realist approach, the 
chapters are rooted in a positivist analysis of the law as it stands, but this analysis is 
taken only as the starting point for further enquiry. The emphasis of the New Legal 
Realist approach on empiricism and pragmatism facilitates this enquiry and allows for 
practice-oriented suggestions based on real life experience highlighted by the two case 
studies. Mindful of the tension between reason and power, the New Legal Realist 
approach also accommodates the struggle of groups such as the Palestinians or the 
Chechens and supports their proactive role in their pursuit of justice. 
Following this methodology chapter is the substantive part on collective punishment 
and the law of armed conflict (part 3 of the thesis). It is divided into two chapters dealing 
with the legal regulation of collective punishment under the law of armed conflict 
(chapter 3.1) and the case study on the Occupied Palestinian Territories (chapter 3.2). 
The first chapter (chapter 3.1) examines the legal regulation of collective punishment 
under the law of armed conflict based on international treaties as well as customary 
international law. Although collective punishment is prohibited under the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and their 1977 Additional Protocols, the drafting history of these 
documents reveals a certain unwillingness or reluctance of state parties to concede 
rights to actors other than states. For this reason, the customary international law status 
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of the prohibition of collective punishment is crucial, as it proves this opposition to be a 
minority opinion. 
Apart from prohibiting collective punishment, the law of armed conflict does not say 
much about the nature and scope of the act itself. This leads to a problem of defining 
collective punishment. The Special Court for Sierra Leone has dealt with the war crime 
of collective punishment as enshrined in its statute and defined its elements as 
‘indiscriminate punishment imposed collectively on persons for omissions or acts some 
or none of them may or may not have been responsible’ with ‘the specific intent of the 
perpetrator to punish collectively’. 2   The first substantive chapter concludes with a 
working definition of the act of collective punishment as the punishment of a group as 
such for an act committed by one or some of its members for which they do not bear 
individual responsibility.  
The group referred to is understood in a broad sense; meaning an “identifiable group” 
such as the family of an alleged terrorist whose house is demolished and is not related 
to any additional criteria such as a broader discriminatory intent. However, in practice 
the groups targeted by collective punishment might also exhibit those broader 
characteristics as the family of a Palestinian whose house is demolished also belongs to 
this broader group, the Palestinians. The same goes for alleged members of the Chechen 
insurgent movement. Yet the group envisaged in the definition of collective punishment 
does not include a discriminatory element based for example on ethnicity, religion or 
sex.  
However, in practice the groups targeted by collective punishment are likely to be 
subject to discriminatory treatment in addition to collective punishment. This again 
leads back to the broader struggle for justice of these groups (the Palestinians and the 
Chechens) and the ways in which a prohibition of collective punishment can contribute 
to those efforts. Although the cases on punitive house demolitions deal with families of 
persons who have (allegedly) committed certain acts and not with the Palestinians or 
the Chechens per se, these cases shine a light on the broader situation in the OPT and in 
Chechnya. To sum up, the term group unless otherwise stated should be understood in 
a broad and neutral manner but these groups do not exist in a vacuum and it is very 
likely, as the two case studies show, that those groups also carry other characteristics 
based on a shared identity. Yet these overlaps do not influence the criteria for assessing 
                                                          
2 Fofana and Kondewa (SCSL-04-14-A) Judgment, Appeals Chamber (28 May 2008) para.224. 
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whether collective punishment was imposed on a group. What it does change however, 
is the broader picture: In both case studies, the groups affected by collective punishment 
also belong to a bigger community, namely the Palestinians and the Chechens. And the 
imposition of collective punishment on families belonging to those groups exposes their 
treatment by the respective state in general. By documenting violations of the 
prohibition of collective punishment, these groups draw attention to the broader 
implications and therefore contribute to the struggle for justice of the Palestinians and 
the Chechens. This interconnection explains the overlap of the groups affected by 
collective punishment in each instance (for example a family) and simultaneously the 
effect this act has on the larger community they belong to (for example the Palestinians). 
The second chapter in the first substantive part of the thesis (chapter 3.2) examines the 
legal regulation of collective punishment under the law of armed conflict and its use in 
practice, with a case study looking at punitive house demolitions in the OPT. After 
confirming the status of the OPT as still occupied, and therefore demonstrating the 
applicability of the law of armed conflict, the case study focuses on one specific form of 
house demolitions practised by Israeli forces, punitive house demolitions. These are 
based on outdated Defence (Emergency) Regulations adopted by the British in 1945 
during their administration of Palestine. Israel still relies on these provisions even 
though they have been repealed. Broadly speaking, the regulation provides for the 
destruction of homes connected to offences against Israeli forces, including buildings 
from which firearms have been launched or buildings in which perpetrators have been 
living. 
Local non-governmental organisations have filed numerous cases on behalf of 
Palestinians against such demolitions and one of them, the HaMoked case brought by the 
non-governmental organisation of the same name, is of particular interest as it attacked 
this Defence (Emergency) Regulation itself. The chapter argues that the prohibition of 
collective punishment under the law of armed conflict supports the Palestinians in their 
struggle for justice as the substantive prohibition can act as a tool contributing to their 
empowerment in a broader sense Relying on the prohibition, they filed cases against 
Israeli forces destroying their homes documenting Israel’s long history of non-
compliance with its international obligations in this regard. Furthermore, the 
international prohibition of collective punishment denies legality to any local law like 
the Defence (Emergency) Regulations and prevents the attempted legalisation of 
collective punishment. Seen from this angle, the prohibition of collective punishment can 
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support the empowerment of the Palestinians by enabling them to call out Israel’s 
violations of the law of armed conflict. Although the prohibition of collective punishment 
under the law of armed conflict alone will not bring about empowerment of the 
Palestinians and Israel’s state practice has still to change to compliance, it is an 
important piece in their broader struggle for justice and in particular regarding punitive 
house demolitions. 
In sum, the first part of the thesis provides the foundational understanding of the origin 
and meaning of collective punishment under the law of armed conflict and sheds light 
on the ways in which a prohibition of collective punishment can contribute to the 
empowerment of the Palestinians. 
The second substantive part of the thesis (part 4) situates collective punishment in 
human rights law. The first chapter examines the legal regulation of collective 
punishment under human rights law (chapter 4.1) while the second chapter is devoted 
to a case study on collective punishment in Chechnya (chapter 4.2). 
Highlighting the fluid transition between the law of armed conflict and human rights law, 
the first chapter of this part (chapter 4.1) starts with a short analysis of states of 
emergency. Most international human rights instruments such as the ECHR include 
derogation mechanisms which will apply during a state of emergency. This means that 
states can temporarily suspend some of their human rights obligations. Given the direct 
reference to collective punishment in the General Comment to the state of emergency 
provision in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), this treaty 
will be used to outline the concept of states of emergency. The General Comment states 
that derogations in times of a state of emergency cannot be used to justify collective 
punishment.3 A short look at how the Turkish authorities have used declarations of a 
state of emergency to pursue a policy of village destruction in the Kurdish dominated 
south of the country, sheds light on the position of states of emergency between armed 
conflict and peace, resulting gaps in protection and their dangers. 
In order to close this gap, the existing human rights framework – in particular the ECHR, 
but also the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) and the ICCPR – are 
examined for any rights or principles related to the substance of the act of collective 
punishment. Related rights are mainly those that are violated in the course of collective 
                                                          
3 CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 General Comment No.29: States of Emergency (Article 4) (31 
August 2001) para.11. 
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punishment. Taking the example of house destruction, violations of the right to private 
and family life and the right to property are involved. Depending on the treatment of the 
inhabitants, the right to life as well as the prohibition of torture are engaged too. All these 
violations have to be seen in conjunction with the prohibition of discrimination. 
Furthermore, the principle of individual responsibility is a core value undermined by 
collective punishment. In addition to these related rights and principles, the group rights 
in the ACHPR and minority rights are briefly mentioned to foreshadow the theoretical 
debate on group rights as human rights in the last part of the thesis. At this point 
however, they are only examined for their substantive connection to collective 
punishment. The European Framework Convention on the Protection of National 
Minorities (FCNM) and the European Social Charter (ESC) which support a prohibition 
of collective punishment under the ECHR on a more theoretical and procedural level, are 
analysed in the last part of the thesis as well.   
Collective punishment is the imposition of sanctions on a group as such for acts 
committed or allegedly committed by one or some of its members for which the other 
members do not bear individual responsibility. These criteria are not present in any 
existing article of the human rights instruments reviewed in this thesis. Although several 
rights are violated in the course of collective punishment, the specific wrong done by 
collective punishment as such remains unaddressed. Neither the prohibition of torture, 
the right to property or the prohibition of discrimination require the punishment of a 
group for an act committed by one of its members. These related rights violations only 
confront the side effects or the symptoms of collective punishment and not the cause. 
Drawing on this assessment, human rights law and the ECHR in particular are currently 
unable to encompass collective punishment. The human rights framework does not 
address the particular wrong done by this act. Nevertheless, the last section of this 
chapter emphasises that although collective punishment as such is not prohibited under 
current human rights treaties, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has already 
referred to this term in over forty cases, some of them even in the Chechen context. This 
means that the Court is familiar with the term and its use and more importantly, it has 
not rejected the reference being made to collective punishment either. Admittedly, this 
might be a small step, but seeing collective punishment feature in the Court’s own cases 
might contribute to a sense of urgency in dealing with collective punishment outside the 
context of armed conflict. 
 
 
  18 
 
This sense of urgency is reinforced by the case study on Chechnya following in the 
second chapter (chapter 4.2) of this part. Owing to the complex turn of events on the 
ground, the current situation in Chechnya is analysed first. In the early 1990s the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union precipitated the first non-international armed conflict in 
Chechnya between the Chechen independence movement and Russian forces. After a 
short interim period, the second non-international armed conflict was triggered by 
Jihadist fighters from Chechnya attacking villages in neighbouring Dagestan, and 
allegations that Chechen insurgents were responsible for apartment block bombings in 
several Russian cities – a claim that has never been proved. The second non-
international armed conflict was portrayed as a counter-terrorist operation by Russian 
authorities and officially declared to be over in 2009. However, the continuation of 
fighting between security and insurgent forces has cast doubts on an end to this conflict. 
For this reason, the first section of this chapter addresses the question on how to 
determine the end of an armed conflict. The range of different approaches to this 
question indicates that this area of the law of armed conflict is still not settled and 
therefore, the question as to the current status in Chechnya remains uncertain. This 
uncertainty can lead to gaps in protection and one of them is related to collective 
punishment. 
The chapter continues with an assessment of practised forms of collective punishment 
in Chechnya. During the early years of the second non-international armed conflict, 
zachistkas were a common form of collective punishment. Zachistkas are sweeping 
operations. A whole village is sealed off for several days while the military is carrying 
out searches for insurgents which often result in extrajudicial killings, torture, looting 
and property destruction. Some of these sweeping operations were already subject of 
cases brought before the ECtHR. Whereas the use of zachistkas declined after 2004, 
house burnings became more common with Ramzan Kadyrov becoming president of 
Chechnya in 2007. The destruction of homes of persons with alleged insurgent ties is 
facilitated by Kadyrov’s open support for family responsibility. In addition, he started a 
campaign of public humiliation against alleged insurgents or sympathisers, sometimes 
resulting in the collective expulsion of entire families and called for family ties to be 
included in identity documents. As numerous examples from colonial as well as post-
conflict contexts show, the use of collective punishment was often associated with the 
aftermath of hostilities and therefore the imposition of collective punishment in 
Chechnya does not represent a departure from previous practice. Yet what is different 
in this case study, is that in addition to collective punishment imposed on Chechens by 
 
 
  19 
 
the local government, Russian-wide legislation has introduced collective punishment. 
This law is not in any way connected to the existence or prior existence of an armed 
conflict or state of emergency as in the case of colonies or post-conflict situations, this 
law is designed for peacetime. 
In 2013 the Russian State Duma adopted a law making it the responsibility of family 
members to pay for damages arising from terrorist attacks involving their relatives. Not 
only does this law go against the principle of individual responsibility, but it punishes a 
group for an act allegedly committed by one or some of its members. Being a law 
applicable across Russia with no mention of the current situation in Chechnya, it has to 
be assessed against the background of human rights law. As shown, human rights law 
does not prohibit collective punishment as such. This case study highlights the effects of 
such a gap in protection in practice, leaving the Chechens without legal tools to actively 
engage in their struggle and confront the perpetrators of collective punishment. Finally, 
at the end of the chapter, ECtHR cases referring to or dealing with collective punishment 
in the Chechen context are reviewed to strengthen the claim of the Court’s familiarity 
with the concept. 
In conclusion, this second substantive part of the thesis looks at collective punishment 
in the context of human rights law. As collective punishment as such is currently not 
prohibited under human rights instruments such as the ECHR, there is a genuine gap in 
protection. The effects of this gap are illustrated by the case study on Chechnya. To give 
the Chechens a chance to actively engage in their struggle for justice, they need tools to 
hold the authorities to account. A prohibition of collective punishment could be such a 
tool.  
The question of group rights as human rights and the viability of a prohibition of 
collective punishment under the ECHR form the last substantive part of the thesis (part 
5). The first chapter of this part (chapter 5.1) deals with the theoretical underpinnings 
of group rights and of group rights as human rights in particular. The second chapter of 
this part (chapter 5.2) looks at practice-oriented solutions to address collective 
punishment under the ECHR. 
Before delving into the group rights debate, the first chapter of this part (chapter 5.1) 
starts with some clarifications on the relationship between the law of armed conflict and 
human rights law as understood in this thesis. Much has been written about the 
applicability of human rights law in times of armed conflict and in particular about the 
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lex specialis approach. The principle of lex specialis means that any specific law applicable 
to a situation overrides a more general law which would be applicable as well. In the 
current context, it has been suggested that the law of armed conflict might be the specific 
law and human rights law the general law. However, as will be shown in this chapter, 
these discussions miss the broader point. The question most relevant to the relationship 
between the law of armed conflict and human rights law in this thesis concerns their 
underlying structure. Whereas human rights law traditionally confers rights onto 
individuals, rights and obligations under the law of armed conflict are conditional on 
membership in a certain group such as prisoners of war or civilians. This group 
dimension facilitates the prohibition of collective punishment under the law of armed 
conflict and simultaneously shows why such a prohibition might prove difficult to 
“translate” into human rights law. This translation does not mean that the prohibition of 
collective punishment will simply be taken from the law of armed conflict and pasted 
into human rights law; it means that the act of collective punishment needs to be 
considered in the context of human rights law and with the means available to human 
rights law. For this reason, the theoretical foundation of group rights in human rights 
law is examined for ways on how to encompass this group dimension. 
Two representatives of the group rights debate, Will Kymlicka and Dwight Newman, are 
singled out and their approaches compared. Whereas Kymlicka argues for ‘group-
differentiated rights’ held by individual members of a group, Newman proposes 
‘collective rights’ held by groups as such. 4  With some additions, the thesis favours 
Newman’s argument for groups as right-bearing entities that derive those rights from 
collective interests, interests that cannot be reduced to their individual members. This 
stands in contrast to Kymlicka’s idea of liberal group-differentiated rights, which 
ultimately concerns the individual rights of group members. The understanding of group 
rights as human rights is further strengthened by the ontological interdependence 
between an individual and her group or community. Furthermore, the claim for group 
rights as human rights is reinforced by the empowerment aspect. Groups such as the 
Chechens need tools to hold the perpetrators of collective punishment to account. This 
active assertion of their rights could be realised by providing means such as a prohibition 
of collective punishment referring to groups as rightholders. 
                                                          
4 Kymlicka, W. (1996). Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Oxford, 
Clarendon Press; Newman, D. (2011). Community and Collective Rights: A Theoretical 
Framework for Rights Held by Groups. Oxford, Hart. 
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The second chapter of the last substantive part of the thesis (chapter 5.2) assesses the 
viability of such a prohibition in practice. Owing to the focus on the ECHR, two other 
Council of Europe (CoE) human rights instruments, the FCNM and the ESC, are examined 
in more detail. Although neither of them addresses collective punishment in its 
substantive context, they highlight the acceptance of CoE member states of human rights 
with a group dimension. The ESC is of special interest in this regard, as under the 
collective complaints mechanism devised in the Charter, its rights can only be claimed 
by collectivities such as non-governmental organisations or trade unions. Together with 
a short look at the ACHPR and the way in which non-governmental organisations can file 
cases on behalf of communities asserting their group rights, this illustrates the viability 
of adjudicating group rights in practice. The ECHR’s own application procedure allows 
non-governmental organisations to submit applications, and in consequence the ECHR 
could encompass group rights from a procedural perspective. 
Whether the ECHR can also encompass a prohibition of collective punishment on a 
substantive level is a different question. Support can be found in the references made to 
the FCNM and ESC, as it indicates that the ECtHR is taking the broader social context of 
cases into account. However, broader interpretations of the existing ECHR framework 
are not sufficient to deal with collective punishment. Even a collective right to non-
discrimination would not encompass the specific wrong done by collective punishment, 
the punishment of a group for an act committed by one of its members. For this reason, 
a new rule is proposed. Acknowledging that any new addition to the ECHR requires 
political support, the broad acceptance of the prohibition of collective punishment under 
the law of armed conflict could be useful in illustrating a pre-existing common 
understanding. 
In trying to devise a prohibition of collective punishment under the ECHR, the chapter 
will address earlier attempts to include rights of national minorities and social and 
economic rights into the ECHR by adopting additional protocols. All these attempts were 
turned down. However, a prohibition of collective punishment does not face the same 
impediments. An additional protocol on rights of national minorities was turned down 
due to its limitation to a specific group. A prohibition of collective punishment would not 
be limited to national minorities but open to any identifiable group without requiring an 
additional discriminatory element – with the groups described in the prohibition of non-
discrimination only acting as possible examples of groups that might be affected by 
collective punishment in practice to illustrate the scope of the new rule. An additional 
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protocol on social and economic rights was turned down due to the “second generation” 
character of these rights, whereas the ECHR is centred on civil and political and therefore 
“first generation” rights. However, the prohibition of collective punishment does fit in 
the civil and political remit of the ECHR, addressing a fundamental right that is well-
recognised (in the law of armed conflict at least) and sufficiently precise in its wording. 
In sum, the establishment of a prohibition of collective punishment under the ECHR 
appears feasible. 
As this thesis will show, a prohibition of collective punishment under human rights law 
is possible, and it could support groups such as Chechen families and the Chechens more 
broadly in actively pursuing their struggle for justice. As rightholders they would be able 
to assert their freedom from collective punishment and to hold the perpetrators to 
account. 
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2 Methodology 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Before starting with the substantive part of the thesis, it is necessary to outline the 
theoretical approach and the methods used. The thesis examines the relationship 
between the law of armed conflict and human rights law with regards to collective 
punishment as well as case studies dealing with the imposition of collective punishment 
under both frameworks. The findings on state policies on collective punishment 
gathered from the case studies and on the regulation of collective punishment in 
international law describe how law is practised and how it changes over time and adjusts 
to other circumstances. These are core questions asked by the New Legal Realist 
approach. 
New Legal Realism as referred to in this thesis describes a contemporary theoretical 
movement.1 According to Shaffer, it is distinguished by questions of how law obtains its 
meaning, how it is practised, and how it changes. The particular appeal of this approach 
lies in its orientation to practice, here understood as a way of problem-solving based on 
knowledge gathered from real life experience. These features are refined by several key 
attributes, namely empiricism, philosophical pragmatism, transnationalism and reason-
giving in tension with power.2 
New Legal Realism has taken over the concepts of empiricism and pragmatism from the 
legal realists of the 1920s such as Karl Llewellyn. New Legal Realism differs from the ‘old’ 
or American Legal Realism developed at the beginning of the twentieth century in the 
United States by its emphasis on empirical work in international law, as opposed to 
national judges’ decisions and the changed factual context.  
New Legal Realism reinforces the underlying reasons for embarking on the present 
thesis. The impetus was a gap in human rights law, caused by changed circumstances on 
the ground. This called for an examination of the interplay between law and its social 
                                                          
1 The inaugural New Legal Realism conference was held in 2004 at the University of Wisconsin 
Law School: Garth, B. & Mertz, E. (2016). Introduction: New Legal Realism at Ten Years and 
Beyond, UC Irvine Law Review, 6, pp.121-136, p.121. 
2 Shaffer, G. (2015). The new legal realist approach to international law, Leiden Journal of 
International Law, 28 (2), pp.189-210, pp.196; Macaulay, S. (2005). The New versus the Old 
Legal Realism: 'Things Ain't What They Used to Be', Wisconsin Law Review, 2005 (2), pp.365-
403, pp.385ff. 
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context, and between law and its application in practice. This will not only lead to a 
better understanding of the current situation, but also to potential solutions or ways to 
approach the situation on the ground through law informed by experience. 
Similarly, the case study method used to investigate two different state policies on 
collective punishment provides an understanding of collective punishment’s social 
contexts and its interaction with the legal regulation thereof on the international level. 
Case studies enable the assessment of particular phenomena, in the present instance 
collective punishment, in real life contexts; and they generate knowledge which could be 
of value in comparable future situations. The historical background of the case studies 
might also enable the indication of trends and a test of proposed theories. 
The following chapter starts with remarks on how New Legal Realism developed from 
American Legal Realism and its underlying pragmatist philosophy. The relationship 
between New Legal Realism and positivism, natural law and idealism are then discussed. 
These two parts are important in situating New Legal Realism and delineating it from 
other theoretical approaches. Core features of New Legal Realism according to Shaffer 
are outlined in order to define the approach’s scope and its advantages. Finally, the case 
study method and its value for the present thesis are highlighted. 
2.2 The development of New Legal Realism and its underlying 
principles 
In the following, the origins of New Legal Realism and its basic tenets are discussed. It 
will be argued that New Legal Realism endorses several ideas of American Legal Realism 
such as the idea of law in action and the consideration of law’s context, but that the 
overall situation and the social context today is not comparable. The reasons why its 
problem-solving oriented stance and its fallibility considerations appear to be 
particularly useful in a combination with empiricism are outlined in terms of 
philosophical pragmatism. In the end, both stances emphasise the importance of law in 
context and of reflexivity in order to create solutions for ends-in-view.  
2.2.1 ‘Old’ legal realism 
As the name indicates, ‘New’ Legal Realism as understood by Shaffer is built on a 
predecessor that could be named ‘old’ or American Legal Realism. This stream of legal 
realism was developed in the early twentieth century through the work of prominent 
representatives such as Karl Llewellyn (1893-1962), Underhill Moore (1879-1949) or 
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Walter Wheeler Cook (1873-1943). 3  After a short introduction on legal realism in 
general, Llewellyn’s work will be discussed in more detail below. This focus is due to 
Shaffer’s emphasis on Llewellyn, which singled him out as ‘arguably the central figure in 
legal realism’.4 In addition, the focus on Llewellyn as one figure in legal realism stems 
from the heterogeneity of legal realists. As Llewellyn himself argued, they did not 
constitute a unified group and therefore an outline of the differing tenets of several legal 
realists besides their common features would be too space-consuming.5 
A claim made by early legal realists was that law was indeterminate, meaning that legal 
reasons alone could neither justify unique decisions nor explain why judges decided in 
the way they did. Legal reasons were seen as insufficient to explain the decision-making 
process. Llewellyn addressed this issue by his take on precedents. He argued that 
precedents could be interpreted in many different ways, each of which would be 
‘legitimate’. In distinguishing those different ways, he separated ‘strict’ from ‘loose’ 
readings of precedents, whereby the strict reading focusses on the facts of the case and 
the loose reading abstracts a case from its facts in order to extract a general rule.6 
This indeterminacy has influenced legal realism’s core claim that law on its own is 
insufficient to explain the decision-making process – one has to look further to explore 
the underlying facts of a case. The legal realism of the 1920s was concerned with national 
law and the decisions of courts made by judges – however, the finding that one has to 
take other sources in addition to law into account when reviewing decisions and how 
they were made, could be seen as an assumption valid in the international law context 
as well.7 
Amongst others, Llewellyn has written on the discrepancies between law and the 
outcome of decision-making in practice. He asked for the consideration of the influence 
of other factors of society on this process and on judges’ behaviour: ‘The question is how, 
and how much, and in what direction, do the accepted rule and the practice of decision 
diverge? More: how, and how much, in each case? You cannot generalize on this, without 
                                                          
3 Leiter, B. (2005). American Legal Realism, in Golding, M.P. & Edmundson, W. A. (eds.). The 
Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory. Oxford, Blackwell, pp.50-66, pp.50ff. 
4 Shaffer, G. (2015) supra note 2, p.192. 
5 Tamanaha, B.Z. (2009). Understanding Legal Realism, Texas Law Review, 87, pp.731-785, 
pp.737f, 780f; Llewellyn, K.N. (1931). Some Realism About Realism - Responding to Dean 
Pound, Harvard Law Review, 44, pp.1222-1264, pp.1233ff. 
6 Leiter, B. (2005) supra note 3, pp.51f; Llewellyn, K.N. (1960). The Bramble Bush: The Classic 
Lectures on the Law and Law School. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp.55ff. 
7 Leiter, B. (2005) supra note 3, pp.52f; Shaffer, G. (2015) supra note 2, pp.196ff. 
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investigation.’ 8  Llewellyn was referring to empirical studies of behaviour: ‘[T]he 
significance of the particular rule will appear only after the investigation of the vital, 
focal, phenomenon: the behavior. And if an empirical science of law is to have any 
realistic basis, any responsibility to the facts, I see no escape from moving to this 
position.’9 In pointing to other important considerations on which judicial decisions are 
built, legal realists were recognising the causal importance of underlying extra-legal 
factors. These are used to explain and justify judicial decisions.10 
As discussed above, ‘old’ legal realism was mainly concerned with judicial decision-
making. This limited scope separates it from New Legal Realism according to Shaffer. 
New Legal Realism, in particular regarding international law, is not confined to national 
judicial decisions, but encompasses a broad range of factual contexts and actors. It 
includes not only judicial decision-making on the international level via international 
courts and tribunals, but also acts carried out by states, international organisations or 
groups outside the court-context. For this reason, New Legal Realism enables the study 
of policy approaches in relation to international legal provisions and their mutual impact 
on each other seen from the angle of the different actors involved.11 
Although legal realism is considered American, Llewellyn was influenced in developing 
this approach by European thinkers such as Rudolf von Jhering (1818-1892) and Eugen 
Ehrlich (1862-1922). Llewellyn’s theoretical work was written under the influence of 
Eugen Ehrlich and his sociology of law and his German and Austrian influences are due 
to several visits to Germany where he first travelled as a student and later to teach at 
universities.12  
Before Llewellyn refined his theory in the 1920s and 1930s, von Jhering published the 
work Der Kampf ums Recht (The Struggle for Law) in 1872.13 His view represented a 
break from the prevailing historical school of law under Savigny. After stating in The 
Struggle for Law that law should be seen as a conflict, a struggle between real interests, 
                                                          
8 Llewellyn, K.N. (1930). A Realistic Jurisprudence – The Next Step, Columbia Law Review, 30 (4), 
pp.431-465, p.444. 
9 Llewellyn, K.N. (1930) supra note 8, p.444. 
10 Leiter, B. (2005) supra note 3, pp.56ff; Llewellyn, K.N. (1960) supra note 6, pp.70f; Llewellyn, 
K.N., Adler, M.J. & Cook, W.W. (1931). Law and the Modern Mind: A Symposium, Columbia Law 
Review, 31 (1), pp.82-115, pp.83f. 
11 Shaffer, G. (2015) supra note 2, pp.197f. 
12 Grise, J.E., Gelter, M. & Whitman, R. (2012). Rudolf von Jherings’s influence on Karl Llewellyn, 
Tulsa Law Review, 48 (1), pp.93-116, pp.98ff. 
13 Von Jhering, R. (1915). The Struggle for Law. 2nd edition. Translated from the 5th German 
edition by Lalor, J.J. Chicago, Callaghan and Company. 
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von Jhering completed his philosophy with the work Der Zweck im Recht (Law as a Means 
to an End), which interprets law as a tool for reconciling conflicting interests by studying 
law in practice. 14  As Seagle said about von Jhering’s approach: ‘The world of legal 
concepts was not self-contained. Society would not wait for the jurist to "construe" its 
needs.’15 In addition to von Jhering’s impact on Llewellyn, his broader influence is going 
to be discussed later on in relation to New Legal Realism’s key attributes.16 
2.2.2 Philosophical pragmatism 
Pragmatism is a philosophical tradition developed in the United States around the late 
nineteenth and the early twentieth century. Major figures representing the stream are 
Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914), William James (1842–1910) and John Dewey 
(1859–1952). 17  Shaffer’s account of New Legal Realism is based on philosophical 
pragmatism, and Dewey in particular appears to have been of considerable influence on 
his approach. 
According to Shaffer, New Legal Realism is ‘empirical and problem-centred in the 
Deweyan tradition of legal pragmatism’. 18  The combination of, as Shaffer calls it, 
‘backward-looking’ empiricism and ‘forward-looking’ problem-solving enriches 
understanding of the operation of law and the experience gathered from it in order to 
approach new and changing factual settings.19 As Dewey put it: ‘The maintenance of life 
is a continuous affair. It involves organs and habits acquired in the past. Actions 
performed have to be adapted to future conditions or death will speedily ensue.’20 
Philosophical pragmatism in this sense means discussing law in its social context guided 
by the idea of solving encountered problems not in a final way, but in a way suitable for 
                                                          
14 Von Jhering, R. (1913). Law as a Means to an End. Translated by Husik, I. and edited by Drake, 
J.H., Lamm, H. & Geldart, W.M. Boston, Boston Book Company; Grise, J.E., Gelter, M. & Whitman, 
R. (2012) supra note 12, pp.107ff. 
15 Seagle, W. (1945). Rudolf von Jhering: Or Law as a Means to an End, University of Chicago Law 
Review, 13 (1), pp.71-89, p.83, pp.81ff. 
16 Grise, J.E., Gelter, M. & Whitman, R. (2012) supra note 12, pp.114ff; Whitman, J. (1987). 
Commercial Law and the American Volk: A Note on Llewellyn 's German Sources for the 
Uniform Commercial Code, Yale Law Journal, 97, pp.156-175, p.59; Shael, H. (1982). Llewellyn 
the Civilian: Speculations on the Contribution of Continental Experience to the Uniform 
Commercial Code, Tulane Law Review, 56 (4), pp.1125-1170, pp.1162f; Seagle, W. (1945) supra 
note 15, pp.87ff. 
17 Hookway, C. (2013). Pragmatism, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, online available at: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatism/ (accessed at 22/02/2016). 
18 Shaffer, G. (2015) supra note 2, pp.189; Hildebrand, D. (2013). Dewey's pragmatism: 
instrumentalism and meliorism, in Malachowski, A. (ed.). The Cambridge Companion to 
Pragmatism. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp.55-82, pp.58ff. 
19 Shaffer, G. (2015) supra note 2, pp.194; Dewey, J. (1916). Essays in Experimental Logic. 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press, pp.343ff. 
20 Dewey, J. (1938). Logic – The Theory of Inquiry. New York, Henry Holt and Company, p.150. 
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the present situation and open to revision if required by changing circumstances. It 
supports a view of law as ongoing process instead of irrefutable and final.21 As Tamanaha 
said about James’ and Dewey’s stance: ‘There is no absolute’.22 This statement underlines 
the pragmatist idea of fallibilism – the acceptance that “truths” gathered from experience 
today can be changed and replaced by another “truth” suitable for a new situation in the 
future.23 Reflecting on legal concepts in light of their social context could prove useful in 
refining and developing ideas, which means challenging their validity in their fluid 
environment.24 
In addition to the relative understanding of “truths”, Dewey pointed at the complex 
relationship between empirical and scientific thinking. He acknowledged the risks of 
empirical inquiry, as it could lead to false beliefs and it lacks capacity to accommodate 
new situations. However, by combining empirical work with a forward-looking problem-
solving aspect, these impasses can be overcome. For this reason, reflexivity on the 
interaction between those two strands could lead to fruitful outcomes.25 As Lang has 
argued: ‘In this context, reflexivity includes the recursive process of monitoring the 
effects of the law, and continually calling into question the law itself in light of these 
observations - not just to increase its effectiveness, but much more importantly to 
constantly rethink the law's underlying objectives, values, techniques and institutional 
architecture.’26 
2.3 The relation between New Legal Realism and other 
theoretical approaches to law 
Choosing any theoretical approach means simultaneously excluding others, which 
makes it necessary to briefly explain the delineation of New Legal Realism from other 
approaches and the reasons why it appears to be better suited. As with every legal theory, 
there are many different streams within one approach, each having their own core 
features and emphases.27 Therefore, positivism, natural law and idealism are discussed 
                                                          
21 Shaffer, G. (2015) supra note 2, pp.193ff. 
22 Tamanaha, B.Z. (1997). Realistic Socio-Legal Theory: Pragmatism and a Social Theory of Law. 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, p.26. 
23 Hookway, C. (2012). The Pragmatic Maxim: Essays on Peirce and Pragmatism. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, pp.39ff; Thomas, E.W. (2005). The Judicial Process: Realism, Pragmatism, 
Practical Reasoning and Principles. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp.308f. 
24 Tamanaha, B.Z. (1997) supra note 22, pp.29ff. 
25 Dewey, J. (1910). How we think. New York, D.C. Heath and Company, pp.145ff. 
26 Lang, A. (2015). New legal realism, empiricism, and scientism: the relative objectivity of law 
and social science, Leiden Journal of International Law, 28 (2), pp.231-254, p.240, pp.233ff. 
27 On positivism see eg: Schauer, F. (2015). The Path-Dependence of Legal Positivism, Virginia 
Law Review, 101, pp.957-976; Priel, D. (2015). Toward Classical Legal Positivism, Virginia Law 
Review, 101, pp.978-1022; on natural law see eg: George, R.P. (1999). In Defense of Natural Law. 
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focussing mainly on one of their proponents – Hans Kelsen (1881-1973), Ronald 
Dworkin (1931-2013) and Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) respectively. This limitation is 
intended to outline basic features of each approach while enabling a slightly deeper 
exploration of one variant.  
The choice of positivism, natural law and idealism is based on Tamanaha’s concept of 
‘three pillars of jurisprudence’ and on the notable idealism-realism divide.28 
2.3.1 Positivism 
On the international level, a positivist view conceives law as comprehensive system of 
rules deriving from state will.29 This system separates ‘law as it is from law as it ought to 
be’. 30  As Kelsen put it: ‘[T]he specific science of law, the discipline usually called 
jurisprudence, must be distinguished from the philosophy of justice, on the one hand, 
and from sociology, or cognition of social reality, on the other.’ 31  Kelsen called the 
examination of law separate from all other disciplines ‘pure theory of law’ and focused 
on the analysis of law in a general and abstract mode.32 The causes for the adoption of 
legal provisions or their effects in particular cases are excluded from this view, even 
though Kelsen identifies such research as ‘legal sociology’. Nevertheless, he insisted on 
a strict differentiation between law and nature.33 
Clearly, as acknowledged by Shaffer, a review of positive rules will build the starting 
point for much New Legal Realist research as well. Since their meaning, application and 
change is at stake their current content has to be evaluated. However, New Legal Realism 
does not stop after this evaluation but rather uses it as the impetus to discuss law’s 
                                                          
Oxford, Oxford University Press; Finnis, J. (1980). Natural Law and Natural Rights. Oxford, 
Clarendon Press; Fuller, L. (1969). The Morality of Law. New Haven, Yale University Press; on 
idealism see eg: Hume, D. (2000). An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. Edited by 
Beauchamp, T.L. Oxford, Clarendon Press; Berkeley, G. (1948–1957). The Works of George 
Berkeley. Edited by Luce, A.A. & Jessop, T.E. (9 Volumes). London, Thomas Nelson and Sons. 
28 Tamanaha, B.Z. (2015). The Third Pillar of Jurisprudence: Social Legal Theory, William & Mary 
Law Review, 56 (6), pp.2235-2277 (Shaffer is referring to this theory: Shaffer, G. (2015) supra 
note 2, pp.190f). 
29 Simma, B. & Paulus, A.L. (1999). The Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights Abuses in 
Internal Conflicts: A Positivist View, American Journal of International Law, 93, pp.302-316, 
p.304. 
30 Hart referring to Austin and Bentham: Hart, H.L.A. (1958). Positivism and the Separation of 
Law and Morals, Harvard Law Review, 71 (4), pp.593-629, p.594. 
31 Kelsen, H. (1941). The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, Harvard Law Review, 
55 (1), pp.44-70, p.44. 
32 Priel, D. (2015) supra note 27, pp.1011f; Kelsen, H. (1992). Introduction to the Problems of 
Legal Theory: The Pure Theory of Law. Translation of the First Edition of the Reine Rechtslehre 
or Pure Theory of Law by Litschewski Paulson, B. & Paulson, S.L. with an Introduction by 
Paulson, S.L. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
33 Kelsen, H. (1992) supra note 32, pp.7ff. 
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development and adaptation to changing social contexts. In this regard it differs from 
the traditional positivist approach as it is concerned with the effects of law in practice.34 
2.3.2 Natural Law 
According to George, natural law theories propose ‘to identify principles of right action 
– moral principles – specifying the first and most general principle of morality, namely, 
that one should choose and act in ways that are compatible with a will towards integral 
human fulfillment.’ 35  Human fulfilment defined as goods such as life, knowledge, or 
friendship, guides human actions. Human actions, in turn, are manifestations of human 
capacities pre-determined by human nature.36 The human goods pursued by human 
action are defined by their value and their significance for human fulfilment is 
determined by an essentially moral decision. Consequently, morality is part of law, as 
law aims to make legal provisions for basic human goods.37 
One famous as well as disputed figure linked to natural law theories by his account on 
morality is Ronald Dworkin.38 In his interpretive theory he defined his understanding of 
law as follows: ‘In my view, legal argument is characteristically and pervasively moral 
argument. Lawyers must decide which of competing sets of principles provide the best 
– morally most compelling – justification of legal practice as a whole.’39 Even though 
Dworkin’s theory is about understanding what ‘best justifies’ legal practice, it describes 
the – as he calls it – ‘philosophical’ decision a judge has to make when evaluating 
competing legal arguments and their abstract foundations.40  
Again, similarly to positivism, New Legal Realism differs from natural law theories in its 
orientation to practice. Experience gathered from empirical research forms the basis for 
potential problem-solving approaches. It is not about the significance of moral values for 
                                                          
34 Shaffer, G. (2015) supra note 2, pp.190ff. 
35 George, R.P. (2008). Natural Law, Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, 31 (1), pp.171-
196, p.172; George, R.P. (1999) supra note 27, pp.102ff. 
36 Finnis, J. (2012). Natural Law Theory: Its Past and its Present, American Journal of 
Jurisprudence, 57, pp.81-102, pp.84ff. 
37 Finnis, J. (2011). Natural Law and Natural Rights. 2nd edition. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
pp.23ff. 
38 Letsas, G. (2007). Monism, Interpretivism, and Law's Aim, in Freeman, M. & Harrison, R. 
(eds.). Law and Philosophy. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp.49-59, pp.49ff. 
39 Dworkin, R. (2006). Justice in Robes. London, Harvard University Press, p.144; Green, M.S. 
(2007). Dworkin v. the Philosophers: A Review Essay on Justice in Robes, University of Illinois 
Law Review, 5, pp.1477-1504, pp.1480ff. 
40 Dworkin, R. (1986). Law’s Empire. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, pp.90ff; Donnelly-
Lazarov, B. (2012).  Dworkin's Morality and its Limited Implications for Law, Canadian Journal 
of Law and Jurisprudence, 25 (1), pp.79-95, p.82. 
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law creation, or any philosophical decisions made by judges built on a priori or pre-
determined attitudes of what is morally right or valid.41 
2.3.3 Idealism 
Shaffer argues that realism should not be reduced to ‘universalist reason of ideal 
liberalist theories’.42 The realist-idealist divide is not limited to New Legal Realism but 
concerns the basic foundation of both approaches. Whereas realism is predicated on the 
assumption that the world exists independently from our knowledge of it as an objective 
reality that can be studied and known by experience, idealism is concerned with abstract 
ideas and concepts based on the mind independent from the outside world but rather 
constituting it.43 
Kant’s transcendental idealism represents one variety of the latter idea. Kant saw the 
outside world as perceived by the mind, as existing only because of the knowledge of it.  
In support for a priori knowledge of the world, he assumed that this world would 
conform to abstract non-empirical concepts developed in the mind.44  Therefore, the 
appearance of things is emphasised instead of the things in themselves – an assumption 
that is also applied to time and space: ‘If, therefore, space (and time as well) were not a 
mere form of your intuition that contains a priori conditions under which alone things 
could be outer objects for you, which are nothing in themselves without these subjective 
conditions, then you could make out absolutely nothing synthetic and a priori about 
outer objects.’45 
In Dewey’s words: ‘Those who come in direct contact with things and have to adapt their 
activities to them immediately are, in effect, realists ; those who isolate the meanings of 
these things and put them in a religious or so-called spiritual world aloof from things are, 
in effect, idealists.’46 This separation or deliberate abstraction from the real world and 
social contexts in idealist thinking could lead to blind spots as identified by Olkowski: 
                                                          
41 Shaffer, G. (2015) supra note 2, pp.190f. 
42 Shaffer, G. (2015) supra note 2, p.206. 
43 Leiter, B. (1996). Legal realism, in Patterson, D. (ed.). A Companion to Philosophy of Law and 
Legal Theory. Oxford, Blackwell, pp.261-279, pp.262ff; Somek, A. (1996). German legal 
philosophy and theory in the nineteenth and twentieth century, in Patterson, D. (ed.). A 
Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory. Oxford, Blackwell pp.343-354, pp.343ff. 
44 Dicker, G. (2004). Kant’s Theory of Knowledge: An Analytical Introduction. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, pp.31ff. 
45 Kant, I. (2009). Critique of Pure Reason. Translated and edited by Guyer, P. & Wood, A.W. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p.171. 
46 Dewey, J. (1930). Democracy and Education. New York, Macmillan, p.401. 
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‘[A]s an idealism … liberalism seriously underestimates the realities of power and social 
determination.’47 
The present thesis addresses a gap in human rights law and its effects in social context. 
The examination of state policies in relation to the relevant international law and the 
various actors involved could not be undertaken without the consideration of the 
outside world; therefore, New Legal Realism appears to be better suited than idealist 
approaches to examine the questions posed here. 
2.4 Shaffer’s key attributes of New Legal Realism 
Shaffer highlights six key features that define New Legal Realism: Empiricism, 
philosophical pragmatism, processualism, transnationalism, conditional theorising and 
reason-giving in tension with power. In outlining each of them, he emphasises that they 
constitute a movement and are not limited to a particular school.48 These six attributes 
are discussed below in order to define the content and scope of New Legal Realism.  
It will be argued that the attribute of processualism is better understood as a 
subordinate feature of pragmatism, and that mentioning it separately distracts from the 
core argument of New Legal Realism. In addition, even though conditional theorising as 
an attribute seems appropriate in terms of its content, it could be understood as a feature 
of pragmatism as well. Finally, the attribute ‘reason-giving in tension with power’ 
primarily points to the problematic relationship of idealism with this issue, not with 
critical theories. 
2.4.1 Empiricism 
According to Shaffer and Ginsburg, ‘social scientists view method as the use of 
methodological tools to assess how, and under what conditions, international law works 
in practice’.49 Empirical work is defined as using qualitative and quantitative methods 
systematically.50 While quantitative methods are testing hypotheses against statistical 
data, qualitative methods are concerned with specific social contexts, making the 
                                                          
47 Olkowksi, D. (2005). The Myth of the Individual, Dialogue and Universalism, 15 (3/4), pp.9-18, 
p.15 (Olkowski is referring here to MacKinnon’s work: MacKinnon, C. (1989). Toward a Feminist 
Theory of the State. Cambridge, Harvard University Press).  
48 Shaffer, G. (2015) supra note 2, pp.200f; Llewellyn, K.N. (1931) supra note 5, p.1225 (‘We are 
no spokesmen for a school.’). 
49 Shaffer, G. & Ginsburg, T. (2012). The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship, 
American Journal of International Law, 106, pp.1-46, p.3. 
50 Shaffer, G. & Ginsburg, T. (2012) supra note 49, pp.3ff; on the differences between empirical 
legal studies and New Legal Realism in terms of qualitative and quantitative research see: 
Mertz, E. & Suchman, M. (2010). Toward a New Legal Empiricism: Empirical Legal Studies and 
New Legal Realism, Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 6, pp.555-579. 
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research outcomes less easy to generalise but involving an in-depth analysis of the 
situation at hand, which is often not possible with quantitative methods. Qualitative 
methods are suitable to explore behavioural changes and ways in which people and 
other relevant actors are affected by rules applicable to them.51  
Shaffer and Ginsburg’s study of the empirical turn in international legal scholarship 
highlights the importance and usefulness of empirical work in this area of law, adding to 
the reasons for choosing this approach for the present thesis. Furthermore, empirical 
research contributes to the evaluation of experience gathered from social context and its 
application to law and legal development – core concepts of New Legal Realism.52 In 
addition, they refer to case studies as method of qualitative empirical research which 
conforms with the structure of the thesis and its significant reliance on two different case 
studies in order to explain how law develops and changes over time.53 The nature of case 
studies as empirical research method will be discussed in more detail below. 
2.4.2 Philosophical pragmatism 
As already mentioned above, New Legal Realism is based on philosophical pragmatism, 
particularly Dewey’s understanding of the concept. According to Dewey, ‘[f]or the 
purposes of a logic of inquiry into probable consequences, general principles can only be 
tools justified by the work they do. They are means of intellectual survey, analysis, and 
insight into the factors of the situation to be dealt with. Like other tools they must be 
modified when they are applied to new conditions and new results have to be 
achieved.’54 The fallibilist take on the empirical study of law in social context is aimed at 
resolving current problems. As admitted by this approach, the solutions proposed are 
                                                          
51 Epstein, L. & Martin, A.D. (2010). Quantitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research, in 
Cane, P. & Kritzer, H.M. (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, pp.902-925; Webley, L. (2010). Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal 
Research, in Cane, P. & Kritzer, H.M. (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research. 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp.927-950; Lawless, R.M., Robbennolt, J.K. & Ulen, T.S. (2009). 
Empirical Methods in Law. New York, Aspen.  
52 Nourse, V. & Shaffer, G. (2014). Empiricism, Experimentalism, and Conditional Theory, 
Southern Methodist University Law Review, 67, pp.141-184, pp.153ff; Nourse, V. & Shaffer, G. 
(2009). Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World Order Prompt a New Legal Theory, 
Cornell Law Review, 95, pp.61-138, pp.79ff. 
53 Shaffer, G. & Ginsburg, T. (2012) supra note 49, pp.26f: For example, they refer to historical 
qualitative case studies such as Michel Veuthey, M. (2003). From Solferino to Kosovo: The 
Contribution of International Humanitarian Law to International Security, in Carey, J., Dunlap, 
W.V. & Pritchard, R.J. (eds.). International Humanitarian Law: Origins. Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 
pp.207-238. 
54 Dewey, J. (1924). Logical Method and Law, Cornell Law Quarterly, 10 (1), pp.17-27, p.26. 
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not final, but have to be reconsidered alongside changing circumstances and changing 
social contexts.55 
The gap in human rights law highlighted in the present thesis by reference to case 
studies and their different social contexts corresponds with the philosophical 
pragmatists’ notion of fallibility and reflexivity that underpin New Legal Realism.56 
2.4.3 Processualism 
A criterion related to the reflexivity of pragmatism is processualism. Shaffer understands 
legal processes as ‘viewed not in ideal terms, but rather empirically and pragmatically in 
their imperfect and dynamic actuality’. 57  However, as shown by this quote, Shaffer 
himself does not seem to attach much distinct meaning or content to processualism. In 
my opinion, processualism does not constitute a separate key attribute of New Legal 
Realism. It is rather a feature of philosophical pragmatism and empiricism expressed in 
the reflexivity of law in accordance with changing social contexts and knowledge that 
evolves steadily through experience, not being rigid and final. In addition, the mention 
of legal process theory appears to create rather more confusion than clarification in that 
it refers to several different strands of legal theory,58 which in my opinion do not advance 
the aims of New Legal Realism, such as constructivism.59  
2.4.4 Transnationalism 
Transnationalism represents the key feature of New Legal Realism to which the 
movement owes much of its name. In other words, New Legal Realism differs from 
American Legal Realism due to the different social contexts and challenges that 
                                                          
55 Shaffer, G. (2015) supra note 2, pp.201ff; Lang, A. (2015) supra note 26, pp.232ff. 
56 Erlanger, H. et al (2005). New Legal Realism Symposium: Is it Time for a New Legal Realism?: 
Foreword, Wisconsin Law Review, 2005 (2), pp.335-364, pp.356ff; McEvoy, A.F. (2005). A New 
Legal Realism for Legal Studies, Wisconsin Law Review, 2005 (2), pp.433-454, pp.434ff. 
57 Shaffer, G. (2015) supra note 2, p.204. 
58 Duxbury describes legal process as a reaction to realism and the orientation of two of its main 
proponents, Hart and Sacks as ‘utilitarian laissez-faire liberalism’: Duxbury, N. (1997). Patterns 
of American Jurisprudence. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp.257, 233ff; Hart, H.M. Jr. & Sacks, 
A.M. (1994). The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law. New York, 
Foundation Press; for reference to liberalism in legal process theory in contrast to Shaffer’s 
stance against ideal liberal theory see eg: Eskridge, W.N. Jr. (1994). Dynamic Statutory 
Interpretation. London, Harvard University Press; Bix, B.H. (2015). Jurisprudence: Theory and 
Context. 7th edition. London, Sweet & Maxwell, pp.281f. 
59 Shaffer refers to social constructivism as demonstrated by Brunée and Toope: Brunée, J. & 
Toope, S.J. (2010). Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An International Account. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; Brunée, J. & Toope, S.J. (2013). Constructivism and 
International Law, in Dunoff, J.L. & Pollack, M.A. (eds.). Interdisciplinary Perspectives on 
International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, pp.119-145; for a critique of this stance see eg: Kurki, M. & Sinclaire, A. (2010). 
Hidden in plain sight: Constructivist treatment of social context and its limitations, International 
Politics, 47, pp.1-25.  
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dominate the twenty-first century, as opposed to issues that were of concern almost a 
hundred years ago. American Legal Realism was mainly concerned with the decision-
making of judges on the national level, and since the international legal institutions such 
as international courts and tribunals as well as international organisations only emerged 
in full force later, they were not so much concerned with the international level.60  
However, today even national law could benefit from a transnational perspective since 
cooperation with other states and international organisations is influencing the states’ 
legal regimes as well. For this reason, national and international law are mutually 
affecting each other in a transnational context.61 As Shaffer says: ‘[I]nternational law is 
best viewed in transnational terms because one cannot understand international law 
empirically outside of the interaction of international, transnational, and national 
institutions and actors, be they public or private.’62 
This emphasis on the interaction of actors on the national and international level fits 
well with the thesis’ interplay of case studies located in two different states, their 
national situation and the international legal regulations applicable to them. 
2.4.5 Conditional theorising 
New Legal Realism undertakes empirical research in order to explore the conditions 
under which law – in this case international law – shapes the behaviour of its addressees 
and has an impact on their decision-making. From this standpoint, New Legal Realism 
understands law’s normativity in a conditional sense. 63  Furthermore, conditional 
theorising allows for a more context-related and open perspective on law, as it 
dismantles “either-or” debates in favour of a more nuanced consideration of several 
overlapping areas of concern, such as the intersection of law and politics.64  
Nourse and Shaffer ascribe two aspects to conditional theory, an immediate rational 
aspect on facts and a deeper and cognitive aspect regarding concepts. The rational aspect 
                                                          
60 Shaffer, G. (2015) supra note 2, pp.196ff; Merry, S.E. (2006). New Legal Realism and the 
Ethnography of Transnational Law, Law & Social Inquiry, 31 (4), pp.975-995, pp.977ff; Alter, K.J. 
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asks when law matters and what conditions have led to this effect. This question is 
addressed by empirical research on the specific context underlying the application or 
non-application of law and its resulting importance and behaviour-shaping ability. In 
addition, the experience gathered from the empirical data could be used in order to 
develop strategies adapted to the context as well as tools to modify the context 
responsible for a certain effect of law. 65  The cognitive aspect relates to concepts 
developed from empirical findings. However, as concepts could constrain and limit the 
scope of actions and available alternatives, they have to be reviewed in light of the social 
contexts they address and be aware of their own fallibility.66  
Building on the above, conditional theorising is based on the philosophical pragmatist 
idea of ‘ends-in-view’.67 As put by Dewey: ‘Only recognition in both theory and practice 
that ends to be attained (ends-in-view) are of the nature of hypotheses and that 
hypotheses have to be formed and tested in strict correlativity with existential 
conditions as means, can alter current habits of dealing with social issues.’68 
Recognising that law and legal concepts are in simultaneous development in the context 
they address fits well with the thesis’ presentation of case studies involving state 
behaviour’s departure from law and ways in which international law could tackle such a 
gap. However, as already mentioned with reference to the key attribute processualism, 
conditional theorising might as well be considered as an aspect already included in 
philosophical pragmatism. Although I generally agree with the tenets of conditional 
theorising seen in this pragmatic way, it does not seem necessary to add it as an explicit 
separate feature of New Legal Realism. 
2.4.6 Reason-giving in tension with power 
The assumption that law operates in isolation, guided neither by power nor by reason, 
is based on the relation between those two factors and their influence on law. In this 
regard, New Legal Realism supports an approach situated in the middle ground between 
universalist ideas of reason guiding decisions and critical ideas reducing law to an 
instrument of politics.69 
                                                          
65 Nourse, V. & Shaffer, G. (2014) supra note 52, pp.152f. 
66 Nourse, V. & Shaffer, G. (2014) supra note 52, pp.153f. 
67 Nourse, V. & Shaffer, G. (2014) supra note 52, pp.153; Dewey, J. (1930) supra note 46, 
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Addressing universalist approaches to power and reason in a liberal and idealist manner, 
MacIntyre has identified the following line of thought deriving from the period of 
Enlightenment: ‘So, it was hoped, reason would displace authority and tradition. 
Rational justification was to appeal to principles undeniable by any rational person and 
therefore independent of all those social and cultural particularities which the 
Enlightenment thinkers took to be the mere accidental clothing of reason in particular 
times and places.’ 70  However, he continued in saying that these thinkers, such as 
Rousseau and Kant, were not able to define what these undeniable principles were and 
therefore ‘the legacy of the Enlightenment has been the provision of an ideal of rational 
justification which it has proved impossible to attain.’71 These short passages indicate 
the difficulties liberal idealist approaches encounter in terms of the tension between 
reason and power. According to Hurrell, this problem might stem additionally from a 
neglect of the power debate both in general and in particular on the international level.72 
Amongst others, Shaffer refers to von Jhering’s Struggle for Law to approach the tension 
between reason and power. Von Jhering conceives law as the product of a constant 
struggle between parties with different interests and rights conceptions. Interestingly, 
the English translation of von Jhering’s work opens with the statement that ‘[t]he life of 
the law is a struggle,—a struggle of nations, of the state power, of classes, of 
individuals.’73 In its original German version however, the term ‘nation’ understood as 
state is not used (Nation/Staat), but the term ‘peoples’ (Völker) and he refers to the 
struggle of peoples as well as individuals for their rights several times throughout the 
text: ‘[A]nd every legal right — the legal rights of a whole nation [people/Volk] as well as 
                                                          
G. (2015) supra note 2, p.196; Wynn, D. Jr. & Williams, C.K. (2012). Principles for Conducting 
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71 MacIntyre, A. (1988) supra note 70, p.6. 
72 He says that this neglect has led to a ‘strikingly apolitical and far too cosy a view of 
institutions and global governance’ (p.33): Hurrell, A. (2005). Power, institutions and the 
production of inequality, in Barnett, M. N. & Duvall, R. (eds.). Power in Global Governance. 
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those of individuals —supposes a continual readiness to assert it and defend it. The law 
is not mere theory, but living force.’74  
If these statements are translated in today’s situation, the mention of group rights in 
combination with von Jhering’s exhortation not to repeat the mistakes of history again, 
could be interpreted as a call to consider groups as actors on the international plane and 
their interests as contributing to the shaping of social context.  Von Jhering’s Struggle for 
Law is guided by existing social forces, by group interests and competing powers. With 
his call to everyone to actively participate in the acquisition and enforcement of rights 
he sees law in the light of social change.75 The active participation in social change, this 
struggle for justice, could be used to address issues of power and balance competing 
interests.76 
Groups and collective rights constitute a major part of the thesis since the case studies 
are based on the collective punishment of particular groups – Palestinian and Chechen 
families. Consequently, the consideration of their ability to act, to participate in social 
change and have their rights enforced and strengthened corresponds well with the 
awareness of the tension between power and reason, in particular on the international 
level. 
2.5 Case studies as legal research method 
Yin defines case study as ‘an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon (the “case”) in depth and within its real-world context, especially when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident’. 77  Case 
studies are employed for describing, analysing or explaining one or several phenomena 
and can be used for theory-building as well as theory-testing.78 According to Patton and 
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Appelbaum case studies are useful ‘to uncover patterns, determine meanings, construct 
conclusions and build theory’.79 The method of case studies could be used for descriptive 
and explanatory purposes and in particular for the examination of dynamic processes.80  
Case studies appear to be a viable instrument to highlight shortcomings of legal systems 
– in this respect human rights law – as they indicate factual developments and expose 
gaps.81 This method offers a sound starting point for the present thesis as the changing 
situation on the ground and the imposition of collective punishment in situations 
governed by human rights law and not by the law of armed conflict represents the very 
impetus for the thesis. 
The case studies used in the thesis could be understood as explanatory and theory-
testing. They are concerned with varying state policies regarding collective punishment 
in two states and under different conditions. The theory that state policies on collective 
punishment can be influenced by relevant international law and vice versa leading to a 
gap in human rights law is going to be tested against the case studies and subsequently, 
the theory will be approved, modified or rejected. In terms of data analysis, the case 
studies will rely on documents and archival material, including primary sources such as 
judgments of international and national courts, government statements before 
international bodies, parliamentary meeting protocols and transcripts, national 
legislation and government statements and explanatory remarks to national legislation. 
These data sets are empirical in nature as they are based on experience and observation 
in the relevant field, meaning at the level of international bodies, governments and state 
policy creation.82 In addition, relevant legal, historical and political secondary literature 
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will be referred to in order to explain the circumstances surrounding the case studies’ 
settings. 
2.6 Conclusion 
To sum up, New Legal Realism represents a movement in legal theory which focuses on 
how law obtains its meaning, how it is practised and how it changes. All these questions 
are best answered by a look at law in its social context, supported by empiricist and 
pragmatist considerations. This combination of empirical research and experience 
gained from real life situations with pragmatic fallibilist problem-solving represents a 
sound approach to tackle the issues at hand. Furthermore, since the thesis’ impetus 
stems from changing social contexts influenced by state policies and international law, 
the emphasis of New Legal Realism on practice corresponds well with the case studies 
and examined potential solutions. 
New Legal Realism is preferred here to positivism and natural law and also to idealist 
conceptions. With regards to positivism, New Legal Realism does not object to the 
evaluation of the current legal situation as a starting point for further research, however, 
it should be the starting point and not the aim in itself. Likewise, moral considerations 
as purported by natural law are not going to advance the present subject. In addition, 
New Legal Realism differs from these two approaches in its orientation to practice and 
its emphasis of law in social context. When it comes to idealism, New Legal Realism does 
not support the idea of an outside world only existing because of our knowledge of it. On 
the contrary, New Legal Realism holds the view that the world and its social contexts are 
independent from mind conceptions and that it is a valuable endeavour to study it and 
learn from it. 
The key attributes of New Legal Realism guiding the present thesis are empiricism, 
philosophical pragmatism, transnationalism and reason-giving in tension with power. 
Together, they enable the examination of social contexts from a view of experience and 
practical problem-solving, combined with transnational dynamics of various actors on 
different levels and an awareness of actors participating in social change and its 
balancing effect on power. New Legal Realism’s attention to social context is reinforced 
by the case studies. Case studies as a method of empirical and qualitative research are a 
viable instrument to focus on particular real-life situations and their indication of gaps, 
in this case in legal regulation. 
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These considerations represent a sound guide to state policies on collective punishment 
and its international legal regulation – a topic with transnational outlook, benefitting 
from empirical evaluation and potential pragmatist solutions including all actors 
involved. After setting out the theoretical approach and methods used, the following part 
on collective punishment and the law of armed conflict will start the substantive analysis. 
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3 Collective punishment, state policies and the law of 
armed conflict 
 
3.1 Collective punishment and the law of armed conflict 
 
3.1.1 Introduction 
The following chapter outlines the legal regulation of collective punishment under the 
law of armed conflict, starting with treaty law provisions on international armed 
conflicts, focussing on the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Subsequently, the regulation of 
collective punishment in non-international armed conflicts, particularly Common Article 
3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II will be discussed, followed by an 
account of customary international law on the issue, encompassing both forms of armed 
conflict and some brief remarks on collective punishment in international criminal law. 
The chapter will be completed by an attempt to define the act of collective punishment. 
Collective punishment can be understood as the imposition of sanctions on a group as 
such for acts one of their members has allegedly committed and they bear no individual 
responsibility for. It represents an act contradicting the fundamental principle of 
individual responsibility as it deliberately targets the innocent. As will be shown, 
collective punishment is prohibited in international and non-international armed 
conflicts by treaty as well as customary international law.1 The most important treaty 
regulations on collective punishment are enshrined in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and 
their Additional Protocols from 1977.2 
These findings constitute an important preparation for the ensuing case study on the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories in order to assess Israel's behaviour and policy in this 
regard. The policies of certain states concerning the prohibition of collective punishment 
were already visible during the codification process of the Geneva Conventions and their 
                                                          
1 Darcy, S. (2015). The Prohibition of Collective Punishment, in Clapham, A., Gaeta, P. & Sassòli, 
M. (eds.). The 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Commentary. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
pp.1155-1171. 
2 75 UNTS 135, Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva (12 
August 1949) Articles 87 (3), 26 (6); 75 UNTS 287, Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva (12 August 1949) Article 33; 1125 UNTS 3, Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Geneva (8 June 1977) Article 75 (2)(d); 
1125 UNTS 609, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating 
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), Geneva (8 June 
1977), Article 4 (2)(b). 
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Additional Protocols. The records show an emerging hostility of states against rules they 
considered to protect “terrorists”, resulting from the debates around non-international 
armed conflicts during the negotiations on the Geneva Conventions and national 
liberation movements and guerrilla fighters during the drafting of the Additional 
Protocols.3 These issues laid bare the unwillingness of some states to cede parts of their 
powers in order to protect groups they did not support or even recognise. Nevertheless, 
in the end rules on collective punishment were adopted, with policies against such 
prohibitions being the minority opinion. In light of states’ policies only reluctantly giving 
up collective punishment, the establishment of a prohibition appears to be crucial in 
order to protect groups and ultimately contribute to the empowerment of the 
Palestinians on a broader level by documenting and challenging Israel’s collective 
punishment policy.4 
However, the prohibition of collective punishment in the law of armed conflict rarely 
includes a definition of the very act prohibited. The variety of forms collective 
punishment can take has made this concept easy to confuse with other prohibited acts 
such as belligerent reprisals. For this reason, particular emphasis will be placed on the 
definition of collective punishment at the end of the chapter. One institution that has 
tried to define the war crime of collective punishment in more detail is the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone – its statute encompasses collective punishment as a war crime. In the 
Court’s case law, two defining elements for collective punishment as a war crime are 
singled out, namely the ‘indiscriminate punishment imposed collectively on persons for 
omissions or acts some or none of them may or may not have been responsible’ and ‘the 
specific intent of the perpetrator to punish collectively’.5 However, this interpretation 
has to be seen in context.6 It will be argued, that the law of armed conflict as a system 
based on specific groups does not address the collective character of its provisions in 
much depth. It is rather assuming the group-based notion of its rules. Nevertheless, this 
group-based character plays a significant role as potential ways to translate the act of 
collective punishment into human rights law are at the core of the thesis. 
                                                          
3 Suter, K. (1984). An International Law of Guerrilla Warfare: The Global Politics of Law-Making. 
London, Frances Pinter. 
4 Malloy, T.H. (2014). National Minorities between Protection and Empowerment: Towards a 
Theory of Empowerment, Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, 13 (2), pp.11-
29, pp.15ff. 
5 Fofana and Kondewa (SCSL-04-14-A) Judgment, Appeals Chamber (28 May 2008) para.224. 
6 Provost, R. (2002). International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press. 
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Going back to the research question about the relationship between the legal regulation 
of collective punishment in the law of armed conflict and human rights law and state 
policies thereon and the effects this relationship has on the empowerment and 
protection of groups, this chapter on the origins and scope of collective punishment 
represents the foundation for an understanding of the act in question and its connection 
to state policies and group empowerment under different legal frameworks. 
It will be argued that the hostility of states towards providing protection and standing 
to parties other than themselves, already shown during the negotiations of the Geneva 
Conventions and the Additional Protocols, could be seen as a link between the legal 
regulation and policy development regarding collective punishment. The groups 
involved in non-international armed conflicts and the decolonisation process are already 
close to those groups targeted more broadly by collective punishment in situations 
governed by human rights law. Although the definition of collective punishment as such 
does not require any discriminatory element, the groups affected in practice are often 
subject to a broader discriminatory policy. The groups directly affected by collective 
punishment are the families whose houses are demolished, but it is peoples and 
minorities who are affected in a broader sense, as shown in the case of the Palestinians 
and the Chechens.  
The evaluation of the drafting histories of the Geneva Conventions and in particular the 
Additional Protocols reveals a shift for and against certain policies and preferences and 
it connects the law of armed conflict as the origin of the concept of collective punishment 
to human rights law. The transition between times of armed conflict and peace is fluid 
and the shift in attitude of states regarding internal issues indicates support for a 
limitation of interference in those affairs. However, when it comes to times of armed 
conflict, affected groups such as civilians have a protection they can raise; when it comes 
to the imposition of collective punishment in situations governed by human rights law, 
they have not. This lack and the broadening of collective punishment’s scope of 
application, perhaps enabled by a certain hostility already visible in the codification 
process of the relevant treaties, constitutes the foundation of the present thesis and will 
be explored further in the following chapters. 
For this reason, the origins and scope of collective punishment will be outlined first, 
representing the basis for an understanding of the concept under the law of armed 
conflict and its effects on state policies and groups. Consequently, the legal regulation of 
collective punishment in treaty and customary international law regarding armed 
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conflicts will be addressed, supported by accounts of the drafting history of the Geneva 
Conventions and their Additional Protocols and followed by a definition of the act of 
collective punishment. 
3.1.2 The legal regulation of collective punishment under the law of armed 
conflict  
3.1.2.1  Treaty law 
3.1.2.1.1 International armed conflicts 
Collective punishment encompasses ‘penalties of any kind inflicted on persons or entire 
groups of persons, in defiance of the most elementary principles of humanity, for acts 
that these persons have not committed.’ 7  This statement made by the first but still 
frequently cited commentary on the Geneva Conventions has lost nothing in its validity.8 
The treaty law regulating collective punishment in international armed conflicts will be 
outlined below. Although efforts to address collective punishment under the law of 
armed conflict reach back a long way in history, the discussion here will start with the 
Hague Regulations from 1899 and 1907, when provisions on collective punishment 
gained binding force for the first time. Subsequently, the focus will be on the 1949 
Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols from 1977. The section concludes 
that today collective punishment is prohibited in international armed conflicts. 
However, the final versions of these treaties do not give a complete account of the states’ 
understanding of collective punishment. Although prohibitions of collective punishment 
were included in the instruments, they did not go down undebated. Their drafting 
history reveals that several states tried to retain their ability to impose collective 
punishment and were disinclined to limit their means of warfare. Yet in the end, states 
agreed to limit the imposition of collective punishment in international armed conflicts 
– a measure to protect themselves from other states, opponents seen as on the same 
level. A decreasing willingness to cede powers in favour of parties not seen as on the 
same level will be witnessed regarding non-international armed conflicts discussed in 
the next section. Consequently, the drafting history serves as an important indicator of 
state policies on collective punishment in relation to its legal regulation and the broader 
effect on groups and will be mentioned in the following whenever relevant. 
                                                          
7 Uhler, O.M. & Coursier, H. (eds.) (1958). IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, International Committee of the Red Cross, p.225. 
8 See eg Darcy, S. (2015) supra note 1, pp.1155-1171 and Darcy, S. (2007). Collective 
Responsibility and Accountability under International Law. Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff referring to 
its provisions. 
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The prohibition of collective punishment is enshrined in various treaties regarding the 
law of armed conflict. The Hague Regulations refer to a prohibition of ‘general penalty’ 
imposed on a population for individual acts not attributable to the population 
collectively.9 The first Hague Peace Conference took place in 1899 and ended with the 
adoption of a set of rules governing the conduct in armed conflict. Article 50 of the 
Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague Regulations) 
addresses the issue of collective punishment: ‘No general penalty, pecuniary or 
otherwise, can be inflicted on the population on account of the acts of individuals for 
which it cannot be regarded as collectively responsible.’10  
However, a closer look at Article 50 exposes its shortcomings. It limits the application of 
collective penalties but does not prohibit them completely – their imposition is still 
allowed in cases where the population can be regarded as collectively responsible. 
According to the commentary on Article 50, this collective responsibility could even be 
seen as established if the population bears passive responsibility.11 This concept does 
not correspond to principles of joint or vicarious responsibility as known for instance 
under tort law but is much broader. Rolin, the drafter of the commentary to the Hague 
Regulations understood passive responsibility to be established by the population’s 
permission or passive support of violations of the laws and customs of armed conflict. 
With group solidarity triggering the permissibility of collective penalties, the threshold 
of the prohibition is relatively low – at least seen from today’s perspective. At the time 
of its codification, any limitation of collective penalties represented an improvement on 
the regulation of conduct in armed conflict, since collective fines and penalties were 
widely used.12 
Following this first binding attempt to limit collective punishment, the Convention 
relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War was adopted in 1929. It similarly included 
a provision on collective penalties. 13   More specifically, the Convention included a 
prohibition of ‘collective disciplinary measures affecting food’ – a rule owing to the camp 
                                                          
9 Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Convention (II) 
with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague (29 July 1899) Article 50; 
Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Convention (IV) 
respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague (18 October 1907) Article 50. 
10 Hague Regulations 1907 supra note 9, Article 50; Darcy, S. (2007) supra note 8, pp.16ff. 
11 The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences, translation of the official texts under the 
supervision of Scott, J.B. (1920). New York, Oxford University Press, Annex 1 to the Minutes of 
the Fifth Meeting, Report to the Conference by Edouard Rolin, pp.64f. 
12 Darcy, S. (2007) supra note 8, pp.23ff. 
13 118 LNTS 343, Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva (27 July 
1929) Article 46 (4). 
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situation and the power of the capturers prisoners of war were exposed to.14 In contrast 
to the Hague Regulations, this Convention prohibited collective penalties regarding a 
specific group of people. The vast number of captured soldiers in the First World War 
and the ‘convenient’ nature of collective punishments in camps represented the main 
impetus for the provision on collective penalties.15 
The Second World War highlighted the persisting shortcomings of the current system 
regulating collective punishment. The Hague Regulations did not prohibit but only limit 
the imposition of collective punishment with a very low threshold and the Convention 
on Prisoners of War was only applicable to this specific group of people. However, even 
these provisions were seemingly ignored when Nazi forces destroyed entire villages and 
deported whole families in response to hostile acts. 16  Reacting to this gruesome 
experience, the four Geneva Conventions on wounded and sick members of the armed 
forces on land and at sea, prisoners of war and civilians were adopted in 1949. Absorbing 
the provisions of the 1929 Convention on Prisoners of War, the Third Geneva Convention 
prohibits ‘collective punishment for individual acts’ and ‘collective disciplinary 
measures affecting food’.17 The change in wording from the prohibition of collective 
penalties in the 1929 Convention to collective punishment in the Third Geneva 
Convention represents a broadening of this rule.18 The term punishment is preferred to 
penalty since penalties are seen as more related to penal sanctions, whereas punishment 
includes a wider range of measures such as actions taken by camp commanders.19 
The Fourth Geneva Convention on the protection of civilians in war included a 
substantially wider provision on collective punishment than the Hague Regulations.20 It 
states in Article 33 (1): ‘No protected person may be punished for an offence he or she 
has not personally committed. Collective penalties … are prohibited.’21 First of all, Article 
33 (1) endorses the principle of individual responsibility, outlawing the vague concept 
                                                          
14 Prisoners of War Convention 1929 supra note 13, Article 11 (4). 
15 Darcy, S. (2007) supra note 8, pp.32ff. 
16 Darcy, S. (2007) supra note 8, pp.34ff. 
17 Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 2, Articles 87 (3), 
26 (6). 
18 Levie, H.S. (1977). Prisoners of War in International Armed Conflict. Newport, Naval War 
College Press, p.130. 
19 Darcy, S. (2007) supra note 8, pp.47f; De Preux, J. (ed.)(1960). III Geneva Convention relative to 
the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, International Committee of the Red Cross, pp.431f. 
20 Darcy, S. (2007) supra note 8, pp.48ff. 
21 Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, supra note 2, 
Article 33. In addition, Article 33 prohibits pillage and reprisals against protected persons and 
their property. 
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of collective responsibility seen in the Hague Regulations. 22  Furthermore, the 
prohibition of collective penalties is not limited to court sentences, ‘but penalties of any 
kind’, considering potential gaps in protection.23 
However, in order to understand the importance of the inclusion of collective 
punishment in the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions, one has to take a look at the 
negotiation process. This process reveals that there has not been a common 
understanding of the issue from the start, with some states still favouring an approach 
similar to Article 50 Hague Regulations. For instance, India backed by the United 
Kingdom proposed an amendment to the Third Geneva Convention that ‘[c]ollective 
hunger strikes and political propaganda in the camps shall be subject to punishment of 
a disciplinary nature’ – an amendment which was denounced by the  Conference as 
effectively permitting collective punishment and in the end rejected. 24  Nevertheless, 
India backed by the United Kingdom kept trying to include a provision permitting 
collective punishment, in even more explicit terms: ‘[C]ollective punishment is 
permitted where the offence is not entirely limited to a particular individual and other 
prisoners of war are implicated by connivance or otherwise.’25 With no member of the 
Sub-Committee being in favour of the proposal, it was rejected – as were following 
attempts by India to introduce collective ‘disciplinary penalties’.26 
Addressing collective punishment in the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Italian 
delegation proposed that collective penalties – which it changed later to ‘collective 
punishments’ – should be included in the list of ‘grave breaches’ mentioned in the 
Convention. However, the United Kingdom and the United States opposed the 
amendment by arguing that ‘such penalties are not always illegal’. Following a debate 
and the Netherlands’ reassurance to Italy that collective punishment was prohibited 
under the Fourth Geneva Convention anyway, the amendment was rejected.27 
These excerpts from the negotiations preceding the adoption of the four Geneva 
Conventions show the controversies surrounding the issue of collective punishment. 
                                                          
22 Darcy, S. (2007) supra note 8, p.53; Von Glahn, G. (1957). The Occupation of Enemy Territory. 
Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, p.234. 
23 Uhler, O.M. & Coursier, H. (eds.) (1958) supra note 7, pp.225, 227ff; Darcy, S. (2007) supra 
note 8, p.55. 
24 Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, Volume II, Section A, pp.499f. 
25 Final Record Volume II, Section A supra note 24, pp.501f. 
26 Final Record Volume II, Section A supra note 24, p.523. 
27 Final Record Volume II, Section A supra note 24, pp.648f; Final Record of the Diplomatic 
Conference of Geneva of 1949, Volume II, Section B, pp.89ff. 
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Although the prohibition prevailed in the final draft, states were concerned about 
limiting their means of warfare.28 
In comparison to the negotiations surrounding the Additional Protocols to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1977, the drafting process of the four Conventions could be described as 
straightforward and uncomplicated. Interestingly, while not discussing the substantial 
provisions on collective punishment extensively, the conference meetings did show a 
certain change in tone. While the negotiations on the four Geneva Conventions have been 
objective and calm overall, the negotiations on the Additional Protocols were 
surrounded by political statements and heated arguments. Preceding conferences on the 
law of armed conflict were attended by a rather modest number of mostly Western 
states. However, around 700 delegates from all parts of the world participated in the 
negotiations on the Additional Protocols, including not only newly independent states 
but also national liberation movements. As this list of attendees already indicates, one 
impetus of initiating a reform of the law of armed conflict was the decolonisation process 
and wars of national liberation calling for a revision of fundamental principles of this 
legal regime, including the situation of guerrilla fighters in the context of the definition 
of combatants and prisoners of war.29  
With both Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation sitting at one table, the mood 
was rather tense. Israel used several chances to remind the international audience of the 
persecution of Jewish people during the Second World War – an undisputable and 
gruesome history. However, it used it as part of an argument regarding Israel’s fight for 
self-determination on Palestinian territory, while at the same time, calling the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation a ‘terrorist group’ which ‘was not striving to liberate anyone’ 
but ‘to destroy the Jewish people’s right of self-determination’. Inevitably, reactions from 
Israel’s Arab neighbour states in favour of the Palestinian people and from the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation followed suit and fuelled the dispute, with the President of the 
Conference finally calling for order and to ‘avoid any political polemics’.30 
                                                          
28 Wallace, G. (2012). Regulating Conflict: Historical Legacies and State Commitment to the Laws 
of War, Foreign Policy Analysis, 8, pp.151-172, pp.153ff. 
29 Alexander, A. (2015). A Short History of International Humanitarian Law, European Journal of 
International Law, 26 (1), pp.109-138, pp.124ff; Harroff-Tavel, M. (2014). The International 
Committee of the Red Cross and the promotion of International Humanitarian Law: Looking 
back, looking forward, International Review of the Red Cross, 96 (895/896), pp.817-857, pp.826f. 
30 Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of 
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1974–1977), Volume 
VII, pp.256ff, see also pp.215ff. 
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A more substantive discussion was held about the permissibility of reprisals as 
documented by Volume 9 of the records of the Additional Protocol’s drafting 
negotiations.31 Although about reprisals and not about collective punishment, the debate 
highlights the decolonisation context and the different agendas pursued by states and 
serves as an indicator for broader policy stances encompassing collective punishment as 
well.  
A French amendment argued for the inclusion of a provision governing the permissibility 
of reprisals under certain conditions. 32  However, other states such as the German 
Democratic Republic and Norway rightly addressed the faults of such a provision - 
civilians would have to bear the brunt of such reprisals, which were also prone to misuse; 
they could trigger counter-reprisals and, as mentioned by Norway, a minority regime 
fighting against a national liberation movement would hardly care about civilian losses 
and would therefore not be forced to adhere to its international obligations by reprisals, 
calling into doubt the effectiveness of such an endeavour.33 The delegate of the German 
Democratic Republic rightfully asked: ‘Were some delegations prepared to allow, for a 
grave violation, the collective punishment of a civilian population, without any 
procedural guarantees, instead of the prosecution, under a universal jurisdiction, of 
those responsible?’ 34  The British delegation countered this harsh condemnation by 
pointing to a ‘mischievous tendency of artificiality’ in international law-making and 
noted that ‘false expectations of high standards in war could only lead to bitter 
disappointment’.35 In the end, the French proposal was withdrawn. However, it was not 
replaced by a stricter prohibition of reprisals as some delegates might have hoped, but 
it was decided to omit a general prohibition of reprisals and to keep some specific 
prohibitions instead, eventually giving in to state pressure on retaining reprisals as a 
form of enforcement.36 
The importance some states attached to their means of warfare could be well illustrated 
by the decolonisation process. France and the United Kingdom had been recently 
                                                          
31 Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of 
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1974–1977), Volume 
IX, pp.70ff. 
32 For the text of the amendment see: Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the 
Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed 
Conflicts, Geneva (1974–1977), Volume III, p.323. 
33 Official Records Volume IX supra note 31, pp.75f. 
34 Official Records Volume IX supra note 31, p.71. 
35 Official Records Volume IX supra note 31, p.73. 
36 Official Records Volume IX supra note 31, pp.92f; see also the withdrawn Polish amendment: 
Official Records Volume III supra note 32, p.313. 
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involved in conflicts in their colonies – the French in Algeria and the British in Kenya – 
and they used collective punishment as a measure to contain the rebellious 
populations.37 In addition, both states denied the existence of a non-international armed 
conflict on these territories, calling the situation an “emergency” instead. With regards 
to the parties involved, neither the British nor the French did consider the fighters 
opposing the colonial regime as prisoners of war or combatants, but as criminals or 
terrorists to be dealt with under national criminal law.38 
Debates in the British House of Lords on collective punishment and its imposition in 
Kenya reveal a strong inclination towards keeping the policy despite some criticism. An 
example for justifying this policy by simply renaming it to counter the criticism could be 
found in the Earl of Listowel’s statement in 1952. He considered the term ‘a little 
misleading’ and favoured the term ‘collective inducement’ or ‘collective deterrent’ 
instead: ‘[C]ollective inducement to help the Administration in the restoration of law and 
order, and collective deterrent to people who would otherwise throw in their lot with 
the terrorists and co-operate with them.’39 This line of argument might look familiar, as 
it is being used by Israel to justify its actions in the Occupied Palestinian Territories 
discussed in the next chapter. However, already at this stage, it is useful to point at this 
contingency of reasoning, based on aversion to certain groups and movements and a 
strategic use of terminology in order to avoid situations conferring rights or protection 
onto them – as seen here with the British and French denying the existence of an armed 
conflict, just as Israel is denying the application of the law of armed conflict in its full 
extent to the situation on the Palestinian territories. 
Still, when faced with strong policy resentments as witnessed in the drafting history of 
the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, the fact, that ultimately, a 
prohibition of collective punishment was achieved, appears the more important. 
                                                          
37 Whittaker, H. (2015). Legacies of Empire: State Violence and Collective Punishment in 
Kenya's North Eastern Province, c. 1963–Present, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History, 43 (4), pp.641-657, pp.643ff; Elkins, C. (2005). Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of 
Britain‘s Gulag in Kenya. New York, Holt, pp.70ff; Anderson, D. (2005). Histories of the Hanged: 
Britain’s Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire. London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, pp.45f, 90ff; 
Klose, F. (2009). Menschenrechte im Schatten kolonialer Gewalt: Die Dekolonisierungskriege in 
Kenia und Algerien 1945-1962. München, Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, pp.29ff, 78ff, 171ff. 
38 Klose, F. (2011). The Colonial Testing Ground: The International Committee of the Red Cross 
and the Violent End of Empire, Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, 
Humanitarianism, and Development, 2 (1), pp.107-126, pp.109ff. 
39 HL Deb 26 November 1952 vol 179 cc586-634, Collective Punishment in Kenya, Earl of 
Listowel, para.608f, online available at: 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1952/nov/26/collective-punishment-in-
kenya#S5LV0179P0_19521126_HOL_90 (accessed on 15/04/18). 
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Similarly, these policy choices make such a prohibition necessary and, as will be seen in 
the case study on the Occupied Palestinian Territories, the prohibition of collective 
punishment offers a tool to affected groups to highlight violations of the law of armed 
conflict and file court cases in this regard. Although the debates surrounding the 
adoption of the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols revolved not so much 
around the groups directly affected by collective punishment such as civilians or 
prisoners of war, they touched upon the groups which are affected by it in the broader 
sense, namely national liberation movements or peoples. And although this additional 
discriminatory element is not required by the prohibition of collective punishment, it 
highlights the broader policy choices of states and the importance of having a 
substantive rule challenging state behaviour and documenting state practice. 
Following this account of the negotiation process of the Additional Protocols, the 
prohibition of collective punishment adopted in Additional Protocol I regulating 
international armed conflicts is addressed briefly. The explicit prohibition of collective 
punishment40 was included to clarify that collective punishment can be imposed by a 
variety of means which are not confined to judicial procedures, covered elsewhere in the 
Protocol.41 Its commentary states that ‘the concept … covers not only legal sentences but 
sanctions and harassment of any sort, administrative, by police action or otherwise.’42 
Furthermore, the Protocol reaffirms the principle of individual responsibility. 43 
Underlying this provision was the condemnation of ‘convictions of persons on account 
of their membership of a group or organization’ in particular regarding collective 
punishment of families, or inhabitants of specific districts or buildings.44 Furthermore, 
the replacement of acts ‘committed’ as in Article 33 (1) Fourth Geneva Convention with 
acts for which persons ‘bear responsibility’ does justice to vicarious liability and 
instances of complicity, since a prohibition of collective punishment should not be used 
                                                          
40 1125 UNTS 3, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Geneva (8 June 1977) 
Article 75 (2)(d). 
41 Sandoz, Y., Swinarski, C. & Zimmermann, B. (eds.)(1987). Commentary on the Additional 
Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949. Geneva, Martinus Nijhoff, 
p.874, para.3054. 
42 Sandoz, Y., Swinarski, C. & Zimmermann, B. (eds.)(1987) supra note 41, p.874, para.3055. 
43 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions (Protocol I) supra note 2, Article 75 (4)(b). 
44 Sandoz, Y., Swinarski, C. & Zimmermann, B. (eds.)(1987) supra note 41, pp.880f, para.3098. 
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in order to avoid responsibility resulting from such acts, but rather to protect the 
innocent.45   
To sum up, collective punishment is prohibited by treaty law in international armed 
conflicts. The most important provisions today are encompassed in the Geneva 
Conventions and their Additional Protocol I. However, the decision to adopt a 
prohibition of collective punishment in international armed conflicts was preceded by 
debates showing the different policy stances of states on the issue and an increasing 
hostility towards the protection of groups other than states participating in armed 
conflict in general. Nevertheless, as far as international armed conflicts are concerned, 
states were finally able to agree on a prohibition of collective punishment. In particular 
the broadening of the prohibition regarding civilians in armed conflict represents an 
important feature for the present thesis, keeping in mind the examples of house 
destruction and family responsibility focussed on in the case studies and the possibility 
for affected groups to use the prohibition to draw attention to such violations. 
3.1.2.1.2 Non-international armed conflicts 
After this analysis of the regulation of collective punishment in international armed 
conflicts, the concept will subsequently be examined under the framework for non-
international armed conflicts. For instance, collective punishment in the form of house 
destruction harming innocent civilians is being used and has been used during 
international and non-international armed conflicts. For this reason, treaty provisions 
regulating the conduct in non-international armed conflicts have to consider the notion 
of collective punishment as well. Non-international armed conflicts were conceived as 
an internal matter not suitable to be regulated internationally for a long time – not at 
least because states preferred to treat insurgents as criminals, sceptical about any rules 
that would protect them. Still, the four Geneva Conventions include a rule on conflicts 
not of an international character, Common Article 3. This provision and the subsequent 
developments in Additional Protocol II are discussed in the following, leading to the 
conclusion that collective punishment is prohibited in non-international armed conflicts 
as well. 
This formal conclusion will be accompanied by a look at the drafting process of relevant 
instruments regulating the law of armed conflict, exposing state policies favouring the 
                                                          
45 Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of 
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1974–1977), Volume 
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possibility to resort to collective punishment whenever they considered necessary. This 
discussion was held in the context of non-international armed conflicts and the 
decolonisation process, where several states remained suspicious towards outside 
interference, as already mentioned in the section above. However, whereas the 
preceding section showed that states agreed on more substantive prohibitions of 
collective punishment in international armed conflicts, they did not show the same 
willingness concerning non-international armed conflicts – not least due to the changing 
parties involved. While opponents in international armed conflicts were considered on 
eye level, the groups involved in non-international armed conflicts were often not 
recognised by states. Therefore, the establishment of a prohibition of collective 
punishment applicable in non-international armed conflicts proved to be more difficult, 
with some states openly opposing any measures protecting non-state actors.46 Given 
these policy tendencies of retaining collective punishment for internal situations, the 
adopted prohibition can support affected groups by providing them with the legal tools 
to make their case. 
Although the four Geneva Conventions represent a cornerstone in the development of 
the law of armed conflict, they still left some important questions unanswered and some 
issues untouched. Amongst them, the most pressing is the consideration of armed 
conflicts not of an international character and their parties – only addressed in Common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.47 Common Article 3 includes some basic guarantees 
for non-international armed conflicts to ensure the humane treatment of the groups 
protected under the Conventions.48  
Although Common Article 3 does not include a rule on collective punishment,  its 
paragraph 1 (d) on judicial guarantees could potentially be seen as slightly more than a 
fair trial provision.49 According to its commentary, Common Article 3 (1) (d) opposes 
‘summary justice’ because ‘it adds too many further innocent victims to all the other 
                                                          
46 Chadwick, E. (1996). Self-Determination, Terrorism and the International Humanitarian Law of 
Armed Conflict. Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, pp.81f; Fryer, E.D. (1977). Applicability of International 
Law to Internal Armed Conflicts: Old Problems, Current Endeavors, The International Lawyer, 
11 (3), pp.567-572, pp.569f; Yingling, R.T. & Ginnane, R.W. (1952). The Geneva Conventions of 
1949, American Journal of International Law, 46 (3), pp.393-427, pp.395ff. 
47 Darcy, S. (2015) supra note 1, pp.1164ff. 
48 Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, supra note 2, 
Article 3 (1). 
49 See for a similar argumentation regarding the war crime of collective punishment: Schabas, 
W.A. (2006). The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra 
Leone. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p.279. 
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innocent victims of the conflict.’50 In addition, collective punishment taking the form of 
any act mentioned in Common Article 3 such as violence to life, hostage-taking, outrages 
on personal dignity or refusal of fair trial rights is prohibited. However, collective 
punishment as such is not listed as a prohibited act under the article.51 Even though 
many acts of collective punishment might be covered by the other prohibited acts 
mentioned in Common Article 3, the specific and independent character of collective 
punishment fails to be recognised. 
Fortunately, explicit provisions on collective punishment in non-international armed 
conflicts appeared with the Additional Protocols in 1977. Additional Protocol II is 
applicable to non-international armed conflicts between state armed forces and 
‘dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible 
command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out 
sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.’52 Article 1 
(2) explicitly excludes ‘situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, 
isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being 
armed conflicts’ from the scope of the Protocol.  
Additional Protocol II includes the prohibition of collective punishment in its 
fundamental guarantees in Article 4 informed by ‘the intention to give the rule the widest 
possible scope’.53 Collective punishment ‘shall remain prohibited at any time and in any 
place whatsoever’.54 In addition, threats of any act mentioned in the foregoing list are 
prohibited, therefore including collective punishment.55 The scope of the prohibition 
encompasses not only civilians but also persons who are hors de combat and not 
participating in hostilities anymore.56 Furthermore, the Protocol includes a provision 
                                                          
50 Uhler, O.M. & Coursier, H. (eds.) (1958) supra note 7, p.39; see also: International Committee 
of the Red Cross (2016). Commentary on the First Geneva Convention: Convention (I) for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field. 2nd edition, 
online version available at: https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/full/GCI-commentary (accessed 
on 15/04/18) para.675. 
51 Darcy, S. (2015) supra note 1, p.1164f. 
52 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions (Protocol II) supra note 2, Article 1 (1). 
53 Sandoz, Y., Swinarski, C. & Zimmermann, B. (eds.)(1987) supra note 41, p.1374; Bothe, M., 
Partsch, K.J. & Solf, W.A. (2013). New rules for victims of armed conflicts: commentary on the two 
1977 protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. 2nd edition. Leiden, Martinus 
Nijhoff, pp.520, 736. 
54 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions (Protocol II) supra note 2, Article 4 (2)(b). 
55 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions (Protocol II) supra note 2, Article 4 (2)(h). 
56 Darcy, S. (2015) supra note 1, pp.1164ff; Bothe, M., Partsch, K.J. & Solf, W.A. (2013) supra note 
54, p.734; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions (Protocol II) supra note 2, Article 4 
(1). 
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reaffirming the principle of individual responsibility building on the same deliberation 
as the respective rule in Additional Protocol I.57 
Another important link between Additional Protocol I and II is the classification of 
certain armed conflicts. Armed conflicts between a state and organised armed groups 
are non-international armed conflicts.58 However, as Article 1 (4) of Additional Protocol 
I sets out, conflicts ‘in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien 
occupation and against racist régimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination’ 
are considered international armed conflicts. 59  This categorisation is of importance 
since the case studies address groups such as minorities and peoples in their broader 
context – in particular regarding the case of the Occupied Palestinian Territories. 
In the final stages of the negotiations of the Additional Protocols, Israel was the only state 
to vote against Article 1 Additional Protocol I – 87 states in favour and 11 abstentions, 
amongst them the United Kingdom, Canada, Spain, France and the United States.60 In the 
explanation of its vote, Israel made clear that it had no issue with the first three 
paragraphs of the Article, but ‘totally objected’ to paragraph four.61 It argued that ‘any 
reference to the motives and cause for which belligerents were fighting was in clear 
contradiction to the spirit and accepted norms of international humanitarian law’ and 
therefore, Article 1 (4) was ‘not a legal norm’, but rather ‘a carefully drafted 
condemnation of a well-deserved benediction’. Furthermore, Israel objected to a system 
giving rights and obligations to non-state entities, arguing that they would not be able to 
comply with their obligations before concluding that ‘the Conference had attempted to 
introduce political resolutions’ which would damage the law of armed conflict in the long 
term.62 
In the following explanation of votes, several states in favour of Article 1 (4) refuted 
Israel’s objections in more or less harsh contributions, amongst them the Soviet Union, 
                                                          
57 Bothe, M., Partsch, K.J. & Solf, W.A. (2013) supra note 54, pp.743ff; Sandoz, Y., Swinarski, C. & 
Zimmermann, B. (eds.)(1987) supra note 41, pp.1398f, para.4603. 
58 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions (Protocol II) supra note 2, Article 1; Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions (Protocol I) supra note 2, Articles 1 & 2. 
59 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions (Protocol I) supra note 2, Article 1 (4); Darcy, 
S. (2007) supra note 8, p.65; Moir, L. (2002). The Law of Internal Armed Conflict. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, pp.89ff, 263ff. 
60 Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of The 
law of armed conflict Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1974–1977), Volume VI, p.41. 
61 Official Records Volume VI supra note 61, p.41. 
62 Official Records Volume VI supra note 61, pp.41f; see also Official Records of the Diplomatic 
Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law 
Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1974–1977), Volume VII, pp.215ff. 
 
 
  57 
 
Egypt and of course, the Palestine Liberation Organisation with the most thorough 
rebuttal coming from Georges Abi-Saab speaking for Egypt. He even questioned whether 
Israel objected to the universally recognised right to self-determination of peoples in 
general. Regarding Israel’s point that paragraph four reflected a negative politicisation 
of the Additional Protocol, Egypt countered: ‘Struggles against colonial domination, alien 
occupation and racist régimes were, however, specific applications of the principle of 
self-determination, which was unquestionably a legal principle: was it political to take 
into consideration some of the atrocious and murderous armed conflicts being waged in 
the present-day world?’63 
The Observer for the Palestine Liberation Organisation welcomed the vote as well, 
expressing satisfaction that an overwhelming majority of states had supported Article 1. 
Regarding the Palestinians’ struggle for self-determination, the delegate saw the 
Palestinian people as falling under all three categories of Article 1 (4) Additional 
Protocol I: ‘[T]hey were under colonial domination; their territory was under foreign 
occupation, despite the assertions of the terrorist Begin; and they were suffering under 
a racist régime, since Zionism had been recognized in a United Nations resolution as a 
form of racism.’64  
On this mention of Begin, Israel stated later on that it considered him a ‘a leader of an 
underground guerrilla movement fighting for the self-determination and independence 
of Israel’. 65  The debate between Israel and Palestine went on over the Deir Yassin 
massacre and Palestinian attacks on Israeli civilians.66 As one might deduce from these 
statements, the negotiations on such sensitive issues were stirring emotions on all 
sides.67 However, except for Israel, other states with objections decided to abstain. Still, 
the abstentions were interpreted by the delegate of the Zimbabwe African National 
Union in the following way: ‘The truth was that the United Kingdom, the United States of 
America and others did not wish to offend South Africa, Portugal and Israel, who were 
their agents in the perpetual exploitation of colonial peoples.’68 While the groups directly 
affected by collective punishment such as families whose houses are demolished (which 
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means civilians) do not need to exhibit particular shared characteristics, those families 
belong to a larger group, namely the Palestinians and therefore, the debate on those 
broader issues matters for the empowerment of the Palestinians in their struggle for 
justice. 
The often political significance of international treaty regulations has been visible in the 
course of the negotiations of the Geneva Conventions as well as their Additional 
Protocols and offers important insights into the states’ understanding of their range of 
powers and obligations, highlighting the significance of a prohibition of collective 
punishment. However, when researching on provisions on collective punishment in 
academic literature, less explicit tendencies are visible as well. Apart from obvious cases 
for or against a particular side such as Meir Shamgar’s defence of Israel’s stance in the 
present context,69 silences in relevant textbooks or commentaries are more problematic. 
In this regard, the recent commentary from Partsch, Bothe and Solf New rules for victims 
of armed conflicts: commentary on the two 1977 protocols additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 from 2013 has to be mentioned. The elaboration on collective 
punishment is limited to one sentence on the provision in Additional Protocol I and three 
sentences on Additional Protocol II. In addition, it is not referred to the 1987 
Commentary but only once to a short paragraph included in a report to Committee III 
during the negotiations on Additional Protocol I.70  
Darcy on the other hand refers to a broad range of sources in his 2007 monograph 
Collective Responsibility and Accountability under International Law, including the 1987 
Commentary and offers a comprehensive and very useful account of collective 
punishment. However, the Partsch, Bothe and Solf commentary – being a commentary 
on the entire Additional Protocols, a discussion of collective punishment as detailed as 
Darcy’s would not have been expected – appears to almost neglect the issue. This silence 
could be problematic as it does not draw the reader’s attention to the concept of 
collective punishment, not doing justice to its relevance today and its ongoing imposition 
on innocent people. Having read solely their commentary, one would not be aware of the 
significance of the prohibition of collective punishment or of its implications in practice. 
                                                          
69 Look eg at: Shamgar, M. (1971). The Observance of International Law in the Administered 
Territories, reprinted in Dinstein, Y. & Domb, F. (eds.)(2011). The Progression of International 
Law: Four Decades of the Israel Yearbook on Human Rights – An Anniversary Volume. Leiden, 
Martinus Nijhoff, pp.429-446. 
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Interestingly enough, both, Partsch and Bothe, were themselves involved in the 
negotiation of the Additional Protocols as part of the German Federal Republic’s 
delegation, where their contributions to the debate on collective punishment were 
rather modest.71 While it is true that it is up to the author to set priorities and discuss 
them in more detail, this should not be at the cost of other similarly important areas. To 
balance these decisions, the commentary could have at least referred to a broad list of 
further readings to mention the collective punishment debate. With the Additional 
Protocols being the most recent treaties regulating the law of armed conflict including a 
prohibition of collective punishment, it might be hoped that the next commentary would 
consider the concept accordingly. 
In conclusion, this part has shown that collective punishment is prohibited in non-
international armed conflicts. Although it took longer to reach an agreement on this 
issue than with international armed conflicts, the prohibition of collective punishment 
is now part of the fundamental guarantees. However, the threshold to trigger the 
application of Additional Protocol II limits the number of non-international armed 
conflicts including an explicit prohibition of collective punishment, except for conflicts 
falling under Article 1 (4) Additional Protocol I. For this reason, the consideration of 
collective punishment in customary international law, irrespective of the type of armed 
conflict discussed below represents a sound addition to those treaty provisions, covering 
existing gaps in protection. 
3.1.2.2 Customary international law 
Article 1 (2) of Additional Protocol I states that ‘[i]n cases not covered by this Protocol 
or by other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the 
protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established 
custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience.’72 
This statement highlights the recognition and importance of customary international 
law. Subsequently, the customary rules on collective punishment are going to be outlined 
based on a comprehensive study on customary international law undertaken by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, ultimately outlawing collective punishment 
in international and non-international armed conflicts.  
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As mentioned above, the treaty provisions on collective punishment are only applicable 
to state parties to the relevant instrument and if the situation in question meets the 
required criteria. These preliminary questions could pose particular difficulties in 
relation to non-international armed conflicts due to the high threshold applied by 
Additional Protocol II. Furthermore, as will be seen in the case study in the next chapter, 
Israel is neither party to Additional Protocol I nor Additional Protocol II.73 Under such 
circumstances, the examination of customary international law in search of common 
safeguards and fundamental guarantees can offer another way of protecting affected 
groups from collective punishment. 
The study on customary international law conducted by the International Committee of 
the Red Cross contains two rules relating to collective punishment: ‘No one may be 
convicted of an offence except on the basis of individual criminal responsibility. 74 
Collective punishments are prohibited.’ 75  According to the study, the prohibition of 
collective punishment and the principle of individual criminal responsibility are linked, 
with collective punishment being broader in scope as it covers not only criminal 
sanctions.76  
The general acceptance of the prohibition of collective punishment could be supported 
by the practice of courts on national and international level and of international 
organisations. In the aftermath of the Second World War, several national courts were 
dealing with cases on collective punishment. The Military Tribunal of Rome ruled in the 
Priebke case that the killing of 335 people as response to the killing of several German 
officers was in violation of the rules on collective punishment.77 The Dutch Special Court 
of Cassation ruled that the imposition of fines by Nazi Germany on a part of the Dutch 
population sufficed to trigger the prohibition of collective punishment and that Germany 
                                                          
73 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I) 
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https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=08000002800f3cb8 (accessed on 
15/04/18). 
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75 Henckaerts, J.M. & Doswald-Beck, L. (eds.) (2005) supra note 75, p.374 (Rule 103). 
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could not refer to Article 50 of the Hague Regulations to justify its actions based on an 
alleged passive responsibility of the Dutch population if it had provoked the attacks by 
‘deliberate acts of injustice’.78 Aside from cases originating from the Second World War, 
a case of collective punishment was discussed by a United States’ Army Court. 
Considering the killing of South Vietnamese civilians, it found that ‘slaughtering many 
for the presumed delicts of a few is not a lawful response to the delicts’.79  
Turning to the international level, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia has ruled in the case Mucić et al. on confinement measures regarding civilians. 
Such acts had to be subjected to individual evaluation, outlawing any collective 
imposition.80 Furthermore, the Special Court for Sierra Leone has dealt with collective 
punishment in several cases. In the Brima, Kamara and Kanu judgment the Court 
adopted a broad approach, highlighting the nature of collective punishment as an 
independent war crime: ‘The Trial Chamber considers that collective punishments and 
acts of terror pursuant to Articles 3 (b) and 3 (d) both require a specific purpose - either 
to terrorise or to punish. These crimes do not necessarily require evidence of violence 
to life, health and physical well-being of persons ….’81  
In addition, the customary character of the prohibition is backed by national regulations. 
Amongst others, Israel’s Manual of the Laws of War includes an absolute prohibition of 
the collective punishment of prisoners of war.82 The Russian Military Manual bans the 
collective punishment of ‘war victims’ by reference to the Geneva Conventions and 
Additional Protocol I.83 
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79 United States v First Lieutenant William L. Calley, Jr. (Judgment) 46 Court of Military Review 
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However, the question of whether the prohibition of collective punishment amounts to 
jus cogens as well, is still open to debate. Referring to a study on jus cogens by 
Hannikainen, Darcy mentioned that there might be caveats regarding the level of 
severity of the collective punishment imposed, meaning that particularly harsh 
measures for instance relating to death sentences might have this peremptory character, 
whereas milder collective punishments have not.84 
To sum up the observations made above, collective punishment is prohibited under the 
law of armed conflict and customary international law concerning international as well 
as non-international armed conflicts.85 This finding represents an important backup of 
existing treaty regulations in cases which are not covered by them or concerning states 
which are not party to the relevant treaties. The reaffirmation of the prohibition of 
collective punishment in customary international law creates another layer of protection 
and stands against opposite state policies, in particular when it comes to non-
international armed conflicts. 
3.1.2.3 International Criminal Law 
Collective punishment is not only prohibited under the law of armed conflict but has 
been considered a war crime by two international criminal tribunals. The war crime of 
collective punishment is explicitly enshrined in the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone and the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and its 
formulation is based on Article 4 of Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions. 86  The Special Court for Sierra Leone has ruled on the war crime of 
collective punishment in its Trial and Appeals Chamber in the case Fofana and Kondewa 
in 2007 and 2008.87 However, the definition of the war crime of collective punishment 
the Special Court has developed in this case is discussed in the next section in more detail 
as it is useful for the analysis of the act of collective punishment in general. 
However, collective punishment is not explicitly mentioned as a war crime in the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 8 of the Rome Statute encompasses 
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an exhaustive list of war crimes and although collective punishment was mentioned in 
earlier proposals, it was not included in the final version of the Statute.88 After providing 
a convincing account of the standing of the war crime of collective punishment in 
customary international law, Darcy argues for the inclusion of collective punishment as 
a war crime in the Rome Statute by way of an amendment. Given the limited scope of ad 
hoc international criminal tribunals such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the 
International Criminal Court, having jurisdiction over international crimes not limited to 
specific circumstances would be well placed to deal with such a war crime and he makes 
the practical point on the Court’s potential ability to decide on collective punishment in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories.89Although it remains to be seen whether the state 
parties to the International Criminal Court will adopt an amendment for the inclusion of 
the war crime of collective punishment into the Rome Statute, the surrounding debate 
pointing to evidence of such a war crime under customary international law highlights 
the seriousness of acts of collective punishment. The definition and scope thereof are 
discussed in the following. 
3.1.3 Definition and scope of collective punishment 
As the evaluation of treaty and customary international law has shown, the prohibition 
of collective punishment in times of armed conflict is a well-established principle. 
However, most treaties solely prohibit collective punishment without defining it. The 
lack of a definition poses difficulties in particular regarding the delineation of collective 
punishment from other acts such as belligerent reprisals. For this reason, the section will 
start with a short description of belligerent reprisals before discussing the act of 
collective punishment in more detail.  
Belligerent reprisals are aimed at the restoration of lawful behaviour of the opposing 
party in an armed conflict and the enforcement of compliance with the applicable rules. 
Although this definition seems to clarify the distinction between collective punishment 
and belligerent reprisals, a look at their use in practice tells a different story.  These 
concepts have been confused in the past due to the widespread use of the term “reprisal” 
in a broader, non-legal sense. 90  Furthermore, collective punishment and belligerent 
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reprisals have taken various similar forms in the past, such as attacks against civilians 
or civilian property.91  
Belligerent reprisals are acts contrary to the law of armed conflict, undertaken in 
response to a prior serious violation thereof by the other party, in order to restore 
compliance with those rules. Since it might be difficult to identify the motivation behind 
such an act as securing respect for the law of armed conflict and not only revenge or 
punishment, the nature of such acts has to be distinguished from collective punishment 
in practice. 92  To distinguish these two notions, Rabbat and Mehring hold that 
‘[b]elligerent reprisals need not target a group as such, whereas the collective nature of 
the sanction is crucial for the classification of an act as collective punishment.’93 
Coming to examples for acts of collective punishment, Darcy mentions Germany’s 
actions against the Russian population during the Second World War, including mass 
executions and property destruction, intensified by the ‘scorched-earth policy’ during its 
retreat. Regarding colonial conflicts, British emergency regulations and ordinances 
provided for the imposition of collective punishment in Palestine, Cyprus, Nigeria and 
Kenya, just to name a few. 94  Practices such as the levying of collective fines, the 
destruction or closing of shops and dwellings or the use of curfews as punishment were 
commonly used in such cases.95  A more recent example of collective punishment in 
international armed conflicts could be provided by the United States’ invasion of Iraq in 
                                                          
Military Tribunal, Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, 1, pp.354-361, pp.354ff; 
Henckaerts, J.M. & Doswald-Beck, L. (eds.) (2005) supra note 79, p.2508. 
91 Garner, J.W. (1917). Community Fines and Collective Responsibility, American Journal of 
International Law, 11 (3), pp.511-537, p.514 (see eg the destruction of the town Fontenoy in 
France by German troops during the First World War after a railroad bridge was blown up and 
it was unclear whether civilians or the military was responsible); Kwakwa, E. (1990). 
Belligerent Reprisals in the Law of Armed Conflict, Stanford Journal of International Law, 27, 
pp.49-81, pp.54ff (see eg the burning of the Belgian University of Louvain by Germans during 
the First World War as reprisals for alleged civilian attacks against German troops). 
92 De Hemptinne, J. (2015). Prohibition of Reprisals, in Clapham, A., Gaeta, P. & Sassòli, M. (eds.). 
The 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Commentary. Oxford, Oxford University Press pp.575-596, 
pp.580ff; Darcy, S. (2015) supra note 1, pp.1163f. 
93 Rabbat, P. & Mehring, S. (2011). Collective Punishment, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law, para.3. 
94 Darcy, S. (2015) supra note 1, p.1161; Lemkin, R. (1944). Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. 
Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, pp.236f. 
95 Simpson, A.W.B. (2004). Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the 
European Convention. revised edition. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp.940ff, 955ff; on 
Cyprus see eg: HC Deb 21 December 1956 vol 562 cc1609-40, Cyprus (Emergency Regulations) 
Mr.Robinson, para.1613, online available at: 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1956/dec/21/cyprus-emergency-regulations 
(accessed on 15/04/18). 
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2003 when they besieged Fallujah or, as described in more detail in the next chapter, 
Israel’s continuing actions in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.96 
One basic principle almost always referred to in the course of collective punishment is 
the principle of individual liability – punishment is personal. However, there is more to 
collective punishment than a violation of this principle. The intent behind it is the 
punishment of a certain distinguished group – to impose harm on a  group of people 
collectively for acts they have not committed and they bear no responsibility for 
otherwise. 97  This group-based nature appears to be always assumed or taken for 
granted in the law of armed conflict, since this framework is tailored to groups such as 
civilians. 98  This might be one of the reasons why this characteristic  of collective 
punishment has not received much attention in the context of the law of armed conflict 
so far.  
However, in the context of the present thesis this matter is of utmost importance. 
Therefore, the act of collective punishment has to be defined in order to understand the 
criteria to which a potential prohibition of collective punishment under human rights 
law needs to respond to. This does not include any attempt to apply the law of armed 
conflict outside of its scope, but rather means that this area of law represents the starting 
point for the analysis of collective punishment and its origins. This undertaking should 
finally lead to an understanding of the act of collective punishment in order to define its 
effects and potential regulation in situations governed by human rights law. It is not the 
legal regulation of the law of armed conflict on collective punishment that has to be 
translated, but the act itself and a regulation under human rights law has to be found 
separately. This translation is necessary due to the imposition of collective punishment 
outside of its original domain – in situations governed by human rights law instead of by 
the law of armed conflict. 
Rabbat and Mehring define collective punishment as ‘a form of sanction imposed on 
persons or a group of persons in response to a crime committed by one of them or a 
member of the group’.99 Punishment is imposed on them due to their identification with 
a certain group. As Rabbat and Mehring state: ‘The persons protected against collective 
                                                          
96 Darcy, S. (2015) supra note 1, p.1161; Shehata, S. (2005). Losing Hearts and Minds: 
Understanding America's Failure in Iraq, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 6 (1), 
pp.71-80, pp.77f. 
97 See the Fofana and Kondewa judgment of the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone below. 
98 Provost, R. (2002) supra note 6, pp.34ff. 
99 Rabbat, P. & Mehring, S. (2011) supra note 93, para.1. 
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punishment are those vulnerable groups who are dependent on an adversary, namely 
prisoners of war and civilian population in armed conflict.’100 Even though Rabbat and 
Mehring do not explicitly address the affiliation with a certain group in their definition 
of collective punishment, this element is inherent in the concept of the law of armed 
conflict. It is useful to highlight this characteristic at this point as it foreshadows the 
debate on group rights in human rights law later in the thesis. In the context of 
international criminal law, a mental element has been added to the definition in order to 
encompass the independent nature of the war crime of collective punishment. This 
mental element is the punisher’s intent to punish this specific group collectively for acts 
its members bear no individual responsibility for as discussed by the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone. 
The Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone elaborated on the war crime 
of collective punishment in its Fofana and Kondewa judgment. After several prior 
attempts to define the war crime of collective punishment in the Trial Chambers, the 
Appeals Chamber defined it as ‘indiscriminate punishment imposed collectively on 
persons for omissions or acts some or none of them may or may not have been 
responsible’ with ‘the specific intent of the perpetrator to punish collectively’.101 The 
Appeals Chamber expanded on this definition by distinguishing the act of targeting 
civilians from collective punishment:  
‘Thus, the mens rea element of collective punishments represents the critical 
difference between this crime and the act of targeting. While targeting takes 
place on account of who the victims are, or are perceived to be, the crime of 
collective punishments occurs in response to the acts or omissions of protected 
persons, whether real or perceived.’102  
The emphasis on a different mens rea, on a different intention behind the act, represents 
a significant element of the war crime of collective punishment.103 The judgment goes on, 
emphasising the different characteristics and material elements of each war crime under 
the Special Court’s statute:  
‘The crime of collective punishment requires proof of an intention to punish 
collectively, which murder, pillage and cruel treatment do not. In addition, 
                                                          
100 Rabbat, P. & Mehring, S. (2011) supra note 93, para.1. 
101 Fofana and Kondewa (SCSL-04-14-A) supra note 5, para.224. 
102 Fofana and Kondewa (SCSL-04-14-A) supra note 5, para.223. 
103 Darcy, S. (2015) supra note 1, pp.1168f; Darcy, S. (2010) supra note 89, pp.40ff. 
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murder requires the death of the victim, which collective punishment does not 
and pillage requires proof of appropriation which the crime of collective 
punishment does not.’104 
The Fofana and Kondewa judgment contributes in a significant way to a definition of the 
war crime of collective punishment. Still, the difficulties in establishing a general 
definition of the act of collective punishment as such might not end with the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, as international jurisprudence on the issue is scarce.105 On the 
other hand, this lack in turn encourages the attempt in the present thesis to contribute 
to this endeavour. Collective punishment is the punishment of a group as such for an act 
committed by one or some of its members for which the remaining members of the 
group do not bear individual responsibility. The different aspects of the act of collective 
punishment highlighted above indicate the challenges that lie ahead for a prohibition of 
collective punishment under human rights law. The ways in which this framework might 
respond to the collective nature of the act itself and the intent behind it are addressed in 
the relevant chapters to follow.  
3.1.4 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the legal regulation of collective punishment in the law of armed 
conflict. As shown by treaty law and custom, collective punishment is prohibited in 
international and non-international armed conflicts, with the most important 
instruments being the Geneva Conventions from 1949 and their 1977 Additional 
Protocols. Their adoption represents a major step towards the protection of civilians 
from collective punishment, especially if one thinks about the permissive Article 50 of 
the Hague Regulations applicable around a century ago. 
Still, the drafting process of the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols 
revealed state policies favouring the imposition of collective punishment and a general 
reluctance or even unwillingness to cede powers in order to protect parties to a conflict 
other than states. Seen from a broader perspective, the debates surrounding non-
international armed conflicts, national liberation movements and their status under the 
law of armed conflict are exemplary of this policy stance.  
Collective punishment is the punishment of a group as such for an act allegedly 
committed by one of its members for which they bear no individual responsibility.  While 
                                                          
104 Fofana and Kondewa (SCSL-04-14-A) supra note 5, para.225. 
105 Sivakumaran, S. (2010). War Crimes before the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, 8, pp.1009-1034, pp.1020ff. 
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establishing the foundation for the discussion of collective punishment under human 
rights law, the definition of collective punishment has also foreshadowed some 
challenges a prohibition of collective punishment under human rights law might face 
such as the group-based character of the act itself.  
This theoretical account of the legal regulation of collective punishment under the law 
of armed conflict will be complemented by the ensuing case study on the OPT looking at 
collective punishment in practice.
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3.2 Case study on the Occupied Palestinian Territories 
 
3.2.1 Introduction 
The following chapter examines Israel’s punitive house demolition policy in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) in relation to the prohibition of collective 
punishment under the law of armed conflict and group empowerment. To start with, the 
overall situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territories will be assessed in order to 
define the applicable legal framework. Subsequently, punitive house demolitions are 
discussed in more detail, starting with an overview of the general proceedings via the 
emergency regulation Israel is relying on, combined with judgments of the Israeli 
Supreme Court on the issue. These decisions will be analysed with regard to aspects of 
the prohibition of collective punishment under the law of armed conflict and broader 
justice and empowerment aspects regarding the role of international law in relation to 
groups. As Malloy holds in the context of minority empowerment: ‘[W]hen minorities 
mobilize on the basis of protection schemes by claiming their rights and calling on duty-
bearers to take responsibility, they move towards the goal of empowerment.’1 It will be 
argued that the prohibition of collective punishment under the law of armed conflict 
fulfils a twofold task – on one hand, it contributes to the empowerment of the 
Palestinians and on the other hand, it denies legality to Israel’s collective punishment 
policy. 
Owing to the chosen methodology, law has to be seen in relation to practice – how it is 
applied and what effects it has on real life situations. Therefore, the following case study 
illustrates the theoretical underpinnings of the previous chapter and links the legal 
regulation of collective punishment to state policies on it. In order to examine the actual 
effect of the relationship between the legal regulation of collective punishment and state 
policies thereon on the protection and empowerment of groups, examples from practice 
such as the situation in the OPT represent an essential component to understand law in 
context and deduce comparable standards and potential solutions for similar situations.  
The Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank is now in its fifth decade. 
Palestinian homes continue to be destroyed as part of a punitive house demolition policy 
pursued by the Israeli government. According to the government line, the demolitions 
                                                          
1 Malloy, T.H. (2014). National Minorities between Protection and Empowerment: Towards a 
Theory of Empowerment, Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, 13 (2), pp.11-
29, p.21. 
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are not measures of punishment, but of deterrence, compelling potential suicide 
bombers to think again. Notwithstanding all the debate as to whether or not punitive 
house demolitions are in fact an effective deterrent, their character remains unchanged 
– they represent measures of collective punishment inflicted upon innocent members of 
a certain group, on Palestinian families whose relatives have allegedly committed an 
offence against the occupying power. Such acts are expressly prohibited under the law 
of armed conflict as discussed in the preceding chapter. 
However, in order to establish if the prohibition of collective punishment is applicable 
in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, their status as occupied has to be confirmed first. 
For this reason, the present chapter will start with an overview of the situation in the 
Palestinian territories and the arguments brought for and against a still ongoing 
occupation thereof. 
Having the status of occupation confirmed, Israel’s policy of punitive house demolitions 
– which represent only one particular type of house demolitions carried out by Israel in 
the OPT – will be examined in more detail. Israel is relying on an outdated emergency 
regulation as basis for these extrajudicial demolitions and its Supreme Court has 
supported their application in a number of cases. Similarly to the Israeli government, the 
Supreme Court focusses on issues of effective deterrence, combined with 
proportionality and military discretion considerations – avoiding an assessment of the 
emergency regulation’s compatibility with the law of armed conflict. The statements 
delivered by the government in court together with the Court’s affirmative reasoning 
represent helpful indicators in exploring Israel’s policy and its underlying intentions. 
Some of these have already been exposed by statements made during the codification 
process of the relevant instruments of the law of armed conflict as explored in the 
previous chapter. Furthermore, the acceptance of collective punishment supported by a 
mixture of a sense of collective guilt, biblical parables and desensitization caused by a 
certain routine might have had its impact on government officials, judges as well as the 
public.2 
However, international law has to rise to this challenge, and the prohibition of collective 
punishment under the law of armed conflict is making efforts towards that. It fulfils the 
important role of blocking Israel from justifying its policy under the law of armed conflict, 
thereby denying it legality. Furthermore, it provides legal tools for affected Palestinians 
                                                          
2 Fletcher, G.P. (2004). Collective Guilt and Collective Punishment, Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 
5, pp.163-178. 
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to make their case in court and actively engage in their struggle for justice. The 
Palestinians have proved that they can use international law as a means of 
empowerment. By becoming party to the Geneva Conventions and their Additional 
Protocols and to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court as well as by 
receiving the non-member observer State status in the United Nations, they have raised 
awareness for the situation in the OPT on international level.3 In addition, moves like 
that enable them to present their case themselves and establish their position. In this 
sense, the way in which the Palestinians make use of international law enables them to 
play a more active role in changing their own living conditions and to engage in their 
struggle for justice. Yet what this also reaffirms is that the prohibition of collective 
punishment alone is not enough to ensure the empowerment of Palestinians but plays 
only a part in a concerted effort with other international and domestic mechanisms 
working towards that goal.  
The chapter will conclude that punitive house demolitions represent measures of 
collective punishment in contravention of Israel’s obligations under the law of armed 
conflict and that although this prohibition could not prevent Israel from demolishing 
homes at the moment, it blocks any justification of the measure under its framework and 
offers a tool as well as a platform for Palestinians to get their case heard.  
3.2.2 Setting the scene – Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories 
This section outlines the situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territories in order to 
assess their status under international law. This analysis represents an important part 
of the case study as it determines whether the prohibition of collective punishment 
under the law of armed conflict is applicable to these territories or not. Consequently, 
                                                          
3 Fourth Geneva Convention: Accession of the State of Palestine and entry into force on 2 April 
2014, online available at: 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280158b1a (accessed on 
15/04/18); Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions: Accession of the State of Palestine 
and entry into force on 2 April 2014, online available at: 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=08000002800f3586 (accessed on 
15/04/18); Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions: Accession of the State of Palestine 
on 4 January 2015, entry into force on 4 July 2015, online available at: 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=08000002800f3cb8 (accessed on 
15/04/18); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Accession of the State of Palestine 
on 2 January 2015, entry into force on 1 April 2015, online available at: 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280025774 (accessed on 
15/04/18); A/RES/67/19 Status of Palestine in the United Nations (4 December 2012); for the 
debate around Palestine’s non-member observer status see eg Goodwin-Gill, G. (2011). 
Palestine, Statehood and the Challenges of Representation, EJIL: Talk!, online available at: 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/palestine-statehood-and-the-challenges-of-representation/ (accessed 
on 15/04/18). 
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the question whether the Palestinians could use the prohibition of collective punishment 
to raise awareness for the situation in the OPT in general, can only be answered by 
knowing the relevant framework. In other words, the assessment of the legal situation 
in the OPT is a precondition for the analysis of punitive house demolitions and the 
resulting reactions in terms of Israeli state policy and Palestinian empowerment. 
In the course of the Six-Day War in 1967, Israel occupied territories belonging to 
Palestine under the British Mandate – the West Bank including East Jerusalem and the 
Gaza Strip.4 However, from the beginning of the occupation the status of the Palestinian 
territories has been heavily disputed, not least because of the duties and obligations 
associated with being an occupying power. The status of occupation would provide 
permanent protection under the law of armed conflict outlawing amongst others the 
imposition of collective punishment, which is relevant for the punitive house 
demolitions witnessed in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. 
An occupying power has to follow the rules of belligerent occupation. The main focus 
here will be placed on the provisions in the law of armed conflict due to its explicit 
regulation of collective punishment. However, human rights instruments such as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights are 
considered applicable as well.5 An example of the way in which Palestinians facilitate 
international human rights instruments in their struggle for justice could be the recent 
inter-state complaint the State of Palestine launched against Israel under the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 6 
                                                          
4 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, p.136, para.73ff. 
5 Tilley, V. (ed.) (2009). Occupation, Colonialism, Apartheid? A re-assessment of Israel’s practices 
in the occupied Palestinian territories under international law. Cape Town, Middle East Project of 
the Democracy and Governance Programme, Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa, 
pp.33ff, online available at: 
http://www.alhaq.org/attachments/article/236/Occupation_Colonialism_Apartheid-
FullStudy.pdf (accessed on 15/04/18). 
6 Keane, D. (2018). ICERD and Palestine’s Inter-State Complaint, EJIL Talk!, online available at: 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/icerd-and-palestines-inter-state-complaint/ (accessed on 15/07/18); 
Bader, M. (2018). The State of Palestine Lodges an Interstate Complaint against Israel under the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the State of Palestine, online available at: http://www.mofa.pna.ps/en/2018/04/24/the-
state-of-palestine-lodges-an-interstate-complaint-against-israel-under-the-convention-on-the-
elimination-of-all-forms-of-racial-discrimination/ (accessed on 15/07/18). 
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Although aware of the discussion of apartheid and colonialism in relation to the OPT, 
this debate would go beyond the scope and emphasis of the present chapter.7  
Whether or not a state can be considered an occupying power, is determined by Article 
42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations: ‘Territory is considered occupied when it is actually 
placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the 
territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.’8 In addition 
to the Hague Regulations, the Fourth Geneva Convention includes provisions on the 
protection of the civilian population during occupation such as the prohibition of 
collective penalties in Article 33 as discussed in the previous chapter. Furthermore, the 
scope of the Fourth Geneva Convention is broader than the Hague Regulations’. The 
commentary to Article 6 Fourth Geneva Convention considers the Convention already 
applicable during the advance of troops, without having to wait for the establishment of 
an occupation regime in order to provide protection for the civilian population.9 Besides 
the protection of basic rights such as the right to life or freedom from genocide, collective 
penalties or deportation, the status as occupying power includes additional obligations 
such as to provide food and medical supplies to the population if the resources of the 
occupied territory are inadequate.10  
Given the variety of obligations of an occupying power, the arguments brought forward 
by Israel aimed at refuting any allegations of occupation – starting with calling the OPT 
‘administered’ or ‘disputed’ instead of occupied.11 Although the Israeli authority issued 
                                                          
7 See eg: Tilley, V. (ed.) (2009) supra note 5; Tilley, V. (ed.)(2012). Beyond Occupation: Apartheid, 
Colonialism and International Law in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. London, Pluto Press; 
Dugard, J. & Reynolds, J. (2013). Apartheid, International Law, and the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, European Journal of International Law, 24 (3), pp.867-913;  
8 Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Convention (IV) 
respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague (18 October 1907) Article 42. 
9 Darcy, S. & Reynolds, J. (2010). An Enduring Occupation: The Status of the Gaza Strip from the 
Perspective of International Humanitarian Law, Journal of Conflict & Security Law, 15 (2), 
pp.211-243, pp.216ff; Uhler, O.M. & Coursier, H. (eds.) (1958). IV Geneva Convention Relative to 
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, International Committee of the Red 
Cross, pp.59ff. 
10 Darcy, S. & Reynolds, J. (2010) supra note 9, p.228; Dinstein, Y. (2009). The International Law 
of Belligerent Occupation. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp.146ff, 180ff; Gasser, H.P. & 
Dörmann, K. (2013). Protection of the Civilian Population, in Fleck, D. (ed.). The Handbook of 
International Humanitarian Law. 3rd edition. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp.231-320, 
pp.237ff; on the additional obligations see eg: 75 UNTS 287, Convention (IV) relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva (12 August 1949) Article 55 and the less 
extensive provisions in Article 23. 
11 Tilley, V. (ed.) (2009) supra note 5, p.67; Shamgar, M. (1971). The Observance of International 
Law in the Administered Territories, reprinted in Dinstein, Y. & Domb, F. (eds.)(2011). The 
Progression of International Law: Four Decades of the Israel Yearbook on Human Rights – An 
Anniversary Volume. Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, pp.429-446; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
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an order in the West Bank that the Fourth Geneva Convention should apply to the 
present situation in the aftermath of the armed conflict in 1967, Israel afterwards 
claimed that the Palestinian territories could not be occupied since there was no 
legitimate sovereign which it could have ousted. 12  This was named the ‘missing 
reversioner’ argument.13 The argument goes on that Egypt and Jordan invaded Israel in 
1948, thereby taking the territory by force themselves. For this reason, neither of these 
states had a legitimate title to the territory and consequently Israel could not be an 
occupying power if there is no ousted sovereign whose reversionary rights it has to 
protect. Nevertheless, Israel conceded that although it would not apply the Fourth 
Geneva Convention in full it would apply its ‘humanitarian provisions’.14 
Secondly, Israel put forward a formal interpretation of Article 2 Fourth Geneva 
Convention concerning its application. Regarding occupation, the Article states that 
‘[t]he Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory 
of a High Contracting Party’.15 Here now, Israel argued that the OPT did not constitute a 
High Contracting Party to the Fourth Geneva Convention, therefore excluding them from 
its scope of application.16 
However, the International Court of Justice dismissed Israel’s arguments altogether in 
its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory. It stated that Israel itself and the Israeli Supreme Court have 
recognised the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the OPT and that 
subsequent claims to the contrary were not tenable. On the ‘missing reversioner’ 
argument, the Court stated that the ‘great majority of other participants in the 
proceedings’ did not confer any significance to the question whether Jordan had claimed 
                                                          
(2003). Forgotten Facts About the West Bank and Gaza Strip, online available at: 
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFA-
Archive/2003/Pages/DISPUTED%20TERRITORIES-%20Forgotten%20Facts%20About%20the
%20We.aspx (accessed on 15/04/18). 
12 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory supra 
note 4, para.93. 
13 For a supportive view on the ‘missing reversioner’ argument see the analysis in Shamgar, M. 
(1971) supra note 11, pp.430ff. 
14 Tilley, V. (ed.) (2009) supra note 5, pp.67ff; see also Regulations concerning the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land supra note 8, Article 43; Qupty, M. (1992). The Application of 
International Law in the Occupied Territories as Reflected in the Judgments of the High Court of 
Justice in Israel, in Playfair, E. (ed.). International Law and the Administration of Occupied 
Territories. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp.87-124, pp.101ff. 
15 Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War supra note 10, 
Article 2. 
16 Tilley, V. (ed.) (2009) supra note 5, p.68. 
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any rights with respect to the Occupied Palestinian Territories before 1967.17 The formal 
point on Article 2 Fourth Geneva Convention was invalidated by an interpretation of the 
Convention in good faith and according to its object and purpose, which was confirmed 
by a review of the Convention’s travaux préparatoires indicating an extensive 
interpretation in favour of the protection of civilians.18  
In recent years, Israel has again made several attempts to distance itself from the role as 
occupying power, with the most prominent development being the unilateral 
disengagement of Israeli troops from the Gaza Strip. In September 2005, the Israeli 
Defence Force declared the end of military rule in the Gaza Strip and withdrew its ground 
troops and the 1967 declaration forming the basis for their deployment and Israeli 
settlements from the territory.19 In addition, the Israeli Security Cabinet declared the 
Gaza Strip ‘hostile territory’ in 2007.20 This stance was later confirmed by the Israeli 
Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice in a case concerning the electricity and 
gas supply to the territory from Israel. The Court held the position that Israel had no 
longer effective control over the Gaza Strip because the military rule ended and ‘Israeli 
soldiers are no longer stationed in the territory on a permanent basis, nor are they in 
charge of what happens there’.21 
                                                          
17 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory supra 
note 4, para.93; Darcy, S. & Reynolds, J. (2010) supra note 9, pp.223f; Dinstein, Y. (1978). The 
International Law of Belligerent Occupation and Human Rights, Israel Yearbook on Human 
Rights, 8, pp.104-143, p.107; Roberts, A. (1992). Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-
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note 4, para.95; Avocats Sans Frontières (2011). Enforcing Housing Rights: The Case of Sheikh 
Jarrah – Report of the fact-finding mission to Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
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19 Scobbie, I. (2004/05). An Intimate Disengagement: Israel's Withdrawal from Gaza, the Law of 
Occupation and of Self-Determination, Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law, 11, pp.3-31; 
Aronson, G. (2005). Issues Arising from the Implementation of Israel's Disengagement from the 
Gaza Strip, Journal of Palestine Studies, 34 (4), pp.49-63; Mustafa, M. (2005). The Israeli 
Disengagement from the Gaza Strip: An End of the Occupation?, Yearbook of International 
Humanitarian Law, 8, pp.356-368. 
20 Tilley, V. (ed.) (2009) supra note 5 pp.81ff; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2007). Security 
Cabinet Declares Gaza Hostile Territory, online available at: 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/pressroom/2007/pages/security%20cabinet%20declares%20gaz
a%20hostile%20territory%2019-sep-2007.aspx (accessed on 15/04/18). 
21 HCJ 9132/07 Al Basyouni et al v The Prime Minister et al (Judgment) 30 January 2008, para.12, 
11ff, unofficial English translation online available at: 
http://www.hamoked.org/items/9862_eng.pdf (accessed on 15/04/18). 
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However, the argument that Israel was no longer in effective control of the Gaza Strip 
was disputed internationally as demonstrated by continuing statements of United 
Nations bodies still considering it occupied territory.22 Israel based its understanding of 
effective control on the very formal interpretation that occupation has to do with land 
warfare and for this reason, there could be no occupation if there are no soldiers on the 
ground. Yet Israel is still controlling the airspace above Gaza, its coastal waters and its 
borders in addition to means of remote surveillance, which Aronson aptly described as 
a ‘security envelope’.23 Currently, Israel remains in a position able to reimpose control 
over the Gaza Strip almost instantly, impeding any exercise of sovereignty by the 
Palestinian Authority and retaining ultimate control.24 Given this substantial territorial 
control combined with control over public institutions such as tax and the population 
registry, a powerful argument can be made for an ongoing occupation of the Gaza Strip 
by Israel.25 
Concluding from the observations made above, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank could 
still be considered occupied by Israel. Neither the ‘missing reversioner’ and other formal 
arguments nor the unilateral disengagement have changed the situation created in 1967 
– a statement supported by the United Nations and the International Court of Justice. 
This finding represents an important precondition for the assessment of punitive house 
demolitions in these territories under the prohibition of collective punishment in 
relation to state policy and group empowerment. This means that Palestinians affected 
by punitive house demolitions can use the prohibition of collective punishment under 
the law of armed conflict to advance the Palestinians’ broader struggle for justice and 
raise awareness for the situation in the OPT. Before evaluating the legal side of punitive 
                                                          
22 See eg: A/HRC/31/73 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in 
the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967 (11 January 2016); A/HRC/12/37 Human Rights 
Situation in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories (19 August 2009); S/RES/1860 
Middle East, including the Palestinian question (8 January 2009); A/HRC/12/48 Report of the 
United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (25 September 2009) para.276; 
A/RES/63/96 Operations of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees 
in the Near East (18 December 2008); A/RES/62/181 Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian 
people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and of the Arab 
population in the occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources (31 January 2008). 
23 Aronson, G. (2005) supra note 19, p.51; Tilley, V. (ed.) (2009) supra note 5, pp.83ff. 
24 A/HRC/12/48 supra note 22, para.276ff; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territory supra note 4, para.78. 
25 A/HRC/7/17 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the 
Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, John Dugard (21 January 2008) para.25ff; Darcy, S. 
& Reynolds, J. (2010) supra note 9, pp.235ff; Dinstein, Y. (2009) supra note 10, pp.276ff. 
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house demolitions, a general overview on how and when such demolitions are 
conducted will be provided.  
3.2.3 Punitive house demolitions 
3.2.3.1 Overview 
This section outlines the ways in which Israel employs punitive house demolitions in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories. To understand the scope of Israel’s policy on collective 
punishment, the measures and procedures taken in this regard must be considered. In 
addition, the manner in which Israel imposes collective punishment already reveals 
traits of its policy and enables an analysis of punitive house demolitions in light of the 
prohibition of collective punishment later on. 
Although the explicit policy of punitive house demolitions emerged with the occupation 
of the Palestinian territories in 1967, Israel’s retaliation policy was formed already in 
the 1950s. Palestinian villages linked to attacks against Israelis were targeted and those 
acts were justified by the authorities with deterrence considerations.26 According to the 
Israeli non-governmental organisation B’Tselem, the Israeli Defence Forces have 
partially or completely demolished around 2467 houses and partially or completely 
sealed around 395 from the beginning of the occupation in 1967 to October 2004.27 
Another more recent study of B’Tselem accounts for 683 house demolitions for punitive 
purposes between January 2001 and February 2016, rendering 4394 people homeless.28 
The number of house demolitions increased during the First Intifada from 1987 to 1991, 
the Second Intifada from 2000 to 2005 and during the outbreak of violence in 2014.29 
Punitive house demolitions are only one particular form of house demolitions carried 
out in the OPT. According to the local non-governmental organisation Al-Haq, the Israeli 
Defence Forces have destroyed more than nine thousand homes from the beginning of 
the occupation until 2003. The other instances where houses are demolished are related 
                                                          
26 Kuperman, R.D. (2001). The impact of internal politics on Israel's reprisal policy during the 
1950s, Journal of Strategic Studies, 24 (1), pp.1-28. 
27 Shnayderman, R. (2004). Through no fault of their own - Punitive House Demolitions during 
the al-Aqsa Intifada, B’Tselem Information Sheet, p.17, online available at: 
http://www.btselem.org/download/200411_punitive_house_demolitions_eng.pdf (accessed on 
15/04/18). 
28 B’Tselem – The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories 
(2016). Statistics on punitive house demolitions, online available at: 
http://www.btselem.org/punitive_demolitions/statistics (accessed on 15/04/18). 
29 Shnayderman, R. (2004) supra note 27, p.17; Harpaz, G. (2015). When Does a Court 
Systematically Deviate from its Own Principles? The Adjudication by the Israel Supreme Court 
of House Demolitions in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Leiden Journal of International 
Law, 28, pp.31-47, pp.33f. 
 
 
  78 
 
to the establishment of ‘no-go areas’ around Israeli settlements, the clearing of settler 
roads and borders, the construction of homes contrary to Israeli housing permit policy 
and for military purposes, whereas the military necessity of such actions is mostly 
insufficiently proven if at all. However, due to the focus on collective punishment, the 
demolition of homes of persons who have carried out attacks against Israelis or are 
suspected of having done so, is discussed in more detail.30 
As Darcy argues, these other instances of house demolitions are of a punitive character 
as well.31 However, the decision to focus on those house demolitions which are explicitly 
carried out for punitive purposes stems not only from the government’s characterisation 
thereof, but also from a point of terminology.  Collective punishment is the punishment 
of a group of persons for an act committed by one or some of its members for which they 
do not bear individual responsibility. Apart perhaps from the construction of homes 
contrary to Israeli housing permit policy, in the case of house demolitions for the 
establishment of ‘no-go areas’, the clearing of settler roads and borders, or for military 
purposes the punishment for an act allegedly committed by one or some of the members 
of a group for which the members of the group bear no individual responsibility for, 
might be in question. Certainly, the broader perspective around all house demolitions is 
the punishment of a certain group in a broader sense, the Palestinians. But whether the 
act of collective punishment as defined here can or should encompass acts based on very 
remote ‘acts committed by one or some of its members’ and how much it overlaps with 
the discriminatory treatment of the Palestinians in general might be open to debate. It 
could be possible to refer to the general struggle of the Palestinians against Israeli 
occupation as that ‘act committed by one or some of its members’, but questions 
surrounding these particular instances might divert attention from the general 
discussion of the definition of collective punishment in the present thesis. Therefore, and 
for the reasons already put forward above, the following analysis focuses on punitive 
house demolitions in reaction to attacks carried out or allegedly carried out by one or 
some of its residents. 
Punitive house demolitions are most common after suicide attacks, but they can also 
result from the commission of less severe crimes or the mere suspicion thereof. In any 
case, the perpetrator’s or alleged perpetrator’s family is effectively rendered homeless 
                                                          
30 Darcy, S. (2003). Israel's Punitive House Demolition Policy: Collective Punishment in Violation of 
International Law. Ramallah, Al-Haq, pp.4f. 
31 Darcy, S. (2003) supra note 30, p.5. 
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as a result, making them pay for a crime they bear no individual responsibility for. 
Although homes sealed with concrete blocks or metal sheets are not demolished, the 
effect stays the same as the former inhabitants can no longer use their home. And while 
sealings would be reversible in theory, sealed homes are rarely reopened in practice. 
The partial demolition or sealing of houses involves only rooms, usually used by the 
perpetrator, whereas the rest of the building remains intact to be used by the family. 
Demolitions and sealings are ordered by the Military Commander, in combination with 
a curfew imposed on the surrounding area. Subsequently, bulldozers arrive to carry out 
the demolition or explosives are installed to blow up the building. In many reported 
cases, the families were given only short notice of the imminent demolition of their home, 
leaving not enough time to evacuate their belongings or even actively preventing them 
from taking their furniture and other valuables with them.32  
To sum up, homes in the OPT are partially or completely sealed with concrete blocks or 
metal sheets, or partially or completely demolished by bulldozers or with explosives. 
The Israeli government has brought several arguments in support of punitive house 
demolitions, most prominently the justification that such measures would have a 
deterrent effect on potential attackers. However, if house demolitions are an effective 
deterrent or not does not change the punitive nature of this practice and therefore its 
prohibition under the law of armed conflict.33 As will be outlined below, the demolition 
or sealing of homes for crimes allegedly committed by one of its inhabitants fulfils the 
basic criteria of collective punishment. Consequently, the depiction of how punitive 
house demolitions and sealings are carried out represents an essential precondition for 
this assessment. Another precondition could be found in Israel’s legal argumentation on 
the matter. For this reason, the legal basis Israel is relying on for the demolitions will be 
examined in the ensuing section. 
3.2.3.2 Legal basis of punitive house demolitions 
In order to justify its punitive house demolitions, Israel is relying on an emergency 
regulation issued by the British during their administration of Palestine. The content and 
context of this regulation will be discussed in the following. The use of another legal 
regulation to counter the prohibition of collective punishment under the law of armed 
conflict supports the presumption that Israel is aware of this violation and willing to 
                                                          
32 Darcy, S. (2003) supra note 30, pp.5ff; 29f; Breaking the Silence (2012). Our Harsh Logic: 
Israeli Soldiers' Testimonies from the Occupied Territories, 2000-2010. New York, Metropolitan 
Books, pp.17ff, 93ff. 
33 Darcy, S. (2003) supra note 30, pp.5ff. 
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defend its policy. In this sense, the law of armed conflict has put Israel in the position of 
having to justify its actions – effectively denying legality to its collective punishment 
policy. Therefore, the examination of Israel’s reasoning sheds light on the relationship 
between law and policy on collective punishment. 
The legal basis for the house demolitions carried out since the beginning of the 
occupation derives from Article 119 (1) Defence (Emergency) Regulations (Article 119). 
These regulations were adopted by the British in 1945 during their time administering 
Palestine in accordance with their League of Nations mandate.34 However, the British 
repealed the regulations before terminating their mandate, a fact that was not 
recognised by Israel on the grounds that Britain did not follow the formal revocation 
procedure.35 Despite several statements by the British and the Jordanian government 
that they considered the regulations as repealed, Israel is upholding these provisions 
and applies them to the occupied territories.36  
Article 119 (1) is part of the penal provisions of the regulations and it states as follows: 
‘A Military Commander may by order direct the forfeiture … of any house, 
structure, or land from which he has reason to suspect that any firearm has been 
illegally discharged, … or of any house, structure or land … the inhabitants or 
some of the inhabitants of which he is satisfied have committed, or attempted to 
commit, … any offence against these Regulations … ; and when any house, 
structure or land is forfeited as aforesaid, the Military Commander may destroy 
the house or the structure or anything on growing on the land.’37 
                                                          
34 Darcy, S. (2003) supra note 30, pp.11ff; O’Brien, W.V. (1991). Law and Morality in Israel’s War 
with the PLO. London, Routledge, pp.242ff; League of Nations, C. 529. M. 314. 1922. VI, Mandate 
for Palestine (12 August 1922). 
35 See eg the detailed argumentation on the validity of the regulations of advocate Rosenthal in 
an objection to an assigned residence order to the Home Front Command: unofficial English 
translation online available at: http://www.hamoked.org/files/2014/1159021_eng.pdf 
(accessed on 15/04/18). 
36 Welchman, L. (1993). A Thousand and One Homes: Israel‘s Demolition and Sealing Of Houses in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Ramallah, Al-Haq, pp.14ff, online available at: 
http://www.alhaq.org/publications/publications-index/item/a-thousand-and-one-
homes?category_id=10 (accessed on 15/04/18); Roadstrum Moffett, M. (1989). Perpetual 
Emergency: A Legal Analysis of Israel‘s Use of the British Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, 
in the Occupied Territories. Ramallah, Al-Haq, pp.6ff, online available at: 
http://www.alhaq.org/publications/publications-index/item/perpetual-emergency-a-legal-
analysis-of-israel-s-use-of-the-british-defense-emergency-regulations-1945-in-the-occupied-
territories 
(accessed on 15/04/18); Darcy, S. (2003) supra note 30, pp.11ff. 
37 Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 27 September 1945, Palestine Gazette (No. 1442), Supp. 
No. 2, pp.1055-1109, p.1089. 
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Taking from the wording of Article 119, the Military Commander can order the 
destruction of ‘the house or the structure’ in case of a suspected launch of any firearm 
from this building or if any person living in such a building was involved in the 
commission of an offence against the Defence (Emergency) Regulations or other Military 
Court offences. In case of punitive house demolitions in response to offences such as 
suicide attacks, the fact that the perpetrator has lived in a house would suffice to justify 
its demolition. The families of perpetrators or alleged perpetrators are specifically 
targeted, but as family ties are no precondition, any other person or structure could be 
at risk as well.38 An indicative example represents the sealing of homes whose owners 
have rented them to other unrelated persons who in turn have committed the offences 
triggering the sealing.39 
The law of armed conflict contains several rules dealing with the destruction of property. 
Article 53 Fourth Geneva Convention limits property destructions to those ‘absolutely 
necessary’ for military operations. 40  A similar caveat is made by Article 23 Hague 
Regulations, allowing only for property destruction or seizure if ‘imperatively demanded 
by the necessities of war’.41 However, as Darcy argues, the punitive nature of these house 
demolitions and the prior notice to the inhabitants of a certain house before demolishing 
it, invalidate the point of military necessity which is foremost concerned with the 
imminent need to act. Similarly, this imminence is lacking in case of punishment 
following an attack already carried out. In addition, any destruction under the 
reservation of Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention has to be proportionate in 
terms of the damage done and the military advantages to be gained – criteria whose 
                                                          
38 Darcy, S. (2003) supra note 30, p.13. 
39 Kretzmer, D. (2002) supra note 17, p.159; HCJ 7040/15, 7076/15, 7077/15, 7079/15, 
7081/15, 7082/15, 7084/15, 7085/15, 7087/15, 7092/15, 7180/15 Haj Hamed et al v The 
Military Commander of the West Bank Area (Judgment) 12 November 2015, unofficial English 
translation online available at: http://www.hamoked.org/files/2015/1159915_eng.pdf 
(accessed on 15/04/18); HCJ 8150/15, 8154/15, 8156/15 Abu Jamal et al v GOC Home Front 
Command (Judgment) 22 December 2015, Opinion Justice Mazuz, para.11, unofficial English 
translation online available at: http://www.hamoked.org/files/2015/1160003_eng.pdf 
(accessed on 15/04/18). 
40 Article 53 Fourth Geneva Convention reads: ‘Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real 
or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or 
to other public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where 
such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.’. 
41 Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Convention (IV) 
respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land supra note 8, Article 23. 
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fulfilment appear questionable regarding punitive house demolitions in response to 
already committed acts.42 
Furthermore, the Military Commander can decide at his or her own discretion whether 
and how to employ Article 119 without any formal court proceedings, meaning the rule 
represents an extrajudicial sanction. However, the law of armed conflict calls for 
guarantees of fair trial for a population living under occupation, including the right to be 
heard, to be represented or to present witnesses.43 Aggravating the situation for affected 
persons, the Israeli Supreme Court has ruled against the right to judicial review in 
relation to house demolitions.44  
After examining the emergency regulation Israel is referring to in order to justify 
punitive house demolitions, this stance will be compared with Israel’s obligations under 
the law of armed conflict. As outlined in the previous chapter, the prohibition of 
collective punishment is enshrined in international treaty law and customary law on 
armed conflicts. The most important provisions are contained in the Fourth Geneva 
Convention and the two Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions. Israel is a state 
party to the Fourth Geneva Convention,45 but it is neither party to the First nor to the 
Second Additional Protocol.46 
Therefore, the rule most pertinent to Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories is 
Article 33 Fourth Geneva Convention, with its first paragraph stating that: ‘No protected 
person may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally committed. 
Collective penalties … are prohibited.’ 47  As a reminder, this prohibition should be 
understood in a broad sense, covering not only judicial sanctions, but also extrajudicial 
                                                          
42 Uhler, O.M. & Coursier, H. (eds.) (1958) supra note 9, p.302; Darcy, S. (2003) supra note 30, 
pp.13f. 
43 For more details, see Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War supra note 10, Articles 71 to 73. 
44 Darcy, S. (2003) supra note 30, pp.43ff; HCJ 6696/02 Amar et al v IDF Commander in the West 
Bank (Judgment) 6 August 2002, Opinion Justice Barak, para.2ff. 
45 Signature on 12 August 1949; Ratification on 06 July 1951, entry into force on 06 January 
1952; for more details, see United Nations Treaty Collection, detail on the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, online available at: 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280158b1a (accessed on 
15/04/18). 
46 See the United Nations Treaty Series for ratification details on Additional Protocol I: 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=08000002800f3586 (accessed on 
15/04/18); Additional Protocol II: 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=08000002800f3cb8(accessed on 
15/04/18). 
47 Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War supra note 10, 
Article 33. 
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acts such as the order given by a Military Commander under Article 119 rendering 
punitive house demolitions illegal under the prohibition of collective punishment. In 
addition, the prohibition is well-established in customary international law, further 
backing Israel’s obligations in this regard.48 
The essence of collective punishment constitutes the imposition of sanctions or penalties 
on a group as such for acts committed or allegedly committed by some of its members 
and for which they do not bear individual responsibility. Therefore, there has to be a 
sufficient link or nexus between the (allegedly) committed offence and the punishment 
to establish the punitive nature of the act itself. Furthermore, the effect of collective 
punishment on innocent persons has to be substantial and not only a side effect of a 
sanction imposed on the perpetrator individually such as imprisonment.49 
In the case of punitive house demolitions in the OPT, Palestinian families are rendered 
homeless for a crime allegedly committed by one of their relatives. They are punished as 
a group in violation of the principle of individual responsibility for crimes committed or 
allegedly committed by others. Gathering from Israeli punitive house demolition policy 
solely targeting Palestinians as well as its argumentation brought forward in relevant 
court cases discussed in detail below, this policy overlaps with the broader 
discriminatory treatment of Palestinians by the Israeli authorities.  The punitive house 
demolitions carried out by Israel in the OPT represent acts of collective punishment. 
They are prohibited under the law of armed conflict applicable in the OPT and Israel has 
an obligation to abstain from such violations and to rather ensure the protection of the 
population living under its occupation. However, as Israel is not complying with its 
international obligations so far, the role of the prohibition of collective punishment in 
the broader struggle for justice of the Palestinians consists in denying legality to Israeli 
punitive house demolition policy and offering means to document Israeli violations of 
the law of armed conflict. 
In conclusion, punitive house demolitions are violating Israel’s obligations under the law 
of armed conflict. The emergency regulation the state is relying on does not justify these 
violations either – its inability to do so has been shown from several perspectives above. 
Given this finding of Israeli acts in contravention of the law of armed conflict, an 
                                                          
48 Darcy, S. (2003) supra note 30, pp.19f; for the rules on collective punishment in customary 
international humanitarian law see: Henckaerts, J.M. & Doswald-Beck, L. (eds.) (2005). 
Customary International Humanitarian Law. Volume 1. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
pp.372ff. 
49 Darcy, S. (2003) supra note 30, pp.23f. 
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examination of the state’s line of argument appears the more interesting and necessary. 
A review of decisions of the Israeli Supreme Court might be helpful in this regard and 
will be undertaken subsequently, as the Court has been backing the government line on 
the issue. 
3.2.3.3 Israel’s punitive house demolition policy and the Israeli Supreme 
Court 
3.2.3.3.1 Cases on punitive house demolitions 
This section addresses some of the Israeli Supreme Court’s key judgments on punitive 
house demolitions illustrating the relationship between Israel’s policy on collective 
punishment and the law of armed conflict. By exploring the arguments brought forward 
by the Israeli authorities and supported by the Court, Israel’s need to justify its policy 
and its awareness thereof will be highlighted, indicating policy choices contrary to its 
obligations under the law of armed. 
In the past, Israel has often justified its punitive house demolition policy with its alleged 
deterrent character. This argument has found its way into the judgments of the Israeli 
Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice. The Court has not only demonstrated 
support for the government position but has argued in a more elaborate way than the 
government itself. For this reason, the policy of punitive house demolitions and its 
relation to the law of armed conflict appear to be properly explored by a look at 
government responses to petitions in combination with the reasoning found in the 
Court’s decisions.50 
During the course of judgments on Article 119, punitive house demolitions have 
undergone various classifications regarding their character. At the beginning of the 
occupation, the Court heard claims that house demolitions under the Article 119 would 
constitute reprisals prohibited by the last sentence of Article 33 Fourth Geneva 
Convention.51 The Court countered this claim by arguing that house demolitions were 
not measures of ensuring future compliance, but of punishment.52 Later however, the 
Court had to deal with the issue of collective punishment, a debate it has partly stirred 
up itself by describing house demolitions as punitive to avoid a finding of unlawful 
reprisals. However, since the Court and the government still consider Article 119 in force 
                                                          
50 Qupty, M. (1992) supra note 14, pp.88, 101ff. 
51 Article 33 Fourth Geneva Convention fourth sentence states: ‘Reprisals against protected 
persons and their property are prohibited’; Kretzmer, D. (2002) supra note 17, p.151. 
52 See eg Shamgar calling it ‘personal punitive measures’: Shamgar, M. (1971) supra note 10, 
p.443. 
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and applicable to the OPT, the discussion of collective punishment put forward by 
petitioners again and again was rather evaded by focussing on proportionality and 
military discretion. 
Generally, the Court has upheld a very broad understanding of Article 119 and its 
constitutive elements. For instance, it considered sons of a family to be inhabitants of 
their parents’ house even though they did not live there during term time or they lived 
permanently in student accommodation.53 Furthermore, it rejected the claim that the 
phrase ‘some of the inhabitants’ would refer to at least more than one person living in 
the house being involved in the commission of an offence. In addition, since the Article’s 
text does not require any kind of participation in the offence by the other inhabitants of 
the house, the Court approved house demolitions in cases where the rest of the family 
did not even had knowledge of the offence committed by one of their relatives.54 
In the Turkmahn case, the Court introduced a test limiting the scope of Article 119. It 
decided on the demolition of a house comprising of three rooms in response to the 
perpetrator shooting a couple. However, as the house was inhabited not only by the 
perpetrator’s siblings and mother, but also by one of his brothers and his family, the 
Court found that the entire demolition would be disproportionate. Given the technical 
impossibility to destroy only parts of the house, the Court ordered the sealing of two 
rooms, leaving the third room for the married brother and his family. This test however, 
bears another range of problematic questions as to why the Court considered the 
suffering of the nuclear family of the perpetrator less severe than of his wider family and 
why it employed a proportionality test in this case and not in other similar cases before 
as well. The Court addressed none of these questions in its judgment. However, the Court 
kept the proportionality test and from this case onwards decided on demolitions only in 
cases were just the nuclear family of the perpetrator was affected.55 
Regarding the effectiveness of punitive house demolitions as deterrence, the Court has 
avoided to offer a clear answer and instead decided that it would not question the 
                                                          
53 For a discussion of the ‘residency tie’ see: HCJ 1125/16 Mer’i et al v Military Commander of 
IDF Forces in the West Bank (Judgment) 31 March 2016, Opinion Justice Naor, para.12ff, 
unofficial English translation online available at: 
http://www.hamoked.org/files/2016/1125_16_eng.pdf (accessed on 15/04/18). 
54 Kretzmer, D. (2002) supra note 17, pp.153ff. 
55 Kretzmer, D. (2002) supra note 17, pp.159ff; HCJ 5510/92 Turkman v Defense Minister (case 
as referred to in Kretzmer, D.); see eg HCJ 4597/14 'Awawdeh et al v West Bank Military 
Commander (Judgment) 1 July 2014, Opinion Justice Naor, para.27, unofficial English translation 
online available at: http://www.hamoked.org/images/1158437_eng.pdf (accessed on 
15/04/18). 
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Military Commander’s assessment on the issue. Initially, the Court seemingly accepted a 
very low level of effectiveness to be sufficient to justify house demolitions and sealings. 
In the Nazaal case it held that ‘it is sufficient that we are dealing with an unknown 
variable, against which there stands the chance (even if it be a small chance) that using 
the measure may possibly save human lives, in order to prevent us from intervening in 
the assessment and decision of the respondent.’56 
In 2005 however, punitive house demolitions were discontinued due to the finding of a 
committee of high-ranking officials that such measures were rather detrimental to the 
overall situation and an ineffective deterrent. Furthermore, the committee was 
concerned about the compatibility of punitive house demolitions with international 
law.57 Nevertheless, the policy of punitive house demolitions was re-established in 2008 
– after an increase in terrorist attacks, the government argued in Court that ‘there is a 
need to strengthen the deterrence measures, including demolitions of terrorists’ houses 
and intensifying the sanctions against the terrorists’ families’. 58  The Court’s sole 
response was that ‘[o]ur position is that there is no room to intervene in the 
respondent’s change of policy’ and that ‘an authority can change a policy and surely it 
may change it with change in circumstances’, therefore abstaining from any 
intervention.59 
                                                          
56  HCJ 6026/94 Nazaal v Commander of IDF Forces in the Judea and Samaria Area (recited in 
Kretzmer, D. (2002) supra note 17, p.162). 
57 HCJ 7733/04 Mahmud ‘Ali Nasser et al v Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank 
(Judgment) 20 June 2005, Opinion Justice Barak, para.4, unofficial English translation online 
available at: http://www.hamoked.org/files/2011/110740_eng.pdf (accessed on 15/04/18); 
Harpaz, G. (2015) supra note 29, pp.41f; Guiora, A.N. (2006). Transnational Comparative 
Analysis of Balancing Competing Interests in Counter-Terrorism, Temple International & 
Comparative Law Journal, 20 (2), pp.363-393, pp.375f; Ben-Naftali, O., Harpaz, G., Shany, Y. & 
Kremnitzer, M. (2014). Expert Opinion: The Lawfulness of Israel’s House Demolition Policy 
under International Law and Israeli Law, unofficial English translation online available at: 
http://www.hamoked.org/files/2014/1159001_eng.pdf (accessed on 15/04/18) pp.17ff. 
58 HCJ 9353/08 Abu Dheim et al v GOC Home Front Command (Judgment) 5 January 2009, 
unofficial English translation online available at: 
http://www.hamoked.org/items/110991_eng.pdf (accessed on 15/04/18) para.10; see also: 
HCJ 9353/08 Abu Dheim et al v GOC Home Front Command (Petition for Order Nisi) 6 November 
2008, para.8ff, unofficial English translation online available at: 
http://www.hamoked.org/items/110468_eng.pdf (accessed on 15/04/18); HCJ 8091/14 
HaMoked - Center for the Defence of the Individual et al v Minister of Defense et al (Judgment) 31 
December 2014, Opinion Justice Rubinstein, para.20, unofficial English translation online 
available at: http://www.hamoked.org/files/2014/1159007_eng.pdf (accessed on 15/04/18); 
HCJ 4597/14‘Awawdeh et al (Judgment) supra note 55, Opinion Justice Naor, para.23. 
59 HCJ 9353/08 Abu Dheim et al v GOC Home Front Command (Judgment) supra note 58, 
para.11. 
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In the 'Awawdeh case, the Court by and large continued the line of reasoning before the 
policy of punitive house demolitions was put on hold in 2005. Despite the petitioners’ 
arguments as to why these house demolitions are prohibited under international law 
and that the point of deterrence would not change the illegality of the measure, the 
respondent decided to adhere to that principle and formulated the reason for the 
demolition order as ‘for the purpose of deterring others from the execution of additional 
terror attacks.’ 60  In addition, the respondent cited former Court decisions 
acknowledging that ‘the exercise of said sanction indeed has a severe punitive 
implication’, but that this punitive nature would be a side effect only and not the overall 
aim of the measure.61  
Not challenging the authorities’ response to the petition, the Court held that it would not 
interfere with the Military Commander’s decision on the effectiveness of such measures. 
Even though the Court applied a proportionality test, it found that the partial demolition 
of a house met the criteria. Despite the petitioners’ claim that the other part of the 
building would collapse as well unless the structure of the building were to be 
strengthened prior to partial demolition, the respondent proceeded with the 
demolition.62 
In conclusion, the Israeli Supreme Court is upholding the government policy on punitive 
house demolitions, effectively supporting the imposition of collective punishment. Not 
only did the Court support the authority’s line, it backed it with additional 
argumentation, new interpretations of Article 119 and new criteria, while failing to grasp 
the claims and line of reasoning brought forward by petitioners. This worrying history 
of Court cases on punitive house demolitions has led up to a case challenging Israel’s 
core defence of such measures – Article 119 itself. With the cases presented above in 
mind, the case confronting Article 119 is discussed in the following. 
                                                          
60 HCJ 4597/14 'Awawdeh et al v West Bank Military Commander (Response) 30 June 2014, 
para.27, unofficial English translation online available at: 
http://www.hamoked.org/images/1158435_eng.pdf (accessed on 15/04/18). 
61 HCJ 6026/94 Nazaal v Commander of IDF Forces in Judea and Samaria Area (recited in HCJ 
4597/14 'Awawdeh et al (Response) supra note 60, para.34). 
62 HCJ 4597/14 ‘Awawdeh et al (Judgment) supra note 55, Opinion Justice Naor, para.15ff; Re: 
HCJ 4597/14 'Awawdeh v the Military Commander (Updating Notice) 1 July 2014, unofficial 
English translation online available at: http://www.hamoked.org/files/2014/1158439_eng.pdf 
(accessed on 15/04/18). 
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3.2.3.3.2 Challenging Article 119 Defence (Emergency) Regulations – the 
HaMoked case 
In 2014, the human rights organisation HaMoked and seven other local human rights 
organisations filed a petition to the Court in order to review the general use of Article 
119 and its compatibility with the law of armed conflict and human rights law. This case 
and its implications are analysed subsequently. Although the focus will be on the Court’s 
findings regarding the law of armed conflict due to the explicit prohibition of collective 
punishment, a brief account of the shortcomings of the law of armed conflict in offering 
redress to victims as well as the potential role of human rights bodies in this regard 
conclude the section. 
Drawing on the research question, its second part addresses not only the protection but 
the empowerment of groups and the HaMoked case represents an example of such 
empowerment through legal means – through the law of armed conflict. The prohibition 
of collective punishment enables the Palestinians to initiate court proceedings 
challenging its imposition and to actively participate in the change of their own living 
conditions. The law of armed conflict is the yardstick against which Israeli state practice 
is measured and it provides the Palestinians with tools to advance their struggle for 
justice. Although the prohibition of collective punishment on its own is unlikely to end 
Israel’s punitive house demolition policy, it plays a role in working towards that aim by 
documenting and challenging Israeli practice. The judgment given by Justice Rubinstein, 
Deputy President of the Court and chair of the panel of three judges, made clear that the 
Court would not again decide on issues already addressed by it in the past – although 
this was a core argument of the petitioners. They argued that the discussion of collective 
punishment in two judgments around thirty years ago concluded that Article 119 as part 
of local law was superior to international law, and therefore the question whether it was 
in breach of the latter was not evaluated, rendering a review of the compatibility of 
punitive house demolitions with international law timely.63 In addition, they made a 
point concerning international criminal law and house demolitions potentially 
constituting war crimes in the light of the State of Palestine’s accession to the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court.64  
                                                          
63 The two judgments were: HCJ 434/79 Sahweil v Commander of the Judea and Samaria Area 
and HCJ 897/86 Ramzi Hana Jaber v GOC Central Command et al (as referred to in HCJ 8091/14 
HaMoked et al (Judgment) supra note 58, Opinion Justice Rubinstein, para.3ff). 
64 HCJ 8091/14 HaMoked - Center for the Defence of the Individual et al v Minister of Defense et al 
(Petition for Order Nisi) 27 November 2014, unofficial English translation online available at: 
http://www.hamoked.org/files/2014/1159000_eng.pdf (accessed on 15/04/18); on this note, 
see the debate about universal jurisdiction and the arrest warrant issued by a British court 
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Nevertheless, the Court upheld its position that the assessment of effective deterrence 
remains with the military and is not up to its evaluation. Furthermore, it referred to 
recent cases such as 'Awawdeh and Qawasmeh, stating that although house demolitions 
have not been used for several years, the current situation would demand a return to 
this measure and that it made its stance clear in these decisions already.65  
On the issue of collective punishment, the Court made a rather unconvincing point by 
distinguishing between proportionate and disproportionate house demolitions, thereby 
blurring the absolute character of the prohibition of collective punishment.66  It stated 
that ‘proportionality also relates, in our opinion, to the question of whether the measure 
is exercised collectively – such as, God forbid, the demolition of the houses of an entire 
neighborhood, an inconceivable action in the context of Regulation 119 – as opposed to 
the demolition of the house of a proven terrorist, and the injury, which should not be 
taken lightly, is caused to the property of the house's inhabitants and neither to the 
property of others nor to human life.’67 
However, the Court seemingly ignored the other persons living in the house with the 
perpetrator. Collective punishment does not start with the involvement of unrelated 
neighbours or landlords; it starts with the involvement of other members of a group such 
as family members of the perpetrator (civilians protected by the prohibition of collective 
punishment under the Fourth Geneva Convention). Although the Court has shown 
substantial efforts to make a case for punitive house demolitions, their illegality under 
the law of armed conflict remains unchanged – irrespective of any proportionality 
thresholds put forward by the Court. 
                                                          
against Major General Almog regarding the commission of war crimes, including the demolition 
of houses in the Gaza Strip in 2002: Machover, D. & Maynard, K. (2006). Prosecuting Alleged 
Israeli War Criminals in England and Wales, Denning Law Journal, pp.95-114. Similar attempts 
were undertaken against the Israeli politician Tzipi Livni in 2009 and 2011 (arrest warrants) 
and 2016 (questioning by the police): Williams, S. (2012). Arresting Developments? Restricting 
the Enforcement of the UK’s Universal Jurisdiction Provisions, Modern Law Review, 75 (3), pp. 
368-386; BBC News (4 July 2016). Israeli politician Tzipi Livni 'summonsed by UK police', 
online available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-36697324 (accessed on 
15/04/18). 
65 HCJ 4597/14 ‘Awawdeh et al (Judgment) supra note 55; HCJ 5290/14, 5295/14, 5300/14 
Qawasmeh et al v Military Commander of the West Bank Area (Judgment) 11 August 2014, 
unofficial English translation online available at: 
http://www.hamoked.org/files/2014/1158616_eng.pdf (accessed on 15/04/18); HCJ 8091/14 
HaMoked et al (Judgment) supra note 58, Opinion Justice Rubinstein, para.16. 
66 HCJ 8091/14 HaMoked et al (Judgment) supra note 58, Opinion Justice Rubinstein, para.24. 
67 HCJ 8091/14 HaMoked et al (Judgment) supra note 58, Opinion Justice Rubinstein, para.25. 
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In his concurring opinion to the judgment Justice Sohlberg added another layer to the 
deterrent character of punitive house demolitions, citing studies on deterrence and 
family ties: ‘The centrality of the family in the eyes of those involved in terror, is clearly 
indicated by these studies, and supports the deterring value embedded in the demolition 
of a terrorist's house.’68 He even called deterrence via targeting family members or the 
family home the ‘soft spot’ of terrorists.69  
Sohlberg elaborated on collective punishment as ‘a moral issue, an issue of values, 
difficult and seething’.70 Engaging in an excess of religious argumentation, he finally 
concluded that ‘the sinner is not alone’,71 basing his point on family responsibility for not 
preventing attacks to equating having a suicide bomber in the family with leprosy: 
‘According to the Torah, when leprosy contaminates the walls of the house and cannot 
be eradicated, the entire house should be destroyed, even if consequently, all inhabitants 
of the house are injured, including the neighbor, whose wall is also destroyed.’72 
In response to this panel judgment, the petitioners decided to file a request for further 
hearing with the Court. The main argument again was that the issue of collective 
punishment has never been satisfyingly discussed, not even in the judgment given in the 
case at hand where it formed the core claim of the petition.73 
The authority’s response to the request was rather brief and restated the argument that 
the issue has already been decided and that there would be hardly a chance to overturn 
these rulings – a stance that was confirmed by the Court which denied the request in a 
short four pages decision in November 2015.74 
                                                          
68 HCJ 8091/14 HaMoked et al (Judgment) supra note 58, Opinion Justice Sohlberg, para.10; he 
also refers to a study which supports ‘targeting what terrorists value’: Wilner, A.S. (2011). 
Deterring the Undeterrable: Coercion, Denial, and Delegitimization in Counterterrorism, Journal 
of Strategic Studies, 34 (1), pp.3-37, p.31. 
69 HCJ 8091/14 HaMoked et al (Judgment) supra note 58, Opinion Justice Sohlberg, para.7ff, 12; 
see also the study on the effectiveness of punitive house demolitions in bringing down the 
number of suicide attacks which delivered inconclusive results but was still cited by Sohlberg in 
favour of the policy: Benmelech, E., Berrebi, C. & Klor, E.F. (2015). Counter-Suicide-Terrorism: 
Evidence from 
House Demolitions, Journal of Politics, 77 (1), pp.27-43. 
70 HCJ 8091/14 HaMoked et al (Judgment) supra note 58, Opinion Justice Sohlberg, para.16. 
71 HCJ 8091/14 HaMoked et al (Judgment) supra note 58, Opinion Justice Sohlberg, para.25. 
72 HCJ 8091/14 HaMoked et al (Judgment) supra note 58, Opinion Justice Sohlberg, para.26. 
73 HCJFH 360/15 HaMoked - Center for the Defence of the Individual et al v Minister of Defense 
(Request for Further Hearing) 15 January 2015, para.2ff, unofficial English translation online 
available at: http://www.hamoked.org/files/2015/1159120_eng.pdf (accessed on 15/04/18). 
74 HCJFH 360/15 HaMoked - Center for the Defence of the Individual et al v Minister of Defense 
(Response) 12 February 2015, para.3ff, 15ff, unofficial English translation online available at: 
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On the same day, the judgment on the Haj Hamed et al case dealing with six house 
demolitions was delivered, declaring five of them proportionate and cancelling one in 
favour of the eviction of the suspect’s family from a rented apartment.75 Interestingly, in 
this as well as the HaMoked case, the Court mentioned not the compatibility of house 
demolitions with international law, but the need of international law to keep up with 
reality. In the Haj Hamed et al case, it was argued that ‘the expectation that the state 
continues to adhere to the dichotomous distinctions created by international law may 
tie its hands in the war against terror, and put at risk the security of its citizens’.76 
Sadly enough, the accusation that international law should be more realistic is nothing 
new in this context. The codification history of the Geneva Conventions as well as their 
Additional Protocols have exposed similar lines of argument, for instance those brought 
forward by the British when they warned the conference delegates that they are going 
to be disappointed if they demanded too many concessions in terms of state power.77 It 
seems, as if the attitude demonstrated at conferences around seventy and fifty years ago 
respectively, has not changed much in Israel. Israeli authorities still tend to favour the 
ability to keep all options available and as in the case of punitive house demolitions in 
the OPT, to use them if they consider it necessary or beneficial. However, states have 
overwhelmingly agreed on the prohibition of collective punishment and so has Israel at 
least with regards to the Fourth Geneva Convention. And what is more, the prohibition 
offers a tool to the Palestinians to actively remind Israel of that obligation. 
The review of court cases on punitive house demolitions has shown a continuing 
approval of the state’s policy permitting collective punishment by the Israeli Supreme 
Court. While the government appears to be sure of the ‘[a]bsence of a real chance to 
overturn the ruling concerning Regulation 119’,78 the Court tries to justify what the 
                                                          
http://www.hamoked.org/files/2015/1159121_eng.pdf (accessed on 15/04/18); para.3ff, 15ff; 
HCJFH 360/15 HaMoked et al v Minister of Defense et al (Judgment) 12 November 2015, para.4f, 
unofficial English translation online available at: 
http://www.hamoked.org/files/2015/1159125_eng.pdf (accessed on 15/04/18). 
75 Haj Hamed et al supra note 39, Opinion Justice Naor, para.36ff; punitive house demolitions are 
still carried out, see eg: B’Tselem (2017). Innocents punished: Israeli military demolishes three 
homes and seals another, Ramallah District, online available at: 
http://www.btselem.org/photoblog/innocents-punished-israeli-military-demolishes-three-
homes-and-seals-another-ramallah-dist (accessed on 15/04/18). 
76 Haj Hamed et al supra note 39, Opinion Justice Sohlberg, para.3; see also HCJ 8091/14 
HaMoked et al (Judgment) supra note 58, Opinion Justice Rubinstein, para.22. 
77 See eg: Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development 
of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1974–1977), Volume 
IX, p.73. 
78 HCJFH 360/15 HaMoked et al (Response) supra note 74, para.15ff. 
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authorities seem to perceive as their right – the right to demolish homes of perpetrators 
or alleged perpetrators of crimes in the OPT. In doing so, the Court has referred to an 
ever more unusual range of sources – even biblical stories and leprosy have entered the 
legal argument. This shows how hard it has become for the Court to uphold the 
government’s position. Objections to the generally supportive line of case law are scarce 
and so far, they have only constituted the minority opinion, unable to overturn the 
Court’s final decision.79 
Israel’s punitive house demolition policy seems to enjoy public support as well. It was 
even argued that the Supreme Court’s permissive decisions on house demolitions are 
due to government and public pressure and the fear of damaging the Court’s reputation 
if a judgment is interfering too much with military decisions and security needs.80 For 
instance, after the beginning of the second intifada, Dershowitz and Lewin have 
proposed the destruction of entire villages and even death sentences for a suicide 
bomber’s family.81 Dershowitz went on after his proposal to broaden Israeli punitive 
house demolition policy to destruction of entire villages that a ‘nonlethal approach like 
this is among the most moral and calibrated responses to terrorism’ and that the 
‘problem with destruction of houses is how the world literally sees it’.82  
Fletcher has argued that this acceptance of collective punishment via punitive house 
demolitions represents an indicator of ‘deeply-held sentiments of collective guilt’.83 He 
derives his analysis from biblical Hebrew terminology for terms such as guilt and 
punishment and explains the use of those concepts in the Bible, in particular the book of 
Genesis and their collective character. 84  The notion of collective guilt appeared 
                                                          
79 Dissenting Opinions have been given by Justice Cheshin, Vogelman and Mazuz (their 
statements regarding the lawfulness of Regulation 119 are usefully summarised in HCJ 
8150/15, 8154/15, 8156/15 Abu Jamal et al v GOC Home Front Command (Judgment) 22 
December 2015, Opinion Justice Mazuz, para.3ff, unofficial English translation online available 
at: http://www.hamoked.org/files/2015/1160003_eng.pdf (accessed on 15/04/18).  
80 Harpaz, G. (2015) supra note 29, pp.37ff; Sultany, N. (2007). The Legacy of Justice Aharon 
Barak: A Critical Review, Harvard International Law Journal Online, 48, pp.83-92, pp.86f; Dotan, 
Y. (1999). Judicial Rhetoric, Government Lawyers, and Human Rights: The Case of the Israeli 
High Court of Justice during the Intifada, Law & Society Review, 33 (2), pp.319-363, pp.326ff; 
Simon, D. (1994). The Demolition of Homes in the Israeli Occupied Territories, Yale Journal of 
International Law, 19 (1), pp.1-79, pp.27ff. 
81 Fletcher, G.P. (2004) supra note 2; Lewin, N. (2002). Deterring Suicide Killers, Sh'ma: A 
Journal of Jewish Responsibility, pp.11-12. 
82 Dershowitz, A.M. (2002). Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the 
Challenge. New Haven, Yale University Press, p.179. 
83 Fletcher, G.P. (2004) supra note 2, p.166. 
84 Fletcher, G.P. (2004) supra note 2, pp.168ff; on the socio-psychological factors underlying a 
desire for collective punishment see also: Mannheim, H. (1998). Group Problems in Crime and 
Punishment. 2nd edition. London, Routledge, pp.53ff; Masalha, N. (2007). The Bible and Zionism: 
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particularly in the comments made by Justice Sohlberg. In stating that ‘the sinner is not 
alone’, he attributed responsibility for the act committed by a relative to the entire family, 
arguing that they “should have known”, that they “should have done something to 
prevent the act” and so forth. However, it appears to be hardly possible that of all families 
around the world, Palestinian families are especially aware of all the plans or actions of 
their relatives. Since punitive house demolitions are only carried out in the OPT against 
Palestinians, this attribution of responsibility is not only aimed at families of alleged 
terrorists, it is aimed at the Palestinians in general in the context of Israel’s broader 
discriminatory treatment. Sohlberg attributed responsibility to persons far beyond any 
legal conceptions thereof, but rather engaging in a moral argument. Yet a Court should 
not hear discriminatory notes on leprosy as if an entire family of a suicide bomber would 
be ill or a plague to the detriment of existing legal obligations of a state to refrain from 
collective punishment. 
The public support as well as the apparent denial of the government that punitive house 
demolitions would violate any of its commitments, indicate an acceptance of collective 
punishment applied as policy measure against Palestinians in Israel. The idea of 
collective guilt and notions such as the war on terror and a sense of revenge for 
gruesome attacks all contribute to a situation where collective punishment of a whole 
group is not conceived to be wrong or even illegal. Together with the long list of court 
cases, the whole situation has entered a certain routine and the government as well as 
the courts and the public might have become used to it. It has become so entrenched that 
a challenge of its legal basis such as in the HaMoked case appears to have aroused feelings 
of astonishment amongst the government and the judges of the Supreme Court. 
Nevertheless, what made this challenge of collective punishment at the highest judicial 
level in Israel possible in the first place was the prohibition of collective punishment 
enshrined in the law of armed conflict. Although the Israeli authorities have so far shown 
no sign of surrendering the powers under Article 119, their acts will be measured against 
Israel’s international legal obligations. 
International law can provide a platform for actors other than states and for the less 
powerful or marginalised in particular.85 As argued in the methodology chapter, groups 
                                                          
Invented Traditions, Archaeology and Post-Colonialism in Palestine-Israel. London, Zed Books, 
pp.148ff. 
85 Hegtvedt, K.A. (2005). Doing Justice to the Group: Examining the Roles of the Group in Justice 
Research, Annual Review of Sociology, 31, pp.25-45; Knop, K. (2002). Diversity and Self-
Determination in International Law. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp.109ff; 
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such as minorities and peoples are active participants in initiating social change and so 
shape their own struggle for justice. To do so within the framework of international law, 
to establish violations of the law of armed conflict by Israel represents a factor 
strengthening the broader case made by the Palestinians and enables them to be heard 
internationally and represent themselves in international fora. In this way, the 
Palestinians have used the prohibition of collective punishment to actively engage in 
change. This transition from mere protection towards empowerment represents an 
important step in acknowledging the role of groups in relation to collective punishment 
– and the Palestinians have proved their ability to use the law of armed conflict to raise 
awareness for their cause.86 
In addition, the prohibition of collective punishment under the law of armed conflict 
blocks Israel from making its case under this legal framework. In that sense, the law of 
armed conflict denies legality to punitive house demolitions – an important indicator of 
the international stance on collective punishment. Furthermore, by providing 
regulations on collective punishment, the law of armed conflict delivers important 
support for the petitioners. It renders what has happened to them from “unjust” or 
“immoral” to illegal, it provides the basis for a court case, it confirms that punitive house 
demolitions are against Israel’s own legal obligations – they are not just wrong, they are 
against the law. Seen as a tool in their struggle for justice, the prohibition of collective 
punishment under the law of armed conflict enables the Palestinians as a group to 
highlight contraventions against legal obligations supposed to protect them. 
Admittedly, the prohibition of collective punishment under the law of armed conflict 
alone is not enough to empower affected Palestinians, but it forms an important part in 
the process working towards empowerment in their broader struggle for justice against 
the illegal occupation of their territory. By monitoring state (non-)compliance with 
international obligations and recording Israeli violations thereof, the court cases 
brought based on the substantive prohibition of collective punishment contribute to this 
broader struggle. This contribution can best be realised by a combined effort together 
with domestic and international mechanisms and applicable human rights oversight by 
bodies such as the Human Rights Committee or the United Nations Human Rights 
                                                          
Koskenniemi, M. (2014). What is International Law for?, in Evans, M.D. (ed.) International Law. 
4th edition. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp.29-52, pp.44f. 
86 Malloy, T.H. (2014). National Minorities between Protection and Empowerment: Towards a 
Theory of Empowerment, Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, 13 (2), pp.11-
29, pp.15ff; Sadan, E. (2004). Empowerment and Community Planning: Theory and Practice of 
People-Focused Social Solutions. Tel Aviv, Hakibbutz Hameuchad Publishers, pp.73ff. 
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Council as the law of armed conflict itself does not provide for redress for victims. 
Although there is a discussion on individuals as rightholders under the law of armed 
conflict, this is an emerging field.87 After arguing in favour of individual rights deriving 
from the law of armed conflict and the right of individuals to reparation, Gaeta points to 
several ways of enforcing such a right. These include claims brought by the state of 
nationality on behalf of the individual as in the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission or 
domestic courts and tribunals able to deal with violations of the law of armed conflict.88  
The International Criminal Court which adjudicates serious breaches of the law of armed 
conflict, but does not mention collective punishment explicitly, is not accessible to 
victims of armed conflict and cannot provide individual reparation.89 On the other hand, 
human rights bodies might be able to provide remedies, but not on the account of 
violations of the law of armed conflict, but human rights law. An example thereof is the 
case law of the European Court of Human Rights with regards to the non-international 
armed conflict in Chechnya as will be seen in the second case study. Although the Court 
does not apply the law of armed conflict, but the rights enshrined in the ECHR and those 
rights only, it managed to provide redress for human rights violations committed during 
armed conflict. In doing so, the Court has documented the violations of the law of armed 
conflict committed by Russia and provided redress for the victims by giving a full 
account of what had happened as well as ordering the state to pay damages in the form 
of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages in several cases.90 
Given that the Israeli government has a long record of non-compliance with 
international obligations in relation to the OPT including the prohibition of collective 
punishment, any actions such as bringing cases on punitive house demolitions might 
seem futile. Yet it is this ongoing and thorough documentation or archiving of the events 
going on in the OPT, that calls out the illegality of Israeli state practice and contributes 
to the Palestinians broader struggle for justice. Since 2009, these efforts are supported 
                                                          
87 Gaeta, P. (2011). Are Victims of Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Entitled 
to Compensation?, in Ben-Naftali, O. (ed.). International Humanitarian Law and International 
Human Rights Law. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp.305-327, 318ff; Ronzitti, N. (2007). 
Access to Justice and Compensation for Violations of the Law of War, in Francioni, F. (ed.). 
Access to Justice as a Human Right. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp.95-134; Provost, R. 
(2002). International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, pp.45ff. 
88 Gaeta, P. (2011) supra note 87, pp.322ff; for domestic proceedings see eg: Mustafic v the 
Netherlands, The Hague Court of Appeal, Case No. 200.020.173/01, Judgment (5 July 2011). 
89 Oberleitner, G. (2015). Human Rights in Armed Conflict. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, pp.317f. 
90 See the chapter on the case study on Chechnya below. 
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on international level by reports of the United Nations High Commissioner on Human 
Rights explicitly aimed at ‘ensuring accountability and justice for all violations of 
international law in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem’.91 
Summing up, the HaMoked case might not have been successful in changing the stance 
of the Court and the Israeli government on the issue of punitive house demolitions for 
now. However, it has been successful in raising awareness for the situation in the OPT 
and this attention on the issue was brought about by the Palestinians themselves – they 
have used the prohibition of collective punishment under the law of armed conflict to 
actively engage in their struggle for justice. Furthermore, the prohibition has put Israel 
in a position where it has to argue and justify its actions against its international 
obligations – a task that is not going to become easier with the Palestinians exposing its 
violations and actively campaigning against it. 
3.2.4 Conclusion 
This case study has shown the implications of the prohibition of collective punishment 
under the law of armed conflict on punitive house demolitions in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories. Given that Israel is upholding its policy, the prohibition covers 
the important role of blocking Israel from justifying its actions under the law of armed 
conflict on one hand, and on the other hand providing a tool for affected groups to make 
their case in court. These two functions are ultimately intended to promote justice for 
the Palestinians and to contribute to their empowerment. 
Punitive house demolitions in times of occupation predominantly regulated by the 
framework of the law of armed conflict represent the first stage in explaining the 
development of state policies and the law on collective punishment. Although at first 
sight it might look as if international law would be powerless against the policies 
promoted by Israel, the prohibition of collective punishment has certainly contributed 
to the considerable lengths the state has gone to in order to justify its actions. This need 
for justification indicates an awareness of the illegality of the measures taken, but also, 
as seen in the judgments of the Supreme Court and the government’s responses, a 
deliberate decision against compliance. However, such a decision is not upheld easily if 
confronted with compelling evidence against it. 
                                                          
91 See eg: A/HRC/37/41 Ensuring accountability and justice for all violations of international 
law in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Report of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (19 March 2018). 
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The imposition of collective punishment in practice, informed by a policy of punitive 
house demolitions by Israel, sheds light on the development of a certain acceptance of 
the said measure and a certain hostility towards the protection of groups such as peoples 
and minorities – a continuing development already witnessed during the codification 
process of relevant instruments on the law of armed conflict discussed in the previous 
chapter. Such a phenomenon should lead to a stronger focus on the issue and a greater 
awareness of the dangers such as getting used to illegal practices over time. 
Unfortunately, as will be seen in the following chapters, international law has not done 
more to protect groups such as the Palestinians or the Chechens from collective 
punishment in changing contexts, but rather less as it is not explicitly prohibited under 
human rights law. 
The punitive house demolitions carried out in the OPT by Israel and its respective policy 
represent a sound starting point for understanding the breadth of this development and 
of its consequences. In this light, the consideration of collective punishment in other 
contexts, particularly the context of human rights law, appears not only timely but 
crucial to enable the active participation of these groups in their struggle for justice. 
Building on these findings, the following part will deal with collective punishment in 
human rights law and a case study on collective punishment in Chechnya. 
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4 Collective punishment, state policies and human rights 
law 
 
4.1 Collective punishment and international human rights law 
 
4.1.1 Introduction 
After outlining the legal regulation of collective punishment in the law of armed conflict 
and the case study on the Occupied Palestinian Territories, collective punishment will 
be discussed in the context of human rights law in the following.  
There is no explicit prohibition of collective punishment in international human rights 
law. However, there are several rights and principles related to the act of collective 
punishment as well as to its broader background. These rights and principles will be 
outlined below. In addition to rights and principles relevant to collective punishment, 
there are situations that are worth exploring, particularly states of emergency for which 
human rights instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights provide. States of emergency 
could be seen as a transition or link between the law of armed conflict and human rights 
law in the context of collective punishment. These situations are linked to exceptional 
circumstances, such as armed conflict, internal unrest or natural catastrophes. For this 
reason, the assessment of collective punishment during states of emergency highlights 
the fluid transition between these two legal frameworks – between the law of armed 
conflict and human rights law. 
After looking at collective punishment and states of emergency, the chapter is going to 
analyse express and implied references to collective punishment that might be found in 
the existing framework of human rights instruments, especially the ICCPR and the ECHR 
due to the present thesis’ focus on Chechnya, but other regional instruments such as the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights as well. Gathering an understanding of 
the current legal framework in relation to collective punishment represents the basis for 
later considerations of potential ways to include a prohibition of collective punishment 
under human rights law. At this point, the assessment of collective punishment under 
human rights law will be limited to its substantive aspects, while several procedural 
aspects are subject of the last chapter of the thesis. In addition to examining references 
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to collective punishment in human rights instruments, the use of the term in the 
European Court of Human Rights’ case law will be reviewed. 
In terms of the research question, this chapter builds the foundation for understanding 
the relationship between state policies on and the legal regulation of collective 
punishment in situations governed by human rights law. Whereas the main discussion 
of state policies on collective punishment will be left to the case study on Chechnya, the 
applicable legal framework will be set out at this point to provide the substance 
necessary for assessing how the relevant law is applied in practice by specific actors. It 
will be shown that the gap in human rights law meant that Russian authorities could 
adopt legislation permitting collective punishment without contradicting any explicit 
international rule prohibiting it. In contrast to the Israeli government which has to 
justify its collective punishment policy due to the ongoing efforts of the Palestinians 
calling out this violation of the law of armed conflict, the Russian government did not 
face the same challenge. 
Furthermore, as already seen in the case study on the Occupied Palestinian Territories, 
group empowerment is about tools and mechanisms to actively engage in change and 
addressing collective punishment can contribute towards that goal. To start such a 
debate in human rights law, aspects of existing human rights engaged in the context of 
collective punishment have to be examined first. This does not mean that potential ways 
of including a prohibition of collective punishment in human rights law are going to be 
assessed already at this point – this discussion is left to the last part of the thesis. 
However, the framework, which will also act as a point of reference for these later 
chapters, is presented here. The regulation of collective punishment during states of 
emergency, specific human rights violated in the course of collective punishment itself 
as well as underlying principles such as individual responsibility and group rights will 
be outlined below. 
The first section is devoted to collective punishment during states of emergency, 
supported by a short look at case law of the ECtHR on the state of emergency regulations 
in Turkey targeting Kurdish villages. Following that, the rights and principles of human 
rights law relating to collective punishment, in particular human rights violations 
involved in the imposition of collective punishment such as the right to life, the 
prohibition of torture, the protection of property and the prohibition of discrimination 
as well as underlying principles, are addressed. Whereas the principle of individual 
responsibility is well-established in the case law of the ECtHR, the concept of group 
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rights will be borrowed from the ACHPR. Although these group rights do not relate to 
the act of collective punishment specifically, they offer a first glimpse at a theoretical 
framework that will be useful in assessing potential ways of including a prohibition of 
collective punishment under human rights law later on. The concept of minority rights 
is mentioned only briefly at this point, as the examination of group or collective rights 
from a theoretical perspective will follow in the last part of the thesis. At the end, 
references to the term “collective punishment” in the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights are reviewed, indicating a certain familiarity of the Court with that 
concept already.  
Ultimately, the chapter concludes that human rights law at present is unable to 
encompass the particular wrong done by collective punishment, the imposition of 
sanctions on a group as such for an act allegedly committed by one or some of its 
members, leaving affected groups not only without protection, but without tools to bring 
about change and seek redress for collective punishment. However, the fact that 
collective punishment as a concept has at least been present in the ECtHR’s case law as 
well as the potential of group rights to offer ways to address collective punishment under 
human rights law, open the way for further analysis at a later stage. 
4.1.2 Reference to collective punishment relating to states of emergency 
The law on states of emergency provides a useful introduction to the understanding of 
collective punishment under human rights law. States of emergency represent to some 
extent a middle ground between the state of armed conflict and the state of peace, as 
they are not confined to armed conflict, but also encompass other crisis situations such 
as internal unrest, terrorist attacks or environmental disasters.1 For this reason, they 
lead the discussion logically from one legal system into another, from the law of armed 
conflict to human rights law. The declaration of a state of emergency in such cases allows 
the state to limit the enjoyment of some human rights as laid out in the treaties the state 
has signed up to, except for non-derogable rights and peremptory norms.2 
The following section focusses on the state of emergency regulations under the ICCPR 
due to the explicit reference to collective punishment in the Human Rights Committee’s 
                                                          
1 Nowak, M. (2005). U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary. 2nd edition. 
Kehl, N.P. Engel Verlag, pp.89ff. 
2 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/19 Tenth annual report and list of States which, since 1 January 1985, 
have proclaimed, extended or terminated a state of emergency, presented by Mr. Leandro 
Despouy, Special Rapporteur appointed pursuant to Economic and Social Council resolution 
1985/37 (23 June 1997) para.34ff. 
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(HRC) General Comment 29 interpreting Article 4 ICCPR regulating derogations in times 
of emergency. In addition to that framework, case law of the ECtHR on the issue will be 
mentioned whenever relevant as the case study following this chapter is centred on the 
ECHR. After discussing states of emergency and their relevance to collective punishment 
as well as to the transition from the law of armed conflict to human rights law, references 
to judgments of the European Court of Human Rights on Turkey’s declaration of a state 
of emergency are provided to emphasise the relation between states of emergency and 
collective punishment in practice.  
4.1.2.1 Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) 
States of emergency represent situations of crisis, of exceptional circumstances allowing 
states to limit the enjoyment of certain human rights according to the procedure of the 
relevant human rights instrument. However, this possibility of derogation from human 
rights guarantees opens the way to abuse, explaining the need to address acts of 
collective punishment occurring during such situations. The way in which states of 
emergency are regulated by human rights instruments is described by reference to 
Article 4 ICCPR. Article 15 ECHR, which similarly includes the regulation of states of 
emergency under the Convention, will not be examined separately in all detail. This is 
due to its strong resemblance to Article 4 ICCPR as well as the scarcity of debate on states 
of emergency in the negotiation process of the ECHR. These debates overwhelmingly 
refer back to the discussions surrounding the issue in the United Nations Commission 
on Human Rights which was dealing with the same issue at that time.3 Furthermore, the 
preference given to Article 4 ICCPR stems from the HRC’s more detailed examination of 
peremptory norms which are non-derogable although they are not included in the list in 
Article 4 (2) ICCPR.4 For these reasons, reference to Article 15 ECHR or case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights is made only if it diverges from or adds significantly to 
the elaborations made concerning Article 4 ICCPR. 
The main rationale behind states of emergency is that if a situation reaches such a level 
of severity that it ‘threatens the life of the nation’, non-discriminatory measures ‘strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation’ can be taken, given that the state has declared 
the state of emergency in accordance with the relevant procedure provided by the 
                                                          
3 DH(56)4 European Commission of Human Rights, Preparatory Work on Article 15 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights (22 May 1956), pp.3f, pp.12ff. 
4 Schabas, W.A. (2015). The European Convention on Human Rights: A Commentary. Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, pp.588ff. 
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treaty.5 The principle of proportionality represents an important limitation as to which 
measures can be taken in the event of a state of emergency since it asks for a ‘reasonable 
relation’6 of the measures and the goals about to be achieved by them.7 Having laid out 
these main criteria, they will be looked at in further detail in the following. 
States of emergency are controversial.8 Sheeran points out that the derogation system 
has been used by governments not to avert a crisis threatening the life of the nation but 
rather to suppress peaceful protests in order to remain in power.9 The terrorism and 
security debate has highlighted this potential of abuse of the state of emergency 
regime.10 Regarding the question of the existence of a state of emergency, the Human 
Rights Committee has maintained a stricter stance than the ECtHR, notably because the 
Committee’s approach to derogations does not mention the concept of ‘margin of 
appreciation’ which has broadened the instances in which the Court has found a state of 
emergency.11 Despite initial criticism,12 in the case A and others v the United Kingdom, 
the European Court of Human Rights found that the national government might be best 
placed to decide on whether there is a state of emergency and stepped aside conceding 
a broad margin of appreciation to the state.13 
The emergency situation does not have to encompass the entire country. It can be 
geographically limited, as seen in the example of Lawless v Ireland14 before the European 
                                                          
5 CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 General Comment No.29: States of Emergency (Article 4) (31 
August 2001); 999 UNTS 171 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (16 December 
1966) Article 4. 
6 Nowak, M. (2005) supra note 1, p.95 para.25. 
7 Nowak, M. (2005) supra note 1, pp.97f. 
8 Nowak, M. (2005) supra note 1, pp.84f. 
9 Sheeran, S.P. (2013). Reconceptualizing States of Emergency under International Human 
Rights Law, Michigan Journal of International Law, 34 (1), pp.491-557, pp.492f, 546f. 
10 Sheeran, S.P. (2013) supra note 9, pp.541ff; Humphreys, S. (2006). Legalizing Lawlessness: On 
Giorgio Agamben's State of Exception, European Journal of International Law, 17 (3), pp.677-
687, pp.683ff; (2006) (book review); Agamben, G. (2005). State of Exception (translated by 
Attell, K.). Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 
11 Schabas, W.A. (2015) supra note 4, p.600; Gross, O. & Ni Aoláin, F. (2001). From Discretion to 
Scrutiny: Revisiting the Application of the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Context of 
Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Human Rights Quarterly, 23 (3), 
pp.625-649, pp.630ff; Joseph, S. (2002). Human Rights Committee: General Comment 29, 
Human Rights Law Review, 2 (1), pp.81-98, p.86. 
12 CommDH(2002)7 Opinion 1/2002 of the Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr Alvaro Gil-
Robles, on certain aspects of the United Kingdom 2001 derogation from Article 5 par. 1 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (28 August 2002). 
13 A and others v the United Kingdom (Merits and Just Satisfaction) no. 3455/05, Court (Grand 
Chamber) (19 February 2009) para.180; Joseph, S. (2002) supra note 11, pp.86ff; Marks, S. 
(1995). Civil Liberties at the Margin: The UK Derogation and the European Court of Human 
Rights, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 15 (1), pp.69-95, pp.74ff, 93f. 
14 Lawless v Ireland (No.3) (Merits) no. 332/57, Chamber (1 July 1961). 
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Court of Human Rights, when Ireland declared a state of emergency because of the 
existence, as the Court put it, of a ‘secret army engaged in unconstitutional activities and 
using violence to attain its purposes’ operating from its territory and carrying out attacks 
in Northern Ireland. 15  Vice versa, the Court confirmed the existence of a state of 
emergency on the territory of the United Kingdom regarding the same situation. 16 
Another example for territorially limited derogations could be found in Turkey’s 
declarations of a state of emergency regarding the south-east of the country.17  This 
example will be addressed separately in the next section. Although these cases have been 
dealt with under the ECHR and not the ICCPR, the latter framework maintains that 
interpretation.18 
There are several conditions limiting the situations in which a state of emergency can be 
declared. The most significant limitation to a declaration of a state of emergency under 
Article 4 ICCPR might be found in the passage ‘strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation’ calling for an assessment of the measures taken relatively to the threat in 
question – meaning an assessment of their proportionality. This assessment should 
consider factors such as the ‘duration, geographical coverage and material scope of the 
state of emergency’.19 According to the Human Rights Committee, ‘this will ensure that 
no provision of the Covenant, however validly derogated from will be entirely 
inapplicable to the behaviour of a State party’. 20  In addition to the factors already 
mentioned, the HRC has issued General Comments on Article 4 ICCPR which are 
                                                          
15 Lawless v Ireland (No.3) supra note 14, para.28; Schabas, W.A. (2015) supra note 4, pp.594ff. 
16 Ireland v the United Kingdom (Merits and Just Satisfaction) no.5310/71, Plenary (18 January 
1978). 
17 Derogation contained in a letter from the Permanent Representation of Turkey, dated 6 
August 1990, registered at the Secretariat General on 7 August 1990, online available at: 
http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/search-on-reservations-and-declarations/-
/conventions/declarations/results?_coeconventions_WAR_coeconventionsportlet_formDate=14
53195415220&_coeconventions_WAR_coeconventionsportlet_searchBy=state&_coeconvention
s_WAR_coeconventionsportlet_codePays=TUR&_coeconventions_WAR_coeconventionsportlet_n
umSTE=&_coeconventions_WAR_coeconventionsportlet_codesMatieres=&_coeconventions_WA
R_coeconventionsportlet_enVigueur=false&_coeconventions_WAR_coeconventionsportlet_date
Debut=05%2F05%2F1949&_coeconventions_WAR_coeconventionsportlet_dateStatus=19%2F0
1%2F2016&_coeconventions_WAR_coeconventionsportlet_numArticle=&_coeconventions_WAR
_coeconventionsportlet_codeNature= (accessed on 15/04/18); Aksoy v Turkey (Merits and Just 
Satisfaction) no. 21987/93, Chamber (18 December 1996) para.70; Bilen v Turkey (Merits and 
Just Satisfaction) no.34482/97, Fourth Section (21 February 2006) para.46; Schabas, W.A. 
(2015) supra note 4, pp.596ff. 
18 Joseph, S., Schultz, J. & Castan, M. (2004). The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights: Cases, Material, and Commentary. 2nd edition. Oxford, Oxford University Press, p.825; 
International Law Association (1985). Paris Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms in a 
State of Emergency, American Journal of International Law, 79, pp.1072-1081, Section (A)4. 
19 General Comment 29 supra note 5, para.4; Nowak, M. (2005) supra note 1, pp.97f. 
20 General Comment 29 supra note 5, para.4. 
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understood as ‘instruments that develop creatively the understanding of the rights in 
the ICCPR’.21 General Comment 5 as well as General Comment 29 emphasise that the 
measures have to be of an ‘exceptional and temporary nature’.22  The Siracusa principles 
describe proportionality in terms of measures taken in reaction to an ‘actual, clear, 
present, or imminent danger and may not be imposed merely because of an 
apprehension of potential danger’.23 
Regarding proportionality considerations, the positions of the HRC and the ECtHR differ 
again. In contrast to the rather strict stance taken by the Committee, the Court has 
conceded a relatively broad margin of appreciation to the member states in its case law 
as already seen regarding the assessment of the existence of a state of emergency. For 
instance in the case of Lawless v Ireland, the Court concluded that provisions allowing 
for detention without trial were in accordance with Article 15 ECHR as they were 
accompanied by sufficient safeguards.24  Furthermore, in the case Ireland v the United 
Kingdom, the Court found regulations which did not define any limitation as to the 
duration of detention in line with being ‘strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation’ as their effect was apparently mitigated in practice as well.25 On the other hand, 
the Court declared regulations providing for the denial of re-hearing and detention 
without judicial supervision for fourteen days not ‘strictly required by the exigencies of 
the situation’.26 
In addition to the proportionality threshold, Article 4 ICCPR as well as Article 15 ECHR 
make clear that a state declaring a state of emergency can neither derogate from other 
international obligations under that provision such as the Geneva Conventions or other 
                                                          
21 Medina, C. (2013). The Role of International Tribunals: Law-Making or Creative 
Interpretation?, in Shelton, D. (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law. 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp.649-669, p.661. 
22 General Comment 29 supra note 5, para.1; see also: HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I) General 
Comment No.5: Derogations (Article 4) (31 July 1981) (replaced by General Comment 29). 
23 E/CN.4/1985/4 (Annex) The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions 
in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (28 September 1984), principle 54; 
O’Donnell, D. (1985). Commentary by the Rapporteur on Derogation Symposium: Limitation 
and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: 
Commentary, Human Rights Quarterly, 7 (1), pp.23-34; Joseph, S., Schultz, J. & Castan, M. (2004) 
supra note 18, pp.825ff. 
24 Lawless v Ireland (No.3) supra note 14, para.31ff. 
25 Ireland v the United Kingdom supra note 16, para.243; Schabas, W.A. (2015) supra note 4, 
pp.598ff; see also Brannigan and McBride v the United Kingdom (Merits and Just Satisfaction) 
nos. 14553/89 14554/89, Plenary (26 May 1993) para.66: Seven days of detention without trial 
was considered ‘strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. 
26 Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and the Netherlands v Greece (1) nos.3321/67, 3322/67, 3323/67, 
3344/67, European Commission of Human Rights (5 November 1969) para.234; Aksoy v Turkey 
supra note 17, para.78. 
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international human rights treaties nor take measures which are ‘inconsistent with its 
other obligations under international law’ as put by Article 15 ECHR.27 
Furthermore, Article 4 ICCPR states that measures taken during a state of emergency 
should be non-discriminatory, meaning that aspects of the right to non-discrimination 
are not derogable. However, it has been argued that indirect discrimination of a certain 
group for instance caused by the geographical scope of a declaration of a state of 
emergency would be permissible.28 Although Article 15 ECHR does not explicitly refer to 
non-discrimination, this principle is implied under the proportionality assessment. 
Reaffirming this stance, the European Court of Human Rights has declared the indefinite 
detention of suspected terrorists who were not nationals of the United Kingdom in 
derogation of Article 5 ECHR as ‘disproportionate in that they discriminated 
unjustifiably between nationals and non-nationals’.29 
Completing the range of criteria limiting the derogation measures permissible during a 
state of emergency is the list of non-derogable rights including amongst others the right 
to life and to recognition as a person before the law and the freedom from torture and 
slavery. In General Comment 29 on Article 4 ICCPR the HRC stated that this enumeration 
of non-derogable rights in Article 4 (2) of the Covenant is not exhaustive, taking into 
account other peremptory norms.30 Following this assumption, it concluded that ‘States 
parties may in no circumstances invoke article 4 of the Covenant as justification for 
acting in violation of humanitarian law or peremptory norms of international law, for 
instance … by imposing collective punishments’.31 Although this formulation does not 
allow for a classification of the prohibition of collective punishment as peremptory norm 
as it encompasses norms of the law of armed conflict as well as peremptory norms,32 the 
General Comment makes clear that a state of emergency could not be invoked to justify 
                                                          
27 Joseph, S., Schultz, J. & Castan, M. (2004) supra note 18, pp.827f; Nowak, M. (2005) supra note 
1, p.99; General Comment 28, para.9, 10; Hartman, J.F. (1985). Working Paper for the 
Committee of Experts on the Article 4 Derogation Provision Symposium: Limitation and 
Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Commentary, 
Human Rights Quarterly, 7 (1), pp.89-131, p.119; Schabas, W.A. (2015) supra note 4, pp.600f. 
28 Joseph, S., Schultz, J. & Castan, M. (2004) supra note 18, pp.828f; Nowak, M. (2005) supra note 
1, pp.99f. 
29 A and others v the United Kingdom supra note 13, para.190; Schabas, W.A. (2015) supra note 4, 
p.600. 
30 Joseph, S. (2002) supra note 11, pp.91ff. 
31 General Comment 29 supra note 5, para.11. 
32 This relates to the question whether the prohibition of collective punishment could be 
considered jus cogens; on that see the short remarks in the chapter on collective punishment 
and the law of armed conflict. 
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the imposition of collective punishment. 33  The summary records on the drafting of 
General Comment 29 reveal debates as to the understanding of collective punishment in 
the context of human rights law. For instance, a reformulation of the paragraph including 
the reference to collective punishment was suggested: ‘States parties may not invoke 
article 4 of the Covenant as justification for taking hostages by derogating from article 9 
of the Covenant or for imposing collective punishments by derogating from article 14’.34 
This proposal linked collective punishment directly to the right to equality before the 
courts and the fair trial guarantees laid out in the ICCPR. However, the proposal was not 
pursued further. The final version of General Comment 29 refers to collective 
punishment in the context of the law of armed conflict, but groups it together with other 
guarantees included in Article 14 ICCPR, namely ‘fundamental principles of fair trial, 
including the presumption of innocence’.35 
In the same General Comment, the HRC referred to ‘the international protection of the 
rights of persons belonging to minorities’ and emphasised that elements of their 
protection ‘must be respected in all circumstances’.36 Here the Committee mentioned the 
prohibition of genocide, the non-discrimination clause in Article 4 ICCPR itself and the 
prohibition of deportation or forcible transfer of population constituting a crime against 
humanity. Clearly, the Committee was aware of the dangers a state of emergency could 
represent for marginalised groups within states declaring such an emergency and the 
potential for abuse of these powers. 37  More broadly, the Committee stated the 
‘substantive gap’ in securing human rights created by states of emergency as the impetus 
for drafting General Comment 29. Similarly, in the document outlining the Committee’s 
intention of drafting General Comment 29 on Article 4 ICCPR, it highlighted the dangers 
of a ‘grey zone’ between the applicability of the law of armed conflict and human rights 
law in times of crisis that do not fulfil the criteria necessary to apply the law of armed 
conflict. With that in mind, the explicit mention of collective punishment indicates the 
                                                          
33 General Comment 29 supra note 5, para.11. 
34 CCPR/C/SR.1874 Summary Record of the 1874th Meeting, 70th session (24 October 2000) Mr 
Klein, para.30; E/CN.4/2000/145 Letter dated from the head of the delegation of Sweden, 56th 
session (4 April 2000) Annex: CCPR/C/66/R.8 Draft General Comment on Article 4: Non-
derogable rights under the CCPR, pp.26ff. 
35 General Comment 29 supra note 5, para.11. 
36 General Comment 29 supra note 5, para.13(c). 
37 Joseph, S., Schultz, J. & Castan, M. (2004) supra note 18, pp.830f. 
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importance the Committee attributed to it as well as the indirect acknowledgement that 
collective punishment can occur outside the ambit of the law of armed conflict.38 
The consideration of these further non-derogable rights has been described in the 
scholarly literature as ‘controversial’ due to its significant departure from the explicit 
wording of Article 4 ICCPR.39 On the other hand, General Comment 29 was prepared 
following advice and recommendations of experts and non-governmental organisations 
such as the International Commission of Jurists. This and the Human Rights Committee’s 
authority to assess derogations as to their compatibility with other international 
obligations of a state might well justify the broad stance the Committee has taken with 
regards to non-derogable rights.40 Regarding the ECHR, Schabas argues that the position 
of the HRC on the issue ‘is certainly germane to the interpretation of Article 15 of the 
European Convention, given the broad similarities between the relevant provisions’.41 
This consideration of collective punishment in the context of states of emergency throws 
light on the changing field of application of collective punishment from situations 
governed by the law of armed conflict to situations governed by human rights law. In 
particular, the indirect acknowledgement of the possibility that collective punishment 
can occur in situations not covered by the law of armed conflict, represents significant 
support for the thesis argument for a potential prohibition of collective punishment 
under human rights law. The following example of a policy of collective punishment 
against the Kurds in Turkey completes this brief analysis of states of emergency, 
highlighting the importance of that concept in practice. 
4.1.2.2 A brief account of the state of emergency in Turkey and collective 
punishment 
In order to demonstrate the link between states of emergency and collective punishment, 
the situation in south-east Turkey from 1990 to 2002, the time when Turkey officially 
declared a state of emergency and derogated from rights set out in the ECHR, will be 
considered briefly. 42  The imposition of collective punishment during a state of 
emergency strengthens the case made for the consideration of the concept of collective 
punishment under human rights law.  
                                                          
38 E/CN.4/2000/145 Letter dated from the head of the delegation of Sweden, Annex supra note 
34, pp.24ff. 
39 Joseph, S., Schultz, J. & Castan, M. (2004) supra note 18, p.831; Joseph, S. (2002) supra note 11, 
p.91. 
40 Nowak, M. (2005) supra note 1, p.96; Joseph, S. (2002) supra note 11, p.91. 
41 Schabas, W.A. (2015) supra note 4, p.593. 
42 Derogation contained in a letter from the Permanent Representation of Turkey supra note 17. 
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Tensions between the Turkish government and the Kurds in this region intensified with 
the foundation of the Kurdistan’s Workers Party (PKK) in 1978.43 When Turkey declared 
a state of emergency in the regions populated by Kurds, it adopted specific decrees 
granting significant powers to the regional authorities and responsibility clauses 
effectively enabling them to act with impunity. Decree no. 430 of 1990 for instance 
provided that ‘[n]o criminal, financial or legal responsibility may be claimed against the 
State of Emergency Regional Governor or a Provincial Governor within a state of 
emergency region in respect of their decisions or acts connected with the exercise of the 
powers entrusted to them by this decree, and no application shall be made to any judicial 
authority to this end.’44  
One specific power granted to these governors was the ‘temporary or permanent 
evacuation, change of place, regrouping of villages, grazing fields and residential areas 
for reasons of public security.’45 This provision was used as a pretext to implement a 
policy of village destruction. While the Turkish government denied those allegations, 
security forces were searching villages for PKK members and destroying homes and 
even entire villages if the residents did not agree to join the pro-government ‘village 
guards’.46  
According to Human Rights Watch, more than 3000 villages were destroyed in the first 
half of the 1990s.47 Officially, Turkey blamed the PKK for those incidents and justified its 
own actions with the exceptional circumstances. 48  Yet the strong case law of the 
                                                          
43 Abbas, T. & Yigit, I.H (2016). Perspectives on Ethno-National Conflict Among Kurdish Families 
With Members in the PKK, Terrorism and Political Violence, 28 (2), pp.297-315, pp.299f; 
McDowall, D. (2004). A Modern History of the Kurds. 3rd edition. London, I.B. Tauris, pp.421ff; 
Goldman, O.Q. (1994). The need for an independent international mechanism for the protection 
of group rights: A case study of the Kurds, Tulsa Journal of Comparative & International Law, 2, 
pp.45-89, pp.71ff. 
44 Akdivar and Others v Turkey (Merits and Just Satisfaction) no.21893/93, Court (Grand 
Chamber) (16 September 1996) para.42. 
45 Derogation contained in a letter from the Permanent Representation of Turkey supra note 17. 
46 Jongerden, J. (2010). Village evacuation and reconstruction in Kurdistan (1993 – 2002), 
Études Rurales, 186, pp.77-100, pp.79ff; Bruinessen van, M. (1990). The Kurds in Turkey: 
Further Restrictions of Basic Rights, International Commission of Jurists Review, 45, pp.46-52, 
pp.50f; Human Rights Foundation of Turkey (1994). Turkey Human Rights Report 1993, pp.56ff, 
online available at: http://en.tihv.org.tr/wp-
content/uploads/2015/08/Ra1993HumanRightReport.pdf (accessed on 15/04/18). 
47 Human Rights Watch (2005). “Still critical”: Prospects in 2005 for Internally Displaced Kurds 
in Turkey, 17 2(D), pp.5f, online available at: 
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/turkey0305/turkey0305.pdf (accessed on 15/04/18). 
48 Ҫali, B. (2010). The Logics of Supranational Human Rights Litigation, Official 
Acknowledgment, and Human Rights Reform: The Southeast Turkey Cases before the European 
Court of Human Rights, 1996-2006, Law & Social Inquiry, 35 (2) pp.311-337, pp.318ff. 
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European Court of Human Rights on house destruction during the state of emergency 
indicates systematic state involvement.49  
In the 1998 case Selçuk and Asker v Turkey, the applicants’ village, situated in the region 
for which a state of emergency was declared, was burned down. 50  The applicants 
insisted that their village was deliberately burned down by local security forces and that 
they even knew the commanding officer as he had been visiting the village several times. 
However, the government rejected that allegation and instead claimed that the PKK itself 
was responsible for the destruction of the village and burned the homes as punishment 
for the villagers’ good relations with the security forces.51 Nevertheless, after a series of 
investigations and hearing of witnesses carried out by the European Commission on 
Human Rights on behalf of the Court, the Court found no reason to doubt the applicants’ 
account of the events confirming state involvement in the destruction of the village.52 
The applicants claimed violations of several rights, amongst others of Articles 2, 3, 6, 8, 
14 ECHR and of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.53 The different substantial 
rights involved are not going to be discussed in detail here, but these rights will be taken 
as a guideline for the consideration of collective punishment in human rights law in the 
next section. 
In addition, the Court’s relevant case law points to the punitive character of the village 
destructions which was pursued by a policy expressed in the state of emergency 
regulations more broadly.54 During the assessment of a violation of Article 3 ECHR in the 
case Yöyler v Turkey the Court made clear that ‘even assuming that the motive behind 
                                                          
49 Selçuk and Asker v Turkey (Merits and Just Satisfaction) no.23184/94, Chamber (24 April 
1998); Orhan v Turkey (Merits and Just Satisfaction) no.25656/94, Court (First Section) (18 
June 2002); Yöyler v Turkey (Merits and Just Satisfaction) no.26973/95, Court (Fourth Section) 
(24 July 2003); for more case law references see footnotes 149ff below; Reidy, A., Hampson, F. & 
Boyle, K. (1997). Gross Violations of Human Rights: Invoking the European Convention on 
Human Rights in the Case of Turkey, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 15 (2) pp.161-173, 
pp.165ff. 
50 Selçuk and Asker v Turkey supra note 49, para.10. 
51 Selçuk and Asker v Turkey supra note 49, para.11ff. 
52 Selçuk and Asker v Turkey supra note 49, para.61. 
53 Articles 2 (right to life), 3 (prohibition of torture), 6 (right to a fair trial), 8 (right to respect 
for private and family life), 14 (prohibition of discrimination) and of the Convention and of 
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property). 
54 Yöyler v Turkey supra note 49, para.71ff; Jacoby, T. (2005). Semi-Authoritarian Incorporation 
and Autocratic Militarism in Turkey, Development and Change, 36 (4), pp.641-665, pp.648f; 
Robins, P. (1993). The Overlord State: Turkish Policy and the Kurdish Issue, International 
Affairs, 69 (4), pp.657-76, pp.664f; Muller, M. (1996). Nationalism and the rule of law in Turkey: 
The elimination of Kurdish representation during the 1990s, in Olson, R.W. (ed.). The Kurdish 
Nationalist Movement in the 1990s: Its Impact on Turkey and the Middle East. Kentucky, 
University Press of Kentucky, pp.173-199, pp.180f. 
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this impugned act was to punish the applicant and his relatives for their alleged 
involvement in the PKK, that would not provide a justification for such ill-treatment.’55 
Furthermore, the practice to force the persons living in a house to watch it being set 
alight while preventing anyone from extinguishing the fire clearly carries a punitive 
character. Not only is the house destroyed for alleged contact to the PKK, the people 
living in it are made to witness its destruction to reinforce this manifestation of state 
power.56  The impunity accompanying these acts could be seen as another indicator 
enforcing the punitive nature of the destruction of houses and villages. As the Court said 
in Akdivar and Others v Turkey, ‘the prospects of success of civil proceedings based on 
allegations against the security forces must be considered to be negligible in the absence 
of any official inquiry into their allegations, even assuming that they would have been 
able to secure the services of lawyers willing to press their claims before the courts.’57 
Given that collective punishment cannot be justified by a state of emergency or any 
decree allowing for the evacuation of villages without the possibility to hold local 
authorities to account for resulting damages, the policy of village destruction 
contravenes several specific provisions of human rights law. The cases brought before 
the ECtHR referred to above create a valuable starting point for the ensuing discussion 
of aspects of human rights law relating to the act of collective punishment. States of 
emergency represent the transition between the law of armed conflict and human rights 
law as the situation in question is often one of internal unrest falling short of the 
threshold of armed conflict. The example of emergency rules imposing collective 
punishment on a specific group emphasises this transition in practice. In that sense, this 
short section about states of emergency and the Kurds prepares the ground for the case 
study on the Chechens in the next chapter, where human rights law is fully applicable 
and not limited by a declared situation of crisis. 
4.1.3 Related rights and principles in international and regional human 
rights instruments 
This section will look at the concept of collective punishment under human rights law in 
peacetime, meaning in situations governed by human rights law in the absence of a 
declared state of emergency. Therefore, it describes impositions of collective 
punishment in times where the state in question has not claimed that any exceptional 
                                                          
55 Yöyler v Turkey supra note 49, para.74. 
56 Selçuk and Asker v Turkey supra note 49, para.77. 
57 Akdivar and Others v Turkey, supra note 44, para.73.  
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circumstances would prevail and consequently, all human rights instruments signed by 
the state are fully applicable.  
Except for the brief reference to collective punishment in General Comment 29 examined 
above, human rights instruments such as the ICCPR or the ECHR remain silent on the 
issue, meaning that neither of them contains an explicit prohibition of collective 
punishment. This lack of a prohibition represents a gap in human rights law. Certainly, 
one could break the concept of collective punishment down into more general principles, 
such as the principle of individual responsibility. Or, as seen in the cases on village 
destruction in south-east Turkey as well as in the Chechen context examined in the case 
study following this chapter, find violations of the right to life and the prohibition of 
torture regarding the ill-treatment of villagers or family members, the protection of 
property due to house burnings, the right to fair trial or other specific rights.  
Used as guideline, some of the rights addressed in the case Selçuk and Asker v Turkey 
outlined above are examined for potential links to the underlying reason for their 
violation, the collective punishment of villagers due to their affiliation with a certain 
group. In doing so, Articles 2, 3, 14 and Article 1 Protocol No. 1 to the Convention will be 
considered in more detail due to their prevalence in the related case law. 
The question whether these human rights are able to encompass the act of collective 
punishment is limited to the specific rights addressed, leaving the general debate about 
individual and collective rights and their structure and compatibility to the last two 
chapters of the thesis. Nevertheless, some aspects of this general debate are considered 
below as they are part of the existing human rights framework relating to collective 
punishment. These are the principle of individual responsibility, which encompasses 
some of the characteristics of collective punishment and the group rights mentioned in 
the ACHPR, which similarly address some aspects of the concept of collective 
punishment.  
Since the empowerment of groups is also a question of the tools and mechanisms 
available to them, the discussion of several specific human rights and some broader 
principles intends to build the foundation for an analysis of potential ways of including 
a prohibition of collective punishment in human rights law. The existing framework will 
be assessed according to its ability to encompass such a prohibition. The choice of 
specific rights for discussion stems from the nature of the act of collective punishment. 
As seen in the case studies, collective punishment can take several forms, ranging from 
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the killing and ill-treatment of members of a certain group to house and village 
destruction. These acts violate several specific human rights and these rights will be 
examined for potential collective aspects. 
Again, as the following case study analyses various forms of collective punishment 
imposed on the Chechens by Russian and Russian-loyal authorities, the evaluation of 
those human rights laid out above will first and foremost centre on the ECHR, while 
mentioning relevant rights and principles encompassed in other international and 
regional instruments as appropriate. 
4.1.3.1 The right to life 
Article 2 ECHR guarantees the right to life.58 Not only its location in the Convention as 
first right to be mentioned, but also the strong resemblance to such guarantees in other 
human rights instruments points to its paramount import.59 To put it in the Court’s 
words, the overlap of treaties regarding the right to life ‘indicates that the right to life is 
an inalienable attribute of human beings and forms the supreme value in the hierarchy 
of human rights.’60 
As the Article states, ‘[n]o one shall be deprived of his life intentionally’. However, this 
statement does not apply in case of the execution of death penalties, self-defence, lawful 
arrest or prevention of escape and lawful action undertaken in order to suppress riots 
or an insurrection.61 
Considering the right to life in the current context of collective punishment, the right 
itself is by guarantee of Article 1 ECHR secured to ‘everyone’. Its content is based on the 
life of individuals as are its elements. Article 2 ECHR is not only engaged in case of death, 
but also in cases where the applicant’s life or the life of an applicant’s relative is ‘at 
serious risk’. 62  Thinking of the burning of houses, applicants’ right to life might be 
engaged when they were still in the building when it was set alight by security forces as 
part of a wider policy of collective punishment as seen in the case Selҫuk and Asker v 
Turkey referred to above. 63  The same could be said about collective punishment 
                                                          
58 Article 2 ECHR. 
59 Schabas, W.A. (2015) supra note 4, pp.117ff. 
60 Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v Germany (Merits) nos. 34044/96 35532/97 44801/98, Court 
(Grand Chamber) (22 March 2001) para.94; Schabas, W.A. (2015) supra note 4, pp.118f. 
61 Schabas, W.A. (2015) supra note 4, pp.122f. 
62 Krivova v Ukraine (Merits and Just Satisfaction) no. 25732/05, Court (Fifth Section) (9 
November 2010) para.45; Ilhan v Turkey (Merits and Just Satisfaction) no.22277/93, Court 
(Grand Chamber) (27 June 2000) para.75; Schabas, W.A. (2015) supra note 4, pp124ff.  
63 Selçuk and Asker v Turkey supra note 49, para.13. 
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practices imposed on the Chechens such as the atrocities committed during searches and 
the burning of houses of relatives of alleged insurgents.64 
Article 2 ECHR does not address the issue of violations of the right to life during armed 
conflict. However, Article 15 ECHR on the derogation from certain rights in case of a state 
of emergency makes clear that states might derogate from Article 2 ECHR to cover 
‘lawful acts of war’.65 Nevertheless, other obligations relating to Article 2 ECHR such as 
the procedural obligation to conduct an effective investigation apply during times of 
armed conflict as well.66  Furthermore, in anticipation of the following case study, it 
might be worthwhile adding at this point that Russia has never derogated from the ECHR 
under Article 15 and therefore, the Court has evaluated situations brought before it from 
Chechnya ‘against a normal legal background’67 – meaning as it would evaluate any other 
case being brought in peacetime.68  
Regrettably, the Court has conceded broad discretion to the Russian authorities 
regarding measures to suppress an insurgency, for instance in Khamzayev and Others v 
Russia the Court said:  
‘The Court is aware of the difficult situation in the Chechen Republic at the 
material time, which called for exceptional measures on the part of the State to 
suppress the illegal armed insurgency. … Bearing in mind the difficulties 
involved in policing modern societies, the unpredictability of human conduct and 
the operational choices which must be made in terms of priorities and resources, 
the obligation to protect the right to life must be interpreted in a way which does 
not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities’.69  
                                                          
64 For relevant cases see the following case study on Chechnya in the next chapter. 
65 Article 15 (2) ECHR. 
66 Al-Skeini and Others v the United Kingdom (Merits and Just Satisfaction) no. 55721/07, Court 
(Grand Chamber) (7 July 2011) para.164; Güleç v Turkey (Merits and Just Satisfaction) no. 
21593/93, Court (Chamber) (27 July 1998) para.81; Isayeva v Russia (Merits and Just 
Satisfaction) no. 57950/00, Court (First Section) (24 February 2005) para.180, 210. 
67 Isayeva v Russia supra note 66, para.191; Khamzayev and Others v Russia (Merits and Just 
Satisfaction) no. 1503/02, Court (First Section) (3 May 2011) para.185. 
68 Schabas, W.A. (2015) supra note 4, pp.154ff. 
69 Khamzayev and Others v Russia supra note 67, para.178 (notes omitted); Akhmadov and 
Others v Russia (Merits and Just Satisfaction) no.21586/02, Court (First Section) (14 November 
2008) para.97; Isayeva v Russia supra note 66, para.180; Makaratzis v Greece (Merits and Just 
Satisfaction) no.50385/99, Court (Grand Chamber) (20 December 2004) para.69; Mahmut Kaya 
v Turkey (Merits and Just Satisfaction) nos.22535/93, 22535/93, Court (First Section) (28 
March 2000) para.86. 
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However, the evaluation of the situation in Chechnya is going to be left to the following 
case study – the reference at this point is only intended to link the two parts and highlight 
the relevance of specific human rights in the collective punishment context. 
Interesting insights are also offered by a look at the prohibition of discrimination 
according to Article 14 ECHR in relation to Article 2 ECHR, meaning violations of the 
right to life motivated by discrimination aimed at a certain group. This again points at 
the potential overlap between collective punishment and discrimination in practice as 
the broader group, to which a family whose house was burnt down belongs (such as the 
Chechens) can also be subject to a broader discrimination campaign in addition to 
collective punishment targeting Chechen families of alleged insurgents. However, this 
does not mean that the act of collective punishment requires a discriminatory element, 
it is simply often the case in practice. Although non-discrimination considerations are 
pertinent to a number of cases, including the Chechen and Kurdish cases, the Court has 
struggled to find violations of Article 14 ECHR. This might also stem from its high 
threshold regarding the burden of proof – to establish proof beyond reasonable doubt of 
discriminatory motivation of an act engaging the right to life is, as Schabas rightly notes, 
‘extraordinarily difficult’.70  
Judge Bonello, in a dissenting opinion on a case about the death of a young man of Roma 
origin in police custody, was particularly frank about his frustrations:  
‘I consider it particularly disturbing that the Court, in over fifty years of 
pertinacious judicial scrutiny, has not, to date, found one single instance of 
violation of the right to life (Article 2) or the right not to be subjected to torture 
or to other degrading or inhuman treatment or punishment (Article 3) induced 
by the race, colour or place of origin of the victim. Leafing through the annals of 
the Court, an uninformed observer would be justified to conclude that, for over 
fifty years democratic Europe has been exempted from any suspicion of racism, 
intolerance or xenophobia.’71 
Summing up, the right to life as a fundamentally individual right does not offer a way of 
accounting for the specific wrong done by collective punishment, the imposition of 
                                                          
70 Schabas, W.A. (2015) supra note 4, pp.159f. 
71 Anguelova v Bulgaria (Merits and Just Satisfaction) no. 38361/97, Court (First Section) (13 
June 2002) Dissenting opinion Judge Bonello, para.2 (notes omitted). 
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sanctions on a group for acts allegedly committed by one or some members of the group 
for which the other members do not bear individual responsibility. 
4.1.3.2 The prohibition of torture 
Another fundamental guarantee that has been violated by the imposition of collective 
punishment is the prohibition of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. Breaches of Article 3 ECHR have been found in cases relating to the Kurds 
and the Chechens. 
In the case Selçuk and Asker v Turkey72 the houses of the applicants were burnt down due 
to security forces’ allegations that they had been previously used by members of the 
PKK.73 The Court found that these acts violated not only the applicants’ right to private 
and family life and to an effective remedy, but also the prohibition of torture or inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment as the destruction of their homes and the way in 
which it was conducted reached the necessary level of severity to constitute inhuman 
treatment.74 In the following years, the Court has reaffirmed this stance several times.75 
However, torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment refer to such 
treatment of individuals, not groups. 76  Although the ECtHR has found violations of 
Article 3 ECHR regarding relatives of victims of human rights violations, their suffering 
has been seen as a separate and distinct violation of the relatives’ rights as individuals.77 
An example for that line of reasoning is the case Musayev and Others v Russia. In this case, 
one of the applicants witnessed the ‘extrajudicial execution of several of his relatives and 
neighbours’ and he ‘was subjected to threats from the perpetrators and forced at 
gunpoint to lie on the ground, fearing for his own life’.78 Gathering from these facts, as 
                                                          
72 Selçuk and Asker v Turkey supra note 49. 
73 Selçuk and Asker v Turkey supra note 49, para.8ff. 
74 Selçuk and Asker v Turkey supra note 49, para.72ff. 
75 See eg: Ahmet Ökzan and Others v Turkey (Merits and Just Satisfaction) no.21689/93, Court 
(Second Section) (6 April 2004); Ipek v Turkey (Merits and Just Satisfaction) no.25760/94, Court 
(Second Section) (17 February 2004). 
76 Schabas, W.A. (2015) supra note 4, pp.169ff. 
77 See eg: Janowiec and Others v Russia (Merits and Just Satisfaction) nos.55508/07 29520/09, 
Court (Grand Chamber) (21 October 2013) para.177, 181; Salakhov and Islyamova v Ukraine 
(Merits and Just Satisfaction) no.28005/08, Court (Fifth Section) (14 March 2013) para.204; 
Esmukhambetov and Others v Russia (Merits and Just Satisfaction) no.23445/03, Court (First 
Section) (29 March 2011) para.190; Khadzhialiyev and Others v Russia (Merits and Just 
Satisfaction) no. 3013/04, Court (First Section) (6 November 2008) para.121; Varnava and 
Others v Turkey (Merits and Just Satisfaction) nos.16064/90, 16065/90, 16066/90, 16068/90, 
16069/90, 16070/90, 16071/90, 16072/90 and 16073/90, Court (Grand Chamber) (18 
September 2009) para.200; Luluyev and Others v Russia (Merits and Just Satisfaction) no. 
69480/01, Court (First Section) (9 November 2006) para.114ff. 
78 Musayev and Others v Russia (Merits and Just Satisfaction) nos.57941/00, 58699/00 and 
60403/00, Court (First Section) (26 July 2007) para.169. 
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well as the insufficient investigation following the incident, the Court found that the 
applicant had suffered from inhuman and degrading treatment in violation of Article 3 
ECHR.79 
In the 2014 case Antayev and Others v Russia, the Court found substantive violations of 
Article 3 ECHR amounting to inhuman and degrading treatment as well as torture. The 
applicants, two families of Chechen origin, were subjected to that treatment whilst 
security forces were searching their homes for weapons. The verbal abuse going 
alongside the physical attacks during the searches was ethnically motivated. 
Consequently, the Court confirmed a violation of Article 14 ECHR the prohibition of 
discrimination taken together with Article 3 ECHR in relation to the majority of 
applicants.80 
The Court has found that discrimination in itself can amount to inhuman treatment in 
violation of Article 3 ECHR, depending on its severity.81 Furthermore, acts motivated by 
discriminatory attitudes towards a specific group carried out by private persons were 
held to be in violation of the state’s procedural obligations in cases where there ‘was a 
systematic practice’ of the authorities tolerating violence against a specific group.82 The 
Court emphasised that view in the case Antayev and Others v Russia referred to above in 
the following way: ‘Racial violence is a particular affront to human dignity and, in view 
of its dangerous consequences, requires special vigilance and a vigorous reaction from 
the authorities.’83 
Article 3 ECHR has often been invoked in cases concerning acts of collective punishment 
and the review of references to collective punishment in the ECtHR’s case law following 
in the next section supports this finding. Although the ill-treatment of the individual 
applicants is a result of the imposition of collective punishment, Article 3 ECHR 
                                                          
79 Musayev and Others v Russia supra note 78; Schabas, W.A. (2015) supra note 4, pp.170f. 
80 Antayev and Others v Russia (Merits and Just Satisfaction) no.37966/07, Court (First Section) 
(3 July 2014). 
81 Moldovan and Others v Romania (No.2) (Merits and Just Satisfaction) no.41138/98 64320/01, 
Court (Second Section) (12 July 2005) para.111; East African Asians v the United Kingdom 
nos.4403/70-4419/70, 4422/70, 4423/70, 4434/70, 4443/70, 4476/70-4478/70, 4486/70, 
4501/70, 4526/70-4530/70, Commission Report (14 December 1973) DR 78, p.5, p.62, 
para.208. 
82 Begheluri and Others v Georgia (Merits and Just Satisfaction) no. 28490/02, Court (Fourth 
Section) (7 October 2014) para.144. 
83 Antayev and Others v Russia supra note 80, para.120; Schabas, W.A. (2015) supra note 4, 
pp.196ff. 
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addresses only the outcome, but not the underlying reason for the human rights 
violation. 
4.1.3.3 The protection of property 
The right to property is interesting in the context of collective punishment as the 
examples of collective punishment include property destruction such as the burning of 
homes or entire villages. In addition, the discussion of property rights will include not 
only the ECHR but the ACHPR and its collective aspects which are useful for the 
understanding of the current legal framework available relevant to collective 
punishment.  
The right to property in Article 1 Protocol No. 1 ECHR refers to the ‘peaceful enjoyment 
of his possessions’ of ‘every natural or legal person’, 84   situating the provision in a 
profoundly individual context.85 On the other hand, the ACHPR does not limit the right 
to property to individuals as it solely states that ‘[t]he right to property shall be 
guaranteed’ without naming any specific beneficiaries. 86  According to the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, this formulation should be understood as 
encompassing the right to property of individuals, groups and peoples.87 The African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has affirmed that interpretation for instance 
in the case concerning the Endorois community, which was forcibly evicted from their 
ancestral lands without adequate consultation or compensation. The Commission held 
in 2009 that ‘the Endorois as a distinct people have suffered a violation of Article 14 of 
the Charter’.88 
                                                          
84 Article 1 Protocol 1; Schabas, W.A. (2015) supra note 4, p.969. 
85 Schabas, W.A. (2015) supra note 4, pp.960ff. 
86 African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Adopted 27 June 1981, OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force 21 October 1986) Article 14. 
87 Schabas, W.A. (2015) supra note 4, p.959; African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
Principles and Guidelines on the Implementation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (24 October 2011) para.53; African (Banjul) 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights supra note 86, Article 14; Olaniyan, K. (2008). Civil and 
Political Rights in the African Charter: Articles 8 – 14, in Evans, M. & Murray, R. (eds.). The 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The System in Practice 1986 – 2006. 2nd edition. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp.213-243, pp.238ff. 
88 Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on 
behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya (Endorois case) Communication 276/2003, 27th 
Activity Report (2009) (Annex 5) para.238; Ssenyonjo, M. (2015). The Development of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, International Human Rights Law 
Review, 4, pp.147-193, pp.160ff; similar decisions regarding indigenous peoples’ rights to land 
have been handed down by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, see eg I/A Court H.R., 
Case of Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v Ecuador. Merits and reparations. Judgment of 
June 27, 2012. Series C No. 245, para 217; I/A Court H.R., Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas 
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Although the ACHPR provides for the protection of collective property, the content of the 
right itself does not address the particular wrong done by collective punishment, 
meaning the punishment of a group as such for acts committed by some of its members. 
However, this vital acknowledgement of collective human rights will be examined 
further below in the context of explicit group rights mentioned in the ACHPR. 
4.1.3.4 The prohibition of discrimination 
This short introduction to the prohibition of discrimination represents the starting point 
for further reference to it throughout the remainder of the thesis, in particular when it 
comes to questions of the translation of the act of collective punishment into human 
rights law at a later stage. Furthermore, non-discrimination provisions in other Council 
of Europe human rights instruments, namely the European Framework Convention on 
the Protection of National Minorities and the European Social Charter are not discussed 
at this point. This decision is due to their similarity to Article 14 ECHR as well as the 
focus on the procedural aspects of these instruments. For this reason, they are discussed 
in more detail in the last chapter, whereas the substantive elements of non-
discrimination are examined in the following. 
As already noted above, although the definition of collective punishment only requires 
the existence of an identifiable group in a relatively neutral sense, the groups affected by 
collective punishment in practice are likely to have a broader shared identity and 
therefore might be subject to discrimination based on those characteristics as well. This 
overlap between the imposition of collective punishment on groups such as the Chechen 
family of an alleged insurgent and its implications for the broader group to which they 
belong, the Chechens, makes it difficult to draw a clear-cut line between all the different 
measures and policies they are exposed to and targeted by. This is particularly true in 
the present context, as the prohibition of discrimination is examined for its potential to 
encompass the particular wrong done by collective punishment. For this reason, it is 
useful to keep in mind the overlap of groups and the measures they are exposed to in 
order not to conflate the understanding of groups in relation to collective punishment 
with the groups protected under Article 14 ECHR.  
Article 14 ECHR prohibits discrimination based on grounds ‘such as sex, race, colour, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a 
                                                          
Tingni Community v Nicaragua. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 31, 2001. 
Series C No. 79, para.149 
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national minority, property, birth or other status.’ 89  As the formulation ‘such as’ 
indicates, the enumeration of grounds in the article is not exhaustive.90 However, Article 
14 ECHR is limited to the ‘enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Convention’, meaning it is subsidiary in nature and has no independent standing as a 
right in itself. For the prohibition of discrimination to be applicable, another Convention 
right must be at least engaged. Consequently, Article 14 ECHR does not require the 
breach of another Convention right to be triggered, but only a factual situation falling 
‘within the ambit’ of another right.91 
A broader prohibition of discrimination came into force with Article 1 Protocol 12 to the 
ECHR. In contrast to Article 14 ECHR, Article 1 Protocol 12 prohibits discrimination not 
regarding Convention rights but regarding ‘any right set forth by law’.92 As the rest of the 
provision should be interpreted identical to Article 14 ECHR, its difference lies in the 
scope of application.93  
According to the ECtHR, discrimination means ‘treating differently, without an objective 
and reasonable justification, persons in similar situations’. 94  In the case Abdulaziz, 
Cabales and Balkandali v the United Kingdom, the Court defined discrimination as ‘cases 
where a person or group is treated, without proper justification, less favourably than 
another’.95 Taking into account the focus of the present thesis on collective punishment 
of groups who are additionally targeted in practice due to their shared identity such as 
minorities, the grounds of race, ethnic origin and association with a national minority 
are going to be explored in some detail in the following.  
                                                          
89 Article 14 ECHR. 
90 Schabas, W.A. (2015) supra note 4, pp.555, 572f; Carson and Others v the United Kingdom 
(Merits) no.42184/05, Court (Grand Chamber) (16 March 2010) para.61, 70. 
91 Schabas, W.A. (2015) supra note 4, pp.562f; Sejdić and Finci v Bosnia and Herzegovina (Merits 
and Just Satisfaction) nos. 27996/06, 34836/06, Court (Grand Chamber) (22 December 2009) 
para.39; Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v the United Kingdom (Merits and Just Satisfaction) 
nos.9214/80, 9473/81, 9474/81, Court (Plenary) (28 May 1985) para.71; Petrovic v Austria 
(Merits and Just Satisfaction) no.20458/92, Court (Chamber) (27 March 1998) para.22; Sahin v 
Germany (Merits and Just Satisfaction) no.30943/96, Court (Grand Chamber) (8 July 2003) 
para.85. 
92 Article 1 Protocol 12 ECHR. 
93 Schabas, W.A. (2015) supra note 4, pp.1180ff; Sejdić and Finci v Bosnia and Herzegovina supra 
note 91, para.55; Zornić v Bosnia and Herzegovina (Merits and Just Satisfaction) no.3681/06, 
Court (Fourth Section) (15 July 2014) para.26f. 
94 Sejdić and Finci v Bosnia and Herzegovina supra note 91, para.42; Schabas, W.A. (2015) supra 
note 4, pp.564ff. 
95 Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v the United Kingdom supra note 91, para.82. 
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Discrimination on the grounds of race as explicitly named in Article 14 ECHR is 
overlapping in practice with the concept of ethnic origin. In Timishev v Russia in 2005, 
the applicant’s right to liberty of movement was restricted due to his Chechen origin. The 
Court emphasised that ‘[d]iscrimination on account of one's actual or perceived ethnicity 
is a form of racial discrimination’ and found a violation of the Article 14 ECHR in 
combination with freedom of movement governed by Article 2 of Protocol 4 to the 
Convention.96 The Court has considered racial discrimination as ‘particularly invidious’ 
in its case law and therefore, it requires states to ‘use all available means to combat 
racism, thereby reinforcing democracy’s vision of a society in which diversity is not 
perceived as a threat but as a source of enrichment’.97 
The ground of discrimination based on association with a national minority has largely 
been considered in cases relating to Roma.98 However, the ground of discrimination does 
not make up for the lack of minority rights as they are provided for instance by Article 
27 ICCPR which will be discussed further in due course.99 Furthermore, several attempts 
to include minority rights in the Convention or its Protocols failed and the European 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities has been criticised for 
its implementation difficulties. 100  Specific instruments and mechanisms on minority 
protection and empowerment and how these could enhance the present thesis’ aim of 
                                                          
96 Timishev v Russia (Merits and Just Satisfaction) nos.55762/00, 55974/00, Court (Second 
Section) (13 December 2005) para.53ff; Schabas, W.A. (2015) supra note 4, pp.577ff. 
97 D.H. and others v the Czech Republic (Merits and Just Satisfaction) no.57325/00, Court (Grand 
Chamber) (13 November 2007) para.176; Horváth and Kiss v Hungary (Merits and Just 
Satisfaction) no.11146/11, Court (Second Section) (29 January 2013) para.101. 
98 See eg: D.H. and others v the Czech Republic supra note 97; Chapman v the United Kingdom 
(Merits) no.27238/95, Court (Grand Chamber) (18 January 2001) para.93ff. 
99 G. and E. v Norway (Decision) nos.9278/81, 9415/81, Commission (Plenary) (3 October 1983) 
p.35. 
100 Schabas, W.A. (2015) supra note 4, pp.581f; CM/AS(2014)Rec2040-final  “The situation and 
rights of national minorities in Europe” – Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 2040 
(2014) (Reply adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 17 September 2014 at the 1207th 
meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies) (19 September 2014); CM/AS(2004)Rec1623-final Rights of 
national minorities – Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1623 (2003) (Reply adopted 
by the Committee of Ministers on 15 December 2004 at the 909th meeting of the Ministers’ 
Deputies) (21 December 2004); Resolution 1713 (2010) Minority Protection in Europe: best 
practices and deficiencies in implementation of common standards, adopted by the Standing 
Committee, acting on behalf of the Assembly, on 12 March 2010 (Doc. 12109, report of the 
Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, rapporteur: Mr Cilevičs); Resolution 1866 
(2012) An Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights on National 
Minorities, adopted by the Standing Committee, acting on behalf of the Assembly, on 9 March 
2012 (see Doc. 12879, report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, rapporteur: 
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translating a prohibition of collective punishment from the law of armed conflict into 
human rights law, are considered in more detail in the final part of the thesis. 
Again, the prohibition of discrimination is aimed at individuals who are targeted because 
they are members of or affiliated with a certain group. However, collective punishment 
is addressing the reverse situation – groups are targeted because one or some of their 
members are accused of having committed certain acts. For this reason, the prohibition 
of discrimination in its present form cannot encompass this particular wrong done by 
collective punishment. The question of whether it might be possible to achieve a 
different result via an extensive interpretation or development of the prohibition of 
discrimination, will be discussed in due course. 
4.1.3.5 The principle of individual responsibility 
Grotius said that ‘no Man, if entirely innocent, can be punished for another’s Crime … 
because all Obligation to Punishment is grounded upon Guilt’.101 He added that ‘Guilt 
must of Necessity be personal, because it results from our Will’ 102  highlighting the 
principle of individual responsibility for crime and rejecting any collective punishment 
giving the example of children being punished for their parents’ crimes.103 This principle 
of criminal law that responsibility is personal, can be found in the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights as well.104 
The presumption of innocence laid out in Article 6 (2) ECHR opposes any form of 
collective guilt. Schabas describes collective guilt as being ‘punished not for their acts or 
omissions but for their association with others’. 105  The ECtHR has dealt with the 
personal character of liability in A.P., M.P. and T.P. v Switzerland regarding the imposition 
of sanctions on heirs for the alleged commission of crimes by the deceased person and it 
held that ‘criminal liability does not survive the person who has committed the criminal 
act.’106 The Court confirmed that ‘[i]nheritance of the guilt of the dead is not compatible 
                                                          
101 Tuck, R. (ed.)(2005). The Rights of War and Peace, Book II by Hugo Grotius (1583-1645). 
Indianapolis, Liberty Fund, Chapter XXI, p.1084. 
102 Tuck, R. (ed.)(2005) supra note 101, p.1084. 
103 Tuck, R. (ed.)(2005) supra note 101, pp.1084ff. 
104 Weigend, T. (2014). Subjective Elements of Criminal Liability, in Dubber, M.D. & Hörnle, T. 
(eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Criminal Law. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp.490-511, 
pp.490ff; see also African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights supra note 86, Article 
7 (2), stating that ‘punishment is personal’ and Organization of American States (OAS), 
American Convention on Human Rights, ‘Pact of San Jose’, Costa Rica, (22 November 1969) 
Article 5 (3). 
105 Schabas, W.A. (2015) supra note 4, p.280. 
106 A.P., M.P. and T.P. v Switzerland (Merits and Just Satisfaction) no.19958/92, Court (Chamber) 
(29 August 1997) para.48; see also: E.L., R.L. and J.O.-L. v Switzerland (Merits and Just 
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with the standards of criminal justice in a society governed by the rule of law’ and 
constitutes a violation of the presumption of innocence under Article 6 (2) ECHR.107 This 
view was reaffirmed in 2012 in the case Lagardère v France where the applicant faced 
civil proceedings for his fathers’ misappropriation of corporate assets although his 
father was found guilty only post mortem.108  
Besides these inheritance related cases, the Court was dealing with the personal 
character of responsibility in cases about lustration mechanisms in Eastern European 
countries which adopted such measures after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In its 
case law, the Court has criticised several of these measures as being overly broad and 
lacking ‘individualisation’.109  
In addition, the Council of Europe has issued a resolution on lustration laws reaffirming 
that measures should not be imposed collectively and that the ‘aim of lustration is not to 
punish people presumed guilty’.110 
The case Sõro v Estonia dealt with an act adopted by the Estonian parliament providing 
for the disclosure of persons who worked for the Committee for State Security during 
Soviet occupation of the country. The applicant was employed by Soviet security services 
as a driver and received notice from the Estonian security services in 2004 that his name 
would be registered under this Disclosure Act. Following the publication of his name, the 
applicant was forced to quit his job due to ongoing harassment. The Court found that the 
Disclosure Act did not allow for the consideration of the level of engagement with Soviet 
security services, given that he was only working as a driver and was not involved in any 
substantive intelligence related activities. Furthermore, the Court held that the 
publication of his name and its consequences were serious enough to represent a 
violation of his right to respect for his private life, Article 8 ECHR.111  
                                                          
107 A.P., M.P. and T.P. v Switzerland supra note 106, para.48. 
108 Lagardère v France (Merits and Just Satisfaction) no.18851/07, Court (Fifth Section) (12 
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2015) para.60; Ādamsons v Latvia (Merits and Just Satisfaction) no.3669/03, Court (Third 
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Court (Third Section) (27 October 2009). 
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In a concurring opinion, Judge Pinto de Albuquerque pointed to another aspect of the 
case which bears valuable insights regarding the principle of individual responsibility.112 
In assessing the Disclosure Act, he particularly stressed that ‘the law is applied 
individually, which implies the prohibition of collective guilt, and fairly, which requires 
at least the acknowledgment of basic procedural guarantees such as the right of defence, 
the presumption of innocence and the right of appeal to a court.’113 
Although individual responsibility, the prohibition of collective guilt and the 
presumption of innocence might sound promising in terms of absorbing the concept of 
collective punishment, they cannot provide redress for groups due to their individual 
nature. In addition, they do not address the specific wrong done by collective 
punishment, the punishment of a group for an act committed by one of its members. 
4.1.3.6 Group rights in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(ACHPR) 
Although a more detailed analysis of the group rights debate will be undertaken in the 
last part of the thesis, existing collective dimensions of human rights such as those found 
in the ACHPR are mentioned at this point already as this chapter is trying to provide an 
overview of existing substantive aspects of human rights law relevant to collective 
punishment.114 However, the procedural aspects of the ACHPR of potential benefit to a 
prohibition of collective punishment under human rights law will be analysed in the last 
chapter. 
Articles 19 to 24 ACHPR address the rights of peoples directly. They include guarantees 
of equality,115 the right to existence and self-determination,116 the right to freely dispose 
of wealth and natural resources, 117  the right to social, economic and cultural 
development,118 the right to national and international peace and security119 and the 
right to a general satisfactory environment favourable to their development. 120  As 
shown above in the Endorois case in 2009, the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights confirmed the commitment to collective rights in its case law, refuting 
                                                          
112 Sõro v Estonia supra note 109, concurring opinion Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, para.7ff. 
113 Sõro v Estonia supra note 109, concurring opinion Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, para.13. 
114 Baldwin, C. & Morel, C. (2008). Group Rights, in Evans, M. & Murray, R. (eds.). The African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The System in Practice 1986 – 2006. 2nd edition. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp.244-288, p.244. 
115 African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights supra note 86, Article 19. 
116 African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights supra note 86, Article 20. 
117 African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights supra note 86, Article 21. 
118 African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights supra note 86, Article 22. 
119 African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights supra note 86, Article 23. 
120 African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights supra note 86, Article 24. 
 
 
  124 
 
claims that the rights set out in Articles 19 to 24 ACHPR would be ‘merely 
aspirational’.121 In this case, the Commission found not only a violation of the right to 
property of the Endorois community, but a violation of their right to freely dispose of 
their natural resources due to a lack of compensation (Article 21 ACHPR)122 as well as a 
violation of Article 22 ACHPR, the right to development.123 So far, the Commission has 
employed a broad understanding of the term ‘people’ used in the Charter and included 
distinct groups within a state such as indigenous peoples or ethnic groups in that 
category as well.124 The example of the Endorois case has been followed by the African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights in 2017 when it found a violation of the right to 
freely dispose of wealth and natural resources and the right to social, economic and 
cultural development of the Ogiek community.125 
Article 19 ACHPR states the equality of all peoples and that ‘[n]othing shall justify the 
domination of a people by another’, therefore prohibiting discrimination against peoples. 
The concepts of inequality and domination used in the article refer to internal situations, 
an example of which would be the Apartheid regime in South Africa. The element 
necessary for Article 19 ACHPR to be triggered is the systematic nature of discrimination, 
meaning of a measure that would ‘affect adversely an identifiable group’. 126  The 
imposition of collective punishment in form of ill-treatment and destruction of homes 
represents a measure having an ‘adverse effect’ on an ‘identifiable group’ such as 
civilians, villagers or families of insurgents (and the Palestinians, the Kurds or the 
Chechens in a broader sense). Furthermore, the state policies targeting those groups, 
some of which are even part of the domestic law of the state in question, could be well 
considered to be of a systematic nature. The question however, whether or not a 
collective right to non-discrimination could remedy the lack of a prohibition of collective 
punishment under human rights law, will be considered in the last part of the thesis. 
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According to Baldwin and Morel, Article 23 ACHPR, the right to peace and security is ‘[a]t 
its most basic level, … the right to be free from violence’.127 The violence referred to 
includes not only violence systematically targeting peoples directly, but also any other 
act creating violence leading to the same effect. The Commission considered Article 23 
ACHPR in the Mauritanian case in 2000.128 This case concerned serious human rights 
violations including summary executions, ill-treatment and detention of Black 
Mauritanians by the government that came to power after a coup d’état and specifically 
targeted that ethnic group. One of the communications constituting the case referred to 
the security forces ‘surrounding the villages, confiscating land and livestock belonging 
to the Black Mauritanians and forcing the inhabitants to flee towards Senegal, leaving 
their property for the Haratines to take or to be destroyed.’129  Regarding Article 23 
ACHPR, the Commission established that the authorities themselves were attacking 
Mauritanian villages and that these ‘unprovoked attacks on villages constitute a denial 
of the right to live in peace and security’.130 The duties arising for a state from Article 23 
ACHPR do not only include to refrain from actions threatening peace and security, but to 
take active steps to ensure peace and security. This positive obligation includes the 
protection from acts of violence by third parties and inaction on behalf of the state in 
case a marginalised group is targeted systematically and suffering from acts of violence 
constitutes a violation of Article 23 ACHPR.131 
The destruction of homes or villages may sound familiar being a practice used in the 
context of collective punishment as shown in the case study on the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories, the short reference to village destruction in the Kurdish regions of Turkey 
as well as in Chechnya as described in the next chapter. For this reason, the Mauritanian 
case is a valuable source showing how other regional human rights bodies have dealt 
with policies and practices which amount to collective punishment. However, even the 
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right to peace does not account for the whole of collective punishment as it does not 
address the punishment of an identifiable group for the actual or alleged commission of 
an act by one or some of its members. 
Nevertheless, Article 23 ACHPR has another aspect supporting group empowerment. 
The subject claiming a violation of the right to peace and security against a state is not 
the state in which the people in question is living, but the people itself.132 This changes 
the status of peoples from being merely objects of human rights instruments to being 
actively engaged. In sum, Article 23 ACHPR holds ‘immense potential’, but case law on it 
is scarce and therefore it is still in need of further interpretation in order to ‘clearly 
setting out the minimum duties that are placed on States to protect, and not to harm, 
peoples’.133 
In conclusion it can be said, that the group rights mentioned in the ACHPR in general 
hold potential for the discussion of translating the act of collective punishment into 
human rights law. In their present shape, they are not able to cover a prohibition of 
collective punishment, but ways of developing their underlying rationale towards that 
objective are going to be considered later on in more detail.  
4.1.3.7 Minority rights 
Finally, another aspect of collective rights can be found in Article 27 ICCPR protecting 
the rights of minorities. These rights have been defined by the Human Rights Committee 
as primarily individual rights, protecting individual members of minorities and not the 
minority as a group or collectivity.134 However, the tensions that might arise between 
individual rights of members and collective rights of the group have been discussed in 
several cases where the HRC has tried to reconcile conflicting rights by limiting 
individual rights of group members in favour of other members’ rights or rights of the 
minority as a whole.135  
Yet an assessment of the Council of Europe minority rights instrument, the European 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities will be included in the 
final part of the thesis and not at this stage. This decision is due to the primary function 
of such an assessment being the comparison of collective rights frameworks in order to 
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find potential ways of including a prohibition of collective punishment in human rights 
law, rather than to outline existing substantive human rights guarantees, be they 
individual or collective in nature, relating to the act of collective punishment itself. 
Traditional minority rights relating to language and culture are not at the centre of 
collective punishment, as it is the physical violence imposed on a specific group. 
Arguably, the intent behind a policy of collective punishment does entail those wider 
aspects, but the immediate effect of collective punishment is a violent response to an act 
allegedly committed by one or some members of a specific group. 
To sum up, the existing human rights framework is unable to encompass the act of 
collective punishment, therefore leaving a gap in protection. How this gap might be 
closed will be subject of the last part of the thesis. However, it is important to address 
the rights engaged in the imposition of collective punishment in order to understand the 
interaction between rights and principles and to provide a foundation for ways to close 
this gap. This analysis will be provided in the last two chapters of the thesis, addressing 
the theoretical framework of group rights as human rights and collective aspects of CoE 
human rights instruments, in particular of the European Social Charter, facilitating a 
prohibition of collective punishment from a procedural perspective. 
4.1.4 Reference to the term ‘collective punishment’ in the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights 
Although the ECHR does not include an explicit prohibition of collective punishment and 
the Court has never found any such violation, it has referred to the term ‘collective 
punishment’ in several cases. As of April 2018, reference to the term ‘collective 
punishment’ can be found in 46 cases. The fact, that this terminology is not unknown to 
the Court provides significant support to the argument made in this thesis for closer 
attention to collective punishment under the framework of the ECHR. 
Broadly speaking, the cases mentioning the term collective punishment deal with the 
treatment of prisoners, non-refoulement, references to international law standards 
including collective punishment and the treatment of Kurds in Turkey, mainly discussed 
under Article 3 ECHR. 
The case Blokhin v Russia in 2016 concerned the treatment of juvenile offenders in 
temporary detention centres136 and is part of a broader set of cases concerning detention 
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conditions where applicants have described practices as ‘collective punishment’.137 The 
applicant described the supervisor’s policy to force all inmates to stand in line without 
moving after one of them has disobeyed the detention centre’s regime as ‘collective 
punishment’.138 Furthermore, the Court referred to international materials relevant for 
the case such as the Recommendation on the European Rules for juvenile offenders 
subject to sanctions or measures. 139  This recommendation includes a reference to 
collective punishment as well: ‘Collective punishment, corporal punishment, 
punishment by placing in a dark cell, and all other forms of inhuman and degrading 
punishment shall be prohibited.’140 However, the Court did not refer to the term in its 
judgment. 
In 2012 in Nada v Switzerland, a case concerning the list of al-Qaeda affiliates introduced 
by the United Nations Security Council’s Sanction Committee, the Court referred to a 
decision of the Swiss Federal Court stating that the prohibition of collective punishment 
amounted to jus cogens, contrasting it with other rights and principles such as economic 
freedom, which did not amount to jus cogens.141 However, the Court did not give an 
independent assessment or response to this statement. In J. and Others v Austria the 
Court referred to the Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour which 
prohibits forced labour as a form of collective punishment.142 
In the 2013 case Maskhadova and Others v Russia the applicants claimed that the 
government’s refusal to return the body of the former Chechen president and separatist 
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leader Aslan Maskhadov did not represent a measure to combat terrorism but in fact 
collective punishment of the families.143 Although the Court did not refer to the term 
collective punishment explicitly, it held that the Russian authorities’ decision not to 
return Aslan Maskhadov’s body failed to consider the individual circumstances of the 
applicants. Stressing the punitive character of the decision, the Court found a violation 
of the applicants’ right to private and family life: ‘In the absence of such an individualised 
approach, the adopted measure mainly appears to have a punitive effect on the 
applicants by switching the burden of unfavourable consequences in respect of activities 
of the deceased person from that person onto his or her close family members.’144 
In the 2013 non-refoulement case I. K. v Austria it was argued that the Chechen applicant 
was likely to suffer from collective punishment in Russia because his father who had 
already been shot had worked for Aslan Maskhadov. The Court referred in its judgment 
to the term ‘collective punishment’ three times whilst citing relevant country 
information.145 In F.H. v Sweden, another non-refoulement case, the Court referred to 
country information on Iraq mentioning ‘collective punishment’ of members of the 
Ba’ath party.146 In another non-refoulement case, the Palestinian applicant mentioned 
collective punishment as well.147 
In Yordanova and Others v Bulgaria in 2012, the applicants of Roma origin claimed that 
the eviction order, which was not based on individual conduct, would amount to 
collective punishment based on their ethnic origin.148  
In Cichopek and Others v Poland, a case on lustration measures, the term ‘collective 
punishment’ was mentioned nine times, including references to a judgment of the Polish 
Constitutional Court, with one dissenting opinion (to that Polish judgment) confirming 
the imposition of collective punishment.149 In an expropriation case relating to property 
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145 I.K. v Austria (Merits and Just Satisfaction) no. 2964/12, Court (First Section) (28 March 
2013) para.51, 53. 
146 F.H. v Sweden (Merits) no. 32621/06, Court (Third Section) (20 January 2009) para.58. 
147 M.H. v Sweden (Decision) no. 10641/08, Court (Third Section) (21 October 2008) para.29. 
148 Yordanova and Others v Bulgaria (Merits and Just Satisfaction) no. 25446/06, Court (Fourth 
Section) (24 April 2012) para.87. 
149 Cichopek and Others v Poland (Decision) nos. 15189/10, 10011/11, 10072/11... Court 
(Fourth Section) (14 May 2013) 
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of German citizens on Polish territory the applicants claimed the seizure of property 
amounted to collective punishment.150 
In addition, the applicants referred to the term collective punishment in a number of 
cases concerning the treatment of Kurds in Turkey as already referred to above.151 In 
some of those cases, the applicants linked collective punishment directly to Article 3 
ECHR, stating that it amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment152 or to torture153 
or phrased their complaints more generally in ways such as ‘[t]he applicants maintain 
under Article 3 of the Convention that they were subjected to inhuman and degrading 
treatment as well as collective punishment’. 154  In some of these cases, collective 
punishment was not only referred to in relation to Article 3 ECHR, but also Article 14 
ECHR, the prohibition of discrimination.155 
                                                          
150 Preussische Treuhand Gmbh and Co. Kg a. A. v Poland (Decision) no. 47550/06, Court (Fourth 
Section) (7 October 2008) para.42. 
151 Bulut v Turkey (Decision) no. 43599/98, Court (Third Section) (1 June 2006); Işҫi v Turkey 
(Decision) no. 31849/96, Court (First Section) (20 March 2001). 
152 Dündar v Turkey (Decision) no. 23182/94, Commission (Plenary) (28 November 1994); 
Asker v Turkey (Decision) no. 23185/94, Commission (Plenary) (28 November 1994); Z.D. v 
Turkey (Decision) no. 25801/94, Commission (Plenary) (23 May 1996); Ovat v Turkey 
(Decision) no. 23180/94, Commission (Plenary) (3 April 1995); Altun v Turkey (Decision) no. 
24561/94, Commission (Plenary) (11 September 1995); Ahmet (Son of Mehmet), Ahmet (Son of 
Sabri) and Isiyok v Turkey (Decision) no. 22309/93, Commission (Plenary) (3 April 1995); 
Akdivar and Others v Turkey supra note 44; Selçuk and Asker v Turkey supra note 49. 
153 Hazar, Tektas, Bekiroglu, Pekol, Bozkus, Tektas, Atman, Isik, Aksucu, Doster, Demirhan and 
Sahin v Turkey (Decision) nos. 62566/00, 62567/00, 62568/00..., Court (First Section) (10 
January 2002). 
154 Kinay v Turkey (Decision) no. 31890/96, Court (First Section) (30 May 2000); Altinok v 
Turkey (Decision) no. 31846/96, Court (First Section) (30 May 2000); Aygördü and Others v 
Turkey (Decision) no. 33323/96, Court (First Section) (19 September 2000); Aggül and Others v 
Turkey (Decision) no. 33324/96, Court (First Section) (19 September 2000); Ince and Others v 
Turkey (Decision) no. 33325/96, Court (First Section) (19 September 2000); Güven v Turkey 
(Decision) no. 31847/96, Court (First Section) (30 May 2000); Aslan v Turkey (Decision) no. 
22497/93, Commission (Plenary) (20 February 1995); Yilmaz v Turkey (Decision) no. 
23179/94, Commission (Plenary) (15 May 1995); Demir v Turkey (Decision) no. 22280/93, 
Commission (Plenary) (9 January 1995); Yasar v Turkey (Decision) no. 22281/93, Commission 
(Plenary) (3 April 1995); Ayder, Lalealp, Doman, Biçer and Ekmekçi v Turkey (Decision) no. 
23656/94, Commission (Plenary) (15 May 1995); Bilgin v Turkey (Decision) no. 23819/94, 
Commission (Plenary) (15 May 1995). 
155 Dündar v Turkey supra note 152; Asker v Turkey supra note 152; Z.D. v Turkey supra note 152; 
Ovat v Turkey supra note 152; Altun v Turkey supra note 152; Ahmet (Son of Mehmet), Ahmet 
(Son of Sabri) and Isiyok v Turkey supra note 152; Laçin v Turkey (Decision) no. 23654/94, 
Commission (Plenary) (15 May 1995); Çelik v Turkey (Decision) no. 23655/94, Commission 
(Plenary) (15 May 1995); Akdivar and Others v Turkey supra note 44. 
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In Ayder and Others v Turkey, the applicants requested the Court to find that they have 
been subjected to collective punishment and argued that it would constitute inhuman 
and degrading treatment. However, the Court did not follow this request.156 
In 2004 in the case of Ahmet Ökzan and Others v Turkey the applicants’ claim regarding 
collective punishment was referred to by the Court itself: ‘The applicants claimed that 
the military operation of 20 February 1993 had been conducted to terrorise and 
humiliate the population of Ormaniçi by rounding them up as a collective punishment, 
which, according to the applicants, was an inhuman form of punishment.’157  
Furthermore, there are four cases where the Court cited provisions of the law of armed 
conflict relating to collective punishment, or in which the applicants referred to them.158 
Another interesting case in this regard is the 1958 interstate case Greece v the United 
Kingdom dealing with collective punishment imposed by British authorities in Cyprus.159 
Judge Eustathiades posed the question in his dissenting opinion on whether the 
destruction of buildings and plantations is ‘nonetheless a collective punishment 
prohibited by the Convention, both under Article 3 and under the reservation concerning 
respect for "other obligations under international law" in Article 15.’ However, he 
refrained from answering this question by offering some inconclusive thoughts on the 
individual and collective aspect of this complex issue:  
‘Having said this, I do not think that it would be relevant in the present instance 
to find that, because no general practice constituting an abuse exists, therefore 
there have been no individual cases of abuse. The question at issue is whether, 
in cases of the destruction of buildings and plantations near the scene of attacks 
– the cases complained of by the Greek Government – the British authorities have 
not gone beyond the requirements of security, thus showing that they have been 
using such measures for purposes of collective persecution. In this connection, 
in view of the circumstances mentioned by both sides, I hesitate to say that 
security reasons had no connection with the action taken by the British 
                                                          
156 Ayder and Others v Turkey (Merits and Just Satisfaction) no. 23656/94, Court (First Section) 
(8 January 2004) para.112. 
157 Ahmet Ökzan and Others v Turkey supra note 75, para.332, 339. 
158 X. v Norway (Decision) no. 2369/64, Commission (Plenary) (3 April 1967); Fejzić and Others 
v Serbia (Communicated Case) no. 4078/15 (15 April 2015); Trivkanović v Croatia (Merits and 
Just Satisfaction) no. 12986/13, Court (First Section) (6 July 2017); Zdjelar and Others v Croatia 
(Merits and Just Satisfaction) no. 80960/12, Court (First Section) (6 July 2017). 
159 Greece v the United Kingdom (Volume II) Report (31) no. 176/56, Commission (Plenary) (26 
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authorities. On the other hand, in view of the same circumstances, it does not 
seem to me to be established that the destruction in question was exclusively in 
the interests of security.’160 
This review of cases brought before the ECtHR clearly shows that the concept of 
collective punishment as such is not unknown to the Court. Although the Court has not 
followed the requests made by applicants to address the concept of collective 
punishment, it has cited relevant country information provided by non-governmental 
organisations and evidence of collective punishment provided by applicants. However, 
the Court has not rejected the use of this notion in the ECHR context either. 
4.1.5 Conclusion 
The short account of states of emergency at the beginning of this chapter has highlighted 
the fluid transition between the law of armed conflict and human rights law and the 
importance of considering the concept of collective punishment in situations governed 
by human rights law. After introducing the concept of collective punishment through 
states of emergency to human rights law, this chapter has analysed existing human rights 
law provisions and principles that relate to the concept of collective punishment. Some 
of them have that connection due to the way in which collective punishment is imposed 
such as the right to life, the prohibition of torture, the protection of property or the 
prohibition of discrimination. These rights are engaged in the instances of village 
destruction briefly referred to regarding the Kurds and the following case study on 
collective punishment in Chechnya. 
Gathering from the review of the rights and principles related to collective punishment, 
it can be said that human rights law in its present state is unable to encompass this act. 
The specific wrong done by collective punishment, the imposition of sanctions on a 
group for acts allegedly committed by one or some of its members, cannot be addressed 
by the specific human rights violations that go alongside it. These specific human rights 
are able to confront the result of an act of collective punishment, for instance the 
destruction of a house by finding a violation of the right to property. However, they are 
not equipped to tackle the underlying reason for that specific violation, the collective 
punishment of a group for an act committed by some of its members. 
Nevertheless, the concept of collective punishment is not unknown to the European 
Court of Human Rights. Although the Court has not decided on the issues so far, it has 
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not rejected the use of the notion either. This familiarity strengthens the thesis’ 
argument for a consideration of collective punishment in the context of the ECHR.  
The finding that human rights law in its present state is unable to deal with collective 
punishment represents a vital precondition for the ensuing attempt to find potential 
ways to close this gap in the final part of the thesis. And the case study in the next chapter 
as well as the examples mentioned above reaffirm the significance of a prohibition of 
collective punishment under human rights law in practice. 
This chapter has tried to outline the current human rights framework and to point to the 
existing gap in protection regarding collective punishment. Specific rights and principles 
such as the prohibition of discrimination or ACHPR group rights discussed here prepare 
the ground for the analysis of potential ways to close the gap in human rights law at a 
later stage. 
After this theoretical account of human rights law, the case study following in the next 
chapter, will strengthen the argument for a prohibition of collective punishment under 
human rights law from a practical perspective. 
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4.2 Case study on Chechnya 
 
4.2.1 Introduction 
After examining collective punishment in the context of human rights law in the 
preceding chapter, its imposition in practice is discussed in the following. As the 
framework currently applicable to the situation in Chechnya is in question, concerns 
about the protection of Chechens affected by collective punishment have arisen. 
Chechnya has experienced two non-international armed conflicts in its recent past, with 
one of them potentially still going on. This long period of transition is prone to producing 
grey areas where it might be unclear which legal framework, the law of armed conflict 
or human rights law, applies. Apart from the choice of the Chechens to use the system of 
the European Convention on Human Rights as means of empowerment to engage in their 
struggle for justice, this question of applicability and potential grey areas strengthens 
the case for the assessment of collective punishment under human rights law.  
Policies imposing collective punishment are being pursued on the federal and local level 
and realised partially in law and in practice. Zachistkas or sweeping operations during 
the second non-international armed conflict in Chechnya were carried out to punish the 
inhabitants of entire villages for allegedly hiding insurgents. The current head of 
Chechnya itself, Ramzan Kadyrov, has been eager on continuing this so-called fight 
against terrorism by imposing collective punishment in the form of house burning.1 As 
house burning or house destruction is a form of collective punishment already well-
established through the case study on the Occupied Palestinian Territories, it will be 
emphasised here as well. Furthermore, legislation adopted by the Russian State Duma 
targeting relatives of alleged terrorists might be particularly aimed at groups such as the 
Chechens. Altogether, the treatment of Chechens who have been critical of the 
government of either the Chechen Republic (CR) or the Russian Federation (RF) of which 
it is one of 83 regions, of which 21 are ethnic republics, raises questions about the 
consideration of collective punishment in times governed by human rights law.2 
                                                          
1 Human Rights Watch (2016). "Like Walking a Minefield": Vicious Crackdown on Critics in 
Russia’s Chechen Republic, online available at: 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/chechnya0816_1.pdf (accessed on 
15/04/18) pp.29ff. 
2 ЧИСЛО РАЙОНОВ, ГОРОДСКИХ И СЕЛЬСКИХ НАСЕЛЕННЫХ ПУНКТОВ ПО СУБЪЕКТАМ 
РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ (numbers deriving from the 2010 population census), online 
available at: http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/perepis2010/croc/Documents/Vol1/pub-
01-03.pdf (accessed on 15/04/18). 
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Given that collective punishment as such is not prohibited under human rights law, RF 
and CR authorities could pursue their policies imposing collective punishment 
effectively and relatively undisturbed. However, the cases brought by Chechens before 
the European Court of Human Rights are continuing to challenge the authorities. They 
have done so over enforced disappearances, and they might do so over collective 
punishment if there would be a prohibition under the ECHR. As this chapter is devoted 
to the case study on Chechnya only, potential ways of realising such a prohibition under 
human rights law will be deferred and discussed in the last part of the thesis. However, 
the successful cases Chechens have brought before the ECtHR serve as an indicator of 
the potential of the Court’s mechanisms as a means of empowerment for marginalised 
groups such as minorities. Against this background, the case study illustrates how 
collective punishment was and is used in Chechnya as well as the potential of human 
rights law to assist affected groups in challenging such policies in practice. 
The chapter will start with a short account of the two non-international armed conflicts 
in Chechnya, the ensuing so-called counter-terrorist operation witnessing the 
‘Chechenisation’ of the conflict and the situation today, leaving it open to debate as to 
whether there is still an armed conflict going on or not. 3  After setting out this 
problematic context,  forms of collective punishment practised during and since the 
periods of armed conflict, namely zachistkas and house burning, are discussed. In 
addition to these forms of collective punishment emerging from the practice of security 
forces in Chechnya, the Russian law providing for the confiscation of property of family 
members of alleged terrorists adopted in 2013 will be analysed. The chapter will 
conclude with a short review of two cases involving collective punishment in Chechnya 
brought before the European Court of Human Rights. The general review of cases 
referring to collective punishment in the previous chapter has shown that the Court is 
already aware of this terminology. Chechen cases not only reaffirm the account of the 
current situation in Chechnya, but also strengthen the case made in terms of the 
potential of the Court’s mechanisms in the context of group empowerment. 
                                                          
3 Human Rights Watch (2009). “What Your Children Do Will Touch Upon You” – Punitive House-
Burning in Chechnya, online available at: 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/chechnya0709webwcover_1.pdf (accessed on 
15/04/18) p.11. 
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4.2.2 Setting the scene – non-international armed conflicts and Chechnya’s 
current status 
The situation in Chechnya cannot be assessed without looking at its recent past. The 
current uncertain status is the result of two non-international armed conflicts in 
Chechnya over the last decades namely 1994 to 1997 and 1999 to 2009. Although large-
scale fighting has ceased, the government of the CR under Ramzan Kadyrov is continuing 
to lead counter-terrorist operations targeting not only alleged insurgents, but people 
critical of his rule more generally. The problem which arises during long periods of 
transition, where there still might be a lingering armed conflict, is bound up with the 
question of which legal framework is applicable.  
This question ultimately leads to the analysis of seemingly basic principles of the law of 
armed conflict – the beginning and end of armed conflicts. In this context, the emphasis 
will be placed on non-international armed conflicts and a short analysis of prevailing 
theories will be provided. Acknowledging the scarcity of academic literature in this area, 
the aim of this section is not to engage with all the unresolved complexities of the issue, 
but rather to highlight the underlying problems relevant to the thesis – long periods of 
transition combined with potential gaps in protection and a lack of empowerment of 
marginalised groups. 
4.2.2.1 Two non-international armed conflicts in Chechnya 
The following section looks at the events in Chechnya from the beginning of the 1990s 
up to today and at the broader context of these events. Russia has fought two non-
international armed conflicts against Chechnya in rapid succession. Although the 
Russian government declared the second armed conflict to be over in 2009, tensions 
between Federal and CR forces and Chechen insurgent forces remain. Furthermore, the 
focus has shifted from being a conflict with Russia to being a conflict of Chechens against 
Chechens from which Federal authorities are largely absent. This short account of 
Chechnya’s recent history provides an understanding of how collective punishment has 
adapted to changing circumstances, strengthening the case for its consideration under 
human rights law. 
In the year between 1990 and 1991, starting before the collapse of the Soviet Union, all 
ethnic republics, including the Chechen-Ingush Republic on 27 November 1990, 
declared state sovereignty. This ‘parade of sovereignties’ demanded full-fledged 
membership of the Soviet Union, meaning the same status as the Russian Soviet 
Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR). In reaction to this threat to Russia effectively 
becoming a confederation, the Federative Treaty providing for a division of powers was 
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drafted in 1992 and signed by most subjects of the RSFSR. However, two ethnic republics, 
Chechnya and Tatarstan did not sign the treaty.4 
The Chechens have a long history of resistance against Russian invasions and became 
part of the then Russian empire only in 1864 after Shamil, an imam who managed to 
unite the North Caucasian peoples in their fight against Russia, was captured. 5  The 
treatment of the Chechens under Soviet rule did not change for the better, culminating 
in the deportation of the entire Chechen and Ingush people under Stalin in 1944. Accused 
as a people of supporting Nazi Germany in the Second World War, they were all deported 
to Central Asia and Siberia and only returned in the late 1950s after Stalin’s death and 
Khrushchev’s coming to power.6 
Chechnya continues to be the most ethnically homogenous of Russia’s ethnic republics, 
and is increasingly so as other ethnicities leave, a factor contributing to the rise of its 
independence movement. According to the Russian-wide population census from 2010, 
around 95% of Chechnya’s population is comprised of its ‘titular’ people, of ethnic 
Chechens. In contrast, there are only around 53% ethnic Tatars in the Republic of 
Tatarstan.7  
In June 1991, the then Chechen-Ingush Republic seceded from the Russian Federation.8 
This accompanied by a range of other political factors accompanying the break-up of the 
Soviet Union, led to the first non-international armed conflict between Chechnya and 
Russia in 1994.9 Although the Russian authorities labelled the operation ‘restoration of 
the constitutional order’,10 the Russian Constitutional Court declared that Additional 
                                                          
4 Bowring, B. (2010). The Russian Constitutional System: Complexity and Asymmetry, in Weller, 
M. & Nobbs, K. (eds.) Asymmetric Autonomy and the Settlement of Ethnic Conflicts. Philadelphia, 
University of Pennsylvania Press, pp.48-74, pp.54ff. 
5 Bowring, B. (2010) supra note 4, p.57; Cornell, S.E. (2001). Small Nations and Great Powers: A 
Study Of Ethnopolitical Conflict In The Caucasus. London, Routledge Curzon, pp.12f. 
6 Cornell, S.E. (2001) supra note 5, pp.14ff, 186ff. 
7 официальной публикации итогов Всероссийской переписи населения 2010 года, 
население по национальности и владению русским языком по субъектам Российской 
Федерации http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/perepis2010/croc/Documents/Vol4/pub-
04-04.pdf 
(accessed on 15/04/18) pp.54f, 60f; for the full census report see: 
http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/perepis2010/croc/perepis_itogi1612.htm 
(accessed on 15/04/18). 
8 Bowring, B. (2010) supra note 4, p.57. 
9 Souleimanov, E. (2007). An Endless War: The Russian-Chechen Conflict in Perspective. Frankfurt 
am Main, Peter Lang, pp.93ff. 
10 Cherkasov, A. & Grushkin, D. (2005). The Chechen Wars and the Struggle for Human Rights, in 
Sakwa, R. (ed.). Chechnya: From Past to Future. London, Anthem Press, pp.131-156, p.138. 
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Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions,11 regulating the law of armed conflict in a conflict 
not of an international character was applicable to the situation and it therefore 
constituted a non-international armed conflict. 12 After a period of intense fighting 
resulting in the almost entire destruction of the Chechen capital Grozny and the defeat 
of the Russian army by Chechen forces, a cease-fire agreement was signed in 1996 and a 
formal peace treaty in 1997, coinciding with the election of the separatist leader Aslan 
Maskhadov as president recognised by Russia. 13  The Khasavyurt Peace Accords 
postponed the final settlement of the status of Chechnya to the end of 2001. Despite that 
caveat, the vague wording of the agreement which amongst others, referred to relations 
between Russia and Chechnya as governed by international law, led to conflicting 
interpretations. The Chechen side interpreted the reference to international law as 
official recognition of Chechnya’s independence, whereas the Russian side considered 
Chechnya as a republic within the Federation. These differences as well as the delay in 
reaching a political agreement, contributed to the destabilisation of the situation.14 
As a result of the conflict, large parts of Chechnya’s infrastructure as well as available 
housing had been destroyed and almost half of the population had fled to neighbouring 
republics such as Ingushetia. In the period between this and the following armed conflict, 
Chechnya was de facto independent. However, Maskhadov’s compromise policies did 
not manage to reconcile internal rivalries and his attempt to unite the country, centralise 
power and rebuild an effective state apparatus failed.15 
In addition, the situation remained tense due to the formation of militant groups 
adhering to Wahhabism, a stream of Islam different to Sufi Islam as traditionally 
practised in Chechnya and brought to the region by Islamic organisations backed by 
foreign financial support.16 Although Maskhadov condemned their actions, the influence 
of adherents to Wahhabism grew, pushing for the establishment of a caliphate of 
                                                          
11 1125 UNTS 609, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), Geneva 
(8 June 1977). 
12 Gaeta, P. (1996). The Armed Conflict in Chechnya before the Russian Constitutional Court, 
European Journal of International Law, 7 (4), pp.563-570, p.568. 
13 Grant, T.D. (2010). Chechnya, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, para.16ff. 
14 Souleimanov, E. (2007) supra note 9, pp.119ff. 
15 Souleimanov, E. (2007) supra note 9, pp.127ff. 
16 Rezvani, B. (2014). Reflections on the Chechen Conflict: Geopolitics, Timing and 
Transformations, Middle Eastern Studies, 5 (6), pp.870-890, pp.873ff. 
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Chechnya and Dagestan and later a Confederation of the Mountain Peoples of the 
Caucasus.17  
In 1999, a group of Jihadist fighters led by Shamil Basayev, a high-profile military 
commander who stood against Alsan Maskhadov in the presidential elections, and Amir 
Khattab, a foreign field commander, attacked villages in neighbouring Dagestan in 
pursuit of those plans. This incident in combination with the apartment block bombings 
in Moscow and other Russian cities at that time could be seen as the impetus Russia used 
to justify its subsequent campaign of air strikes against Chechnya, starting the second 
armed conflict.18 Russia framed the conflict as a war against international terrorism 
without taking into account the little support extremist factions gained amongst the 
Chechen population and their president, let alone the lacking proof of Chechen 
responsibility for the apartment block bombings.19   
Despite its character as a non-international armed conflict, Russia has avoided that term 
and has spoken instead of an ‘antiterrorist operation’.20 The major bombing offensives 
took place from late 1999 to early 2000 and afterwards, the conflict was transformed by 
a process of ‘Chechenisation’, meaning the local government under Akhmat Kadyrov and 
following his assassination on 9 May 2004, his son, Ramzan, put in place by the Russian 
authorities continued fighting the insurgents. Russia officially declared the end of the 
‘antiterrorist operation’ in April 2009.21  
Although the end of the second non-international armed conflict in Chechnya will be 
discussed in the next section, it is worth noting already that at least during the most 
intense periods of fighting, the conflict reached the threshold of Additional Protocol II to 
the Geneva Conventions. Gathering from this assessment, the Russian authorities were 
bound by the prohibition of collective punishment as enshrined in Article 4 Additional 
Protocol II protecting victims of non-international armed conflicts as well as Common 
                                                          
17 Gilligan, E. (2010). Terror in Chechnya: Russia and the Tragedy of Civilians in War. Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, pp.28ff; Souleimanov, E. (2007) supra note 9, pp.127ff. 
18 Zurcher, C. (2007). The Post-Soviet Wars: Rebellion, Ethnic Conflict, and Nationhood in the 
Caucasus. New York, New York University Press, pp.85ff. 
19 Russell, J. (2007). Chechnya – Russia’s ‘War on Terror’. Abingdon, Routledge, pp.74ff. 
20 Gilligan, E. (2010) supra note 17, pp.33, 124f; Gray, C. (2012). The Meaning of Armed Conflict: 
Non-International Armed Conflict, in O’Connell, M.E. (ed.). What Is War? An Investigation in the 
Wake of 9/11.Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, pp.69-95, pp.89f; Abresch, W. (2005). A Human Rights 
Law of Internal Armed Conflict: The European Court of Human Rights in Chechnya, European 
Journal of International Law, 16 (4), pp.741-767, p.754. 
21 Human Rights Watch (2009) supra note 3, pp.11ff, 25; Dannreuther, R. (2014). Shifting 
Dynamics of the Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the North Caucasus, Ethnopolitics, 13 (4), 
pp.377-395, p.385. 
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Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and the prohibition of collective punishment based 
on customary international law. However, as already established above with regards to 
the case study on the Occupied Palestinian Territories, victims of violations of the 
Additional Protocol cannot seek redress under the law of armed conflict. This factor 
again highlights the potential of the ECtHR to fill this gap and provide Chechens affected 
by collective punishment with redress. 
After 2009, sporadic fighting as well as acts of collective punishment imposed on 
relatives of alleged insurgents continued. This agenda is now firmly in the hands of 
Ramzan Kadyrov whose regime is supported by the Russian authorities and has been 
given substantial discretion in its “fight against terrorism”.22 The way in which the local 
government has taken over the rebuilding and modernisation of Chechnya has been sold 
as a success story by the Russian authorities to its own population as well as abroad.23 
Starting from this brief account of the two non-international armed conflicts in Chechnya, 
the question arises as to its current status. The transition from a non-international 
armed conflict to a situation of actual peace is mostly not determined by a clear-cut point 
in time, but rather by a long and difficult process, involving reconciliation and regaining 
of mutual trust beyond the mere rebuilding of cities and infrastructure. The question 
whether the second non-international armed conflict in Chechnya is still ongoing and 
the more general question of whether and how it is possible to determine the end of such 
a conflict are addressed in the following. Ultimately, this grey area between the 
applicability of the law of armed conflict and human rights law highlights the importance 
of a consideration of collective punishment under human rights law as the use of these 
practices continues. 
4.2.2.2 The end of non-international armed conflicts 
After setting out the context, the theoretical background of the situation in Chechnya will 
be assessed. Although the end of the counter-terrorist operation was announced in 2009, 
violent clashes between Kadyrov’s regime and insurgents as well as attacks by Islamist 
groups have not ceased.24 This situation, which continues to this day, necessitates an 
                                                          
22 Snetkov, A. (2015). Russia’s Security Policy under Putin: A critical perspective. Abingdon, 
Routledge, pp.114ff, 173ff. 
23 Snetkov, A. (2015) supra note 22, pp.176ff. 
24 Human Rights Watch (2014). Burning Down the House in Chechnya, online available at: 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/12/10/dispatches-burning-down-house-chechnya-0 
(accessed on 15/04/18); Memorial Human Rights Centre (2016). Counter-terrorism in the 
North Caucasus: a human rights perspective. 2014 – first half of 2016, online available at: 
https://memohrc.org/sites/all/themes/memo/templates/pdf.php?pdf=/sites/default/files/do
klad_severnyy_kavkaz_-_angl.pdf (accessed on 15/04/18) pp.28f. 
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examination of the question as to when a non-international armed conflict ends. This 
question is vital in the present context as it illustrates the problems that can occur during 
periods of transition in terms of protecting affected groups. In other words, long 
transition periods between times of a non-international armed conflict and the return to 
peace not just characterised by the absence of violence, but a certain degree of stability, 
can lead to long gaps in protection, to grey areas where the applicability of the relevant 
legal framework might be unclear. 
Non-international armed conflicts were defined by the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the 1995 Tadić case as ‘protracted armed violence 
between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups 
within a State’.25 This ‘protracted armed violence … within a State’26 reaching a certain 
level of intensity and ‘organization of the parties to the conflict’,27 distinguishes non-
international armed conflicts from ‘internal disturbances and tensions’.28 According to 
Article 1 (1) Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the Protocol applies 
to armed conflicts between a state and ‘dissident armed forces or other organized armed 
groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its 
territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and 
to implement this Protocol.’29 
The beginning and end of non-international armed conflicts are difficult to pin down, not 
least because major treaties do not offer a definition of non-international armed 
conflicts.30  For this reason, the Tadić judgment of the ICTY is an important point of 
reference which is widely held to be reflective of customary international law. 31 
                                                          
25 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić a/k/a “Dule“ (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction) IT-94-1 (2 October 1995) para.70.  
26 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić a/k/a “Dule“ (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal 
on Jurisdiction) supra note 25, para.70.  
27 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić a/k/a “Dule“ (Opinion and Judgment) IT-94-1-T (7 May 1997) 
para.562; Additional Protocol II supra note 11, Article 1. 
28 Additional Protocol II supra note 11, Article 1 (2). 
29 Additional Protocol II supra note 11, Article 1; Sandoz, Y., Swinarski, C. & Zimmermann, B. 
(eds.)(1987). Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions 
of 12 August 1949. Geneva, Martinus Nijhoff, pp.1347ff; Milanović, M. & Hadzi-Vidanovic, V. 
(2013). A taxonomy of armed conflict, in White, N. & Henderson, C. (eds.). Research Handbook on 
International Conflict and Security Law. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, pp.256–314, pp.280ff; 
Sivakumaran, S. (2011). Re-envisaging the International Law of Internal Armed Conflict, 
European Journal of International Law, 22 (1), pp.219-264, pp.225ff. 
30 Milanović, M. & Hadzi-Vidanovic, V. (2013) supra note 29, pp.282ff. 
31 Milanović, M. & Hadzi-Vidanovic, V. (2013) supra note 29, p.283; Prosecutor v Akayesu (Trial 
Chamber Judgment) ICTR-96-4 (2 September 1998) para.619; Prosecutor v Rutaganda (Trial 
Chamber Jugdement) ICTR-96-3 (6 December 1999) para.92; Prosecutor v Lubanga (Decision on 
the Confirmation of Charges) ICC-01/04-01/06 (29 January 2007) para.233. 
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According to Tadić, ‘[i]nternational humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such 
armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion 
of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is 
achieved.’ 32  In the Haradinaj case, the Tribunal reaffirmed this criterion as crucial. 
However, it is still unclear what exactly is meant by a ‘peaceful settlement’ and when one 
could declare a non-international armed conflict as terminated without risking the 
danger of doing so prematurely. In case of non-international armed conflicts, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross has found the test of a ‘risk of resumption’ to 
be practical to define the termination of said conflict.33 This test should focus ‘not solely 
on the cessation of hostilities, which may be short-lived, but on an evaluation that related 
military operations of a hostile nature have also ended’.34 
The test established in Tadić has been summarised and reaffirmed in the Boškoski 
judgment of 2008 by the Trial Chamber and later the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY.35 The 
Tribunal laid out the two constitutive criteria for a non-international armed conflict – 
organisation and intensity. The criterion of organisation relates to armed groups only, 
as it is assumed that a government involved in a non-international armed conflict is 
sufficiently organised. The Boškoski judgment offers five criteria for determining 
sufficient organisation of armed groups namely the existence of a command structure, 
of military and logistical capacity, of an internal disciplinary system including the ability 
to implement the law of armed conflict and the ability of the group to speak with one 
voice.36 
The intensity necessary for a situation to constitute a non-international armed conflict 
can be approached through a range of factors such as the number and type of troops 
involved and their weapons and equipment, the seriousness of attacks regarding 
casualties, damage and territorial scope, the effects on the civilian population or the 
involvement of external actors such as the United Nations Security Council. Particular 
                                                          
32 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić a/k/a “Dule“ (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal 
on Jurisdiction) supra note 25, para.70. 
33 32IC/15/11 Report: International humanitarian law and the challenges of contemporary 
armed conflicts Document prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva 
for the 32nd International Conference of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent, Geneva, 
Switzerland 8-10 December 2015 (October 2015) pp.10f; Prosecutor v Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz 
Balaj, Lahi Brahimaj (Judgment) T-04-84bis-T (29 November 2012) para.396. 
34 International Committee of the Red Cross (2015) supra note 33, p.11. 
35 Prosecutor v Ljube Boškoski and Johan Tarčulovski (Judgment) ICTY-04-82-T (10 July 2008), 
para.175ff; the judgment was confirmed by the Appeals Chamber: Prosecutor v Ljube Boškoski 
and Johan Tarčulovski (Judgment) ICTY-04-82-A (19 May 2010) para.19ff. 
36 Prosecutor v Ljube Boškoski and Johan Tarčulovski, Trial Chamber, supra note 35, para.194ff. 
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emphasis was put on the way in which state organs use armed force against armed 
groups as indicative of a non-international armed conflict.37 
In addition, the Tribunal referred to case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
several times. Interestingly, the Tribunal pointed to Chechen cases where the Court has 
refrained from categorising the situation in Chechnya during the second non-
international armed conflict.38 However, the fact that the Tribunal drew from human 
rights case law is illustrative of the intersections between the law of armed conflict and 
human rights law when it comes to non-international armed conflicts. Furthermore, the 
Tribunal discussed the decision of the Russian Constitutional Court on the categorisation 
of the First Chechen War as non-international armed conflict briefly. The use of the army 
against the insurgents was indicative of a non-international armed conflict in that 
context.39 
In theory, a non-international armed conflict would end when these criteria of sufficient 
organisation of the parties and intensity of the fighting are no longer present. However, 
in practice there might be a range of various factors pointing to an end of the conflict, 
but the presence of one of them on its own might be not enough to assess the whole 
situation accurately. Examples might be a prolonged period where no attacks are carried 
out, the return of refugees to their homes, disarmament programmes or the conclusion 
of a peace treaty. However, caution has to be applied as the situation on the ground might 
still be one of armed conflict despite the conclusion of a peace treaty or a decrease in 
attacks.40 
Bartels held that a non-international armed conflict ends when the organisation of the 
parties and the intensity of the fighting fall under a certain threshold and the constitutive 
criteria for an armed conflict are no longer present. However, he acknowledged the 
dangers of declaring a non-international armed conflict over in terms of protection 
afforded to the parties and cited the Gotovina et al judgment in this regard.41 In this case, 
the ICTY considered the question of determining the end of an armed conflict, aptly 
                                                          
37 Bartels, R. (2014). From Jus In Bello to Jus Post Bellum: When do Non-International Armed 
Conflicts End?, in Stahn, C., Easterday, J.S & Iverson, J. (eds.). Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the 
Normative Foundations. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp.297-314, p.307; Prosecutor v Ljube 
Boškoski and Johan Tarčulovski, Trial Chamber, supra note 35, para.177f. 
38 Prosecutor v Ljube Boškoski and Johan Tarčulovski, Trial Chamber, supra note 35, para.178f. 
39 Prosecutor v Ljube Boškoski and Johan Tarčulovski, Trial Chamber, supra note 35, para.180. 
40 Bartels, R. (2014) supra note 37, pp.309ff. 
41 Prosecutor v Ante Gotovina, Ivan Čermak, Mladen Markač (Judgment) IT-06-90-T (15 April 
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summarising the problems arising therefrom: ‘[T]he participants in an armed conflict 
may find themselves in a revolving door between applicability and non-applicability, 
leading to a considerable degree of legal uncertainty and confusion.’42 This dilemma is 
well illustrated by examples such as the continuation of fighting between splinter groups, 
fragmented opposition forces or terrorist activities that might follow once the most 
intense periods of fighting are over.43 
Bartels concluded that current non-international armed conflicts ‘show that it is neither 
possible, nor desirable, to identify a specific point in time when international 
humanitarian law ceases to apply’.44 However, whereas he argued for the application of 
some form of ‘jus post bellum’ or ‘law after war’ to address the potential gaps arising, the 
present thesis argues for the consideration of one specific concept of the law of armed 
conflict under human rights law. Furthermore, the idea pursued in this thesis aims at a 
prohibition of collective punishment under human rights law as that would include 
situations not only after an armed conflict, as addressed by ‘jus post bellum’, but also 
instances of collective punishment at any other time, independent from the occurrence 
of an armed conflict. 
The International Committee of the Red Cross issued a conference paper on current 
challenges for the law of armed conflict in 2015, conceding that research on the issue of 
how armed conflicts end is scarce.45 It singled out two opinions on how to assess the end 
of a non-international armed conflict. The first referred to the level of intensity of the 
ongoing fighting, meaning that the conflict would end as soon as the necessary threshold 
level for ‘protracted armed violence’ is no longer met.46 The second opinion focussed on 
the organisation of the parties and required that at least one of the parties to the conflict 
no longer meets the threshold of organisation, meaning it is no longer able to carry out 
‘sustained and concerted military operations’.47 However, this view also accepts that a 
non-international armed conflict would end in case the fighting has ceased and there is 
no real risk of the conflict flaring up again despite the parties still meeting the necessary 
                                                          
42 Prosecutor v Ante Gotovina, Ivan Čermak, Mladen Markač supra note 41, para.1694. 
43 Bartels, R. (2014) supra note 37, p.310. 
44 Bartels, R. (2014) supra note 37, p.314. 
45 International Committee of the Red Cross (2015) supra note 33, p.8. 
46 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić a/k/a “Dule“ (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal 
on Jurisdiction) supra note 25, para.70. 
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level of organisation, therefore accepting the intensity threshold as laid out by the first 
opinion.48 
Taking into account the possibility of resumption in non-international armed conflicts 
which can be characterised by alternating periods of hostilities and relative calm, there 
is a risk in declaring the end of such conflicts prematurely. Therefore, the ICTY has 
decided that any such assessments should wait until any risk of resumption can be ruled 
out.49 This evaluation of the cessation of hostilities without possible reoccurrence has to 
be based on the facts on the ground.50 
Although the situation in Chechnya constituted ‘protracted armed violence … within a 
State’51 during the first period of the second armed conflict, it is unclear whether the 
level of violence still meets the threshold criteria of ‘intensity of the conflict and the 
organization of the parties to the conflict’.52  Since 2010 there has been a decline in 
government officials’ and insurgents’ deaths from 127 to 52 per year.53 However, the 
data for the first quarter of 2017 suggests a rise with 28 casualties54 already compared 
to 27 deaths in 201655 and 14 deaths in 2015 altogether.56 There are several approaches 
regarding such thresholds. Data models trying to define the beginning and end of armed 
conflicts operate with battle deaths thresholds ranging from 1000 to 25 per year. 57 
                                                          
48 International Committee of the Red Cross (2015) supra note 33, p.10. 
49 International Committee of the Red Cross (2015) supra note 33, p.10; Prosecutor v Ramush 
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50 International Committee of the Red Cross (2015) supra note 33, p.11. 
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52 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić a/k/a “Dule“ (Opinion and Judgment) supra note 27, para.562; 
O’Loughlin, J. & Witmer, F.D.W. (2012). The diffusion of violence in the North Caucasus of 
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53 Caucasian Knot (2015). Infographics. Total number of victims in Northern Caucasus in 2010-
2014 under the data of the Caucasian Knot, online available at: http://eng.kavkaz-
uzel.ru/articles/30858/ (accessed on 15/04/18). 
54 Caucasian Knot (2017). Infographics. Statistics of victims in Northern Caucasus in Quarter 1 
of 2017 under the data of the Caucasian Knot, online available at: http://www.eng.kavkaz-
uzel.eu/articles/39081/ (accessed on 15/04/18). 
55 Caucasian Knot (2017). Infographics. Statistics of victims in Northern Caucasus for 2016 
under the data of the Caucasian Knot, online available at: http://www.eng.kavkaz-
uzel.eu/articles/38325/ (accessed on 15/04/18). 
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under the data of the Caucasian Knot, online available at: http://www.eng.kavkaz-
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Depending on which of these models is applied, the situation in Chechnya could be 
considered to have constituted a non-international armed conflict until the first half of 
the 2000s, or it could be classed as ongoing.58 
The uncertainty surrounding the end of non-international armed conflicts strengthens 
the case for the assessment of collective punishment under human rights law. Although 
one could make a case for there still being a non-international armed conflict in 
Chechnya arguing that collective punishment is prohibited under the law of armed 
conflict, this position does not reflect the approach taken by Chechens themselves. They 
brought their cases relating to the armed conflict before the European Court of Human 
Rights. Another argument might be found in the position taken by the Russian 
government. Right from the start of the second non-international armed conflict, the 
authorities have avoided a categorisation as armed conflict, calling it an “antiterrorist 
operation” instead. Although this does not change Russia’s obligations under the law of 
armed conflict, such a stance may exploit the uncertainty surrounding the end of non-
international armed conflicts in general and the current situation in Chechnya in 
particular. This uncertainty is created by collective punishment not being considered by 
human rights law. This short section on the status of Chechnya and its theoretical 
underpinnings has outlined additional reasons for such a consideration. 
4.2.3 Forms of collective punishment used in practice 
The following sections discuss forms of collective punishment that were or still are used 
in Chechnya by state security forces against alleged insurgents or alleged terrorists and 
their families. During the second non-international armed conflict, acts of collective 
punishment targeted entire villages. Today, these operations are smaller in scale, but 
retain all the characteristics of collective punishment, namely the punishment of a group 
for acts allegedly committed by one or some of its members. 
4.2.3.1 Zachistka 
Zachistkas are sweeping operations conducted in villages predominantly during the 
early years of the second non-international armed conflict in Chechnya in response to 
insurgent attacks close to a village. Not only do they stand out for the brutality with 
                                                          
conflict beget conflict? Explaining recurring civil war, Journal of Peace Research, 41(3), pp.371-
388; Quinn, J.M., Mason, D. & Gurses, M. (2007). Sustaining the peace: Determinants of civil war 
recurrence, International Interactions, 33(2), pp.167-193; Sambanis, N. (2004). What Is Civil 
War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 48 (6), pp.814-858. 
58 Caucasian Knot (2017). North Caucasus – statistics of victims, online available at: 
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which they were conducted, but also for the indiscriminate use of force against civilians. 
Killing villagers or destroying their property for alleged ties to insurgents constitutes 
collective punishment. The ensuing section outlines the general nature of these 
operations as well as an account of cases regarding zachistkas brought before the 
European Court of Human Rights again pointing to the Court’s awareness of the situation 
in Chechnya and the use of collective punishment. 
The major bombing offensives during the second non-international armed conflict in 
Chechnya have taken place from late 1999 to early 2000 and simultaneously, zachistkas 
emerged. The word itself derives from зачистить (zachistit’), meaning ‘to clear’ or ‘to 
clean out’. Zachistkas are sweeping or mopping-up operations during which entire 
villages were sealed for a period ranging from several days up to three weeks ‘to check 
people’s residence permits and identify participants of illegal armed formations’. 59 
These operations were conducted as a punishment for prior insurgent attacks at Russian 
troops or checkpoints or diversionary insurgent attacks in the vicinity of the village in 
question. The strong variation in the duration of zachistkas further emphasises their 
punitive character – the uncertainty of villagers as to when the operation might be over 
contributes to their fear and anguish, not to mention the uncertainty as to which 
measures the soldiers might resort to. 
At the start of such an operation, a village would be encircled by heavy artillery, tanks 
and trucks, sometimes even helicopters. This task would usually be carried out by 
conscript soldiers. Subsequently, special forces or contracted soldiers would enter the 
village in search for weapons or insurgents. Houses were searched by military forces 
that did not provide any information about their identity or rank, accompanied by 
summary executions, torture, looting, destruction of property, detention and 
disappearances. The concealed nature of those operations substantially obstructed 
efforts to identify the persons or military unit responsible. The soldiers entering a village 
usually refused to identify themselves or name their rank or other affiliation and used 
masks or soot to cover their faces. The military vehicles surrounding the villages as well 
as entering it would have no registration plates or unrecognisable, often deliberately 
                                                          
59 Memorial Human Rights Centre (2007). Counter Terror: Russian Practice, Reports of human 
rights organizations hearings of International Commission of Jurists 29-30 January 2007, online 
available at: http://old.memo.ru/s/267.html (accessed on 15/04/18). 
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  148 
 
muddy plates. Some incidents of zachistkas are reported from the first Chechen war as 
well, where Russian forces sealed villages in order to ‘cleanse out Chechen fighters’.60  
One of the most horrific zachistkas took place in and around the Novye Aldy suburb of 
Grozny in 2000. The village was sealed for several days, carried out by contracted 
soldiers and special forces. People were burnt inside their homes, summarily executed 
and their property looted and destroyed. The operation resulted in about 56 deaths with 
some sources even referring to as many as 82, all of them civilians.61  
The sweeping operation was preceded by heavy shelling of the area, followed by 
conscript soldiers entering Novye Aldy telling the residents that they should have their 
documents ready for inspection by contract soldiers the next day. When more than a 
hundred of those ‘kontraktniki’ arrived on 5 February, they started to search for hidden 
insurgents and weapons despite no evidence or reports supporting such allegations. 
During the zachistka, the soldiers engaged in summary executions of civilians, rape and 
the looting and destruction of homes.62 
An illustration of the scope of atrocities suffered could be provided by two decisions of 
the European Court of Human Rights relating to applicants who lost five63 and seven64 of 
their relatives respectively during the operation: 
The dead bodies of five members of the Estamirov family were found by a relative lying 
in their home’s courtyard and doorway, one of them partly burned, including a pregnant 
woman and a child with all of them carrying gunshot wounds. Their valuables had been 
taken – jewellery removed from the bodies and their property looted and burned.65 
In the Musayev and Others case decided in 2007, the applicants found the dead bodies of 
their relatives piled up on the streets, shot in their homes and some of them burned in 
their own cellar. The victims bore gunshot wounds and cartridges of automatic rifles and 
                                                          
60 Gilligan, E. (2010) supra note 17, pp.50ff, 53. 
61 Memorial Human Rights Centre (4 February 2010). Clean-up operation in New Aldy. To the 
10th Anniversary of the Tragedy. Press-conference, online available at: 
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machine guns were scattered around the area. Furthermore, their property was looted 
and much of it destroyed.66 
These and the cases cited in the following emerged from the events of the second non-
international armed conflict in Chechnya. As such, they are direct successors of the first 
Chechen cases brought before the European Court of Human Rights on this issue which 
were decided in 2005.67 These successful cases started a whole range of cases brought 
by Chechens establishing Russian responsibility for numerous human rights violations 
and awarding damages. Apart from that, these cases fulfilled another role. As Bowring 
rightly points out, ‘[t]he Chechen applicants in many ways spoke for the whole of their 
people. Their objective in the proceedings was not to obtain monetary compensation. 
What they wanted was the vindication, at the highest level, of the truth of their account 
of what had happened to them and to the mass of Chechens.’68  
Other cases involving zachistkas include Magomed Musayev and Others v Russia decided 
in 2008. 69  The sweeping operation had taken place in the neighbouring villages of 
Raduzhnoye, Pobedinskoye and Dolinskiy simultaneously and three of the applicants’ 
relatives were amongst the 21 men that had been detained. Following a similar pattern, 
‘[t]he operation was carried out by 60 to 70 armed men wearing masks and camouflage 
uniforms, in a convoy of military trucks and armoured personnel carriers (APCs) with 
obscured number plates’.70 The case Baysayeva v Russia about the disappearance of the 
applicant’s husband concerns a zachistka taking place in the village of Podgornoye. It 
refers to the detention of over 50 people including the applicant’s husband as he had 
apparently witnessed the killing of two men by soldiers.71  
                                                          
66 Musayev and Others v Russia supra note 64, para.11ff. 
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Another disappearance case is Musayeva v Russia where the applicant’s son was detained 
during a zachistka taking place in the southern part of Grozny. 72  Similarly, the case 
Akhmadova and Sadulayeva v Russia concerned the detention and disappearance of the 
applicant’s husband following a zachistka in the town of Argun. In this case, 11 of the 
men detained during the zachistka disappeared and bodies of four of them were 
discovered shortly after their disappearance close to a Russian military base whereas 
the bodies of some of the remaining missing persons including the applicant’s husband 
were found later on the outskirts of the town.73 The case Isigova and Others v Russia was 
dealing with two men who disappeared after being detained with around 40 others 
during a zachistka in the village of Sernovodsk.74 The case of Turluyeva and Khamidova v 
Russia concerned disappearance after a zachistka in the village of Alleroy.75 The case of 
Zulpa Akhmatova and Others v Russia reported zachistkas in the villages of Novye Atagi 
and Starye Atagi. 76  The case of Askharova v Russia dealt with detention after the 
zachistka in the village of Serzhen-Yurt.77 
This list of cases before the European Court of Human Rights relating to zachistkas is not 
exhaustive. Their large number indicates the Court’s awareness of this collective 
punishment practice in the Chechen context. This in turn could support the argument 
that the collective implications of such situations have to be reconsidered by human 
rights law – a point that will be analysed further in the last part of the thesis. In any case, 
the Court does know that collective punishment has been used in Chechnya during the 
second non-international armed conflict. This finding strengthens the argument for a 
prohibition thereof under human rights law as the Court deals with such situations, but 
not with the act itself. 
According to estimates, 5 000 to 10 000 deaths were caused by zachistkas between 2000 
and 2004. However, the data collected concerns only a third of the territory subjected to 
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such operations, indicating a higher absolute toll.78 After 2004 zachistkas still took place, 
but their number decreased.79 
Subsequently to zachistkas disappearances and abductions became more common and 
the armed conflict was transformed by a policy of ‘Chechenisation’.80  The power of 
Akhmat Kadyrov, who fought in the first non-international armed conflict against Russia 
but changed sides afterwards, was strengthened and he became the president of 
Chechnya in 2003.81 His influence was protected by the ‘Kadyrovtsy’, an infamous armed 
group led by his son Ramzan. Akhmad Kadyrov sought to incorporate Chechen 
insurgents into the police and administrative apparatus, offering incentives such as 
amnesties on one hand, but employing torture to force people to join his private security 
force on the other. Additionally, these groups were responsible for the disappearances 
and hostage-taking of relatives of alleged insurgents. This development had a significant 
impact on the situation, as the united fight against Russia turned into a fight between 
Chechens. In 2004, Akhmat Kadyrov was killed in a bomb attack, ceding his power to his 
son Ramzan who became president three years later.82 Under his leadership, the use of 
collective punishment changed from zachistkas to other forms such as house burning. 
This section has shown how collective punishment was imposed on the Chechens in the 
early years of the second non-international armed conflict. Moreover, the cases brought 
before the European Court of Human Rights indicate an awareness of the Court of such 
practices in Chechnya. The way in which collective punishment has persisted even after 
periods of large scale fighting illustrates its flexibility and perhaps explains how it could 
be seamlessly transferred into a different context, governed by human rights law. The 
forms collective punishment has taken after that transition are discussed in the 
following.  
4.2.3.2 House burning and other current forms of collective punishment 
After setting out collective punishment during the early period of the second non-
international armed conflict, this section will focus on the forms in which collective 
punishment has been imposed recently. With Ramzan Kadyrov coming to power in 2007, 
the policy of collective responsibility of families for the acts of their relatives has reached 
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new popularity. In reaction to his calls on families to take the blame for alleged actions 
of their relatives, houses have been burned down, people have been publicly humiliated 
and whole families have been expelled. These actions will be outlined below in the 
context of collective punishment. As house burning or house destruction represents a 
recurring theme from the case study on the Occupied Palestinian Territories, it will be 
focused on in this setting as well. 
One of the practices used against insurgents is punitive house burning, has been carried 
out since the early 2000s. This tactic was increasingly employed after Ramzan Kadyrov 
became president of Chechnya in 2007, broadening the influence and importance of CR 
security agencies and law enforcement. Government officials would typically approach 
the family of an alleged insurgent in order to gather information about his or her 
whereabouts and try to persuade the family to compel their insurgent relative to return 
home – otherwise they would face consequences. Shortly after such interrogations or 
after insurgent attacks close to their villages, houses of families of alleged insurgents are 
burned. The highest number of house burnings to date – 25 – was reported in 2008. 
Conducted at night, people were forced out of their homes and prevented from 
extinguishing the fire. Additionally, they were warned not to complain about the incident 
and in the cases where people filed claims, no investigation took place.83 Although the 
Chechen government denied any responsibility for the burnings, Kadyrov made 
statements implying the punishment of relatives of insurgents on several occasions.84 
Similar findings are made by the Society for Threatened Peoples, which stressed the 
                                                          
83 Human Rights Watch (2009) supra note 3, pp.19ff; Dannreuther, R. (2014) supra note 21, 
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Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Europe, online available at: 
http://www.ecre.org/topics/areas-of-work/returns/174.html (accessed on 15/04/18) pp.44ff; 
Human Rights Watch (2014). Human Rights Watch Concerns and Recommendations on Russia: 
Submitted to the UN Human Rights Committee on the occasion of its Pre-Sessional Review of 
Russia, online available at: 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/2014_Russia_HRCsubmission.pdf 
(accessed on 15/04/18) p.8; A/HRC/25/NGO/156 Written statement submitted by the Society 
for Threatened Peoples, a non-governmental organization in special consultative status (4 
March 2014). 
84 Human Rights Watch (2009) supra note 3, pp.22ff; International Crisis Group (2012). The 
North Caucasus: The Challenges of Integration (II), Islam, the Insurgency and Counter-
Insurgency, Europe Report N°221, online available at: 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/caucasus/221-the-north-caucasus-the-
challenges-of-integration-ii-islam-the-insurgency-and-counter-insurgency.pdf 
(accessed on 15/04/18) p.28. 
 
 
  153 
 
persecution of alleged ‘Wahhabis’, involving the denunciation of men with beards or 
women wearing a ‘non-traditional’ Hijab as terrorists.85  
During the last few years, attacks on governmental premises or government officials 
have spread across the North Caucasus region once again.86 After an insurgent attack in 
Grozny in December 2014 and statements made by Kadyrov regarding responsibility of 
family members for their relatives, at least six incidents of house-burning of relatives of 
insurgents were reported.87 Some local human rights organisations even speak of the 
destruction of the homes of 15 families linked to Kadyrov’s remarks.88 In May 2016, the 
family homes of two insurgents were burned down after they attacked a checkpoint. 
Furthermore, families of persons suspected to be involved in a shootout with security 
forces in December 2016, were facing expulsion.89 
These actions are accompanied by an increasingly drastic rhetoric. Kadyrov and the 
Chechen parliament have repeatedly called for stronger Russian legislation permitting 
the punishment of family members of alleged insurgents – the proposals range from 
confiscation of property to expanded responsibility for assistance resulting in 
imprisonment from 15 to 25 years. 90  The efforts to enact laws providing for the 
collective responsibility of family members will be discussed in more detail below. 
Apart from legal attempts to impose collective responsibility on families of alleged 
insurgents or terrorists or of people critical of his regime more generally, Kadyrov has 
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pursued this agenda in practice. In 2016, the non-governmental organisation Human 
Rights Watch issued a report documenting the current situation in Chechnya. It includes 
the case of Ramazan Dzhalaldinov who published a video complaint to Putin about 
Ramzan Kadyrov’s regime and corruption on social media.91 When the video got the 
attention of the authorities in Grozny, Dzhalaldinov fled to the neighbouring republic of 
Dagestan. He was portrayed as being mentally ‘unstable’ and even Ramzan Kadyrov 
himself thought it necessary to visit his village and interview other villagers who 
supported this claim. Dzhalaldinov’s family was repeatedly pressured by the police to 
provide information about his whereabouts. This culminated in a raid of the family home 
after which Dzhalaldinov’s wife and three daughters were taken to the regional police 
department and his wife and oldest daughter were severely beaten in order to find out 
where he was hiding. His wife was subjected to mock executions several times. After that, 
they were brought to the border with Dagestan and told never to return to Chechnya. In 
the meantime, their home was burned down by unidentified men. A few days later, 
Chechen officials found Dzhalaldinov and afterwards he appeared on Chechen television 
publicly apologising for his behaviour and rejecting any allegations of ill-treatment by 
the authorities. Ramzan Kadyrov accepted his apology via the social media platform 
Instagram.92 
This case is illustrative of the current climate in Chechnya. In particular the practice of 
public humiliation has become more popular and local residents speak of fearing this 
public loss of face more than any physical violence. As one Grozny resident put it: ‘They 
will disown you, publically [sic] humiliate you, make you a prostitute or a drug addict. 
You won’t be able to live with dignity in this republic anymore. This is worse than 
death.’93  This damage to the reputation does not only affect the person making the 
apology, but his or her family as well. Public humiliation resulting in the collective 
expulsion of an entire family could be seen as fulfilling the criteria of collective 
punishment. Furthermore, these practices are not any longer only applied against 
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alleged terrorists or insurgents, but any person criticising the regime, even if their so-
called crime consists only in a critical post on social media.94  
Apart from that, the harassment of human rights organisations and their members is 
widespread, including the killing of human rights defenders as well as the burning of 
offices, which led to most of them leaving the republic over safety concerns. 95 
Furthermore, people who turn to those human rights defenders for help are targeted as 
well. Murad Amriev was kidnapped and tortured by Chechen police in 2013 demanding 
from him to denounce his brother who was living abroad and compel him to return to 
Chechnya to face charges for alleged crimes. After that incident, Amriev contacted local 
human rights organisations for help. In June 2017, he was detained in the Bryansk region 
of Russia on allegations of using fraudulent documents. Now transferred to Chechnya, 
he made a public statement saying that he was released, and his rights are being 
observed. However, as Tatiana Lokshina from Human Rights Watch Russia observed, ‘he 
and his family are in fact hostages’.96 
When applied to the situation in Chechnya, house burning and public humiliation result 
in the punishment of innocent people for alleged acts of others. They belong to the same 
group as they are considered the relatives of suspected insurgents or terrorists or their 
supporters by the authorities. And the authorities, in particular Ramzan Kadyrov himself, 
have shown their intent to punish this group collectively rather openly and in public. 
Leading a policy centred on the collective responsibility of family members and pursuing 
it in practice, effectively resulting in collective punishment, would not have been as 
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simple if there were rules explicitly prohibiting it. This again highlights the timeliness of 
a discussion of translating a prohibition of collective punishment into human rights law. 
4.2.4 Law on the confiscation of property (family responsibility) 
Legislation adopted by the Russian State Duma in 2013 illustrates how the non-existence 
of a prohibition of collective punishment under human rights law is enabling the 
adoption of laws introducing it. Due to this gap, there are no explicit rights or obligations 
in international human rights law a domestic law in favour of collective punishment 
would breach. In this sense, the silence of human rights law had an effect on state 
practice regarding collective punishment – it made it easier to introduce measures 
amounting to collective punishment at domestic level as there was no international 
standard Russia had to refute or object to first.  
An amendment to counter-terror legislation obliging family members of alleged 
terrorists to pay for damages arising from terrorist attacks is now applicable across 
Russia. As the amendment includes not only relatives, but also persons ‘close’ to the 
perpetrator, the scope of the provision is as broad as it is vague. Given that these persons 
bear no individual responsibility for the committed acts, they are held to account solely 
because of their ties with the perpetrator. The content of this amendment as well as its 
implications in terms of collective punishment are considered in the following. 
Besides additional prohibitions relating to the participation in terrorist training and the 
organisation of terrorist groups, the Russian legislation N 302-FZ ‘On Amendments to 
Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation’ encompassed a modification of the 
Federal Law N 35-F3 ‘On Countering Terrorism’ from 2006 concerning terrorist acts.97 
The amendment to Article 18 Part 1 of the Federal Law N 35-F3 reads as follows:  
‘Reparation of harm, including moral harm, suffered as a result of a terrorist act 
is to be carried out … at the expense of the person who committed the act of 
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terrorism, as well as at the expense of his/her close relatives, relatives and 
friends if there is sufficient reason to believe that money, valuables and other 
property was received by them as a result of the terrorist activities and (or) are 
the proceeds of such property [received as a result of terrorist activity].’  
Regarding the procedural aspects, the amendment provides that federal executive 
agents  
‘are entitled to request information about the legal origin of money, valuables, 
and other property and income from their close relatives, relatives and other 
persons close to the perpetrator of a terrorist act, where there is sufficient 
reason to believe that the property was received as a result of terrorist activities 
and (or) is the income from such property, and shall verify the reliability of such 
information. Specified persons are obliged to submit information requested. … 
In the absence of reliable information on the legality of the origin of money, 
property or other assets and income from them relevant materials are to be sent 
to the office of the prosecutor of the Russian Federation. The Prosecutor General 
of the Russian Federation or his subordinate prosecutors upon the receipt of 
these materials in accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation on 
civil proceedings, appeal to the court with an application to make income of the 
Russian Federation the money, valuables, and other property and income from 
them, in respect to which the said person has not presented data confirming the 
legality of their acquisition.’98  
According to this amendment, relatives and friends of as well as ‘close persons’ to the 
perpetrator shall be held to account to compensate for damages occurring through 
terrorist acts, even for moral damages. Their property shall be open to seizure if they 
cannot provide evidence that its possession does not derive from ‘terrorist activity’.99 
Given the traditions of inheritance and properties received as a gift in the North 
Caucasus, the means to proof the legal title to possession can be difficult to obtain.100  
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The law containing this amendment was approved with 439 votes in favour, none 
against and one abstention.101 Apparently, it was adopted with suicide bombers in mind 
– persons who cannot be held to account after committing their acts. Collective 
punishment is the imposition of sanctions on a group as such for an act allegedly 
committed by one or some of its members. Applying this definition to the seizure of 
property of a group of persons who were not involved in the commission of a crime in 
any way and who are held to account because of their relationship with the perpetrator, 
the amendment to the law on countering terrorism resonates with the key elements of 
collective punishment. In addition, several statements of members of the Russian State 
Duma outlined below explain the underlying reasons of the amendment in a way 
indicative of a collective punishment policy. 
As the amendment represents legislation applicable across Russia, it is considered under 
human rights law in times of peace. The specific effects of this amendment in the Chechen 
context are aggravated by the question on whether there is still an ongoing non-
international armed conflict or not. However, as this Russian-wide amendment does not 
refer in any sense to these peculiarities, it is supposed to be applied in times of peace. 
Furthermore, the current situation in Chechnya would not change the nature of the 
amendment, meaning its applicability during times governed by human rights law.  This 
might seem like something obvious, but the significance lies in the substance of this 
amendment as it introduces collective punishment, a concept regulated by the laws of 
armed conflict outside of that context. As already laid out in the previous chapter, human 
rights law has not yet adapted to that change in circumstances. 
Generally speaking, the provisions on family responsibility undermine the principle of 
personal liability and the presumption of innocence. Arguments against that finding 
made by members of the Russian State Duma relied on the civil nature of the claim, and 
therefore the presumption of innocence would not be violated.102 However, as shown by 
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the case Lagardère v France mentioned in the preceding chapter, such situations can be 
in violation of the right in question.103 According to the European Court of Human Rights 
a ‘clear enough link between the criminal case and the related compensation 
proceedings to justify extending the scope of the application of Article 6 § 2 to the 
latter’104 is necessary and such a link could be established in the cases set out in the 
legislation as well. For this reason, the amendment violates the presumption of 
innocence under the ECHR. However, the presumption of innocence does not address 
the full extent of collective punishment, as already set out in the preceding chapter. 
Several members of the Russian State Duma, predominantly from the governing party 
‘United Russia’, have emphasised the responsibility of family members due to their 
alleged support of relatives committing or allegedly committing terrorist acts. Their 
argumentation strongly resonates with the reasoning of the Israeli Supreme Court 
examined in the case study on the Occupied Palestinian Territories. These judgments 
included statements such as ‘the sinner is not alone’ indicating a strong tendency 
towards the attribution of collective guilt resulting in collective punishment. 105  In a 
similar vein, Duma members spoke of the strong influence of the family over its members. 
Furthermore, during the parliamentary readings of the amendment, the seizure of 
property of family members and other close persons was presented as an incentive to 
young people not to engage in crime, another issue already prevalent in Israeli collective 
punishment policy, the alleged deterrent aspect of such provisions. Moreover, the point 
was made that punishment should be ‘inevitable’, a statement likely referring to the case 
of suicide bombers.106 In addition, the concept of seizing property was contrasted with 
the existence of the death penalty in Western countries, portraying this solution as more 
lenient, another strategy witnessed in Israeli argumentation of its collective punishment 
policy before.107  
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There are still attempts to tighten anti-terror legislation, such as the bill suggested by 
Roman Khudyakov, a member of the Russian State Duma. He proposed legislation 
introducing the criminal liability of relatives of suspected insurgents and explained this 
step with reference to Israel’s policy of house demolitions: ‘These measures make to 
think not just about yourself, because with such actions he dooms his family for life in 
starvation with reputation tainted forever’.108 Similar proposals were made recently by 
the head of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov.109 
In April 2017, Kadyrov spoke about collective responsibility of family members in an 
interview with Russian media. He reaffirmed his stance that the family of someone who 
has joined a terrorist group are accomplices in the crime and equally responsible for 
their relative’s actions. In addition, he has again called for the expulsion of these families, 
which has already been witnessed in practice in recent years.110 
Another example for the creeping introduction of collective responsibility into the 
Chechen legal system is the ‘spiritual and moral passportisation’ campaign that was 
launched in February 2016. According to the procedure, every Chechen citizen between 
the age of 14 and 35 would receive a document stating not only their passport number, 
address and place of work or study, but also their religious denomination, teip and wird 
membership. After an overwhelmingly negative reaction to this project and broad media 
attention, Kadyrov announced its termination. However, the idea of the campaign was 
pursued further in the form of a questionnaire disseminated to young people by teachers 
and local police. This questionnaire asks for details of older family members and imposes 
responsibility for all future actions of the ‘candidate for passportisation’ on these 
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relatives.111 In that sense, family members are held to account as guarantors for their 
relatives.112 
Although the law adopted by the Russian State Duma applies to the whole country, 
family members of alleged insurgents or of alleged terrorists, mainly in the North 
Caucasus and in Chechnya – given Ramzan Kadyrov’s engagement in so-called counter-
terrorism activities – are particularly targeted for acts they are not personally 
responsible for. As outlined above, collective punishment should be interpreted in its 
broadest sense, including any kind of penalties imposed on groups for acts allegedly 
committed by some of its members. Since this definition applies to practices used in 
Chechnya such as zachistka or house burning, it certainly applies to a legal regulation as 
well. 
Russian legislation has effectively introduced collective punishment, but the law of 
armed conflict does not apply in peacetime and human rights law does not address 
collective punishment explicitly. So far, the European Court of Human Rights has decided 
upon violations of specific rights by collective punishment, but not on collective 
punishment itself. Due to the lack of legal consideration of collective punishment under 
human rights law, it is seen as a “practice” leading to human rights violations, not as a 
human rights violation itself. In a recent report the Human Rights Committee asked 
Russia to ‘[i]mmediately end the practice of collective punishment of relatives and 
suspected supporters of alleged terrorists, and provide effective remedies to victims for 
violation of their rights, including for damage or destruction of property and forced 
expulsion.’113 This statement was made in the context of Russia’s ‘counter-terrorism 
operations in the Chechen Republic’, but it likewise referred to the violation of specific 
human rights and the “practice” of collective punishment as their trigger. 114 
                                                          
111 Caucasian Knot (2016). Жители Чечни пожаловались на "духовную паспортизацию" под 
видом анкетирования, online available at: http://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/278238/ 
(accessed on 15/04/18). 
112 Memorial Human Rights Centre (2016) supra note 88, p.24; Tumanov, G. (2016). В Чечне 
ввели «духовно-нравственный паспорт», Kommersant News, online available at: 
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2919256 (accessed on 15/04/18); Caucasian Knot (2016) 
supra note 111. 
113 CCPR/C/RUS/CO/7 Concluding observations on the seventh periodic report of the Russian 
Federation (31 March 2015) advance unedited version adopted at the 3157th meeting 
(CCPR/C/SR.3157) para.7; CCPR/C/RUS/CO/6 Concluding observations of the Human Rights 
Committee: Russian Federation (24 November 2009) para.14. 
114 Concluding observations on the seventh periodic report of the Russian Federation supra note 
113, para.7. 
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The assessment of this legal provision introducing family responsibility and in effect, 
collective punishment, gives rise to serious concerns. However, the fact that a vacuum in 
protection has enabled this provision appears the more concerning. Human rights law 
has to address the challenges it faces and this brief account of an amendment of Russian 
counter-terror law has shown the importance of that discourse in practice. 
4.2.5 References to collective punishment in Chechnya in the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights 
The need to consider collective punishment under human rights law stems not only from 
the changing circumstances, but also from the choices made by the actors in practice. 
Whereas Palestinians have used the prohibition of collective punishment in the law of 
armed conflict as tool to make their case, Chechens have brought cases relating to the 
armed conflict and the current, uncertain situation before the European Court of Human 
Rights. The analysis of potential ways to translate the concept of collective punishment 
into human rights law and formulate a prohibition draws from that essential difference, 
determined as it was by the fact that the Chechens, unlike the Palestinians, had the 
Strasbourg system available to them. 
Before starting with the review of cases, a few remarks on the monitoring function of the 
ECtHR with regards to the law of armed conflict and its ability to provide redress for 
victims of armed conflict are in order. The ECtHR has taken the stance to apply the ECHR 
only and not the law of armed conflict to situations amounting to a non-international 
armed conflict such as in Chechnya. This approach has led to a number of successful 
cases brought by Chechen applicants and although they were not assessed against the 
law of armed conflict, the Court was able to supervise situations of internal violence and 
offer redress to the victims.115 
In terms of available remedies, the Court can rely on ‘just satisfaction’ which commonly 
consists of a payment of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages and court costs, 
individual measures such as the reopening of domestic judicial proceedings or the 
imposition of positive obligations on the respondent state and general measures to 
prevent recurrence in the course of pilot judgements addressing a ‘structural or systemic 
problem’.116 
                                                          
115 Abresch, W. (2005) supra note 23; for the leading Chechen cases see supra note 67. 
116 ECtHR, Rules of Court, Registry of the Court, Strasbourg (14 November 2016) Rule 61 (1); 
Open Society Justice Initiative (2010). From Judgment to Justice: Implementing International and 
Regional Human Rights Decisions. New York, Open Society Foundations, pp.39ff; McKay, F. 
(2013). What Outcomes for Victims?, in Shelton, D. (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of International 
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In the judgements relating to the Chechen conflict, the Court provided an authoritative 
account of the events and the numerous violations of Chechens’ rights committed by the 
Russian state and this in itself fits with a corrective approach to empowerment (as 
described in the following chapter), which deals with mending long histories of 
discrimination and oppression. However, in comparison with another regional human 
rights body, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the ECtHR could improve its 
remedial framework by outlining the specific ways in which a state has to comply with a 
judgement instead of leaving the means of compliance up to the state itself.117 Yet a 
thorough examination of the remedial framework of the ECtHR and the Inter-American 
Court goes beyond the scope of this thesis. 
The review of cases referring to collective punishment in the preceding chapter revealed 
that there is not much reference to the term ‘collective punishment’ in the case law on 
Chechnya in this context. The cases on zachistkas reviewed above do not refer to 
collective punishment explicitly. However, the two cases outlined below show the 
Court’s awareness of the continuing imposition of collective punishment on Chechens 
after the most intense periods of fighting of the second non-international armed conflict 
and after the decrease of zachistkas. The following analysis will show that the Court has 
indicated a desire or an intention to consider them as instances of collective punishment. 
In addition, this section will conclude with a short digression to Austrian asylum cases, 
which include a large number of Chechen cases concerning collective punishment, 
reaffirming the widespread use of collective punishment in Chechnya.   
In the case Turluyeva v Russia, the Court dealt with disappearance and house burning 
occurring in 2009.118 The applicant was the mother of a young man who had contacts 
with insurgents via phone and internet and who disappeared after a special operation 
aimed at discovering hidden insurgents. The events on the day of his disappearance 
started with armed men arriving at their home, who alleged that members of the 
insurgents had been hiding on their estate and showed the body of a young man to the 
applicant. This man and another man accused of being insurgents had been killed by the 
                                                          
Human Rights Law. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp.921-954; on individual measures see eg: 
Assanidze v Georgia (Merits and Just Satisfaction) no. 71503/01, Court (Grand Chamber) (8 
April 2004) (ordering the release of the applicant). 
117 Bowring, B. (2012) supra note 67, p.760f, pp.767ff; Hawkins, D. & Jacoby, W. (2010). Partial 
Compliance: A Comparison of the European and Inter-American American Courts for Human 
Rights, Journal of International Law and International Relations, 6 (1), pp.35-85. 
118 Turluyeva v Russia (Merits and Just Satisfaction) no.63638/09, Court (First Section) (20 June 
2013). 
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security forces while allegedly hiding on the estate belonging to the applicant and her 
brothers in law. The applicant and another relative were brought to the district 
department of the interior for questioning and when they returned their homes had been 
burned down. The applicant’s son disappeared after a relative saw him the same day at 
the district department bearing visible signs of beatings.119 
Regarding the house burning, the Russian government accepted the applicant’s account 
of the events to the extent set out in a memorandum stating that ‘[a]s a result of this 
conflict, the houses at 117 Sovetskaya Street had burned down’.120 Fire fighters at the 
scene told the applicant their house had been burned down deliberately contradicting 
the government’s version of the houses ‘burning down’ as they apparently ‘had been 
burned down’. 121  In a later statement, servicemen of the district department of the 
ministry of the interior who had participated in the special operation confirmed that the 
houses ‘had been burned down’.122 Another argument for the deliberate nature of the 
destruction of their homes can be found in the timeline of the events. The special 
operation, which resulted in the killing of two alleged insurgents took place before the 
applicant was questioned, and her home and the homes of her relatives were still 
undamaged. After the applicant returned from being questioned, her house was burned 
down, meaning it occurred long after the special operation ‘aimed at locating and 
exterminating members of illegal armed groups’ took place.123 
Although the European Court of Human Rights did not explicitly refer to collective 
punishment in the context of this case, the nature of the events indicates the imposition 
of collective punishment on the applicant in the form of house burning. Her home as well 
as the homes of her relatives were burned down due to alleged ties to insurgents, making 
them bear responsibility for acts committed by others. In the authorities’ view, the 
applicant as well as her relatives were supporters of or at least sympathising with the 
insurgents. 
In the second case, I.K. v Austria in 2013, the Court established a violation of the 
prohibition of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment relating to a 
Chechen asylum seeker. In this case, it was likely that the applicant would suffer from 
collective punishment if he would be deported to Russia. His father was killed because 
                                                          
119 Turluyeva v Russia supra note 118, para.8ff. 
120 Turluyeva v Russia supra note 118, para.19. 
121 Turluyeva v Russia supra note 118, para.11. 
122 Turluyeva v Russia supra note 118, para.41. 
123 Turluyeva v Russia supra note 118, para.18. 
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he had worked for separatist leader Aslan Maskhadov. Furthermore, he himself was 
beaten by security forces, arrested several times and only released in exchange for 
ransom.124 
The Court referred to a number of reports providing country-specific information 
describing the current situation in Chechnya. These reports include two mentions of 
collective punishment: ‘The burning of homes of suspected rebels, a mechanism of 
collective punishment in use since 2008, was reportedly continuing.’125 And: ‘Chechen 
law-enforcement and security agencies under Ramzan Kadyrov’s de facto control were 
continuing to resort to collective punishment of relatives and suspected supporters of 
alleged insurgents.’126 
While concluding its assessment of the situation in Chechnya, the Court stated: ‘The 
reports also still referred to the practice of reprisals and collective punishment of 
relatives and suspected supporters of alleged insurgents’. 127  Apart from the Court’s 
effective recognition of the use of collective punishment in Chechnya, these remarks also 
indicate that the Court had been aware of collective punishment in Chechnya before 
(‘still’). This might be a reference to the zachistka cases it dealt with earlier, thereby 
acknowledging that these sweeping operations constituted collective punishment as 
well. 
However, as already seen in the case review in the preceding chapter, the Court has not 
decided on the issue of collective punishment itself. It has rather recognised that 
collective punishment is used by CR authorities, but since collective punishment itself is 
not prohibited by the ECHR, it can only find contraventions regarding the outcomes it 
causes. The information on collective punishment is merely used as a reference to show 
the real risk of ill-treatment the applicant would face in case of deportation and the Court 
did not elaborate any further on collective punishment. 
However, the Court took some time to discuss the decision of the Austrian Asylum Court 
(Asylgerichtshof), which in turn refers to country reports on Chechnya speaking of 
                                                          
124 I.K. v Austria (Merits and Just Satisfaction) no.2964/12, Court (First Section) (28 March 
2013); for another case relating to punitive measures imposed on the relatives of Aslan 
Maskhadov see: Maskhadova and Others v Russia (Merits and Just Satisfaction) no. 18071/05, 
Court (First Section) (6 June 2013) (discussed in section 4.1.4 above). 
125 I.K. v Austria supra note 124, para.51. 
126 I.K. v Austria supra note 124, para.54. 
127 I.K. v Austria supra note 124, para.81. 
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collective punishment and one of its forms, house burning.128 Citing the asylum case of 
the applicant’s mother, the Austrian courts found that she would be at serious risk of ill-
treatment because of her ‘membership of a particular social group’ meaning supporters 
of the insurgent movement.129 To face the risk of ill-treatment due to the affiliation with 
or belonging to a certain group is already indicative of collective punishment. 
Apart from the decisions relating to this case brought before the European Court of 
Human Rights, it is interesting to have a look at further decisions of the Austrian courts, 
in particular regarding asylum cases. Austria has a relatively large Chechen diaspora, 
numbering about 30,000, and as a result, a large number of asylum cases deals with 
Chechen applicants. 130  A search on the database of the Austrian court dealing with 
asylum cases, the Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht), yields a 
staggering 1258 results when searching for ‘Chechnya’ and ‘collective punishment’ for 
the period between January 2014 and April 2018.131 One recent example includes the 
granting of asylum in 2017 to a former insurgent who fled Chechnya in 2013. In its 
decision, the Austrian court referred to detailed country specific information on the use 
of collective punishment in Chechnya. It mentioned house burnings as well as the law on 
the confiscation of property of relatives of alleged terrorists as discussed above.132 
This section has highlighted the European Court of Human Rights’ awareness of 
collective punishment being used in Chechnya. However, the Court has not decided on 
collective punishment so far, it has only referred to a vast number of country specific 
reports containing information on collective punishment in Chechnya. Yet it has not 
rejected the use of this notion either. In addition, the large number of Chechen asylum 
cases brought before Austrian courts indicate that collective punishment is a broader 
                                                          
128 I.K. v Austria supra note 124, para.17. 
129 I.K. v Austria supra note 124, para.13. 
130 Medien-Servicestelle (2015). Rund 30.000 TschetschenInnen in Österreich, online available 
in German at: http://medienservicestelle.at/migration_bewegt/2015/02/26/rund-30-000-
tschetscheninnen-in-oesterreich/ (accessed on 15/04/18). 
131  Austrian Legal Information Database (Rechtsinformationssystem), online available in 
German at: 
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Ergebnis.wxe?Abfrage=Bvwg&Entscheidungsart=Undefined&Suche
NachRechtssatz=True&SucheNachText=True&GZ=&VonDatum=01.01.2014&BisDatum=15.04.2
018&Norm=&ImRisSeitVonDatum=&ImRisSeitBisDatum=&ImRisSeit=Undefined&ResultPageSi
ze=100&Suchworte=tschetschenien+kollektivbestrafung&Position=1 (accessed on 15/04/18). 
132 BVwG 09.05.2017, W226 2105945-2, online available in German at: 
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Bvwg/BVWGT_20170509_W226_2105945_2_00/BVWG
T_20170509_W226_2105945_2_00.pdf (accessed on 15/04/18). 
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issue that should be addressed outside of the context of armed conflict under human 
rights law. 
4.2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown the effects of a gap in protection from collective punishment 
under human rights law in practice. After briefly elaborating on the two non-
international armed conflicts that have been fought in Chechnya during the last decades, 
the complexities of defining the beginning and end of such conflicts were highlighted 
from a theoretical perspective.  
The short foundational section has prepared the ground for the ensuing assessment of 
forms of collective punishment witnessed in Chechnya. Starting with collective 
punishment applied in practice, zachistkas or sweeping operations were most common 
during the early stages of the second non-international armed conflict. These operations 
were characterised by summary executions, disappearances, looting and the destruction 
of property. Entire villages were punished for alleged ties to insurgents as perceived by 
the security forces – this constitutes collective punishment. 
Fortunately, zachistkas are no longer used in Chechnya. However, the concept of 
collective punishment has adapted to the changing circumstances. After attacks on 
governmental premises or in reaction to comments critical of the authorities, family 
homes of the alleged perpetrators are burned down. Ramzan Kadyrov’s open support 
for family responsibility for the alleged crimes committed by their relatives indicates a 
general policy of not only collective responsibility, but in effect collective punishment. 
His comments denouncing certain families are followed by action, resulting in their 
homes being burned down or in public humiliation and collective expulsion from 
Chechnya, affecting the entire family just as much as the destruction of their home. As 
innocent people are punished for acts allegedly committed by one of their members, 
collective punishment is still in use in Chechnya.133 In preparation of these acts, the 
authorities even collect information about the broader family relationships of young 
people. 
In addition to these forms of collective punishment exercised in practice, a law has been 
adopted by the Russian State Duma. Collective responsibility is imposed on a broader 
circle by the confiscation of property of families or even persons close to someone who 
                                                          
133 See eg: PACE, Resolution 2157 (2017) Human rights in the North Caucasus: what follow-up 
to Resolution 1738 (2010)? (25 April 2017). 
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committed a terrorist attack in order to cover for damages resulting from the act. This 
amendment to counter-terror legislation is applicable across Russia, but the particular 
circumstances in Chechnya are likely to result in a stronger impact on its population. 
Furthermore, statements made by Duma members during the readings of the bill 
indicate that the amendment was modelled on collective punishment policies applied by 
Israel against the Palestinians. 
In response, the Chechens have turned to the European Court of Human Rights. They 
have brought a large number of cases relating amongst others to zachistkas, enforced 
disappearances and torture. However, cases where collective punishment is explicitly 
mentioned are scarce. So far, the Court has not decided on the issue of collective 
punishment itself. But the Court has acknowledged the situation in Chechnya and has 
not rejected the use of the concept in this context. 
The uncertain situation in Chechnya does not offer sufficient protection from collective 
punishment, as the question of whether the second non-international armed conflict is 
still ongoing is open to debate. This gap in protection is situated in human rights law. 
Another aspect why human rights law should consider the concept of collective 
punishment within its framework is the active choice of Chechens to take their cases to 
the European Court of Human Rights. Just as they have done in other respects, the 
Chechens could use the Court’s mechanisms as means of empowerment to actively 
participate in the broader struggle for justice if there would be a prohibition of collective 
punishment. Consequently, the final part of the thesis will outline potential ways of 
approaching collective punishment within human rights law in an attempt to provide 
affected groups with the tools they need to engage in that change. 
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5 Human rights and collective punishment – can human 
rights law take on the challenge? 
 
5.1 Conceptual differences and group rights in human rights law 
 
5.1.1 Introduction 
The preceding parts have laid out the meaning and scope of collective punishment under 
the law of armed conflict and its interplay with human rights law. Both parts are 
supported by case studies highlighting the practical importance of the prohibition of 
collective punishment and the problems arising in case of a gap in protection. This gap 
is the subject of the last part of the thesis. The characteristics defining the law of armed 
conflict and human rights law will be discussed in search for reasons causing the gap in 
human rights law, followed by an account of the current understanding of group rights 
in human rights law and group empowerment. This theoretical analysis of the 
foundation of group rights forms the base for the following chapter which will explore 
potential practical solutions, focusing on the European Convention on Human Rights. 
The research question asked about the relationship between state policies on collective 
punishment and its regulations under the law of armed conflict and human rights law, 
and what effects this relationship has on the protection and empowerment of groups. 
The last part of this question will be addressed here. Owing to the theoretical approach 
adopted, it is not enough to examine what the law is; one also has to question how it is 
applied in practice and what impact the law, or the lack of it, has on the living conditions 
of those affected. In short, this part will focus on how to deal with these effects in order 
to work towards the empowerment of affected groups and ways to hold authorities to 
account for acts of collective punishment in situations governed by human rights law. 
The chapter starts with a short review of the different underlying tenets of the law of 
armed conflict and human rights law. In addition, the question of the applicability of the 
law of armed conflict and human rights law will be addressed briefly in order to 
delineate their scope. Afterwards, the position of group rights in human rights law is 
examined. As the present thesis is contemplating a prohibition of collective punishment 
under human rights law, the subjects of which are groups, the question of whether group 
rights can be accommodated by human rights law is an important precondition for the 
evaluation of potential solutions. This analysis will start with a brief general account of 
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the development of group rights, followed by the comparison of two theoretical stances. 
One position claims that group rights are group-differentiated rights held by the 
individual members of a group, whereas the other proposes that groups themselves can 
be rightholders. After establishing that groups are capable of holding rights, the question 
of whether these rights can be human rights is addressed, followed by an account of 
group empowerment, explaining the underlying rational of this review of theoretical 
approaches to group rights. 
The conclusion is that groups can be the holders of rights, that some of those rights can 
be group or collective human rights and that the human rights framework needs to 
accommodate these findings in order to protect and empower groups affected by 
collective punishment. 
5.1.2 The interplay between the law of armed conflict and human rights law 
Starting with a comparison of the underlying approaches of the law of armed conflict 
and human rights law, this section traces some of the deeper reasons for why collective 
punishment has not been considered under human rights law so far. In addition, this 
question will be separated from the frequently recurring debate on the application of 
either or both frameworks, which might be referred to as the lex specialis debate. 
The juxtaposition of conceptual aspects of the law of armed conflict and human rights 
law is helpful in order to understand where the regulation of collective punishment 
comes from and why the translation of the act itself into human rights law might 
encounter difficulties. To tackle those potential obstacles, one has to be mindful of the 
origin and context of collective punishment. Similarly, the conceptual differences 
between the law of armed conflict and human rights law should not be confused with 
their applicability. Several approaches, above all the lex specialis argument, have been 
put forward to deal with situations involving potential norm conflicts. However, the 
present thesis does not aim at resolving these issues, nor at applying the law of armed 
conflict outside its domain. It rather aims at a separate and independent consideration 
of the act of collective punishment under human rights law. Not the applicability of the 
prohibition of collective punishment under the law of armed conflict in situations 
governed by human rights law. 
The section will start with an overview of the conceptual approaches taken by the law of 
armed conflict and human rights law, providing some insights into their different 
starting points and actors. Subsequently, a short delineation of the applicability of the 
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law of armed conflict and human rights law will reject the lex specialis argument and 
clarify the broader aim of the thesis. 
5.1.2.1 Different perspectives 
The law of armed conflict and human rights law do not only address different situations. 
They are situated in different contexts, concern different actors and start from different 
vantage points. The group-based concept pursued in the law of armed conflict has to be 
acknowledged when thinking about collective punishment and the translation of the act 
into human rights law. For this reason, a review of the conceptual foundations of both 
legal frameworks is useful in order to identify the differences and take them into account 
in the course of devising potential solutions.  
The law of armed conflict and human rights law differ in terms of context and 
relationships they address. Whereas the law of armed conflict applies in times of armed 
conflict, regulating the relationship between states, organised armed groups and groups 
of protected persons, human rights law is concerned with the affairs between states and 
individuals under their jurisdiction.1 Another distinction can be made regarding their 
structure. The law of armed conflict obliges the parties to act in a certain way compared 
with human rights law which traditionally confers certain positive rights onto 
individuals.2  
In order to be protected under the law of armed conflict, individuals have to be part of a 
group – such as combatants, prisoners of war or civilians. For instance, the Geneva 
Conventions include several requirements for conferring combatant status to militias, 
resistance groups and national liberation movements.3 Although these requirements list 
individual duties such as to carry your arms openly, they have a “group dimension” 
insofar as the group itself has to abide by the law of armed conflict. For this reason, the 
members of the group have to fulfil certain requirements in order to ensure the group’s 
                                                          
1 Provost, R. (2002). International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, pp.6ff; Bowring, B. (2009). Fragmentation, Lex Specialis and the Tensions in 
the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, Journal of Conflict & Security Law, 14 
(3), pp.485-498, pp.489ff. 
2 Doswald-Beck L. & Vité, S. (1993). International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, 
International Review of the Red Cross, 33 (Special Issue 293), pp.94-119, pp.101ff. 
3 970 UNTS 31, Convention (I) for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick in 
armed forces in the field, Geneva (12 August 1949) Article 13 (2); 971 UNTS 85, Convention (II) 
for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of the 
armed forces at sea, Geneva (12 August 1949) Article 13 (2); 75 UNTS 135, Convention (III) 
relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva (12 August 1949) Article 4(A)(2); 1125 
UNTS 3, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Geneva (8 June 1977) 
Articles 43, 44. 
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compliance.4 Provost highlights the importance of group membership with an example 
based on irregular combatants: ‘In all cases, the existence of, and appurtenance to, an 
identifiable group is an absolute condition for application of humanitarian law in favour 
of irregular combatants. Isolated francs-tireurs are not given any protection as privileged 
belligerents and are liable to be tried as war criminals.’5  
The Fourth Geneva Convention on the protection of civilians in times of armed conflict 
is applicable to ‘protected persons’. Article 4 defines this group as persons who ‘find 
themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or 
Occupying Power of which they are not nationals.’6 Given the exclusion of several groups 
such as the party’s own nationals from that definition, the Convention widens the 
application of some of its parts to the ‘whole of the populations of the countries in 
conflict, without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, nationality, 
religion or political opinion’.7 
The International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has ruled on the issue of group 
membership and the definition of ‘protected persons’ in the case Mucić and others.8 The 
question revolved around the detention of Bosnian Serbs by the Bosnian government, 
meaning the detention of its own nationals.9 The Tribunal found that the condition of 
nationality was too strict, as ‘the victims of the acts alleged in the Indictment were 
arrested and detained mainly on the basis of their Serb identity’. 10  The Tribunal 
reaffirmed this reasoning in its Appeals Judgment, emphasising the ‘development of 
conflicts based on ethnic or religious grounds’ and its effect on the interpretation of the 
nationality criterion.11 Provost welcomed this shift as it focuses on the ‘substantive links 
between an individual and a party to the conflict rather than fixing on the rather formal, 
and at times highly artificial, concept of nationality.’12 Apart from a few exceptions such 
                                                          
4 Provost, R. (2002) supra note 1, pp.35f. 
5 Provost, R. (2002) supra note 1, p.36. 
6 75 UNTS 287, Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 
Geneva (12 August 1949) Article 4 GCIV. 
7 Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War supra note 6, 
Article 13. 
8 Prosecutor v Delalić, Mucić, Delić and Landzo (Judgment) IT-96-21-T (16 November 1998).  
9 Prosecutor v Delalić, Mucić, Delić and Landzo (Judgment) supra note 8, para.264. 
10 Prosecutor v Delalić, Mucić, Delić and Landzo (Judgment) supra note 8, para.265. 
11 Prosecutor v Delalić, Mucić, Delić and Landzo (Appeal Judgment) IT-96-21-A (20 February 
2001) para. 73; see also: Prosecutor v Duško Tadić (Appeal Judgment) IT-96-21-A (15 July 1999) 
para.166; Prosecutor v Zlatko Aleksovski (Appeal Judgment) IT-95-14/1-A (24 March 2000) 
para.152. 
12 Provost, R. (2002) supra note 1, pp.39f. 
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as minority rights, human rights law does not require membership of a group. 13 
However, the broader aspects of group rights in human rights law are discussed below 
in more detail. 
The requirement to be a member of a group in order to gain a certain status highlights 
the differences between the law of armed conflict and human rights law. Under the law 
of armed conflict, one has to be part of the protected persons or the civilians to become 
subject to guarantees and protections whereas human rights law focuses on the 
individual alone. However, the act of collective punishment cannot be sufficiently 
considered under human rights law if the analysis is limited to individuals as subjects of 
rights. Aware of the problems arising from situations where both areas of law, the law of 
armed conflict and human rights law are seemingly inadequate, several voices have 
argued for a variety of modes of applicability to remedy such situations. Although the 
thesis does not support this conflation of conceptual issues with applicability and 
therefore aims at solutions based on human rights law only, the impetus that might have 
contributed to the emergence of the lex specialis and similar arguments is 
understandable from this point of view. A short overview of this debate is provided 
below. 
5.1.2.2 The lex specialis debate 
Non-international armed conflicts and long periods of transition between armed 
conflicts and times of peace are factors that have contributed to blurring the line of 
application between the law of armed conflict and human rights law. As a result, a variety 
of approaches to dealing with potential norm conflicts and the scope of the relevant 
frameworks has emerged. This section will outline some of the positions on this issue 
starting with case law of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and its reception in 
academia followed by the stance of the European Court of Human Rights on the 
applicability of the law of armed conflict in cases under its jurisdiction. 
Milanović has written a very useful chapter addressing the current state of this debate. 
He begins by assessing the case law of the ICJ on the relationship between the law of 
armed conflict and human rights law. In the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, the 
Court held that the right to life deriving from human rights law would also apply in times 
of armed conflict, but it would have to be interpreted using standards of the law of armed 
conflict: ‘The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be 
                                                          
13 Provost, R. (2002) supra note 1, p.42; CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5 General Comment No.23: 
Rights of Minorities (Article 27) (26 April 1994). 
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determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict 
which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities.’14 
After ruling on one specific provision – the right to life – in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory 
Opinion, the Court assessed the general implications of this lex specialis approach in the 
Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory.15 Here, the Court declared that both human rights law and the law of armed 
conflict would apply in times of armed conflict, with the law of armed conflict being lex 
specialis to human rights law.16  It established three different modes of applicability: 
‘[S]ome rights may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others may 
be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others may be matters of both these 
branches of international law.’ 17  Milanović criticised this verdict as ‘vague’ and 
‘unhelpful’ as it lays out different general applicability options without saying which 
provisions would fall into which category, therefore not providing sufficient guidance 
for future cases.18 In the following case Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, the 
Court dropped the lex specialis reference, but maintained those general categories.19  
After discussing a range of cases highlighting the problems created by norm conflicts 
between the law of armed conflict and human rights law, Milanović concludes that there 
‘is simply no evidence that lex specialis is in fact a rule of conflict resolution’ and that states 
should use the relevant derogation mechanisms to avoid such situations instead. 20 
Although lex specialis might have its use in a harmonious interpretation to some extent, 
he calls for the concept to be ‘discarded as a general matter, and it should especially not 
                                                          
14 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, ICJ Reports 
1996, p.226, para.25; Milanović, M. (2011). Norm Conflicts, International Humanitarian Law, and 
Human Rights, in Ben-Naftali, O. (ed.). International Humanitarian Law and International Human 
Rights Law. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp.95-152, p.99. 
15 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion of 9 July 2004, ICJ Reports 2004, p.136. 
16 Doswald-Beck, L. (1997). International and humanitarian law and the Advisory Opinion of the 
ICJ on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, International Review of the Red Cross, 
316, pp.35-55, pp.50f. 
17 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, supra 
note 15, para. 106. 
18 Milanović, M. (2011) supra note 14, p.100. 
19 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), 
Judgment of 19 December 2005, ICJ Reports 2005, p.168, para.216; Happold, M. (2013). 
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, in White, N. & Henderson, C. (eds.). 
Research Handbook on International Conflict and Security Law. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 
pp.444-466, pp.459ff. 
20 Milanović, M. (2011) supra note 14, p.115. 
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be used to describe the relationship between IHL [international humanitarian law] and 
IHRL [international human rights law] as a whole.’21 
Clapham has summarised the relevant academic debate in his chapter in the recent 
commentary on the 1949 Geneva Conventions. He discusses treaties explicitly regulating 
their own relationship with the Geneva Conventions and others which contain only 
references to their relationship in case law. He concludes that the question as to the 
general relationship between the law of armed conflict and human rights law is still 
‘unsettled’ and that there is no ‘”one-size-fits-all” answer’.22 
In tracing the origins of the law of armed conflict and of human rights law, Bowring 
points to additional differences between the two frameworks and questions whether 
human rights bodies such as the ECtHR should apply the law of armed conflict. The law 
of armed conflict, being a framework centred on the conduct in war, meaning not only 
the protection of civilians, but lawful ways of killing, is based on a fundamentally 
different premise than human rights law which has the protection of individuals against 
the state at its core.23 The ECtHR has decided not to apply the law of armed conflict to 
water down the protection granted under the ECHR, when it stated in the Isayeva case 
that ‘[n]o martial law and no state of emergency has been declared in Chechnya, and no 
derogation has been made under Article 15 of the Convention. The operation in question 
therefore has to be judged against a normal legal background.’24 
Returning to Clapham and his categories of human rights treaties regulating their 
relationship with the Geneva Conventions, the ECHR is located amongst the group 
                                                          
21 Milanović, M. (2011) supra note 14, pp.124, 115. 
22 Clapham, A. (2015). The Complex Relationship Between the Geneva Conventions and 
International Human Rights Law, in Clapham, A., Gaeta, P. & Sassòli, M. (eds.). The 1949 Geneva 
Conventions: A Commentary. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp.701-735, 734f. 
23 Bowring, B. (2009) supra note 1, pp.489ff; contra Hampson, F. (2013). The relationship 
between international humanitarian law and international human rights law, in Sheeran, S. & 
Rodley, N. (eds.). Routledge Handbook of International Human Rights Law. Abingdon, Routledge, 
pp.185-213; E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/14 Working paper by Ms. Hampson and Mr. Salama on the 
relationship between human rights law and international humanitarian law (21 June 2005); 
Quénivet, N. (2008). The Right to Life in International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights 
Law, in Arnold, R. & Quénivet, N. (eds.). International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights 
Law: Towards a New Merger in International Law. Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, pp.331-353; 
Abresch, W. (2005). A Human Rights Law of Internal Armed Conflict: The European Court of 
Human Rights in Chechnya, European Journal of International Law, 16 (4), pp.741-767; Gioia, A. 
(2011). The Role of the European Court of Human Rights in Monitoring Compliance with 
Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict, in Ben-Naftali, O. (ed.). International Humanitarian Law 
and International Human Rights Law. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp.201-249. 
24 Isayeva v Russia (Merits and Just Satisfaction) no.57950/00, Court (First Section) (24 
February 2005) para.191 (in-quote references omitted). 
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‘referring to their applicability in situations of armed conflict’. 25  Article 15 ECHR 
regulating the derogation procedure in times of emergency, makes clear that the 
Convention continues to apply during armed conflict. Yet the Court has referred to 
terminology stemming from the law of armed conflict as seen in the Isayeva case where 
it mentioned the terms ‘illegal armed insurgency’, ‘armed fighters’, ‘evacuation of 
civilians’ and ‘indiscriminate weapons’.26 In 2011 in Al-Skeini v United Kingdom and Al-
Jedda v United Kingdom concerning the British occupation of parts of Iraq during and in 
the aftermath of the international armed conflict, the Court explicitly referred to 
provisions of the Geneva Conventions.27  However, it still applied the relevant ECHR 
provisions and not any less strict rules applicable to occupying powers under the law of 
armed conflict.28  
Another case resulting from the armed conflict with Iraq is Hassan v United Kingdom on 
the legality of detention during the conflict.29 The Court approached the question on the 
applicability of the law of armed conflict as follows: ‘… deprivation of liberty pursuant to 
powers under international humanitarian law must be “lawful” to preclude a violation 
of Article 5 § 1. This means that the detention must comply with the rules of international 
humanitarian law and, most importantly, that it should be in keeping with the 
fundamental purpose of Article 5 § 1, which is to protect the individual from 
arbitrariness …’.30 In doing so, the Court has resorted to ‘treaty interpretation in the light 
of subsequent practice and other international obligations’ and decided against the 
government’s argument that ‘since Tarek Hassan was captured and initially detained as 
a suspected combatant, Article 5 was displaced by international humanitarian law as lex 
specialis’.31 
This stance of the ECtHR is shared by the underlying tenets of this thesis. Although the 
prohibition of collective punishment is a concept stemming from the law of armed 
conflict, the question at hand is not one of the applicability of the law of armed conflict 
outside of its scope. It is rather a question of human rights law finding its own way of 
                                                          
25 Clapham, A. (2015) supra note 22, pp.711f. 
26 Isayeva v Russia supra note 24, para.180, 189. 
27 Al-Skeini and Others v the United Kingdom (Merits and Just Satisfaction) no. 55721/07, Court 
(Grand Chamber) (7 July 2011) para.89ff; Al-Jedda v United Kingdom (Merits and Just 
Satisfaction) no. 27021/08, Court (Grand Chamber) (7 July 2011) para.42ff. 
28 Al-Skeini v United Kingdom supra note 27, para.168ff; Al-Jedda v United Kingdom supra note 
27, para.97ff; Clapham, A. (2015) supra note 22, pp.713f. 
29 Hassan v United Kingdom (Merits) no. 29750/09, Court (Grand Chamber) (16 September 
2014). 
30 Hassan v United Kingdom supra note 29, para.105. 
31 Clapham, A. (2015) supra note 22, p.715; Hassan v United Kingdom supra note 29, para.88. 
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dealing with the act of collective punishment itself. For this reason, the term “translating” 
is used – it is not Article 33 (1) of the Fourth Geneva Convention that should be applied 
by the ECtHR, rather the ECHR itself should provide the Court with means to address 
collective punishment and support affected groups in their struggle for justice.32 
The human rights commonly violated by collective punishment include no collective 
element which could be assessed by judicial bodies such as the ECtHR.33 However, this 
section has shown that the Court should still not resort to – and so far has not resorted 
to – the application of the law of armed conflict to the detriment of the protection and 
guarantees enshrined in the ECHR. Despite the lex specialis debate contributing to the 
confusion surrounding these issues, the Court has adopted a sensible approach based on 
its own derogation procedure and general treaty interpretation.  
The comparison between the law of armed conflict and human rights law at the 
beginning of this section highlighted their different approaches and reflected on the 
difficulties complicating the attempt to “translate” collective punishment from the law 
of armed conflict into human rights law, which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
However, before embarking on that endeavour, the general question of whether human 
rights law is able to consider situations with group implications at all has to be examined. 
The following section will address this question. 
5.1.3 Group rights and human rights law 
This section analyses the position of human rights law regarding group rights. As 
mentioned above during the discussion of conceptual differences between the law of 
armed conflict and human rights law, the requirement of group membership, for 
instance regarding minority rights, is the exception in human rights law. However, the 
question of group rights in human rights law is a different one. Although one of the 
theories discussed in more detail supports the idea of individual rights based on group 
membership, the focus here is on rights held by groups collectively and independent of 
their members. The terms group rights and collective rights are used interchangeably in 
this context. 
Collective punishment is the punishment of a group as such for an act committed or 
allegedly committed by one or some of its members for which they do not bear individual 
                                                          
32 75 UNTS 287, Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 
Geneva (12 August 1949) Article 33. 
33 For a review of those rights see the preceding chapter on collective punishment and human 
rights law. 
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responsibility. A prohibition of collective punishment under human rights law would 
have to be able to encompass the collective dimension of this definition. This in turn 
would mean to allow groups to hold rights under human rights law such as the ECHR. As 
already laid out in the preceding chapters, individual rights protected under human 
rights law are unable to address the particular wrong done by collective punishment and 
the underlying intention going with it.34 Groups are targeted because of alleged acts of 
some of their members – the act of collective punishment is not aimed at a particular 
individual member of a group, it is aimed at the group as a whole. For this reason, a 
prohibition of collective punishment needs to address the group as a collectivity. In 
order to empower affected groups, they require rights they can assert themselves as 
subjects, as independent rightholders. 
The question of group rights in human rights law is addressed in the following. Although 
focused on the relationship of group rights and human rights law, the general tenets of 
the group rights debate will open the section and provide an overview of the concept’s 
development. This is useful as most of the general debate is applicable to the particular 
debate about group rights and human rights as well. Subsequently, two group rights 
theories are contrasted – Will Kymlicka’s ‘group-differentiated rights’, which has 
dominated the field for some time, and Dwight Newman’s ‘collective rights’. 35  This 
comparison highlights basic theoretical characteristics, in particular the problems of 
liberal theory with rights conceptions not based on individuals. After coming to the 
conclusion that groups are capable of holding rights, the concept of collective human 
rights will be discussed. An important aspect in this regard is the clarification that group 
or collective rights and collective human rights are not necessarily the same thing. Much 
theoretical confusion can be avoided by holding that group rights can be human rights, 
but group rights and human rights are two different concepts with both having their own 
theoretical foundation. Following that, the importance of considering collective 
punishment as a group right under human rights law will be supported by a short 
account of the meaning of empowerment and how it can contribute to the active 
participation of groups in social change. 
                                                          
34 On this point in general see eg: McKay, F. (2013). What Outcomes for Victims?, in Shelton, D. 
(ed.). The Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
pp.921-954, p.951. 
35 Kymlicka, W. (1996). Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Oxford, 
Clarendon Press; Newman, D. (2011). Community and Collective Rights: A Theoretical 
Framework for Rights Held by Groups. Oxford, Hart. 
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5.1.3.1 The development of group rights 
This short account of the general group rights debate already indicates that it is a 
contested field. The different approaches to the question relate to the different 
underlying ideologies or philosophical stances of the authors as much, or sometimes 
even more as they relate to practical considerations. Unless otherwise stated, this thesis 
adopts the understanding that group or collective rights describe rights held by groups 
instead of rights held by individuals. First however, the following sections need to 
provide some theoretical grounding for that understanding. This section will contribute 
to that aim by tracing the development of group rights. 
In her introduction to a collection of articles on group rights, Stapleton provides a 
historical account of group rights, starting with English pluralism in the early twentieth 
century and Frederic Maitland. He was inspired by the German thinker Otto von Gierke 
who rejected the prevailing theory of groups as mere aggregations of individuals without 
independent existence by reference to German native societies being built on local 
communities (Gemeinden) and fellowships (Genossenschaften).36 In his lecture on moral 
and legal personality, Maitland touched on ‘group-personality’: ‘If the law allows men to 
form permanently organised groups, those groups will be for common opinion right-
and-duty-bearing units’ and ‘[f]or the morality of common sense the group is person’.37 
In the interwar period, the focus shifted from groups with which the pluralists were 
concerned such as corporations, trusts and trade unions to groups based on nationality, 
ethnicity or race. Exemplary of that shift was the question of minority rights arising after 
the First World War. The League of Nations’ minority protection scheme recognised the 
political status of several European minorities. 38  However, the way in which Nazi 
Germany used minority protection as a cloak for aggression undermined those efforts 
and the concept of group rights in general. Sceptics include Barker, who described 
totalitarianism as ‘the idea of the transcendent and unitarian group’.39 Albeit to a lesser 
extent, this scepticism continued after the Second World War, with opponents of group 
                                                          
36 Stapleton, J. (1995). Introduction, in Stapleton, J. (ed.). Group Rights: Perspectives since 1900. 
Bristol, Thoemmes Press, pp.xiff. 
37 Maitland, F.W. (1903). Moral Personality and Legal Personality, in Fisher, H.A.L. (1911)(ed.). 
The Collected Papers of Frederic William Maitland. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
pp.304-320, p.314. 
38 Stapleton, J. (1995) supra note 36, pp.xxiiff. 
39 Barker, E. (1942). Reflections on Government. New York, Oxford University Press (reprinted 
1958), p.152. 
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rights perceiving them merely as impeding ‘free individual choice’. 40  For instance 
Oakeshott depicts ‘anti-individualists’ or the ‘mass man’ as follows: ‘He wants 'salvation'; 
and in the end will be satisfied only with release from the burden of having to make 
choices for himself.’41 
Accounts dismissive of group rights or focused solely on individual rights have been and 
are being subjected to more and more questioning.42 For instance, Rawls’ A Theory of 
Justice, published in 1970, was thoroughly criticised by Van Dyke.43 Rawls’ findings are 
based on social contract theory and have the individual as starting point. Van Dyke’s 
criticism is best explained in two of his remarks: ‘It is arbitrary to assume that justice is 
only for individuals, or only for individuals and states.’ And: ‘Groups in fact have status 
and rights at an intermediate level between the individual and the state, and it is 
imperative for a theory of justice to take this fact into account.’44 
This is not the only instance of Van Dyke trying to explain the problems of liberal thought 
with collective entities as it is centred around the individual.45 After citing Dworkin and 
the idea that individuals’ interests give rise to individual rights if there is no ‘collective 
goal’ denying that, he moved on questioning whether the individual’s interest must 
necessarily result in a right held by an individual and whether sometimes it might not be 
more useful to have a collective entity holding such a right. 46  As he concluded: 
‘Individuals are not self-sufficient. … The development of their personalities and talents, 
their philosophies of life, and perhaps their very existence would depend on the 
community of which they are a part.’47 
Similarly, Macdonald argued that the fixation of liberal thought on the individual as 
rightholder was missing the ‘centrality of groups as the bearers of rights’ which he 
explained as follows: ‘I do not choose my language - it chooses me; I do not choose my 
                                                          
40 Stapleton, J. (1995) supra note 36, pp.xxviiff; Oakeshott, M. (1961). The Masses in 
Representative Democracy, in Hunold, A. (ed.). Freedom and Serfdom: An Anthology of Western 
Thought. Dordrecht, D. Reidel, pp.151-170. 
41 Oakeshott, M. (1961) supra note 40, p.168. 
42 Stapleton, J. (1995) supra note 36, p.xxixf; O’Nions, H. (2007). Minority Rights Protection in 
International Law: The Roma of Europe. Farnham, Ashgate, pp.26ff. 
43 Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Harvard University Press. 
44 Van Dyke, V. (1975). Justice as Fairness: For Groups?, American Political Science Review, 69, 
pp.607-614, p.614. 
45 Van Dyke, V. (1974). Human Rights and the Rights of Groups, American Journal of Political 
Science, 18 (4), pp.725-741; Van Dyke, V. (1982). Collective Entities and Moral Rights: Problems 
in Liberal-Democratic Thought, Journal of Politics, 44 (1), pp.21-40. 
46 Dworkin, R. (1978). Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, p.xi; Van 
Dyke, V. (1982) supra note 45, pp.23ff. 
47 Van Dyke, V. (1982) supra note 45, p.39. 
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history, nor my cultural heritage nor my race. It is not that I am an individual with a 
particular identity who freely chooses to which groups I belong. My identity as an 
individual is, at least in part, a function of the groups of which I am a member.’48  
Segesvary’s stance on group rights provides a useful addition to the quotes above as he 
approached the issue from the point of socio-cultural analysis. He held that the 
‘individual human being and his group or community are ontologically 
interdependent.’49 By that he meant ‘[t]here can be no individual without a group or 
community; there can be no community without individuals who are not only the actors 
in social and cultural life but the bearers of the community's belief- and value-systems, 
of its traditionally transmitted symbolic order.’50 In his opinion, groups are sui generis 
entities just as individuals. Therefore, he criticised the ‘sacralizing’ of the abstract 
individual and the elimination of groups which has led to a situation where individuals 
are faced with an ‘all-powerful’ state.51  
This socio-cultural analysis corresponds well with the methodological approach 
adopted in this thesis, the position that law has to be examined in relation to its impact 
in practice and its ability to provide tools for change. Segesvary offers an analysis of 
group rights dividing them into ‘quasi-group rights’ and ‘sui generis group rights’ with 
the former describing groups based on predetermined natural conditions such as sex or 
age and the latter ‘derived from the constitution of a specific social and cultural human 
environment by groups of men’ such as ethnic groups. His reasoning for attributing 
rights to such ‘sui generis groups’ resonates with the underlying tenets of this thesis’ 
research question: ‘The origin of group rights resides in the fact that members of the 
group are discriminated against precisely because of their group membership and not 
for their specific characteristics, qualities or defects, as individuals.’52 
Gathering from this short review of the development of group rights theory, the stance 
that groups are constitutive of individual human beings and therefore rights-bearing 
entities just as individuals represents a promising starting point. The arguments that 
group rights would undermine individual choice or create the conditions for totalitarian 
                                                          
48 Macdonald, I. (1989). Group Rights, Philosophical Papers, 18 (2), pp.117-136, p.122. 
49 Segesvary, V. (1995). Group rights: The definition of group rights in the contemporary legal 
debate based on socio-cultural analysis, International Journal on Group Rights, 3, pp.89-107, 
p.93; see also: Bowring, B. (2008). The Degradation of the International Legal Order? The 
Rehabilitation of Law and the Possibility of Politics. Abingdon, Routledge-Cavendish, pp.151ff. 
50 Segesvary, V. (1995) supra note 49, p.93. 
51 Segesvary, V. (1995) supra note 49, pp.94ff. 
52 Segesvary, V. (1995) supra note 49, p.102. 
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regimes are superficial and not convincing. Based on this principal assumption, a more 
detailed analysis of two contrasting theories of group rights is provided in the following 
to ground the theoretical approach.  
5.1.3.2 Group-differentiated rights and group rights 
After outlining the origins of group rights including some comments and positions, the 
focus will now turn to recent scholarship on the matter. For the sake of space and clarity, 
this section compares only two stances representative of recent developments. One is 
Kymlicka’s theory of ‘group-differentiated rights’ held by individual members of the 
group and the other is Newman’s theory of collective moral rights held by groups, partly 
supported by Jovanović’ core claims.53 The contrast between those theories’ conceptual 
foundations will emphasise the thesis’ claim that it is not enough to simply grant rights 
to individual members of a group and not to the group itself. Thinking of collective 
punishment, an individual right would fail to acknowledge the inherent collective 
dimension of the act itself and would be unable to address the particular wrong done. 
However, in order to reach the point of devising potential solutions, potential obstacles 
such as theories rejecting group rights, have to be confronted first. 
Will Kymlicka’s liberal theory of minority rights as group-differentiated rights starts 
from the premise of rights granted because of specific qualities or features of a group in 
contrast to another group. Group members have individual rights due to their group 
membership.54 Consequently, Kymlicka’s account of minority rights is rooted in liberal 
individualist analysis.55 
In his 1996 monograph Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights 
Kymlicka devoted a chapter to individual and collective rights. In his opinion, it is not the 
distinction between individual and collective rights that is important, but the distinction 
between different claims of a group which he calls ‘internal protections’ and ‘external 
restrictions’.56  In his words: ‘The first involves the claim of a group against its own 
members; the second involves the claim of a group against the larger society.’57  
                                                          
53 Kymlicka, W. (1996) supra note 35; Newman, D. (2011) supra note 35; Jovanović, M. (2012). 
Collective Rights: A Legal Theory. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
54 Kymlicka, W. (1996) supra note 35, pp.27ff, 110ff. 
55 Bowring, B. (1999). Multicultural Citizenship: A More Viable Framework for Minority Rights?, 
in Fottrell, D. & Bowring, B. (eds.). Minority and Group Rights in the New Millennium. The Hague, 
Kluwer Law International, pp.1-24, pp.9ff. 
56 Kymlicka, W. (1996) supra note 35, p.36. 
57 Kymlicka, W. (1996) supra note 35, p.36. 
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When discussing ‘internal protections’, issues such as internal dissent and the limitation 
of rights of group members are mentioned. However, being limitations on individual 
autonomy, these restrictions would raise ‘the danger of individual oppression’. Although 
Kymlicka concedes that every state requires its citizens to contribute in some sense to 
the public good, be it by paying taxes or military duties, his ‘internal restrictions’ 
definition would only apply to limitations of ‘basic civil and political liberties’. An 
example thereof would be cultural or religious traditions calling for particular gender 
roles or church duties.58 
The nature of ‘external protections’ is defined by their concern with equality. Although 
special rights for instance in terms of land or language might create an ‘unfair’ situation 
between two groups, meaning putting one group in a better position to the detriment of 
another, Kymlicka sees the potential of ‘external protections’ in their ability to reduce 
the vulnerability of a minority against the larger society. Therefore, he supports ‘external 
protections’, but not ‘internal restrictions’.59 
In Kymlicka’s view, the term ‘collective rights’ is misleading as it does not distinguish 
between ‘internal restrictions’ and ‘external protections’ and because it ‘suggests a false 
dichotomy with individual rights’.60 Owing to his theory, the idea that collective rights 
are opposed to individual rights would be unhelpful as the concept of group-
differentiated rights grants rights to individual members of groups. However, Kymlicka 
is not overly concerned with the broader implications of the group rights debate, as 
indicated by one remark made during his assessment of the ‘ambiguity’ of collective 
rights, using the example of French Canadians’ language rights: ‘This debate is sterile 
because the question of whether the right is (or is not) collective is morally unimportant. 
The real issue in evaluating language rights is why they are group-specific – that is, why 
francophones should be able to demand court proceedings or education in their mother-
tongue at public expense when Greek- or Swahili-speakers cannot.’61 
Dwight Newman, the second author presented here, would disagree with the statement 
that the question of whether a right is collective or not is morally unimportant. In his 
2011 monograph Community and Collective Rights: A Theoretical Framework for Rights 
Held by Groups, he lays out the principles for collective moral rights. According to 
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  184 
 
Newman, a moral right is ‘an entitlement or justified claim whose justification does not 
depend on whether any legal or political system recognizes the right.’62 Collectivities are 
a ‘collection of persons such that one would still identify it as the same collectivity were 
some or all of the included persons to change’ and groups are collectivities with 
‘particularly strong member identification’.63 
Following Raz’ interest-based theory of rights, he argues that groups can be rightholders: 
‘[O]nce we realise that a collectivity, a corporation or other, can act as a deep 
personification, mediating for persons of ultimate value [individual members], we see 
that a collectivity’s capacity for rights makes sense.’64 Elaborating on that, he holds that 
‘[c]ollective rights will exist when a collective interest is sufficient to ground a duty.’65 In 
order to support his claim, Newman refers amongst others to a case brought before the 
ECtHR. In the case Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v Moldova the Court 
ruled that the non-recognition of the applicant Church by the Moldovan state violated 
the applicants’ freedom of religion.66 By stating that the recognition of a Church was vital 
to the protection of freedom of religion, the judgment affirms that ‘the individual right 
to freedom of religion presupposes the fulfilment of certain collective interests of 
religious collectivities.’67 Referring to the “collective dimension” of the right to manifest 
one’s religion, the Court held:  
‘Seen in that perspective, the right of believers to freedom of religion, which 
includes the right to manifest one’s religion in community with others, 
encompasses the expectation that believers will be allowed to associate freely, 
without arbitrary State intervention. Indeed, the autonomous existence of 
religious communities is indispensable for pluralism in a democratic society and 
is thus an issue at the very heart of the protection which Article 9 affords.’68 
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Clarendon Press, p.11. 
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According to Newman’s theory, collectivities have to fulfil two ‘community conditions’ 
in order to become rightholders: The service principle and the mutuality principle. The 
service principle requires that collectivities serve their members’ interests, meaning that 
they can only hold rights if that is in the interest of its members.69 This ‘interest’ is 
preserved as long as ‘sufficient regard’ has been paid to individual members’ interests 
and they have not been ignored by the collectivity. 70  Furthermore, serving in its 
members’ interest should be understood in a broad sense, which differs from Kymlicka’s 
focus on individual autonomy.71  
While the service principle describes the internal relationship between members and 
the group, the mutuality principle describes the external relationship between 
collectivities and their relationship to non-members. Newman holds that ‘a collectivity's 
claims to rights must be respectful of equivalently weighty interests of non-members’.72 
Limitations to rights as well as means of coordination are offered to reconcile conflicts 
between collectivities’ rights and those of non-members.73 
After outlining Kymlicka’s and Newman’s account of group-differentiated rights and 
collective rights respectively, Newman’s response to Kymlicka as well as a broader 
critical analysis of his theory are examined in the following. 
First of all, Newman notes that Kymlicka’s theory of group-differentiated rights avoids 
the broader group rights debate and instead focuses on individual rights in a minority 
rights context based on equality considerations. This approach does not contribute to a 
theory of group rights, as such a theory would have to be able to take majority as well as 
minority rights into account. Furthermore, Newman finds that Kymlicka’s emphasis on 
individual autonomy based on a context of choice enabled by groups, restrains the 
‘object of equality behind the rights he advocates’.74 As seen above, Newman’s service 
principle is not limited to interests of individual autonomy, but includes broader 
interests promoting the wellbeing of the members of a group.75 
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Against Kymlicka’s note that collective rights are ‘heterogeneous’ and ‘have little in 
common’,76 Newman holds that to ‘the extent that such rights are heterogeneous, they 
are no more so than individual rights, and much writing has sought to analyse the 
justifications of individual rights’.77 Although Kymlicka is concerned with the clarity of 
collective rights, his categories of ‘internal restrictions’ and ‘external protections’ are 
vaguely defined themselves. According to him, ‘internal restrictions’ are objectionable if 
they infringe the rights of individual members of the group, or their ‘basic civil and 
political liberties’.78 However, elaborating further on that claim, he provides examples of 
taxation, which indicates that taxation would already infringe basic civil liberties and 
therefore almost any ‘internal restriction’ would be impermissible. Furthermore, 
‘external protections’ can impose restrictions on or transform individual rights as well 
and have characteristics of ‘internal restrictions’. For this reason, Newman criticises 
Kymlicka’s basic categories as ‘blurred’ and not able to deal ‘meaningfully’ with the 
question of identifying external and internal aspects of cases.79 
Another point of critique is found in Kymlicka’s understanding of self-government. He 
describes self-government rights as devolving ‘powers to smaller political units, so that 
a national minority cannot be outvoted or outbid by the majority on decisions that are 
of particular importance to their culture’. 80  However, Newman holds that self-
government can be seen as part of the process of internal self-determination – a right 
‘giving rise to extended discussions on collective rights differing from traditional liberal 
rights.’81 In particular, he highlights that any form of self-government is likely to include 
forms of internal restrictions for members of the group in question and a general 
objection to such restrictions would ‘rob self-government of a substantial part of its 
meaning’.82 
Similar to Newman, Miodrag Jovanović’ theory of collective rights as presented in his 
2012 monograph Collective Rights: A Legal Theory is grounded in Raz’ interest-based 
theory of rights.83 However, he develops a different approach as he claims that groups 
can have rights which are independent of their contribution to their members’ wellbeing. 
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Furthermore, he divides groups into pre-legally existing and legally constituted groups, 
with indigenous groups being an example for the former and trade unions for the latter.84 
Only ‘pre-legally existing’ groups can claim collective rights. Jovanović builds his theory 
on ‘value collectivism’. Borrowing from Hartney, he describes value collectivism as ‘the 
view that a collective entity can have value independently of its contribution to the well-
being of individual human beings’.85  
Newman has questioned Jovanović’ theory regarding these two tenets – the selection of 
groups capable of holding rights and value collectivism providing for collective rights 
independent from their contribution to the wellbeing of group members. 
Understandably, a narrow approach of individual wellbeing such as Kymlicka’s which 
accepts only group-differentiated rights that advance individual autonomy, would not 
be able to encompass the variety of rights groups can hold in order to advance and 
promote members’ interests in general. However, situated within Newman’s 
understanding, it is questionable which collective rights Jovanović has in mind as being 
independent of members’ wellbeing, as most collective rights are likely to contribute to 
or promote exactly that in a broader sense. As Newman summarises: ‘Something that 
makes the community’s life go better that would not have made a particular individual’s 
life go better but for the individual’s participation in the community is actually primarily 
a collective interest and only secondarily an individual interest. And, here, one arrives 
already at the possibility of collective interests that are in some manner irreducible to 
individual interests.’86  
Furthermore, legally constituted groups can hardly be reduced to mere legal constructs, 
as they too should be capable of holding rights to act in the interests of their members. 
In this regard, Newman refers to trade unions as example. He argues that groups of 
workers in particular industries might well have a ‘clear set of shared understandings, a 
shared identity’ and could therefore be considered to have pre-legal existence. 
Developing this thought, he points out: ‘If the group then attained status as a trade union 
… the fact the group had legal recognition and legal definition would not be good reason 
to then say that it could not hold collective rights.’87 
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Although Newman’s and Jovanović’ account of group rights differ in their realisation, 
both agree that Kymlicka’s concept of group-differentiated rights is insufficient to 
provide a sound theoretical grounding for group rights. Both agree that groups can be 
rightholders and have irreducible collective rights. 
In addition to Newman and Jovanović, Corsin Bisaz has written the monograph The 
Concept of Group Rights in International Law: Groups as Contested Right-Holders, Subjects 
and Legal Persons in 2012.88 According to Jovanović, Bisaz’ account of group rights in 
international law is focused on legal rights and refrains explicitly from the more 
substantial debate of the theoretical grounding thereof.89 Although he too comes to the 
conclusion that groups can be rightholders, he does so by stating that any claims to the 
contrary would be ‘unconvincing’.90 Despite the practical value of his research in terms 
of a thorough and useful review of existing group rights in international law combined 
with an outlook on potential emerging concepts and how states could deal with group 
rights in future, he does not provide a theoretical framework for his claim.91 
 
The review of Kymlicka’s and Newman’s theory has shown that current scholarship is 
shifting from individual rights based on group membership to collective rights held by 
groups which are irreducible to their individual members. Despite conceptual 
differences between Newman and Jovanović, the general thrust of their and Bisaz’ work 
points in the direction of groups as independent rightholders away from liberal accounts 
based on individual autonomy only. This finding represents an important step towards 
the consideration of a prohibition of collective punishment under human rights law 
based on a group right. The final missing component opening the way to embark on 
potential practical solutions to the problem at hand is the analysis of human rights law’s 
capacity to encompass group rights which will be dealt with subsequently. 
5.1.3.3 Group rights as human rights 
Although the question of human rights held by groups or collective human rights is at 
the centre of this chapter, its evaluation will be rather brief. This is due to the overlap of 
the general theoretical debate on group rights with the claims made regarding collective 
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human rights. However, in that overlap lies significant danger too. Although the question 
at hand is whether human rights can be held by a group, that does not mean that group 
rights are simply a subdivision of human rights. Some group rights are human rights, but 
that does not mean that all group rights are human rights – just as not all individual 
rights are human rights. 
The question whether group rights are human rights is controversial. Arguments range 
from opposition based on the premise that human rights are necessarily linked to 
individual human beings to support stating that some aspects fundamental to human life 
can only be protected by recognising their collective dimension.92 Felice has written a 
comprehensive monograph entitled Taking Suffering Seriously: The Importance of 
Collective Human Rights in 1996. 93  First, he points out that the exercise of some 
individual rights is depending on the previous realisation of an associated group right.  
Support for this stance might be found in the ECtHR case referred above, where the Court 
held that the recognition of a church was vital to the protection of freedom of religion of 
individuals.94  
Felice’s main claim, however, is based on the following assumption: ‘In contrast to the 
liberal premise of the isolated human being, the ideas of collective human rights begin 
with a view of humans as they really are, that is, as social beings.’95 These social beings 
‘congregate, associate and exist within groups.’ 96  Felice widens the scope of groups 
holding human rights to include not only groups defined by ethnicity or race, but also 
groups based on class, gender and sexuality.97 His understanding of the term ‘human’ is 
informed by his definition of the social being: ‘Human here means fundamental 
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relationships, processes, and interactions with others in society.’98 Building on Marxist 
theory, he states the promise of collective human rights: ‘[A] democratic socialist theory 
of collective human rights could confront structures of domination and exploitation 
through its advocacy of certain group rights. This theory could expose how the 
structures of class society violate these rights and thereby create pressure for 
fundamental change.’99 
Felice’s stance could be supported by Gould’s recent essay on A Social Ontology of Human 
Rights. Although not explicitly referring to the concept of group rights in human rights 
law, Gould further develops her account of agency stemming from earlier works, which 
is based on ‘individuals-in-relations’.100 These relations are understood as ‘constitutive 
of individuals in the sense that they become who they are in and through these relations’, 
but the individuals concerned retain the ability of choosing and changing these relations 
individually or collectively with others.101 Speaking of the features of her social ontology, 
she holds that agency ‘is essentially open to others and expresses our need for and 
dependence on each other. Such interdependence and mutual neediness involve 
elements of both inter-constitution through processes of recognition and the necessity 
for collective rather than only individual action for the realization of many aims and 
goals.’102 
On a side note and for clarification purposes, Bisaz argues that much of the controversy 
surrounding group rights stems from the (in his opinion wrong) conception that group 
rights are necessarily human rights or a sub-group of human rights. He holds that 
‘providing group rights does not mean at the same time to provide human rights or vice 
versa, there is no basis for such a conceptual connection.’103 Although some group rights 
are considered fundamental rights, ‘it is important not to discuss this topic from a 
categorical perspective, but from the perspective of a concrete example of a group right 
like the group’s right to existence in the sense of the Genocide Convention.’104 
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This case-by-case assessment of group rights as human rights in practice seems 
appealing as more international and regional human rights instruments are featuring 
collective rights, starting with the most prominent group right, the right to self-
determination of peoples, which is enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
dating back to 1966.105 More recent instruments, such as the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights include whole sections explicitly dealing with group rights.106 This 
development has been characterised by some as the emergence of a “third generation” 
of human rights, with the first generation containing civil and political rights and the 
second economic and social rights. Rights constituting this “third generation” include 
rights of indigenous peoples, rights to development, peace, culture or a clean 
environment.107 
Apart from the endorsement of collective rights in human rights instruments in practice, 
Felice’s theoretical argument for collective human rights corresponds well with the 
theoretical approach grounding this thesis. His theory of collective human rights 
encompassing groups based on ethnicity, race, class, gender and sexuality represents a 
strong starting point for potential ways to approach collective punishment in human 
rights law. Although Felice lists some groups explicitly, these are seen as illustrative of 
his theory and not as excluding groups based on other criteria as long as the group as 
such is identifiable. A prohibition of collective punishment under human rights law could 
contribute to the empowerment of affected groups to actively engage in and raise 
awareness for their broader struggle for justice and social change. After establishing the 
possibility of collective human rights, the question of group empowerment and its 
implications for the present thesis are outlined in the following last section of this 
chapter. 
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5.1.3.4 From protection to empowerment 
A theoretical aspect that does not directly relate to the question of group rights but to 
the general aim of the present thesis is that of group empowerment. As argued 
throughout the preceding chapters, groups affected by collective punishment such as the 
families of alleged terrorists or insurgents need tools to hold the perpetrators to account. 
At the same time, the groups mentioned in the case study also belong to bigger groups 
or communities, namely the Palestinians and the Chechens and the collective 
punishment policies imposed on Palestinian and Chechen families overlap with the 
discriminatory treatment of those groups by the authorities in general even though the 
prohibition of collective punishment itself does not require a discriminatory element 
regarding group composition. The question of empowerment explains the importance of 
a consideration of collective punishment under human rights law as groups need rights 
they can assert themselves to call on duty bearers to respect their rights and bear 
responsibility in case of violations. 
Tove Malloy has written about a theory of empowerment for national minorities in 2014. 
Setting the scene, she confirms that ‘the protection paradigm holds a hegemonic position 
in policy-making’ and that ‘a dependency relationship is created which on the surface 
renders members of minorities inactive in the determination of their own existence. One 
might argue that the notion of protection portrays minorities as victims, or recipients of 
a type of entitlement, the entitlement of protection. It brackets minorities as objects 
rather than subjects of their own lives.’108 Whereas Malloy sees protection as a ‘one-way 
process involving proactive providers and passive recipients’, empowerment is about 
‘the capacity of the beneficiaries as actors who make choices and take action on the basis 
of choices’. To get from protection to empowerment, Malloy envisages a transition 
building on this capacity of beneficiaries.109 
To create her theory of minority empowerment, Malloy relies on Sadan’s theory of 
empowerment based on power. 110  Sadan divides empowerment into ‘individual 
empowerment’, ‘community empowerment’ and ‘empowerment as a professional 
practice’.111 Community empowerment is understood as ‘the increased control of people 
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as a collective over outcomes important to their lives’. 112  Speaking about ethnic 
minorities, Sadan develops a ‘corrective’ and a ‘preserving’ approach. As the corrective 
approach ‘sees empowerment as a method of treatment which will ease problems 
created as a result of prolonged deprivation and discrimination, and will help a group 
overcome obstacles on the path to social equality’ it is more relevant to the present thesis 
than the preserving approach which deals with the protection of special qualities and 
resources of the group which could be of benefit to the larger society if it is willing to 
undertake adjustments to enable the group’s empowerment. 113  In the process of 
community empowerment, a ‘collective with a common critical characteristic, that 
suffers from social stigmas and discrimination, acquires ability to control its relevant 
environment better and to influence its future.’114 
According to Malloy, ‘empowerment as part of social change within a social structure is 
seen as human action made possible within the boundaries of the social structure in 
which it takes place (structuration).’115 After reviewing Sadan’s account of collective 
empowerment, Malloy offers a combination of empowerment and rights theory. In this 
combination, she finds the ‘two-way process that identifies the relationship between the 
rights-holder and the duty-bearer’ in contrast to the one-way relationship examined at 
the beginning. For Malloy, minority groups only need to act in case of positive rights, 
which they can claim. However, in my opinion, rights based on non-interference also 
have this inherent call for action. As Malloy rightly says: ‘[W]hen minorities mobilize on 
the basis of protection schemes by claiming their rights and calling on duty-bearers to 
take responsibility, they move towards the goal of empowerment.’116 What groups such 
as minorities are empowered to do by a prohibition of collective punishment under 
human rights law is exactly that, ‘calling on duty-bearers to take responsibility’. 
The aspect of group empowerment strengthens the call of this chapter for human rights 
held by groups in the form of a prohibition of collective punishment under human rights 
law. Such a provision would enable affected groups to act and not just to be acted upon. 
In addition, they could also contribute to the broader struggle for justice of the bigger 
group they belong to. Although a prohibition implies only retrospective action in terms 
of claim proceedings, it also offers preventive potential as duty bearers are asked to 
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comply with an obligation and the relevant institutions overseeing these obligations 
could monitor their conduct. These aspects are considered in more detail in the next 
chapter, which is devoted to potential solutions in practice. 
5.1.4 Conclusion 
Collective punishment is defined as the punishment of a group as such for an act 
committed or allegedly committed by one or some of its members for which they do not 
bear individual responsibility. Due to this inherent collective dimension, collective 
punishment has to be approached from a group rights perspective. A prohibition of 
collective punishment centred on an individual as rightholder is unable to encompass 
the particular wrong done by collective punishment. Consequently, this discussion needs 
to be based on the affected group, the family of an alleged insurgent, as rightholder. 
However, in order to get to the practical considerations surrounding that prohibition, 
the possibility of rights held by groups in human rights law needs to be established first. 
This chapter has addressed the nature and conceptual differences between the law of 
armed conflict and human rights law, including some aspects of the applicability of both 
frameworks in case of norm conflicts. Subsequently, it focused on the concept of group 
rights by first providing a general account of their development, followed by a 
comparison of two competing theories and the situation of group rights within human 
rights law and group empowerment. In conclusion, one can hold that groups are 
constitutive of individual human beings who are essentially social beings. For this reason, 
groups are right-bearing entities who derive those rights from collective interests that 
are irreducible to their individual members. Although group rights are not a sub-group 
of human rights from a conceptual point of view, group rights can be human rights. 
Human rights understood as rights regulating fundamental social processes and 
interactions with others in society can accommodate the notion of group rights. 
Expanding on this short summary, the chapter has provided the theoretical foundation 
for the following attempt to devise ways to deal with collective punishment under 
human rights law. The possibility of rights based on groups as rightholders under human 
rights law is an essential precondition for the assessment of the practical viability of a 
prohibition of collective punishment under this framework in the next chapter.  
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5.2 Closing the gap – a practical question 
 
5.2.1 Introduction 
This last chapter analyses the potential of a prohibition of collective punishment under 
the European Convention on Human Rights or an additional protocol to it. Owing to the 
underlying methodological approach, this emphasis on the application and effect of law 
in practice represents a sound conclusion of the thesis. However, the potential solution 
offered in this chapter provides merely an outlook and its realisation depends on further 
developments in the area. 
The analysis so far has established the possibility of group rights as human rights in the 
preceding chapter, as well as the necessity of a consideration of collective punishment 
under the human rights framework in the chapters on human rights and collective 
punishment and the case study on Chechnya. This section of the analysis, which is 
intended to lay the basis for suggestions on how to address collective punishment under 
human rights law, starts with an assessment of other Council of Europe human rights 
instruments bearing collective aspects. These are the Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities and the European Social Charter. 
Even though the minority rights enshrined in the FCNM focus on rights of persons 
belonging to national minorities instead of the rights of national minorities as groups, 
the examination of that area of human rights offers insights in the realisation of collective 
rights in practice. Another important indicator is the ESC whose collective complaint 
mechanism is only available to collectivities such as non-governmental organisations or 
trade unions. Looking at how the European Committee on Social Rights (ECSR) is dealing 
with collective complaints by these organisations relating to groups such as the Roma 
generates useful evidence for the viability to adjudicate on collective rights in the human 
rights context. 
In addition, one should not forget one crucial aspect these two instruments (just as any 
international treaty) bring to the discussion of group rights in the CoE context – state 
consent. Member states of the CoE have agreed on these two human rights treaties and 
regarding the ESC, also on group rights and a collective complaints mechanism open only 
to collectivities to ensure their protection. This approval lends support to a 
consideration of a prohibition of collective punishment as a group right under the ECHR, 
another CoE human rights instrument. 
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In order to highlight similarities and differences between rights and cases relating to the 
ESC and the ECHR, a short case review will be undertaken. The selected cases focus on 
discrimination of groups and the majority thereof concerns the Roma community. To see 
how the ECSR and the European Court of Human Rights deal with similar situations and 
applicants of the same group offers valuable insights into their working methods and 
potential ways of realising a prohibition of collective punishment under the ECHR. 
Finally, the usefulness of a broad interpretation of the ECHR in the light of the FCNM, the 
ESC and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights will be addressed. Although 
the ECtHR’s references to the FCNM and the ESC support the general acceptance of a 
broader, perhaps groups-encompassing reading of the ECHR, a prohibition of collective 
punishment cannot be interpreted into its existing framework. For this reason, the 
potential of a new rule is analysed and weighed up against previous unsuccessful efforts 
to include minority rights or social rights into the ECHR. Given the well-established state 
consent regarding the prohibition of collective punishment under the law of armed 
conflict, the fundamental nature of a right to freedom from collective punishment and its 
sufficiently precise wording, the chapter concludes that the adoption of a new rule 
prohibiting collective punishment under the ECHR is viable.  
5.2.2 European Framework Convention on the Protection of National 
Minorities (FCNM) 
Reversing the chronological order of their creation, the assessment of group related 
human rights instruments of the CoE starts with the Framework Convention. This 
decision is due to the cross-referencing case reviews of the ECSR and the ECtHR which 
lead logically to the last section of the chapter and are therefore better placed after this 
section. 
The FCNM was adopted by the Council of Europe in 1995 and entered into force in 1998.1 
As the term “framework” indicates, it sets out programme-type provisions, calling on 
member states to promote and implement these principles. Although the Framework 
Convention is a legally binding instrument, the formulation of its provisions allows for a 
measure of discretion. 2  It has no complaints mechanism, but states are required to 
provide periodical reports which are reviewed by the Advisory Committee (AC) under 
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the FCNM. Although the FCNM addresses ‘persons belonging to a national minority’ and 
not national minorities as collectivities, its Article 3 (2) states that ‘[p]ersons belonging 
to national minorities may exercise the rights and enjoy the freedoms flowing from the 
principles enshrined in the present framework Convention individually as well as in 
community with others.’3 In the following, the monitoring procedure of the AC and the 
non-discrimination framework of the FCNM will be outlined. Both serve as indicators of 
the way in which CoE member states perceive human rights related to groups and how 
those relevant FCNM principles could support a prohibition of collective punishment.  
5.2.2.1 Monitoring procedure 
The monitoring mechanism of the FCNM is set out in its Articles 24 to 26 with the main 
competent body being the Committee of Ministers (CoM). 4  The CoM monitors the 
implementation of the FCNM and is supported in its tasks by the Advisory Committee. 
Originally, the European Commission on Democracy through Law supported a judicial 
mechanism. During the negotiations on the final draft, however, the support for some 
form of committee or expert panel oversight was growing and realised in the form laid 
out in Articles 24 to 26 FCNM. This means that individual petitions cannot be filed under 
the FCNM framework.5 The AC is an independent expert committee. Its impartiality is 
crucial to ensure an unbiased monitoring process as the CoM which acts as the CoE’s 
decision-making body, is a political body.6 The AC reviews periodic state reports and 
adopts opinions on measures to be taken to implement the FCNM which are forwarded 
to the CoM.7 The AC can request further information from the state under review and 
after notifying the CoM, it can seek information from non-governmental sources as well.8 
In addition to these tasks, the AC is conducting country visits.9 
                                                          
3 Article 3 (2) FCNM; ACFC/56DOC(2016)001 The Framework Convention: a key tool to 
managing diversity through minority Rights, Thematic Commentary No. 4 The Scope of 
Application of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (27 May 
2016) para.2; Thornberry, P. & Estébanez, M. (2004). Minority Rights in Europe. Strasbourg, 
Council of Europe Publishing, pp.98f. 
4 Topidi, K. (2005). Articles 24-26, in Weller, M. (ed.). The Rights of Minorities in Europe: A 
Commentary on the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp.573-587. 
5 Topidi, K. (2005) supra note 4, pp.575ff. 
6 Topidi, K. (2005) supra note 4, pp.577ff; Article 26 FCNM. 
7 Resolution (97)10 Rules adopted by the Committee of Ministers on the Monitoring 
Arrangements under Articles 24 to 26 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities (17 September 1997) Rule 23; on the outline for state reports see: 
ACFC/INF (98)2 Rules of Procedure of the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention 
for the Protection of National Minorities (29 October 1998). 
8 Resolution (97)10 supra note 7, Rules 29, 31. 
9 Resolution (97)10 supra note 7, Rule 32; Thornberry, P. & Estébanez, M. (2004) supra note 3, 
pp.112ff. 
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Neither the findings of the AC nor the CoM are legally binding. 10  In addition, the 
effectiveness of the monitoring process is suffering due to delays in the submission of 
state reports and initial uncooperative behaviour of states regarding comments to AC 
opinions and the follow-up process which is fortunately changing.11 
In his concluding remarks to the commentary, Weller pointed to the weak wording of 
the FCNM as well as the limited capacities of the CoM and the AC.12 He observed that the 
Framework Convention was a result of the rejection of a protocol relating to minority 
rights to the ECHR in 1993 just a few years before the adoption of the FCNM. 13 
Nevertheless, he reaffirmed that minority rights are human rights.14  Overall, Weller 
painted an optimistic outlook which, more than ten years after his remarks can only be 
confirmed by the number of states acceding to the Framework Convention.15 As of April 
2018, 39 member states of the Council of Europe have signed and ratified the treaty, 
leaving Belgium, Greece, Iceland and Luxembourg as signatory states which have not yet 
ratified and Andorra, France, Monaco and Turkey which have neither signed nor ratified 
the FCNM. 16  Furthermore, Kosovo is subject to a specific monitoring arrangement 
regarding the principles set out in the FCNM in accordance with an agreement signed 
between the CoE and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK).17 These accession numbers as well as the increasing compliance of states with 
                                                          
10 Topidi, K. (2005) supra note 4, p.581. 
11 Topidi, K. (2005) supra note 4, pp.582f; see eg: Advisory Committee on the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 10th Activity Report covering the period 1 
June 2014 - 31 May 2016, pp.13f. 
12 Weller, M. (2005). Conclusion: The Contribution of the European Framework Convention for 
the Protection of National Minorities to the Development of Minority Rights, in Weller, M. (ed.). 
The Rights of Minorities in Europe: A Commentary on the European Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp.609-638. 
13 Weller, M. (2005) supra note 12, p.610; for further details on the debate on an additional 
protocol see the last section of the chapter. 
14 Weller, M. (2005) supra note 12, p.613; Heintze, H.-J. (2005). Article 1, in Weller, M. (ed.). The 
Rights of Minorities in Europe: A Commentary on the European Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp.77-96; Article 1 FCNM; 
Hannikainen, L. (2007). Legal nature of minority rights as part of human rights, limitations, 
derogations, reservations, and interpretative statements, in Weller, M. (ed.). Universal Minority 
Rights: A Commentary on the Jurisprudence of International Courts and Treaty Bodies. Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, pp.27-48, pp.27ff. 
15 Weller, M. (2005) supra note 12, pp.628f. 
16 Council of Europe, State Parties to the FCNM, online available at: 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-
/conventions/treaty/157/signatures?p_auth=ZuYF6lVq (accessed on 15/04/18). 
17 Council of Europe, Agreement between the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo (UNMIK) and the Council of Europe on technical arrangements related to the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 890th meeting (30 June 2004) 
online available at: 
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their reporting obligations are ‘actively contributing to lifting the expectations of 
performance in relation to the Framework Convention.’18  In other words, states are 
increasingly more willing to accept minority rights obligations such as those set out in 
the FCNM. This gradual shift could serve as important indicator when it comes to the 
interpretation of other human rights instruments such as the ECHR in the group rights 
context. 
5.2.2.2 Non-discrimination 
Article 4 FCNM enshrines the rights of equality before the law, equal protection by the 
law and a prohibition of discrimination based on belonging to a national minority.19 In 
addition, the Article calls for the adoption of adequate measures to promote full and 
effective equality between persons belonging to a national minority and to the majority 
and clarifies that such measures would not be considered discriminatory. The adequacy 
of such measures is determined by their proportionality.20 Although the FCNM follows 
the traditional individualistic human rights framework, Alfredsson argued that ‘there 
are good reasons for extending minority rights to group rights’ – a point he only briefly 
explained by reference to solidarity and conflict prevention aspects.21 
Interestingly, at the end of his short commentary on Article 4 FCNM, Alfredsson 
reiterated his opinion that group rights might be beneficial in terms of minority 
protection and expressed support for the adoption of an additional protocol to the ECHR 
on minority rights to allow the ECtHR ‘to deal not only with the rules of equal rights and 
non-discrimination, but also with specific, special measures for the effective realization 
of minority rights.’ 22  Several attempts of adopting such an additional protocol for 
national minorities will be discussed later in this chapter. 
In addition to the rights set out in Article 4 FCNM, Article 6 FCNM urges states to 
undertake effective measures to ‘promote mutual respect and understanding and co-
                                                          
https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectId=09000016805dc82d (accessed 
on 15/04/18). 
18 Weller, M. (2005) supra note 12, p.635. 
19 Article 4 FCNM; Alfredsson, G. (2005). Article 4, in Weller, M. (ed.). The Rights of Minorities in 
Europe: A Commentary on the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp.141-152; ACFC/44DOC(2012)001rev Thematic 
Commentary No. 3: The Language Rights of Persons Belonging to National Minorities under the 
Framework Convention 
(adopted on 24 May 2012) para.26ff; Thornberry, P. & Estébanez, M. (2004) supra note 3, 
pp.100ff. 
20 Alfredsson, G. (2005) supra note 19, pp.148f. 
21 Alfredsson, G. (2005) supra note 19, pp.150f. 
22 Alfredsson, G. (2005) supra note 19, p.152. 
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operation among all persons living on their territory, irrespective of those persons’ 
ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity’ and to ‘protect persons who may be 
subject to threats or acts of discrimination, hostility or violence as a result of their ethnic, 
cultural, linguistic or religious identity.’23 
Given the regulation of non-discrimination by the ECHR as well as the FCNM, the 
question as to their relationship arises. The FCNM refers directly to the ECHR in its 
Articles 19 and 23. Article 19 FCNM contains a general clause on compliance with other 
relevant instruments when implementing FCNM principles.24 Article 23 FCNM states 
that any principles of the Framework Convention which have a counterpart in the ECHR 
should be ‘understood so as to conform to the latter provisions’.25 This rule provides 
useful guidance as the AC can refer to the ECtHR’s case law in areas such as freedom of 
expression, assembly or religion. However, this is not a one-way process. The ECtHR has 
in turn referred to AC opinions in cases such as D.H. and Others v the Czech Republic, 
Oršuš and Others v Croatia or Antayev and Others v Russia.26 Furthermore, other CoE 
bodies such as the ESC discussed in the following, have made use of the state reports 
delivered under the FCNM system as well.27 
The increasing number of states ratifying the FCNM as well as their willingness to 
contribute to the AC’s monitoring procedure are promising developments in the context 
of minority rights. Together with the ECtHR practice of referring to AC opinions, this 
gradual shift could help facilitate a broader interpretation of the ECHR and group rights 
such as a prohibition of collective punishment. 
5.2.3 European Social Charter (ESC) 
In search for useful guidance for the adoption of a prohibition of collective punishment 
under the ECHR, the ESC’s collective complaints system and Article E Revised ESC on 
                                                          
23 Article 6 FCNM; Thematic Commentary No. 4 The Scope of Application of the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities supra note 3, para.51ff. 
24 Article 19 FCNM; Spiliopoulou Åkermark, S. (2008). The Added Value of the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (I), in Verstichel, A, Alen, A., De Witte, B. & 
Lemmens, P. (eds.). The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities: A Useful 
Pan-European Instrument?. Antwerp, Intersentia, pp.69-90, pp.79ff. 
25 Article 23 FCNM. 
26 Spiliopoulou Åkermark, S. (2008) supra note 24, pp.82ff; D.H. and Others v the Czech Republic 
(Merits and Just Satisfaction) no.57325/00, Court (Grand Chamber) (13 November 2007) 
para.66; Oršuš and Others v Croatia (Merits and Just Satisfaction) no.15766/03, Court (Grand 
Chamber) (16 March 2010) para.68ff; Antayev and Others v Russia (Merits and Just Satisfaction) 
no.37966/07, Court (First Section) (3 July 2014) para.83. 
27 See eg: European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v Bulgaria (Merits) no.46/2007 (3 December 
2008) para.46; Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v Italy (Merits) no.58/2009 (25 
June 2010) para.69. 
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non-discrimination are examined below in more detail. In addition, several non-
discrimination cases of the ECSR are reviewed to highlight the viability of adjudicating 
group rights in practice. 
The ESC was adopted in 1961 and entered into force in 1965.28 Following the structure 
of the emerging International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, it was envisaged as the 
social, economic and cultural rights counterpart to the civil and political rights 
encompassing ECHR.29 However, the ESC has suffered from a lack of state as well as 
public interest in the first years after its adoption. The available monitoring and 
supervision mechanisms and its programme-type provisions have been criticised.30 In 
response, the ESC underwent substantial revision in 1995 and 1996, one of the most 
important developments being the establishment of a collective complaints system only 
open to complaints by collectivities and not by individuals. 31  As of April 2018, the 
additional protocol introducing the collective complaints system was signed and ratified 
by 15 CoE member states.32 The Revised Charter was signed and ratified by 34 CoE 
member states by April 2018, 11 states including Germany, Spain and the United 
Kingdom have signed but not ratified and Liechtenstein and Switzerland have neither 
signed nor ratified the treaty. 33  The following section will focus on the relevant 
provisions of this Revised Charter.  
The Revised ESC is built upon several groups of protected rights, covering the areas of 
housing, health, education, employment, legal and social protection, movement of 
                                                          
28 CETS 035 European Social Charter (adopted on 18 October 1961, entry into force on 26 
February 1965). 
29 Benelhocine, C. (2012). The European Social Charter. Strasbourg, Council of Europe 
Publishing, pp.12f. 
30 See eg: De Schutter, O. & Sant’Ana, M. (2012). The European Social Charter, in De Beco, G. 
(ed.). Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms of the Council of Europe. London, Routledge, pp.71-
99, p.72; Gori, G. (2005). Domestic Enforcement of the ESC: The Way Forward, in De Búrca, G., 
De Witte, B. & Ogertschnig, L. (eds.). Social Rights in Europe. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
pp.69-88, pp.70f. 
31 CETS 158 Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter Providing for a System of 
Collective Complaints (adopted on 9 November 1995, entry into force on 1 July 1998); CETS 163 
European Social Charter (revised) (adopted on 3 May 1996, entry into force 1 July 1999). 
32 Council of Europe, State Parties to the Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter 
Providing for a System of Collective Complaints, online available at: 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-
/conventions/treaty/158/signatures?p_auth=F3KSQtYr (accessed on 15/04/18). 
33 Council of Europe, State Parties to the Revised ESC, online available at: 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-
/conventions/treaty/163/signatures?p_auth=6WKmbcgT (accessed on 15/04/18). 
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persons and non-discrimination.34 In contrast to other human rights instruments such 
as the ECHR where states ratify the treaty as a whole and make reservations in that 
process, the ESC requires acceding states only to agree on six out of nine ‘core provisions’ 
and they can decide by which other provisions they want to be bound subject to certain 
minimum thresholds.35 The core provisions include Article 1 (right to work), 5 (right to 
organise), 6 (right to bargain collectively), 7 (right of children and young persons to 
protection), 12 (right to social security), 13 (right to social and medical assistance), 16 
(right of the family to social, legal and economic protection), 19 (right of migrant 
workers and their families to protection and assistance) and 20 (right to equal 
opportunities and equal treatment in matters of employment and occupation without 
discrimination on the grounds of sex) Revised ESC.36 
Compliance with these rights is monitored by the European Committee on Social Rights. 
In addition to issuing conclusions on received state reports, this body decides on 
collective complaints brought by trade unions and non-governmental organisations. 
Ideally, the Committee’s activities result in changes in the law of the affected member 
state, bringing its legal framework in line with the Charter. Although the ECSR’s 
decisions are only declaratory of the law and not directly enforceable in domestic courts, 
some states have even undertaken necessary legislative changes as soon as a collective 
complaint arose and before the ECSR had handed down a decision.37 
5.2.3.1 Collective complaints procedure 
In contrast to other human rights instruments, the ESC does not provide for individual 
petition. Instead, the collective complaints system allows organisations to raise concerns 
about domestic legislation affecting Charter rights of whole groups of people such as 
workers or union members. The organisations entitled to submit complaints to the ECSR 
are national and international workers’ and employers’ organisations, international 
non-governmental organisations with participatory status and included in a list of the 
                                                          
34 Benelhocine, C. (2012) supra note 29, pp.19ff. 
35 European Social Charter (revised) supra note 31, Part III Article A 1 (c). 
36 European Social Charter (revised) supra note 31, Part III Article A 1 (b). 
37 See eg: European Council of Police Trade Unions v Portugal (Merits) no.11/2001 (21 May 
2002); Benelhocine, C. (2012) supra note 29, pp.26f; Council of Europe (2016). Collective 
Complaints Procedure, online available at: https://edoc.coe.int/en/european-social-
charter/7252-european-social-charter-collective-complaints-procedure.html (accessed on 
15/04/18) pp.4f; De Schutter, O. & Sant’Ana, M. (2012) supra note 30, p.92. 
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CoE and national non-governmental organisations of states which have agreed to their 
standing.38 
Of particular interest in the present context is the ECSR’s case law on discrimination of 
Roma, a group frequently involved in ECtHR cases as well. Among the international non-
governmental organisations which have brought applications relating to access to 
education, health or housing of Roma are the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions 
(COHRE), the European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) and the International Centre for the 
Legal Protection of Human Rights (INTERIGHTS).39 This procedural aspect – to have a 
non-governmental organisation representing a specific group – might be something the 
ECtHR could take up as non-governmental organisations enjoy standing under the ECHR 
as well. The question of group applications to the ECtHR will be discussed in more detail 
below. 
Positive aspects of the collective complaints mechanism are its relative simplicity and 
short duration. However, this might also be due to the low number of cases brought so 
far.40 Given that the ESC is not directly applicable in the domestic setting and the ECSR 
is the only body deciding on its rights, complaining organisations do not have to exhaust 
domestic remedies before they bring an application. Furthermore, complaints can also 
be filed before a law potentially violating ESC rights enters into force, adding a 
preventative aspect. Apart from incorporating the ECSR’s decision into national 
legislation to remedy laws in violation of ESC rights, the Committee’s decisions can also 
be referred to by domestic courts. According to the ECSR they should ‘decide the matter 
in the light of the principles the Committee has laid down on this subject or, as the case 
may be, for the legislator to enable the courts to draw the consequences as regards the 
conformity with the Charter and the legality of the provisions at issue’.41 
In its decisions, the ECSR can include immediate measures either on its own initiative or 
following the request of a party to the case. Immediate measures are ‘necessary with a 
                                                          
38 Benelhocine, C. (2012) supra note 29, p.54; Churchill, R.R. & Khaliq, U. (2004). The Collective 
Complaints System of the European Social Charter: An Effective Mechanism for Ensuring 
Compliance with Economic and Social Rights?, European Journal of International Law, 15 (3), 
pp.417-456, pp.424ff. 
39 Benelhocine, C. (2012) supra note 29, pp.66ff. 
40 As of April 2018, there have been 214 decisions on the merits: see ESC database, online 
available at: http://hudoc.esc.coe.int/eng#{"ESCDcType":["DEC"]} (accessed on 15/04/18). 
41 Confederation of Swedish Enterprise v Sweden (Merits) no.12/2002 (15 May 2003) para. 42; 
Brillat, R. (2005). The Supervisory Machinery of ESC: Recent Developments and their Impact, in 
De Búrca, G., De Witte, B. & Ogertschnig, L. (eds.). Social Rights in Europe. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, pp.31-43, pp.40ff. 
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view to avoiding the risk of serious damage and to ensuring effective respect for the 
rights recognised in the Charter.’42 
After the ECSR has decided on the merits of a collective complaint, the decision is 
forwarded to the Committee of Ministers. The complaint remains confidential until the 
CoM has adopted a resolution or recommendation but will be published after four 
months if the CoM does not act upon it.43 By adopting a resolution on the decision, the 
CoM is ‘taking note’ of the ECSR’s decision and by adopting a recommendation it requires 
states to ‘do everything in their power’ to conform with it.44 
The collective complaints mechanism enabling non-governmental organisations to 
represent groups such as the Roma offers a promising route towards the realisation of a 
prohibition of collective punishment under the ECHR. As will be shown below, non-
governmental organisations can submit cases to the ECtHR and therefore, the existing 
legal framework is already able to encompass such claims. Furthermore, the ECSR’s case 
law examined subsequently proves that claims brought by non-governmental 
organisations on behalf of groups can be adjudicated in practice. 
5.2.3.2 Non-discrimination 
In contrast to the 1961 Charter which only referred to non-discrimination in its 
preamble, Part V of the Revised ESC contains Article E, a general non-discrimination 
clause.45 It states: ‘The enjoyment of the rights set forth in this Charter shall be secured 
without discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national extraction or social origin, health, association with a 
national minority, birth or other status.’46  
Apart from clarifying that differential treatment based on objective and reasonable 
grounds should not be considered discriminatory in the Appendix attached to the 
Revised ESC, the Charter mentions non-discrimination explicitly in some of its 
provisions.47 Article E has been based on Article 14 ECHR and is also dependent on the 
                                                          
42 Council of Europe (2016) supra note 37, p.14. 
43 Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter Providing for a System of Collective 
Complaints supra note 29, Articles 8, 9; Benelhocine, C. (2012) supra note 29, pp.50ff. 
44 See eg: Resolution CM/ResChS(2017)9: Collective Complaint No. 111/2014: Greek General 
Confederation of Labour (GSEE) v Greece (5 July 2017); Benelhocine, C. (2012) supra note 29, 
p.51. 
45 Besson, S. (2012). Evolutions in Non-Discrimination Law within the ECHR and the ESC 
Systems: “It Takes Two to Tango in the Council of Europe”, American Journal of Comparative 
Law, 60 (1), pp.147-180, p.155. 
46 European Social Charter (revised) supra note 31, Part V Article E. 
47 European Social Charter (revised) supra note 31, Appendix Article E. 
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violation of a substantive right of the Charter.48 Besson has written on the relationship 
between the ECSR and the ECtHR regarding the discrimination of Roma. She holds that 
‘[t]o a large extent, these developments have been mutually responsive and convergent. 
This has been the case, for instance, with regard to the emerging notions of collective 
indirect discrimination and remedial positive duties’.49 
As already mentioned in the chapter on the regulation or rather non-regulation of 
collective punishment under human rights law, rules on non-discrimination do not entail 
the specific wrong done by collective punishment. Discrimination targets a single person 
because that person belongs to a specific group. Collective punishment however, targets 
a whole group because of alleged acts of a member of that group. Even though both 
situations involve specified groups, in one instance the individual member is targeted 
and in the other the group as such. For this reason, the analysis of non-discrimination 
cases of the ECSR seems particularly promising for the present thesis – the Revised ESC 
allowing for collective complaints brought by organisations which represent groups 
such as the Roma. This is different to the non-discrimination cases brought before the 
ECtHR and therefore it merits closer attention. However, even a group right to non-
discrimination does not cover all elements of collective punishment as it lacks the 
punishment for an act allegedly committed by one or some of the group’s members 
preceding the imposition of collective punishment. Although a group right to non-
discrimination offers support to a prohibition of collective punishment on a general level, 
it cannot replace such a prohibition. 
A search on Article E Revised ESC on the ECSR database reveals that it was invoked in 
around a third of its cases so far. This stands in stark contrast to the reluctant use the 
ECtHR has been making of its non-discrimination provisions laid out in Article 14 ECHR 
and Article 1 Protocol 12 to the ECHR.50 In the following, some ECSR cases addressing 
Article E Revised ESC are examined. This case review stands in dialogue with the review 
of discrimination cases of the ECtHR in the ensuing section. 
Several collective complaints with regard to housing, health care and social and workers 
rights’ protection of Roma in conjunction with Article E Revised ESC were brought 
                                                          
48 CETS 163 Explanatory Report to the European Social Charter (Revised) (3 May 1996) 
para.135ff, see eg: Autism-Europe v France (Merits) no.13/2002 (4 November 2003). 
49 Besson, S. (2012) supra note 45, p.149. 
50 Besson, S. (2012) supra note 45, pp.158f. 
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against France, Bulgaria, Italy and Portugal.51 In these as well as other cases concerning 
Roma, the ECSR has confirmed that the concept of racial discrimination is to be 
interpreted in the light of ECtHR case law, mentioning leading ECtHR cases such as 
Timishev v Russia outlined below.52 This interpretational reference as well as the context 
of the ECSR cases show that both, the ECSR and the ECtHR are dealing with similar 
situations affecting similar groups. However, in contrast to the ECtHR, the ECSR has 
proven that it is possible to address discrimination based on group characteristics not 
only in the individual, but the collective context. 
The ECSR has highlighted discrimination against Roma by referring to the concept of 
vulnerability which is also making headway in the ECtHR’s non-discrimination case 
law.53 In the 2012 case Médecins du Monde - International v France the Committee stated: 
‘It recalls that it recognised that special consideration should be given to the needs and 
different lifestyle of the Roma, which are a specific type of disadvantaged group and a 
vulnerable minority’.54  In the same case, the Committee held that ‘[i]t considers the 
alleged discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under the Charter as 
inseparable from the other violations alleged, given the claim that the alleged 
discrimination specifically concerned persons because of their ethnic origin.’55 This is a 
welcome approach standing in contrast to ECtHR cases where the Court found it ‘not 
necessary’ to address the discriminatory implications of cases.56 
In the 2011 case Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v France the ECSR found 
an ‘aggravated violation’ because of the ‘the active role of the public authorities in 
framing and implementing this discriminatory approach to security’ targeting 
                                                          
51 See eg: European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v France (Merits) no.51/2008 (19 October 
2009); Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v France (Merits) no.63/2010 (28 June 
2011); European Roma and Travellers Forum (ERTF) v France (Merits) no.64/2011 (24 January 
2012); European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v Bulgaria (Merits) no.31/2005 (18 October 2006); 
European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v Bulgaria (Merits) no.46/2007 (3 December 2008); 
European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v Portugal (Merits) no.61/2010 (30 June 2011). 
52 See eg: Médecins du Monde - International v France (Merits) no.67/2011 (11 September 2012) 
para.39; Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v Italy, no.58/2009 supra note 27, 
para.37f; Timishev v Russia (Merits and Just Satisfaction) nos.55762/00, 55974/00, Court 
(Second Section) (13 December 2005) para.56ff. 
53 Peroni, L. & Timmer, A. (2013). Vulnerable groups: The promise of an emerging concept in the 
European Human Rights Convention law, International Journal of Constitutional Law, 11 (4), 
pp.1056-1085. 
54 Médecins du Monde - International v France, no.67/2011 supra note 52, para.40; see also: 
European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v Portugal, no.61/2010 supra note 51, para.20; 
International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH) v Belgium (Merits) no.62/2010 (21 March 
2010) para.165, 204. 
55 Médecins du Monde - International v France, no.67/2011 supra note 52, para.41. 
56 See ECtHR case review below. 
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vulnerable groups. 57  Referring to ECtHR case law, the Committee held that ‘[t]he 
European Court of Human Rights considered inacceptable any waiver of the right not to 
be subjected to racial discrimination as such a waiver “would be counter to an important 
public interest"’.58 This straightforward integration of ECtHR interpretations into ECSR 
decisions indicates the viability of cross-referencing, which could offer a perspective on 
how the ECtHR could take the broader collective aspect of cases into account.  
In European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v Italy in 2005, the ECSR has confirmed the 
positive obligations arising from the Charter as ‘equal treatment implies that Italy should 
take measures appropriate to Roma's particular circumstances to safeguard their right 
to housing and prevent them, as a vulnerable group, from becoming homeless.’59 In the 
same case, the Committee took a strong stance regarding state responses to 
discrimination of vulnerable groups: ‘Finally, the Committee notes that when credible 
evidence is adduced alleging discrimination it becomes incumbent on the State party 
concerned to answer to the allegations by pointing to, for example, legislative or other 
measures introduced, statistics and examples of relevant case-law. More precise 
allegations call for more detailed response.’60 
In the 2012 case European Roma and Travellers Forum (ERTF) v France the Committee 
reaffirmed its practice-oriented understanding, as it ‘must also be ensured that 
discrimination is eliminated not only in law but also in fact.’61 Talking about the contents 
of Article E, the ECSR noted that the ‘function of Article E is to help secure the equal 
effective enjoyment of all the rights enshrined in the Charter regardless of any particular 
characteristic of an individual or group of persons.’ 62  This in turn highlights the 
collective character of ESC rights and, looking at the ECSR’s practice, the viability of 
adjudicating such group rights and ensuring their effective protection. 
                                                          
57 Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v France, no.63/2010 supra note 51, para.53. 
58 Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v France, no.63/2010 supra note 51, para.77 
(quote citing D.H. and Others v the Czech Republic (Grand Chamber) supra note 26, para. 204, as 
well as Oršuš and Others v Croatia supra note 25, para. 178). 
59 European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v Italy (Merits) no.27/2004 (7 December 2005) para.21. 
60 European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v Italy, no.27/2004 supra note 59, para.24 (in-text 
references omitted); see also: European Roma Rights Centre v Greece (Merits) no.15/2003 (8 
December 2004) para.50. 
61 European Roma and Travellers Forum (ERTF) v France, no.64/2011 supra note 51, para.42; 
see also: European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC) v Italy, no.27/2004 supra note 59, para.46; 
International Commission of Jurists v Portugal (Merits) no.1/1998 (9 September 1999) para.32. 
62 European Roma and Travellers Forum (ERTF) v France, no.64/2011 supra note 51, para.41, see 
also eg: International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH) v Belgium, no.62/2010 supra note 54, 
para.48. 
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In Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v Italy, a case on the segregation of 
Roma families and their right to housing decided in 2010, the Committee held that the 
housing policies targeting Roma and Sinti constituted an aggravated violation of ESC 
rights. Such violations are defined as ‘measures violating human rights specifically 
targeting and affecting vulnerable groups’ where ‘public authorities not only are passive 
and do not take appropriate action against the perpetrators of these violations, but they 
also contribute to such violence.’63  
The effects of aggravated violations are described as follows: ‘[They] do not only affect 
individuals as victims or the relationship between these individuals and the respondent 
state: they challenge the community interest and the fundamental common standards 
shared by Council of Europe Member States (human rights, democracy and the rule of 
law). Consequently, the situation requires urgent attention from all Council of Europe 
Member States.’64 This emphasis on the collective aspect of ESC rights as well as on 
collective responsibility highlights the strong stance the ECSR is taking on the protection 
of those rights. At the same time, it shifts the focus from a liberal individualist approach 
to a collective approach. This in turn is supported by the argument made in the preceding 
chapter on group rights as human rights, that the ’individual human being and his group 
or community are ontologically interdependent.’65  
The ECSR’s statement that aggravated violations ‘specifically targeting and affecting 
vulnerable groups’ ‘challenge the community interest and the fundamental common 
standards shared by Council of Europe Member States’ and that such violations require 
‘urgent attention from all Council of Europe Member States’ indicates a strong belief of 
the ECSR in the consent around ESC rights. Being a CoE instrument just as the ECHR, this 
common stance on the collective responsibility to ensure the protection of groups from 
particularly serious violations should not be seen in isolation and only relating to the 
ESC. In order to give meaning and gravity to this pledge, this consent could be 
interpreted in the broader context of the obligations of CoE member states including the 
ECHR. 
Regarding the relationship between the ECHR and the ESC, the ECtHR has referred to 
case law of the ECSR in several instances. In Sanchez Navajas v Spain the Court held that 
                                                          
63 Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v Italy, no.58/2009 supra note 27, para.76f. 
64 Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) v Italy, no.58/2009 supra note 27, para.78. 
65 Segesvary, V. (1995). Group rights: The definition of group rights in the contemporary legal 
debate based on socio-cultural analysis, International Journal on Group Rights, 3, pp.89-107, 
p.93. 
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‘it may infer from Article 11 of the Convention, read in the light of Article 28 of the 
European Social Charter (Revised), that workers’ representatives should as a rule, and 
within certain limits, enjoy appropriate facilities to enable them to perform their trade-
union functions rapidly and effectively’, taking on board an ESC provision and its 
interpretation by the ECSR.66  
Furthermore, the Court has referred extensively to ECSR case law on the right to bargain 
collectively and applied the ECSR’s interpretation of ESC provisions in the 2008 case 
Demir and Baykara v Turkey. After talking about the ‘common values’ of the ESC and the 
ECHR, the Court acknowledged that the right to bargain collectively was now part of 
Article 11 ECHR (freedom of assembly and association), even though that contradicted 
its own preceding case law.67 As a result, the Court held that Turkey was bound by ESC 
provisions via its interpretation of the ECHR even though it had not signed up to the 
relevant ESC provisions.68 Acknowledging that, the Court made a remark of significant 
value in the present context:  
‘In this context, it is not necessary for the respondent State to have ratified the 
entire collection of instruments that are applicable in respect of the precise 
subject matter of the case concerned. It will be sufficient for the Court that the 
relevant international instruments denote a continuous evolution in the norms 
and principles applied in international law or in the domestic law of the majority 
of member States of the Council of Europe and show, in a precise area, that there 
is common ground in modern societies.’69  
This ‘continuous evolution’ and the interpretation of the ECHR as a ‘living instrument’ 
will be addressed below in the section on interpreting the ECHR. 
Concluding his assessment of the relationship between the ECSR and the ECtHR, Akandji-
Kombé located its most important aspects ‘in the dynamic intersection between the 
bodies charged with the protection of human rights, particularly in Europe, that hold 
that social rights, on the one hand, and civil and political rights on the other are 
                                                          
66 Sanchez Navajas v Spain (Decision) no.57442/00, Court (Fourth Section) (21 June 2001) para. 
2. 
67 Demir and Baykara v Turkey (Merits and Just Satisfaction) no.34503/97, Court (Grand 
Chamber) (12 November 2008) para.85. 
68 De Schutter, O. & Sant’Ana, M. (2012) supra note 30, p.95. 
69 Demir and Baykara v Turkey supra note 67, para.86 (in-text references omitted); see also: 
Marckx v Belgium (Merits and Just Satisfaction) no.6833/74, Court (Plenary) (13 June 1979) 
para.41; Airey v Ireland (Merits) no.6289/73, Court (Chamber) (9 October 1979) para.26. 
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interdependent, and working towards the same goal: the protection of each human 
being.’70 This section has underscored the potential of ESC principles and ECSR case law 
for a prohibition of collective punishment under the ECHR and will be supported by a 
look at the ECHR’s own already existing principles and cases preparing the ground for 
such a prohibition in the following section. 
5.2.4 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
After examining the FCNM and the ESC, the ECHR itself will be analysed for potential 
support for a prohibition of collective punishment. The possibility of applications 
brought by non-governmental organisations offers such support on the procedural level 
while the ECtHR’s case law on non-discrimination provides insights into the present 
substantive framework strengthening the call for a prohibition of collective punishment. 
The case review will focus on minority related cases which address situations similar to 
the ECSR cases reviewed above and on cases highlighting the Chechen context. 
5.2.4.1  Group applications 
Article 34 ECHR regulates individual applications. It states that ‘[t]he Court may receive 
applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals 
claiming to be the victim of a violation …’. 71  The ability of non-governmental 
organisations and groups of individuals to file applications is of particular interest. As 
examined above, the ESC only accepts collective complaints brought by non-
governmental organisations or trade unions. This procedure and the ECSR case law 
might be used for guidance when approaching the rather scarce case law of the ECtHR 
on applications by applicants other than individuals. 
According to Schabas, the term ‘non-governmental organisation’ has to be interpreted in 
a ‘broad and flexible’ way and ‘is not subject to any formalities of registration’, 
encompassing corporate bodies as well.72 Furthermore, the question of representation 
is not dependent on rigorous formalities as ‘some form of authorization’ suffices for an 
individual to speak on behalf of a corporate body.73 
                                                          
70 Akandji-Kombé, J.F. (2005). The Material Impact of the Jurisprudence of the European 
Committee of Social Rights, in De Búrca, G., De Witte, B. & Ogertschnig, L. (eds.). Social Rights in 
Europe. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp.89-108, p.108. 
71 Article 34 ECHR. 
72 Schabas, W.A. (2015). The European Convention on Human Rights: A Commentary. Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, p.736; Hyde Park and Others v Moldova (No. 4) (Merits and Just 
Satisfaction) no. 18491/07, Court (Fourth Section) (7 April 2009) para.33; Agrotexim and Others 
v Greece (Merits) no. 14807/89, Court (Chamber) (24 October 1995) para.66ff. 
73 Schabas, W.A. (2015) supra note 72, p.736; see also Nosov v Russia (Decision) no. 30877/02, 
Court (First Section) (20 October 2005). 
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However, in order to be eligible to submit an application, the group of individuals or non-
governmental organisation has to be a victim of a violation of ECHR rights. According to 
the ECtHR in 2013, ‘Article 34 concerns not just the direct victim or victims of the alleged 
violation, but also any indirect victims to whom the violation would cause harm or who 
would have a valid and personal interest in seeing it brought to an end.’74 Although the 
victim criterion is not to be interpreted in a narrow sense, certain rights under the ECHR 
cannot be claimed by non-governmental organisations as victims.75 The example of the 
right to marry is illustrative of rights which are by their nature limited to individual 
applicants. Apart from that, the Court has found that corporations as subsumed under 
the term non-governmental organisation by Article 34 ECHR can be victims of violations 
of their right to property or freedom of expression or association.76 However, in two 
cases decided in 2001, advocacy groups were denied victim status in the case where the 
persons they represented had individual victim status and no separate issues affecting 
solely the organisation itself arose.77 
Furthermore, cases brought by minority groups themselves are rare. 78  The case 48 
Kalderas Gypsies v Germany and the Netherlands was brought by three Roma families 
regarding the authorities’ refusal to provide them with identity documents and the 
arising consequences for their living conditions. However, the case was dismissed on the 
grounds of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies as well as insufficient evidence 
provided to the Commission. 79  Another case, Rassemblement Jurassien and Unite 
Jurassienne v Switzerland, dealt with a French-speaking minority’s freedom of assembly 
in a newly created predominantly German-speaking Swiss Canton. The application was 
held inadmissible and the Commission emphasised that it did not see any discriminatory 
treatment in the case.80 
                                                          
74 Vallianatos and Others v Greece (Merits and Just Satisfaction) nos. 29381/09, 32684/09, Court 
(Grand Chamber) (7 November 2013) para.47 (in-text references omitted). 
75 Schabas, W.A. (2015) supra note 72, p.741; Article 12 ECHR. 
76 See eg: Hyde Park and Others v Moldova (Nos. 5 and 6) (Merits and Just Satisfaction) nos. 
6991/08, 15084/08, Court (Fourth Section) (14 September 2010) para.32; Schabas, W.A. 
(2015) supra note 72, p.741. 
77 Čonka et Ligue des Droits de L'homme c Belgique (Decision) no. 51564/99, Court (Third 
Section) (13 March 2001); Grande Oriente d'Italia di Palazzo Giustiniani v Italy (Merits and Just 
Satisfaction) no. 35972/97, Court (Fourth Section) (2 August 2001) para.15, 24ff. 
78 Bowring, B. (2013). Protecting Minority Rights through an Individual Rights Mechanism: The 
Strasbourg Court and some Significant Developments to June 2012, European Yearbook of 
Minority Issues, 10, pp.437-460, pp.441f. 
79 48 Kalderas Gipsies v Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands (Decision) nos. 
7823/77, 7824/77, Commission (Plenary) (6 July 1977). 
80 Rassemblement Jurassien and Unite Jurassienne v Switzerland (Decision) no. 8191/78, 
Commission (Plenary) (10 October 1979) para.13. 
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A more recent case, decided in 2012, is Aksu v Turkey relating to publications which 
exhibited bias against Roma. The applicant, although not directly affected, was found 
eligible to submit an application due to his affiliation with the Roma community. The 
Court held that ‘in the present case the applicant, who is of Roma origin, complained 
about remarks and expressions which allegedly debased the Roma community. It is true 
that the applicant was not personally targeted; he could, however, have felt offended by 
the remarks concerning the ethnic group to which he belonged.’81 
In the 2013 judgment Vallianatos and Others v Greece, Judge Pinto de Albuquerque 
elaborated on these remarks in his partly concurring, partly dissenting opinion. He held 
that ‘when a law or regulation confers a Convention right solely on one group of people 
based on an identifiable characteristic of that group, by implication depriving another 
group of people in the same or similar situation of the enjoyment of the said right 
without any objective justification, the Convention compliance of that law or regulation 
may be reviewed in abstracto by the Court on the basis of a complaint lodged by any 
member of the deprived group of people.’82  
Such statements are nothing new in the Court’s case law. For instance in the 2006 case 
Arvanitaki-Roboti and Others v Greece dealing with 91 applicants of the same profession 
(doctors), Judges Tulkens and Spielmann discussed the collective aspects of applications 
in their joint concurring opinion.83 They held that ‘it is each applicant, taken individually, 
who has sustained the non-pecuniary damage, irrespective of whether his or her 
application was lodged with the Court singly or jointly with others’ and that collective 
complaints intended to encompass ‘class action’ are ‘not (yet) the case’.84 Indicating 
support for group rights, they noted that ‘we believe that it would certainly be desirable 
in future for the Court to be able to recognise, in certain cases, a right to take action as a 
group …’.85 This remark shows that there is a need for a broader reading of Article 34 
                                                          
81 Aksu v Turkey (Merits and Just Satisfaction) nos. 4149/04, 41029/04, Court (Grand Chamber) 
(15 March 2012) para.53. 
82 Vallianatos and Others v Greece supra note 74, partly concurring, partly dissenting opinion of 
Judge Pinto de Albuquerque; see also: Marckx v Belgium supra note 69, para.27; Sejdić and Finci 
v Bosnia and Herzegovina (Merits and Just Satisfaction) nos. 27996/06, 34836/06, Court (Grand 
Chamber) (22 December 2009) para.28f. 
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ECHR regarding the admissibility of applications which could be attained by reference 
to the ESC as laid out above. 
5.2.4.2 Non-discrimination in the minority rights context 
The general tenets of Article 14 ECHR have already been discussed in the chapter 
relating to collective punishment and human rights law. Therefore, the following section 
focuses on the review of several cases relating to minorities and how the Court has dealt 
with the broader collective implications in contrast to the ECSR. At the same time, the 
Chechen cases in this review highlight the overlap between the groups affected by 
collective punishment directly (Chechen families of alleged insurgents) and the general 
discriminatory treatment of the broader group they belong to (the Chechens). 
Article 14 ECHR had a slow start to say the least.86 Formulations such as that ‘no separate 
issue arises under Article 14 of the Convention’ or that the ‘Court considers that these 
complaints arise out of the same facts as those considered under Articles … and does not 
find it necessary to examine them separately’ might sound all too familiar to people 
studying the Court’s case law on non-discrimination.87 
Recently however, the Court has become more active regarding Article 14 ECHR. This 
development started with the 2005 judgment in Timishev v Russia. The applicant of 
Chechen ethnicity was refused entry into Kabardino-Balkaria where he lived with his 
family due to the border officials’ order not to let any Chechens pass. In addition, his 
children were refused access to school because he could not provide the school with any 
identity documents. To receive compensation for the property the applicant lost in 
Chechnya, he had to surrender his migrant card which confirmed his status as resident 
in Kabardino-Balkaria and as forced migrant from Chechnya.88  
The Court found a violation of the applicant’s right to liberty of movement (Article 2 
Protocol 4 to the ECHR) in conjunction with Article 14 ECHR. It elaborated on the 
circumstances of the order given to border officials not to admit any Chechens: ‘[A] 
person's ethnic origin is not listed anywhere in Russian identity documents, the order 
barred the passage not only of any person who actually was of Chechen ethnicity, but 
                                                          
86 Bowring, B. (2013) supra note 78, pp.442ff. 
87 See eg: Hirst v the United Kingdom (No. 2) (Merits and Just Satisfaction) no.74025/01, Court 
(Grand Chamber) (6 October 2005) para.87; Kiliç v Turkey (Merits and Just Satisfaction) 
no.22492/93, Court (First Section) (28 March 2000) para.98; Bowring, B. (2013) supra note 78, 
pp.454f. 
88 Timishev v Russia supra note 52. 
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also of those who were merely perceived as belonging to that ethnic group.’ 89 
Discrimination based on ethnicity and racial discrimination overlap: ‘Whereas the 
notion of race is rooted in the idea of biological classification of human beings into 
subspecies according to morphological features such as skin colour or facial 
characteristics, ethnicity has its origin in the idea of societal groups marked by common 
nationality, tribal affiliation, religious faith, shared language, or cultural and traditional 
origins and backgrounds.’90 The act in question was identified as racial discrimination 
and therefore a ‘particularly invidious kind of discrimination’.91 A violation of the right 
to education (Article 2 Protocol 1 to the ECHR) of the applicant’s children was found as 
well.92 
The 2007 case of D.H. and Others v the Czech Republic concerned the segregation of Roma 
pupils by placing them in special schools. 93  The Chamber dismissed the claim of 
discrimination in conjunction with the right to education. 94  The Grand Chamber 
however, overturned this decision. On indirect discrimination, it held that ‘[d]espite 
being couched in neutral terms, the relevant statutory provisions therefore had 
considerably more impact in practice on Roma children than on non-Roma children and 
resulted in statistically disproportionate numbers of placements of the former in special 
schools.’95 Consequently, the applicants did not have to prove discriminatory intent on 
behalf of the authorities.96 The Court found a violation of Article 2 Protocol 1 to the ECHR 
in conjunction with Article 14 ECHR.  
The Court added, significantly, towards the end of the judgment: ‘Lastly, since it has been 
established that the relevant legislation as applied in practice at the material time had a 
disproportionately prejudicial effect on the Roma community, the Court considers that 
the applicants as members of that community necessarily suffered the same 
discriminatory treatment. Accordingly, it does not need to examine their individual 
cases.’ 97  All eighteen applicants were awarded the same amount of non-pecuniary 
damage without considering their individual case any further.98 The Court’s emphasis 
                                                          
89 Timishev v Russia supra note 52, para.54. 
90 Timishev v Russia supra note 52, para.55. 
91 Timishev v Russia supra note 52, para.56. 
92 Timishev v Russia supra note 52, para.63ff. 
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94 D.H. and Others v the Czech Republic (Merits) no.57325/00, Court (Second Section) (7 
February 2006). 
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on the affiliation with a specific community and the consequences arising therefrom 
represent a significant development. In effect, the Court acknowledged the collective 
aspect of the case and treated the applicants as a group, discussing the situation of the 
Roma community in the Czech Republic and not so much the individual circumstances. 
With regards to a prohibition of collective punishment under the ECHR, this assessment 
of the underlying collective aspects of a case shows the Court’s general ability to address 
group rights and perhaps an increasing willingness to do so. 
In the 2010 case Oršuš and Others v Croatia, Roma pupils were placed in Roma-only 
classes not on the ground of any actual or presumed disability as in D.H. and Others v the 
Czech Republic, but because of the absence of command of the Croatian language.99 The 
Chamber found no violation, stating that the measure was justified. By a narrow margin 
of nine votes to eight, the Grand Chamber overturned that judgment and held that there 
were ‘no adequate safeguards in place capable of ensuring … a reasonable relationship 
of proportionality between the means used and the legitimate aim’.100 Therefore the 
measure was disproportionate and constituted a violation of the right to education in 
conjunction with the prohibition of discrimination.101 
In the case Sejdić and Finci v Bosnia and Herzegovina decided in 2009, the Court held that 
the eligibility criteria to stand for presidential elections enshrined in the Constitution of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina discriminated against persons not declaring their affiliation 
with a ‘constituent people’. This judgment is one of the rare instances where the Court 
has found a violation of Article 1 Protocol 12 to the ECHR, which features the same 
understanding of discrimination as Article 14 ECHR, but enlarges its scope to ‘any right 
set forth by law’.102 
                                                          
99 Oršuš and Others v Croatia supra note 25; Bowring, B. (2013) supra note 78, pp.450ff. 
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Bearing in mind the focus on collective punishment, cases on forced evictions and the 
destruction of settlements of Roma are of particular interest. As shown in the two case 
studies, the destruction of homes represents a commonly used form of collective 
punishment. 
The 2012 case Yordanova and Others v Bulgaria concerned a group of Roma who were 
facing eviction from the land where some of them lived for over forty years. Although 
they did not deny that the buildings erected in a neighbourhood of the Bulgarian capital 
Sofia were built without permit, the local authorities had tolerated them for decades. 
However, in 2000, non-Roma neighbours started voicing complaints about the 
settlements to which they referred as ‘ghettos’ and the authorities issued eviction orders 
which, at the time of the judgment, were not yet enforced. The Court found that enforcing 
the eviction order would amount to a violation of Article 8 ECHR, the right to private and 
family life. However, it did not consider Article 8 in conjunction with Article 14 ECHR 
and dismissed any other discrimination implications by reference to a domestic claims 
mechanism on the protection against discrimination which ‘apparently functions in 
practice’ and to which the applicants did not resort.103 
Another case in point is Winterstein and Others v France, decided in 2013. 104  The 
applicants, 25 Roma and the non-governmental organisation ATD Fourth World argued 
that the forced eviction from the land where they lived for many years and the 
demolition of caravans and sheds violated Articles 3, 8 and 14 ECHR. Again, while 
confirming a violation of Article 8 ECHR, the Court did not consider it necessary to 
elaborate on the implications regarding Article 14 ECHR and discrimination. In a partly 
dissenting opinion Judge Power-Forde criticised the lack of an investigation into Article 
14 ECHR and called for ‘heightened vigilance’ of authorities regarding any ‘unacceptable 
treatment of a vulnerable minority’.105 Furthermore, she held that ‘a greater readiness 
on the part of the Court to scrutinise, thoroughly, complaints of discrimination in such 
circumstances would encourage national authorities to pay greater attention to the 
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procedural aspects of Article 14. Such procedural obligations are of critical importance 
in the challenge to eliminate discrimination.’106 
In Fedorchenko and Lozenko v Ukraine in 2012, the Court ruled on the destruction of 
three houses belonging to persons of Roma origin.107 The arson attack killing several 
people apparently targeted drug dealers selling drugs in one of these houses. Looking 
behind that pretext, the Court pointed to the widespread discrimination of Roma in 
Ukraine and found a violation of Article 2 ECHR, the right to life in conjunction with 
Article 14 ECHR since ‘it cannot be excluded that the decision to burn the houses of the 
alleged drug traffickers had been additionally nourished by ethnic hatred’.108 
Looking at these three cases together, it is difficult to form a conclusion on the Court’s 
general direction of travel. Although the Court has cited ECSR cases, it did not take note 
of the ECSR’s stance on discrimination as ‘inseparable from the other violations alleged’ 
in two of the three cases and was criticised for this omission in a powerful dissenting 
opinion.109 As Judge Power-Forde rightly asked about the treatment of minorities, it is 
difficult to understand why the Court has shied away from addressing Article 14 ECHR. 
Finding a violation of Article 8 ECHR in those two cases, it confirmed that harm was done 
to the applicants, but did not address the underlying discrimination. In the third case 
however, the Court found a violation of Article 14 ECHR. Apart from being a good 
addition to the Court’s still modest body of case law on non-discrimination, this case 
would, in my view, fit the remit of a prohibition of collective punishment as well. The 
homes of members of the Roma community were burnt down due to the allegation that 
one member of this group was involved in drug trafficking. However, as the Court found, 
rightly, the arson attack was not directed against ‘drug dealers’ but targeted the Roma 
community collectively. This case represents another example of the difficult delineation 
of acts of collective punishment from acts of, as the Court has put it, ‘ethnic hatred’ in 
practice. However, the case also shows the viability of addressing group related 
situations in practice. 
                                                          
106 Winterstein and Others v France supra note 104, partly dissenting opinion Judge Power-
Forde; Bowring, B. (2015) supra note 102, pp.209ff. 
107 Fedorchenko and Lozenko v Ukraine (Merits and Just Satisfaction) no.387/03, Court (Fifth 
Section) (20 September 2012). 
108 Fedorchenko and Lozenko v Ukraine supra note 107, para.68; Bowring, B. (2015) supra note 
102, p.219. 
109 Médecins du Monde - International v France, no.67/2011 supra note 52, para.41. 
 
 
  218 
 
Further discrimination cases regarding Chechens include Makhashevy v Russia (2012)110 
and Antayev and Others v Russia (2014).111 The first case concerned brothers of Chechen 
origin living in Kabardino-Balkaria who were beaten and verbally abused by security 
forces after being arrested for allegedly hurting a Karbardinian security guard in a night 
club. The racist verbal insults were based on their Chechen ethnicity and included terms 
such as ‘faggots’ and ‘animals’.112 The Court found a violation of the procedural and 
substantive limb of Article 3 ECHR, the prohibition of torture, in conjunction with Article 
14 ECHR as the authorities had ‘failed to do what was in their power to investigate the 
possible racist motives behind the events’ and had failed ‘to put forward any arguments 
showing that the incident was ethnically neutral’.113 
The case Antayev and Others v Russia concerned two families of Chechen origin who were 
physically and verbally abused during a search of their homes by security forces. The 
racist insults based on their ethnicity by the security forces led the Court to find a 
violation of Article 3 ECHR in conjunction with Article 14 ECHR on similar grounds as in 
Makhashevy v Russia. In particular, the Court pointed to the ‘recurrent reference to 
internal police instructions to treat suspects of Chechen ethnic origin in a particular 
manner’.114 Those two cases again indicate that the Court is aware of the discrimination 
Chechens face in Russia. 
In 2014, the Court ruled on three cases concerning the families of alleged terrorists who 
were killed during the second non-international armed conflict in Chechnya, some in the 
course of sweeping operations. The families complained that the bodies of their relatives 
had not been returned by the authorities so that they might bury them according to their 
traditions and customs, violating Article 8 ECHR in conjunction with Article 14 ECHR. 
Even though the Court found a violation of Article 8 ECHR, it dismissed the 
discrimination claim stating that it could not prove any direct discrimination and did not 
examine whether there was evidence of indirect discrimination.115 Commenting on the 
                                                          
110 Makhashevy v Russia (Merits and Just Satisfaction) no.20546/07, Court (First Section) (31 
July 2012). 
111 Antayev and Others v Russia supra note 26. 
112 Makhashevy v Russia supra note 110, para.9,24,26. 
113 Makhashevy v Russia supra note 110, para.145, 179; Bowring, B. (2015) supra note 102, 
pp.217f. 
114 Antayev and Others v Russia supra note 26, para.127; Bowring, B. (2015) supra note 102, 
p.218. 
115 Abdulayeva v Russia (Merits and Just Satisfaction) no.38552/05, Court (First Section) (16 
January 2014); Kushtova and Others v Russia (Merits and Just Satisfaction) no. 21885/07, Court 
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case, Henrard criticised the fact that the Court’s ‘‘avoidance’ of indirect discrimination is 
a steady feature in cases on religious themes’.116  
Recent cases regarding discrimination based on ethnicity by and large follow the 
established case law of the Court.117 In addition, the Court has found violations of Article 
14 ECHR in relation to the freedom of expression and assembly of the LGBT community 
in several cases.118 For instance in 2017, in Bayev and Others v Russia the Court found 
that legislation favouring opposite-sex relationships discriminated against the 
homosexual minority in Russia.119 
Having reviewed several specific cases, a look at some broader developments in the 
discrimination and minority case law of the Court might be useful. According to Peroni 
and Timmer, a new concept is emerging in the Court’s jurisprudence which they identify 
as ‘vulnerable groups’.120  The Court employed this concept first in cases concerning 
Roma such as in D.H. and Others v the Czech Republic where it referred to the ‘vulnerable 
position of Roma/Gypsies’ and found that ‘as a result of their turbulent history and 
constant uprooting the Roma have become a specific type of disadvantaged and 
vulnerable minority’. 121  Other groups the Court has described as vulnerable include 
asylum seekers, people living with HIV or people with mental disabilities.122 
Although the Court itself has not so far provided any definitions of ‘vulnerable groups’, 
Peroni and Timmer define the characteristics of the concept as relational, particular and 
                                                          
116 Henrard, K. (2016) supra note 102, p.279. 
117 See eg: M.F. v Hungary (Merits and Just Satisfaction) no.45855/12, Court (Fourth Section) 
(31 October 2017); Grigoryan and Sergeyeva v Ukraine (Merits and Just Satisfaction) 
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122 Peroni, L. & Timmer, A. (2013) supra note 53, p.1057; M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece (Merits and 
Just Satisfaction) no.30696/09, Court (Grand Chamber) (21 January 2011); Kiyutin v Russia 
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harm-based.123 As seen in the Court’s understanding of Roma as vulnerable group due to 
their ‘turbulent history’, the concept of group vulnerability is relational in the sense that 
it addresses the broader social circumstances and context. This means that individual 
vulnerability is linked to the ‘social or institutional environment, which originates or 
sustains the vulnerability of the group she is (made) part of.’124 The concept is particular 
as its subjects are members of ‘particularly vulnerable groups’. 125 Finally, the harm-
based characteristic originates from ‘(historical) prejudice and stigmatization’.126 
Although the relational character of the concept of vulnerable groups sounds appealing 
and transferrable to the understanding of human rights and the interdependence of 
individuals as social beings, the general concept has its risks too.127 Peroni and Timmer 
do not shy away from addressing them and point to essentialism, stigmatisation and 
paternalism as main factors.128 In order to minimise those risks, they suggest the Court 
should assess group vulnerability first on the collective and then on the individual level: 
‘Otherwise, the Court may end up essentializing vulnerable groups and stereotyping the 
individuals from these groups, thereby reinforcing their vulnerability rather than 
lessening it.’129 
However, despite their efforts to limit the potential negative effects of the group 
vulnerability concept, it is still at odds with the notion of group empowerment 
emphasised throughout this thesis. The present focus is on groups as subjects who 
actively engage in changing their living conditions and pursue their struggle for justice. 
Defining a group as vulnerable places it in an inferior position in need of protection. On 
the other hand, the broader notion of group rights places these groups in an active 
position asserting rights. An aspect of group vulnerability that might be beneficial to the 
present thesis’ approach is the collective element that was discussed by Peroni and 
Timmer. The willingness of the Court to take the broader social context into account 
might indicate a certain acceptance of the widening scope of human rights beyond the 
individual. Furthermore, the fluctuating case law of the ECtHR on cases with a collective 
                                                          
123 Peroni, L. & Timmer, A. (2013) supra note 53, pp.1063ff. 
124 Peroni, L. & Timmer, A. (2013) supra note 53, p.1064; Fineman, M. (2008). The Vulnerable 
Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, Yale Journal of Law & Feminism, 20 (1), 
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context as seen in the house destruction cases shows that the law in this area is not yet 
settled and that non-discrimination cannot encompass all of the arising aspects of such 
group related cases. 
5.2.5 The ECHR in context 
This last section tries to gather together the findings on the FCNM, ESC and ECHR in 
order to support a prohibition of collective punishment under the ECHR. Further 
assistance is coming from the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights where non-
governmental organisations can file applications on behalf of groups whose collective 
rights have been violated. As will be shown, although interpretation of the ECHR in a 
broader social context can be a powerful tool, the current ECHR framework is not 
capable of addressing collective punishment. However, with the contextual support of 
this broader interpretation and state consent on the prohibition of collective 
punishment in the area of armed conflict, a new rule on such a prohibition under the 
ECHR might be feasible. 
5.2.5.1 Interpretation of the ECHR in the light of other human rights 
instruments 
Emphasising the references the ECtHR has made so far to other human rights 
instruments, in particular the FCNM, Pentassuglia has seen an emerging ‘integrated 
mode of interpretation’ of the Court with regards to minority rights.130 He based his 
remarks on the ECHR being a ‘living instrument’ and cited cases such as Muñoz Díaz v 
Spain, where the Court held that ‘the force of the collective beliefs of a community that 
is well-defined culturally cannot be ignored’. 131  The concept of ‘living instrument’ 
developed by the Court demands that the Convention ‘must be interpreted in the light of 
present-day conditions.’132  
On this broader interpretation of Convention rights, Pentassuglia commented:  
‘While there is evidence to suggest that progressive interpretations of human 
rights treaties informed by external instruments may be based on minimum 
standards clauses linked to state consent (one of which can be found in Article 
                                                          
130 Pentassuglia, G. (2012). The Strasbourg Court and Minority Groups: Shooting in the Dark or a 
New Interpretive Ethos?, International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 19, pp.1-23, 
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131 Pentassuglia, G. (2012) supra note 130, pp.13f; Muñoz Díaz v Spain (Merits and Just 
Satisfaction) no.49151/07, Court (Third Section) (8 December 2009) para.59. 
132 Tyrer v the United Kingdom (Merits) no.5856/72, Court (Chamber) (25 April 1978) para.31. 
 
 
  222 
 
53 ECHR), systemic readings (including the ones supported by the Court itself) 
generally rest on wider views of human rights developments irrespective of state 
consent.’133 
With regards to the interpretation of minority rights, he held: 
‘When looking at such a bourgeoning case law comprehensively, one might argue 
that the broader question is not so much the role of the Court in theoretically 
defining minority groups as the role of the Court in generating practical 
protection for minority groups generally. … They [general human rights treaties] 
create comprehensive frameworks which allow for flexibility and creative 
judging across systems.’134 
As the ESC and ECHR case reviews have shown, there is an existing consent of CoE 
member states regarding the protection of group rights as laid out by the Revised ESC – 
at least of those 34 states which have ratified it.135 Furthermore, this consent has been 
strengthened by the adoption of the FCNM and its 39 member states.136 Turning to the 
interpretation of the ECHR in the light of these other CoE instruments, one might argue 
that the consent reached in related fora cannot be ignored in the ECHR context. 
As I have shown above, provisions of the ESC, FCNM and ECHR and their case law are 
cross-referenced by their supervising bodies. As of April 2018, a search on the ECtHR’s 
database revealed 218 judgments mentioning the ESC and 108 mentioning the FCNM. 
The most significant acknowledgement by the ECtHR of such an ‘integrated mode of 
interpretation’ as Pentassuglia calls it, might be found in the 2008 case Demir and 
Baykara v Turkey mentioned above. The Court focused on the ‘continuous evolution in 
the norms and principles applied in international law or in the domestic law of the 
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majority of member States of the Council of Europe’ and on the indication ‘that there is 
common ground in modern societies.’137 
This statement is in line with the ‘living instrument’ understanding of the ECHR and 
offers support for a broader interpretation of existing ECHR rights. However, as 
previously noted, existing ECHR rights do not cover the specific wrong done by collective 
punishment. Nevertheless, these progressive developments relating to non-
discrimination and groups within the Court’s current remit provide a useful foundation 
for any debate on further rights and freedoms to be included in the ECHR. 
Additional procedural support for the realisation of a prohibition of collective 
punishment under the ECHR comes from the ACHPR. As laid out in the chapter on 
collective punishment and human rights law, the ACHPR contains a section devoted to 
group rights. The question of how the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(ACtHPR) tackles the issue of groups as applicants is relevant in the context of this 
chapter. Apart from the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, involved 
state parties and intergovernmental organisations, individuals and non-governmental 
organisations can submit cases to the Court if the state in question has made a 
declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the Court in this regard.138 
Although the ACHPR enshrines individual and group rights, the jurisdiction does not 
enable individuals and groups to file applications, but individuals and non-governmental 
organisations. This in turn could be relevant for the present endeavour to translate the 
prohibition of collective punishment into human rights law and more specifically, the 
ECHR framework. The ECtHR accepts applications made by non-governmental 
organisations. And the way in which the ACtHPR deals with applications claiming the 
violation of group rights could serve as an illustrative example and could be taken into 
account as part of an ‘integrated mode of interpretation’ by the ECtHR. 
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To highlight the viability of this approach in practice, the Endorois case is significant. As 
this case has been examined in the chapter on collective punishment and human rights 
law, it will not be discussed here in detail. It suffices to state the first lines of the 
judgment:  
‘The complaint is filed by the Centre for Minority Rights Development 
(CEMIRIDE) with the assistance of Minority Rights Group International (MRG) 
and the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE - which submitted an 
amicus curiae brief) on behalf of the Endorois community. The Complainants 
allege violations resulting from the displacement of the Endorois community, an 
indigenous community, from their ancestral lands, the failure to adequately 
compensate them for the loss of their property, the disruption of the 
community's pastoral enterprise and violations of the right to practise their 
religion and culture, as well as the overall process of development of the 
Endorois people.’139  
A similar route was taken in the recent Ogiek case, where the African Commission filed 
the application after receiving a communication from the Centre for Minority Rights 
Development (CEMIRIDE) and Minority Rights Group International (MRG) on behalf of 
the Ogiek community.140 This approach represents a viable option of addressing group 
rights which could be taken up by the ECtHR without any major changes to its 
jurisdiction ratione personae or its procedure.  
Although recourse to interpretive aids from the ESC, FCNM and ACHPR enables a 
broader debate on group rights on the substantive as well as procedural level, an 
‘integrated mode of interpretation’ cannot compensate for a genuine gap in protection 
in the ECHR framework as left by collective punishment. For this reason, the potential 
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form such a new rule could take and previous attempts to widen the scope of the ECHR 
regarding collective rights will be addressed in the following. 
5.2.5.2 New rule 
In the 1990s, the adoption of an additional protocol to the ECHR regarding national 
minorities was discussed.141  However, this stalled, as did a similar initiative in 1961 
calling for the adoption of a minority rights provision. 142  Although the FCNM was 
adopted in the 1990s to remedy the lack of CoE instruments on minority protection, its 
relative weakness when compared with the ECHR led to the resurfacing of the debate on 
a protocol on minorities in 2009.143 However, the Committee of Ministers turned these 
new demands down saying that it ‘does not consider that there is a need for new 
normative work in this field’ and that ‘it does not consider it appropriate to accompany 
the ECHR with additional protocols setting out a range of rights applicable to specific 
groups of people.’144 
Likewise, there was an earlier attempt in 1999 to adopt an additional protocol to the 
ECHR on social rights.145 A working group on social rights had been set up to examine 
the issue, but it was discontinued in 2005 ‘because it did not lead to any specific outcome 
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nor brought up the need to launch a new additional protocol to the European Convention 
on Human Rights’.146   
Regarding the inclusion of collective rights in the ECHR, the opinion from 1999 on the 
report concerning the additional protocol held:  
‘With regard to the possible inclusion of collective rights in the European 
Convention on Human Rights, it should be borne in mind that the Convention 
was intended for individuals, who have to prove that they have been the “victims” 
of a violation of their rights. To include collective rights would be to change the 
nature of the Convention, even though certain individual rights — such as 
freedom of assembly and association — are necessarily exercised collectively. 
Think, for example, of the problems that would be thrown up by introducing a 
right of appeal for national minorities as such.’147 
Apart from failing to name the problems arising from a right of appeal for national 
minorities, the statement contradicts an earlier passage included in the same opinion 
describing a set of criteria for new rights to be considered for inclusion into the ECHR: 
‘[T]he rights must be fundamental ones and generally recognised and … they must be 
capable of sufficiently precise formulation to give rise to legal obligations on the part of 
the state rather than merely setting a general standard.’ 148  This definition does not 
preclude collective rights. Furthermore, the argument that collective rights would not be 
compatible with the ECHR as they lack a “victim” is circular.149 This status would be 
fulfilled as soon as there is a provision in the ECHR granting rights to groups. Being 
subject of those rights, groups would be “victims” of violations of their rights. 
                                                          
146 CM/AS(2008)Rec1795-final Monitoring of commitments as regards social rights – 
Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1795 (2007) (Reply adopted by the Committee of 
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Although the debate on adopting a protocol on national minorities intensified only in the 
1990s, a 1973 report of the Committee of Experts already addressed the issue and held 
that ‘there appears to be no overriding obstacle of a legal character to prevent this from 
being done.’150 This again points to the essentially political reluctance of CoE member 
states and reaffirms that the ECHR framework would, as I have argued, be capable of 
encompassing group rights from a legal perspective. 
The argument for the rejection of an additional protocol on social and economic rights 
largely focused on historical reasons and their stance in the ‘hierarchy of rights’, 
referring to the generations of human rights.151 When looking at human rights in this 
generational context, the punishment of a group for acts allegedly committed by one or 
some of its members, for which they do not bear individual responsibility and with the 
intent to punish this specific group collectively, appears to be firmly rooted in the civil 
and political rights arena due to its content. Social, economic or cultural rights of groups 
and their members are rather facilitated by fundamental safeguards such as a 
prohibition of collective punishment.  
Returning to the criteria for rights to be considered for incorporation into the ECHR, the 
prohibition of collective punishment can be considered a ‘fundamental’ right and given 
its status in the law of armed conflict also as ‘generally recognised’.152 Furthermore, its 
elements are ‘sufficiently precise’ to ‘give rise to legal obligations on the part of the state 
rather than merely setting a general standard.’153 Regarding the question of obligations 
and consequently, compensation for groups whose right to freedom from collective 
punishment has been violated, I suggest a fresh look at the Court’s ‘general measures’. 
According to the Rules of Court, the pilot-judgment procedure allows the ECtHR to adopt 
general measures in case of the ‘existence of a structural or systemic problem or other 
similar dysfunction which has given rise or may give rise to similar applications.’154 Such 
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general measures have led to changes in domestic law, sometimes even on constitutional 
level.155 This is not a call for an automatic pilot-judgment procedure in cases involving 
collective punishment, but rather a suggestion that the Court could make use of general 
measures on a broader scale to provide an effective remedy. General measures appear 
useful in the context of collective punishment as policies in favour of such practices 
might be widespread and therefore would require abstract measures going beyond the 
facts of the case at hand to prevent recurrence. Also, when looking at the rejection of a 
national minorities protocol by the Committee of Ministers in 2013, it is apparent that 
they were criticising the adoption of rights for specific groups of people. However, a 
prohibition of collective punishment would not be limited to national or ethnic 
minorities, as it does not require a discriminatory element. The group affected by 
collective punishment only has to be identifiable. A group is identifiable or sufficiently 
distinct if it is being punished as a whole for an act committed by one of its members. As 
mentioned previously, this rather neutral understanding of the term “group” will often 
overlap in practice with groups based on a shared identity such as in the case studies. 
Although the groups directly affected by collective punishment are the families whose 
houses are destroyed, those acts are often only another piece in the ongoing 
discriminatory treatment they are exposed to as members of a bigger group or 
community, namely the Palestinians or Chechens. Although one could refer to the groups 
protected by the prohibition of discrimination (for instance based on ethnicity, religion 
or sex) to illustrate which groups might be affected by collective punishment in practice, 
this would not represent an exhaustive list nor a limitation to groups based on those 
criteria.  
Setting aside political debates about those issues in the CoM, the Court itself has already 
addressed questions relevant to collective punishment. As shown in the case review in 
the chapter on collective punishment and human rights law, the Court is well aware of 
the concept of collective punishment. It has referred to it in 46 cases so far, some of them 
even in the Chechen context.156 In addition, the cases reviewed in this chapter point out 
two things. Firstly, the Court is able to address cases filed by non-governmental 
organisations understood in a broad sense. Secondly, the Court has started to use Article 
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1995 on Demicoli v Malta (Merits and Just Satisfaction) no.13057/87, Court (Chamber) (27 
August 1991); Lambert Abdelgawad, E. (2008). The execution of judgments of the European 
Court of Human Rights. 2nd edition. Strasbourg, Council of Europe Publishing, pp.28ff. 
156 See chapter on human rights and collective punishment, number of cases as of April 2018. 
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14 ECHR more frequently and called for the consideration of the broader context of cases. 
Together with the cross-references made to the FCNM and the ESC, the Court has 
enriched this broader context with a reading of the social aspects of individual cases, 
which could prove to be fertile ground for a prohibition of collective punishment under 
the ECHR or an additional protocol to it. 
A prohibition of collective punishment under the ECHR could prove useful in cases 
relating to state-sponsored marginalisation of specific groups, in particular when 
legislation targeting specific groups is involved. Examples of such situations could be the 
Chechen house destructions and the law requiring relatives of alleged terrorists to pay 
compensation for damages arising from terrorist acts addressed in the second case study, 
or the 2017 case Bayev and Others v Russia and the so-called ‘gay propaganda law’.157 In 
these instances, groups are punished for acts allegedly committed by one or some of its 
members. The question of evidence could be handled in a way similar to Article 14 ECHR. 
After prima facie evidence of a collective punishment policy had been provided by the 
applicants showing that a sanction was imposed on an identifiable group as such in 
response to one of its members committing a certain act, the respondent state would 
have to show that the respective law or the incident in the present case was ‘neutral’ and 
was not targeting a specific group collectively by proving that the sanctions or other 
measures were imposed based on the individual responsibility of the perpetrators. 
Furthermore, a case on collective punishment could feature a number of applicants. 
Firstly, there would be a non-governmental organisation representing the group and 
claiming the violation of the group’s freedom from collective punishment. Secondly, 
there could be additional individual applicants claiming violations of the rights regularly 
violated in the course of collective punishment such as the right to life, the prohibition 
of torture, right to private and family life or the right to property in conjunction with 
Article 14 ECHR, the prohibition of discrimination. As indicated above, it is expected that 
most of the groups in those cases will overlap with groups based on a shared identity 
such as minorities and general discriminatory practices used against them by state 
authorities, making the judgement of those cases and the delineation of acts involved 
challenging for the Court. However, the claim brought by the non-governmental 
organisation on behalf of the group and the claims brought by individual members of 
                                                          
157 See chapter on the Chechen case study; Bayev and Others v Russia supra note 119. 
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that group would mutually reinforce each other as they provide the substance and 
background to each other’s claims. 
A draft prohibition of collective punishment could be along the following lines:  
“Prohibition of collective punishment.  
The punishment of a group as such for acts committed by one of its members for 
which they bear no individual responsibility is prohibited.”  
The question of allegedly committed acts and the commission of those by more than one 
of the members of the group would be left to the explanatory remarks to the prohibition. 
As seen in the case studies, authorities have often only accused members of an 
identifiable group to have committed a certain act (for example shots coming from the 
direction of a certain village, hiding of insurgents on their premises) without proving 
their allegations. If the “act committed” would be limited to crimes under the relevant 
domestic laws for which a member of the group has been found guilty, the collective 
punishment of groups based on allegations made by the authorities against members of 
the group would fall outside its scope. This represents an unnecessary limitation of the 
prohibition of collective punishment. Therefore, the collective punishment of a group 
based on an act allegedly committed by one of its members should be seen as within the 
remit of the prohibition as long as the act the member is accused of is sufficiently linked 
to the punishment of the group. Otherwise, the imposition of sanctions on a group for 
other reasons such as their shared identity, represents rather discriminatory treatment 
of the group in a broader sense, pointing again at the potential overlap of those issues in 
the context of collective punishment. The phrase “one of its members” does not exclude 
the imposition of collective punishment on a group as such for acts (allegedly) 
committed by one of its members but encompasses the commission of acts by more than 
one member as well. 
The term “group as such” is broad. However, this decision is due to the relatively neutral 
understanding of it as it includes any identifiable group. Whether or not a group is 
identifiable, is shown by the facts of the case. A group is identifiable if it was punished 
collectively for the act of one of its members, which means the group is sufficiently 
distinct to determine who is a member of it and to attribute them to the group. Although 
this definition does not include any additional elements based on discrimination or a 
shared identity, the groups affected by collective punishment in practice are likely to 
overlap with groups or broader communities based on such shared identities. As shown 
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in the case studies, the group directly affected by collective punishment is the family of 
the accused. Yet this family also belongs to a broader group or community which is based 
on a shared identity and subject to discriminatory treatment by the authorities in 
general. The question of defining the broad notion of the identifiable group would be up 
to the Court and decided on a case-by-case basis.  
Summing up, I contend that there is promising ground for a prohibition of collective 
punishment under the ECHR. Previous unsuccessful efforts regarding the incorporation 
of minority rights or social rights into the ECHR framework do not, in my view, inhibit a 
prohibition of collective punishment. A prohibition of collective punishment would 
represent a fundamental, generally recognised and sufficiently precise defined group 
right able to address the group dimension of collective punishment. 
5.2.6 Conclusion 
CoE member states have already agreed in different fora to the protection of collective 
rights by adopting the ESC and FCNM. By way of interpretation, the ECtHR has taken note 
of FCNM reports and case law of the ECSR showing that it is following these 
developments. However, interpretive aids will not suffice to tackle collective 
punishment. After analysing the collective complaints procedure of the ESC and the 
complaints procedure under the ACHPR as well as non-discrimination cases of the ECSR 
and the ECtHR, the establishment of a new rule under the ECHR framework prohibiting 
collective punishment appears viable and necessary. 
In contrast to a broad interpretation of already existing rights, the adoption of a new rule 
requires state involvement and political support. However, the reasons for the rejection 
of an additional protocol on minority rights and on social rights are not present in the 
context of collective punishment in the same manner, as it is understood as a non-
exclusive and fundamental right. A prohibition of collective punishment is not limited to 
one specific group such as national minorities as it applies to any identifiable group and 
is not based on a discriminatory element. Furthermore, the prohibition of collective 
punishment is situated in the civil and political spectrum of human rights. A group’s 
freedom from punishment for acts committed by one or some of its members is a 
fundamental right facilitating and contributing to the enjoyment of other rights such as 
social and economic rights. Finally, the prohibition of collective punishment enjoys 
broad political support under the law of armed conflict and therefore it is unlikely that 
states will openly reject such a prohibition under human rights law, which is necessary 
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due to instances of collective punishment occurring in situations outside the scope of 
armed conflict. 
As Bowring observed, ‘[t]he founding documents of the Council of Europe displayed a 
certain allergy to minority or group rights.’158 He traced this attitude back to the Western 
aversion to communist ideology: ‘[T]he Western European states wished to demonstrate 
that they were as serious about the “first generation” civil and political rights as the USSR 
and its allies undoubtedly were with regard to the “second generation” social and 
economic rights.’159 However, the time when states could have said that collective rights 
would be nothing they would ever agree to is long over. They have agreed to collective 
rights in the ESC, including a collective complaints system and like the ECHR, part of the 
human rights instruments of the Council of Europe. Therefore, collective rights in the 
CoE human rights context are nothing new anymore. 
Combining this state consent with procedural and substantive support gathered from a 
range of sources including the FCNM, ESC, ACHPR and ECHR, a prohibition of collective 
punishment under the ECHR seems possible and as shown by the case study on 
Chechnya, is very much needed. 
                                                          
158 Bowring, B. (2013) supra note 78, p.439. 
159 Bowring, B. (2013) supra note 78, p.440. 
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6 Conclusion 
 
Collective punishment of a group as such for an act allegedly committed by one or some 
its members has traversed from situations of armed conflict to situations governed by 
human rights law. Although collective punishment has been imposed in the colonial and 
post-conflict context before, the adoption of a law in peacetime introducing collective 
punishment without any reference to armed conflict or a state of emergency adds to the 
urgency of addressing collective punishment in times governed by human rights law. In 
order to provide the legal background, the thesis started with an account of the legal 
regulation of collective punishment in the law of armed conflict. Collective punishment 
is prohibited in times of international as well as non-international armed conflict by the 
1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977 Additional Protocols. Although a minority of 
states was reluctant to agree, these rules are widely accepted which is reflected by their 
status as customary international law. Yet the unwillingness of certain states to afford 
guarantees to actors other than states, in particular national liberation movements or 
peoples, indicates a suspicion towards such groups and rights or guarantees for them in 
a broader sense. 
The research question posed at the beginning asked about the relationship between the 
state policies on collective punishment and the legal regulation thereof under the law of 
armed conflict and human rights law and the effects of this relationship on the protection 
and empowerment of affected groups. Was the substantive prohibition of collective 
punishment under the law of armed conflict successful in preventing punitive house 
demolitions in the Occupied Palestinian Territories? If not, why would a prohibition of 
collective punishment under human rights law fare any better? Faced with state practice 
violating the prohibition of collective punishment, one could question the rule’s 
effectiveness and influence on state practice as well as its contribution to the 
empowerment of groups.  
However, the prohibition of collective punishment under the law of armed conflict has 
to be seen in the broader context, as illustrated by the case study on the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories. Although the substantive rule against collective punishment 
alone will not bring about a change in state behaviour and empowerment for affected 
groups, it is an important part in a concerted effort working towards that aim. Together 
with other domestic and international mechanisms based on the law of armed conflict, 
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international criminal law and human rights law, the prohibition of collective 
punishment has the potential to make a difference. The Palestinians have brought a 
number of cases against Israeli authorities regarding punitive house demolitions in the 
Gaza Strip and the West Bank. In this context, the prohibition of collective punishment 
provided the basis for these court cases and denied legality to any legal regulation 
brought in by Israeli authorities to justify collective punishment. In that sense, the 
prohibition of collective punishment under the law of armed conflict contributes to the 
empowerment of Palestinians as it provides them with a tool to actively participate in 
their struggle for justice. 
After laying the foundation for an analysis of collective punishment, the thesis continued 
with a survey of human rights instruments containing any explicit or implicit traces of a 
prohibition of collective punishment. Yet this survey has proved unsuccessful. Although 
the human rights instruments reviewed such as the ICCPR, the ECHR or the ACHPR do 
mention related concepts such as the principle of individual responsibility and group 
rights, they do not address collective punishment as such. The only explicit reference to 
collective punishment was found in a General Comment to the ICCPR regarding the 
declaration of states of emergency. This reference showed how closely entwined 
situations of armed conflict and situations governed by human rights law can become 
and strengthened the call for a consideration of collective punishment under human 
rights law.  
States of emergency highlight the fluid transition between the law of armed conflict and 
human rights law, in particular when it comes to the aftermath of non-international 
armed conflicts. At the moment, human rights instruments can only deal with violations 
of specific individual human rights going hand in hand with collective punishment 
during such periods of transition. In other words, they only address the “symptoms” of 
collective punishment. These can range from violations of the right to life, the prohibition 
of torture, the right to private life or the right to property in conjunction with the 
prohibition of discrimination. However, they do not address the cause, the act of 
collective punishment itself. The ECtHR, which was the focus of attention due to its 
connection to the Chechen case study, has already referred to the term “collective 
punishment” in several cases dealing amongst others with the treatment of prisoners, 
non-refoulement (including a Chechen case), references to international law standards 
including collective punishment and the treatment of Kurds in Turkey. Although it has 
not decided on collective punishment as such so far, due to the lack of a prohibition, these 
 
 
  235 
 
cases show that the Court is familiar with the concept of collective punishment and that 
it has not objected to the use of this term either. 
The impact of the inability of human rights law to address collective punishment can be 
seen in Chechnya today. The two non-international armed conflicts fought with Russia 
since the beginning of the 1990s as well as the local repressive regime loyal to the 
Federal government have facilitated the imposition of collective punishment in a 
number of ways. During the second non-international armed conflict, whole villages 
were subjected to sweeping operations, zachistkas, which were accompanied by 
extrajudicial killings, disappearances, torture, looting and property destruction. These 
operations as well as following measures of collective punishment are directed against 
alleged members of the Chechen insurgent movement, now equated with terrorists by 
the authorities. Today, collective punishment is taking the form of house burnings and 
collective expulsion. 
In addition to these practices of Chechen security forces, Russian-wide legislation calling 
for the responsibility of family members of alleged terrorists to pay for damages arising 
from terrorist attacks has effectively introduced collective punishment. Such laws are 
facilitated by the lack of an explicit prohibition of collective punishment outside armed 
conflict and highlight the importance of addressing collective punishment under human 
rights law. As outlined in the case review, the ECtHR is already familiar with collective 
punishment. It is explicitly familiar with collective punishment in the Chechen context, 
as some of the cases brought before the Court show. However, the Court could again only 
rule on the specific rights violated in the course of collective punishment and not on the 
act itself.  
Although the substantive rule prohibiting collective punishment under the law of armed 
conflict has only a limited capacity to influence state practice on its own, its existence 
contributes to a broader framework aiming to hold the perpetrators to account in 
domestic and international fora. A prohibition of collective punishment under human 
rights law could fulfil a similar purpose and might even go beyond that as human rights 
instruments such as the ECHR could offer redress to groups affected by collective 
punishment. The gap in human rights law concerning collective punishment has so far 
rather facilitated collective punishment policies as seen in the Chechen case study and 
therefore it would be timely for human rights law to fill this gap and challenge state 
practice in favour of collective punishment. 
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After establishing the necessity of addressing collective punishment under human rights 
law, the thesis looked at possible ways to include a prohibition of collective punishment 
under human rights law, in particular under the ECHR. First, the theoretical approaches 
of the law of armed conflict and human rights law were compared. The collective 
character of the law of armed conflict stands in stark contrast to human rights law’s focus 
on the individual. However, human rights law is able to encompass group rights from a 
theoretical perspective by conceiving of individuals as ‘social beings’.1 This means that 
the ‘individual human being and his group or community are ontologically 
interdependent’. 2  Taking on Newman’s theory of collective rights, groups can be 
rightholders or right-bearing entities whose rights are derived from collective interests 
that are irreducible to the individual members of the group. 
Following this theoretical account of the viability of collective human rights or human 
rights held by groups, the last chapter of the thesis examined potential solutions to close 
this gap in human rights law. This gap does not only represent a gap in protection, but it 
leaves affected groups without tools to confront the perpetrators of collective 
punishment. Focussing again on the ECHR, other human rights instruments of the 
Council of Europe were reviewed for potential interpretative aid and ways for 
addressing group claims. The ESC proved to be particularly insightful in this regard. 
Although the ESC’s social rights do not address collective punishment in its substantive 
aspects, these rights can be claimed only by groups via a collective complaints 
mechanism. This mechanism and the ECSR’s handling of such cases showed that there 
are no technical or procedural impediments to adjudicating group rights. Furthermore, 
the ECHR itself could accommodate claims brought by groups if they are represented by 
non-governmental organisations in a way similar to the ESC’s collective complaints 
procedure. 
Although the procedural framework for group rights under the ECHR can be mapped out, 
the question whether a substantive prohibition of collective punishment under the ECHR 
is possible remains. Several attempts at the adoption of a protocol to the ECHR regarding 
national minority rights and social and economic rights have failed in the past. However, 
the question of including national minority rights or social and economic rights in the 
                                                          
1 Felice, W.F. (1996). Taking Suffering Seriously: The Importance of Collective Human Rights. New 
York, State University of New York Press, p.19. 
2 Segesvary, V. (1995). Group rights: The definition of group rights in the contemporary legal 
debate based on socio-cultural analysis, International Journal on Group Rights, 3, pp.89-107, 
p.93. 
 
 
  237 
 
ECHR framework is not the same as the question of including a prohibition of collective 
punishment. While the main reason for rejecting national minority rights was their 
limitation in scope, the main reason for rejecting social and economic rights was their 
status as “second generation rights” in contrast to the “first generation rights” covered 
by the ECHR. Yet a prohibition of collective punishment would not face these two 
criticisms. Firstly, the prohibition of collective punishment is not limited to a specific 
group but based on the broad notion of an identifiable group without a discriminatory 
element. Secondly, the prohibition of collective punishment is a fundamental right that 
is generally recognised, at least in the context of the law of armed conflict, and 
sufficiently precise in its formulation to create legal obligations. This means, that the 
prohibition of collective punishment would fulfil the criteria for inclusion in the ECHR 
framework. 
Acknowledging the fact that the adoption of a new rule, the inclusion of the prohibition 
of collective punishment in the ECHR framework, requires state support, a look back at 
the analysis of collective punishment under the law of armed conflict reaffirmed the 
customary law character of said prohibition. Although this support is present in a 
different forum, the law of armed conflict, it is unlikely that states would openly object 
to a prohibition of collective punishment under human rights law on its substantive 
grounds. Similarly, any remaining suspicions towards rights held by groups have to 
stand against the facts on the ground. CoE member states have already agreed to 
collective rights by adopting the ESC and FCNM and although the theoretical debate 
might well continue, this is a powerful sign towards a general acceptance of rights held 
by collectivities among CoE member states. This consent should not be ignored and can 
help facilitate a prohibition of collective punishment under the ECHR.  
As the case study on Chechnya has shown, this endeavour is not solely theoretical in 
nature. It is a call for action, a challenge to the ECHR to contribute to the empowerment 
of groups affected by collective punishment, to enable them to actively participate in 
their struggle for justice. This is not just about the destruction of houses, this is about the 
treatment of groups and about the chance to give them rights that go beyond lump-sum 
payments for rebuilding their homes, but enable them to seek justice and reinforce trust 
in human rights instruments which recognise them not as objects of protection, but as 
active rightholders building their own future. 
While this thesis is only the starting point for further discussion and future research on 
the question of a prohibition of collective punishment under human rights law and the 
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ECHR in particular; and for a reconsideration of group rights in human rights law in 
general, it is hoped that it has offered enough reasons to continue this debate and to 
work towards the empowerment of groups affected by collective punishment. 
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